Kungmin yulli t'ŭkkang -- Ch'oe Che-u non -- Silla munhwa wa p'ungnyu chŏngsin.

1. Pŏmbu ŭi p'ungnyu chŏngsin ch'ŏnmyŏng kwa "Hwarang oesa" kusang : kungmin todŏk seugi wa kwallyŏn hayŏ -- 2. Nae ka ponŭn Pŏmbu wa Pak Chŏng-hŭi ŭi sasŭng kwan'gye : Pak Chŏng-hŭi chipkwŏn ch'ogi ŭi chŏngch'i kihoek kwa kwallyŏn hayŏ -- 3. Han t'ojong sasangga ŭi sam kwa saenggak : iyagi ka innŭn Pŏmbu kim chŏngsŏl yŏnbo -- 4. Samin chŏngdam : chŏngch'i, kyŏngje, munhwa e kŏlch'yŏ -- 5. Yŏhaenggi : kurŭm ttara mul ttara ch'ŏlli rŭl kada.

This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind...

In the ultimate meeting of the sublime with the ridiculous" (London Evening Standard) My Beautiful Despair blends the existential philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard with the superficial musings of Kim Kardashian West, based on the popular Twitter feed @KimKierkegaard. The love child of Søren Kierkegaard and Kim Kardashian, the @KimKierkegaard Twitter account has been admired, praised, and adored in The New Yorker, The Washington Post, The New York Times, Financial Times, The Economist, New York, Buzzfeed, and more, and has amassed nearly (...) a quarter of a million Twitter followers, including J.K. Rowling and Anna Kendrick. A mash-up of Kim's tweets and observations with Kierkegaard's philosophy, Kim Kierkegaardashian shares their musings on fashion, beauty, brunch, and the relentless waves of existential dread that wash over us day after day. Now in a humorous, illustrated gift book, perfectly suited for our existential times, Kierkegaardashian's philosophical insights are juxtaposed for the first time with Dash Shaw's brilliant black-and-white illustrations. A sample of the revelations included in My Beautiful Despair include: - I have majorly fallen off my workout-eating plan! AND it's summer. But to despair over sin is to sink deeper into it. - Obsessed with protecting your skin, lips, hair & face from the sun? Close the cover of the coffin tight, really tight, and be at peace. - I like my men like I like my coffee: a momentary comfort in the midst of all my suffering. - What is the operation by which a self relates itself to its own self, transparently? Selfie. - What if everything in life were a misunderstanding, what if laughter were really tears? Scared LOL!! - Glamour, menswear, top hat. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a novel account of entrapment. This account suggests that the wrongness of pursuing punishment in cases of entrapment consists of two distinct components, one concerning the culpability of the entrapped defendant and the other concerning the legitimacy of the entrapping state to prosecute crimes that it has effectively created. Distinguishing these two components of entrapment, I explain, helps to clarify the moral issues at stake and to resolve some confusions and debates in existing legal analyses (...) of entrapment. (shrink)

Infallibilism leads to skepticism, and fallibilism is plagued by the threshold problem. Within this narrative, the pragmatic turn in epistemology has been marketed as a way for fallibilists to address the threshold problem. In contrast, pragmatic versions of infallibilism have been left unexplored. However, I propose that going pragmatic offers the infallibilist a way to address its main problem, the skeptical problem. Pragmatic infallibilism, however, is committed to a shifty view of epistemic certainty, where the strength of a subject’s epistemic (...) state can vary depending upon the practical context. Pragmatic views of epistemic strength are quite radical so the argumentative goal of my discussion is to argue for its plausibility, thereby arguing for the plausibility of pragmatic infallibilism. To do so, I discuss the role that the framing of decision problems and the construction of our deliberative attitudes have in our theories of rational choice. And I explore a way in which these necessary components of a normative theory of rationality can be used to motivate pragmatic views of evidential support. Finally, since the plausibility of our pragmatic account will depend upon the plausibility of a constructive account of rational choice, I conclude by comparing the adequacy of the constructive account with orthodox Bayesian and knowledge-based accounts. (shrink)

Although informed consent is important in clinical research, questions persist regarding when it is necessary, what it requires, and how it should be obtained. The standard view in research ethics is that the function of informed consent is to respect individual autonomy. However, consent processes are multidimensional and serve other ethical functions as well. These functions deserve particular attention when barriers to consent exist. We argue that consent serves seven ethically important and conceptually distinct functions. The first four functions pertain (...) principally to individual participants: (1) providing transparency; (2) allowing control and authorization; (3) promoting concordance with participants' values; and (4) protecting and promoting welfare interests. Three other functions are systemic or policy focused: (5) promoting trust; (6) satisfying regulatory requirements; and (7) promoting integrity in research. Reframing consent around these functions can guide approaches to consent that are context sensitive and that maximize achievable goals. (shrink)

Direction of fit theories usually claim that beliefs are such that they “aim at truth” or “ought to fit” the world and desires are such that they “aim at realization” or the world “ought to fit” them. This essay argues that no theory of direction of fit is correct. The two directions of fit are supposed to be determinations of one and the same determinable two-place relation, differing only in the ordering of favored terms. But there is no such determinable (...) because of ineliminable asymmetries between the way that beliefs “aim at truth” and the way that desires “aim at realization.” This essay traces the ills of direction of fit theory to a misunderstanding of Anscombe and proposes a cure that distinguishes theoretical and practical thought by appeal to a distinction between thought in the form of a state and thought in the form of an event. (shrink)

Philosophers ask just whose expression, if anyone’s, we hear in lyric poetry. Walton provides a novel possibility: it’s the reader who “uses” the poem (just as a speech giver uses a speech) who makes the language expressive. But worries arise once we consider poems in particular social or political settings, those which require a strong self-other distinction, or those with expressions that should not be disassociated from the subjects whose experience they draw from. One way to meet this challenge is (...) to consider the poem expressive of a plural subject, which frees us from looking for a particular individual whose voice we hear in the work, whether she be fictional or actual. Some lyrics give voice to a group whose experience is attended to in the work. This may be done through a posited fictional speaker, but the ontology of the speaker is shown to be less important. Attending to a group whose concerns are voiced allows us to explain how poems can manage to address our-worldly concerns even when lacking actual persons whose expressions we encounter in the poems. (shrink)

Das weit uber die Zeit seiner Abfassung und uber die Grenzen seines Entstehungslandes hinaus unter dem Namen "Qabusname" bekannte, literarisch wie kulturgeschichtlich bedeutsame Werk heisst wortlich "Buch der Ratschlage," persisch "nasihat-name." Sein Verfasser Kej Kawus wurde um 1021/22 n.Chr. geboren und genoss die fur die persischen Furstensohne seit Jahrhunderten vorgeschriebene Erziehung, bei der eine Synthese von ritterlichen und geistigen, vornehmlich religiosen Tugenden angestrebt wurde. Es handelt sich um eines der interessantesten und eigenartigsten Erzeugnisse der mittelalterlichen iranischen Literatur. Mit Recht werden (...) der intime Ton des Werks und die reizvolle Schlichtheit der hubschen Anekdoten sowie die auf Schmuck verzichtende Einfachheit der Erzahlkunst geruhmt. Die vorliegende Ubersetzung des "Qabusname" ist die erste in deutscher Sprache, die nach dem persischen Original vorgenommen wurde. Die einzige fruhere deutsche Ubersetzung des Orientalisten H. F. von Diez erfolgte aus dem Turkischen und wurde 1811 veroffentlicht. Schon Goethe beschaftigte sich bei seiner Begegnung mit dem klassischen Schrifttum der Perser unter der Fuhrung H. F. von Diez eindringlich mit dem Qabusname. Der Beziehung des Dichters zu diesem so bedeutsamen Stuck der persischen Literatur ist daher ein besonderes Kapitel gewidmet. (shrink)

Change is inevitable, and increasingly rapid and continuous in healthcare as organizations strive to adapt, improve and innovate. Organizational change challenges healthcare providers because it restructures how and when patient care delivery is provided, changing ways in which nurses must carry out their work. The aim of this doctoral study was to explore frontline nurses’ experiences of living with rapid and continuous organizational change. A critical hermeneutic approach was utilized. Participants described feeling voiceless, powerless and apolitical amidst rapid and continuous (...) organizational changes which fuelled apathy, cynicism and disengagement from the organization. However, critical analysis of the data showed that nurses actively engaged with power, voice and politics through resistant and transgressive behaviours in micro‐ethical moments of practice. There is a need to reconceptualize the concepts of voice, power and politics in nursing as there is dissonance between nurses’ beliefs about these concepts and what they are enacting in practice. Recognizing their enactment of power, voice and political agency at the micro‐level may empower nurses. Empowerment would mitigate the high levels of reports of powerlessness experienced in practice during organizational changes. (shrink)

Philip Kitcher’s The Ethical Project trios to vindicates ethics through an analysis of its evolutionary and cultural history, a history which in turn, he thinks, supports a particular conception of the role of moral thinking and normative practices in human social life. As Kitcher sees it, that role could hardly be more central: most of what makes human life human, and preferable to the fraught and impoverished societies of the great apes, depends on moral cognition. Prom this view of the (...) role of the ethical project as a social technology, Kitcher derives an account of moral progress and even moral truth: a normative analogue of the idea that truth is the convergence of rational enquiry. To Kitcher’s history, I present an anti-history. Most of what is good about human social life depends on the expansion of our social emotions, not on our capacities to articulate and internalise explicit norms. Indeed, since the Holocene and the origins of complex society, normative thought and normative institutions have been more prominent as tools of exploitation and oppression than as mechanisms of a social peace that balances individual desire with collective co-operation. I argue that the vindication project fails in its own terms: even given Kitcher’s distinctive pragmatic concept of vindication, history debunks rather than vindicates moral cognition. (shrink)

1. 하나가 여럿에게 가는 길 - 2008년 11월 동아시아 경제공동체포럼 기조강연, 인천 드림시티에서 2. 물 - 마음과 돈과 물의 시대에 부쳐 3. 님 - 획기적 재분배의 이원집정제에 관하여 4. 도깨비 - ‘신의 우물’ 근처에서 춤추는 가난한 도깨비 이야기 5. 혁신 - 중국의 혁신은 ‘법혜월’과 같은 화엄개벽의 여성!

필자는 본 논문에서 귀납의 문제와 관련하여 흄이 『인성론』 1권에서 이성을 통하여서는 이를 정당화 할 수 없다고 주장한 것으로 해석하는 기존의 회의주의적 해석을 비판적으로 검토한다. 필자의 견해에 따르면, 흄이 『인성론』 1권에서 비판의 대상으로 삼고 있는 것은 인과 추론의 정당성 문제 그 자체가 아니라, 무비판적으로 받아들여져 온 무오류적 이성 개념이다. 흄은 이 무오류적 이성 개념을 부정하고, 이성을 넓은 의미에서의 상상력 아래로 포섭 시킨 후, 그 안에서 무작위로 작동하는 좁은 의미에서의 상상력과 개연성의 논리에 따라 작동하는 이성을 구분함으로써, 인과 추론을 정당화하는 새로운 길을 열고 (...) 있다. 따라서, 흄은 『인성론』 1권에서 인과 추론의 정당성을 부정하고 더 나아가 총체적 회의주의로 빠져드는 것이 아니라, 이성 개념을 새롭게 정립함으로써 오히려 총체적 회의 주의로 빠지지 않고 새로운 방식으로 인과 추론의 정당성을 확보하는 시도를 하고 있는 것이다. 이와 같은 필자의 해석은 『인성론』 1권과 『인성론』 2권, 3권을 단절적으로 해석하지 않고, 오히려 『인성론』 1권에서의 논의가 『인성론』 2권과 3권의 초석이 되어줌을 잘 드러내 보여준다. 다시 말해, 흄이 『인성론』 1권에서 주장하는 바, “우리의 감각들을 넘어서서 추적될 수 있고, 우리가 볼 수 없고 느낄 수 없는 존재들과 대상들을 우리들에게 알려주는 유일한 것은 인과이다”라고 하는 흄의 언명이 『인성론』 2권과 3권에서의 대상 세계에 대한 논의의 출발점이 되어주는 것이다. -/- This paper argues against the common interpretation that, in Book I of the Treatise, Hume attempts to show that inductive arguments concerning matters of fact cannot be justified by reason. It is true that he argues that inductive arguments cannot be justified by the traditional concept of infallible reason. However, it is important to note that contra to the traditional understanding of reason as infallible, he takes it to be open to errors by classifying it under the category of imagination in a broad sense. He then makes a distinction between reason as “the general and more establish’d properties of the imagination” and imagination as a narrow sense. From this, the paper concludes he attempts to justify inductive arguments concerning matters of fact by redefining reason as open to errors. That is, although inductive arguments cannot be justified by probable reasoning in terms of the traditional concept of infallible reason, the former can be justified by the logic of probability, which he calls “general rules” in terms of Hume’s concept of error-prone reason. (shrink)

Ch'aek mŏri e -- 1. Ch'oe Han-gi ŭi sam kwa kŭ ŭi sidae -- 2. Silchŭng kwa siryong ŭi sirhakchŏk hangmun'gwan -- 3. Chujahak pip'an kwa Kihak ŭi hyŏngsŏng -- 4. Sŏyang kwahak kisul ŭi suyong kwa Kihakchŏk pyŏnyong -- 5. Insingnon ŭi chŏnhwan kwa kaekkwan insik ŭi pangbŏmnon -- 6. T'al Chujahakchŏk sayu ŭi chŏn'gae wa segye p'yŏnghwaron -- Kyŏllon : Chosŏn hugi Sirhak kwa Ch'oe Han-gi ŭi ch'ŏrhak.

Che 1-p'yŏn. Ch'ŏndo wa inbŏp (inbŏpch'ŏn) -- 1. Kodae Chungguk ŭi inbŏpch'ŏn ch'ŏrhak sasang -- 2. Sŏnjin sidae ch'ŏnmyŏnggwan ŭi chŏn'gae -- 3. Sŏnjin sidae chŏnt'ong chaeigwan -- 4. Kunju wa minbon : Sŏnjin sidae kunju, minbollon kwa chŏhang, hyŏngmyŏng sasang -- 5. Ch'ŏndo ŭi naeyong kwa inbŏp ŭi panyŏng - Che 2-p'yŏn. Hangsang kwa pyŏnhwa -- 1. To ŭi hangsangsŏng kwa pyŏnhwasŏng -- 2. Pŏp ŭi hangsangsŏng kwa pyŏnhwasŏng -- 3. Pŏpchesasang hangsang kwa pyŏnhwa -- 4. Ch'im Ka-bon kwa (...) Yang Kye-ch'o ŭi pyŏnbŏmnon pigyo -- Che 3-p'yŏn. P'yŏnghwa ŭi pŏp kwa yebang pŏphak : punjaeng ŭi p'yŏnghwa haegyŏl kwa yebang. (shrink)

1. Yŏhaeng e nasŏgi kkaji -- 2. Ch'ŏng cheguk ŭi sudo esŏ -- 3. Hangju se sŏnbi waŭi kyoyu -- 4. Chonmyŏng ŭisik kwa ujŏngnon -- 5. Sasangjŏk pyŏnhwa.

The question of justice -- Foundational matters -- Plato: a moral universe -- Aristotle: the virtuous life -- The inquiry into justice -- The moral inquiry -- Values -- The nature of the polity -- Debates of justice -- The nature of justice -- Individual rights and responsibilities -- International relations -- Future lives.