Results for 'Qualia'

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Quining Qualia.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Oxford University Press.
    " Qualia " is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give examples than to give a definition of the term. Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you--the particular, personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   258 citations  
  2. Qualia Ain't in the Head.Alex Byrne & Michael Tye - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):241-255.
    Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head. 1 Intentionalism comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects have the same qualia. 2.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  3. Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
  4. Reduction, Qualia and the Direct Introspection of Brain States.Paul M. Churchland - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (January):8-28.
  5. Mad Qualia.Umut Baysan - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):467-485.
    This paper revisits some classic thought experiments in which experiences are detached from their characteristic causal roles, and explores what these thought experiments tell us about qualia epiphenomenalism, i.e., the view that qualia are epiphenomenal properties. It argues that qualia epiphenomenalism is true just in case it is possible for experiences of the same type to have entirely different causal powers. This is done with the help of new conceptual tools regarding the concept of an epiphenomenal property. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6. Artificial Qualia, Intentional Systems and Machine Consciousness.Robert James M. Boyles - 2012 - In Proceedings of the DLSU Congress 2012. pp. 110a–110c.
    In the field of machine consciousness, it has been argued that in order to build human-like conscious machines, we must first have a computational model of qualia. To this end, some have proposed a framework that supports qualia in machines by implementing a model with three computational areas (i.e., the subconceptual, conceptual, and linguistic areas). These abstract mechanisms purportedly enable the assessment of artificial qualia. However, several critics of the machine consciousness project dispute this possibility. For instance, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  7. Transparency, Qualia Realism and Representationalism.Michael Tye - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):39-57.
    In this essay, I want to take another look at the phenomenon of transparency and its relevance to qualia realism and representationalism. I don’t suppose that what I have to say will cause those who disagree with me to change their minds, but I hope not only to clarify my position and that of others who are on my side of the debate but also to respond to various criticisms and objections that have arisen over the last 10–15 years (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  8. Qualia and Consciousness.Sydney Shoemaker - 1991 - Mind 100 (399):507-24.
  9. Qualia and Analytical Conditionals.David Braddon-Mitchell - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):111-135.
  10. Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia.David J. Chalmers - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 309--328.
    It is widely accepted that conscious experience has a physical basis. That is, the properties of experience (phenomenal properties, or qualia) systematically depend on physical properties according to some lawful relation. There are two key questions about this relation. The first concerns the strength of the laws: are they logically or metaphysically necessary, so that consciousness is nothing "over and above" the underlying physical process, or are they merely contingent laws like the law of gravity? This question about the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  11. Qualia and the Senses.Peter W. Ross - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):495-511.
    How should we characterize the nature of perceptual experience? Some theorists claim that colour experiences, to take an example of perceptual experiences, have both intentional properties and properties called 'colour qualia', namely, mental qualitative properties which are what it is like to be conscious of colour. Since proponents of colour qualia hold that these mental properties cannot be explained in terms of causal relations, this position is in opposition to a functionalist characterization of colour experience.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  12. Qualia and Introspection.Michael Beaton - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (5):88-110.
    The claim that behaviourally undetectable inverted spectra are possible has been endorsed by many physicalists. I explain why this starting point rules out standard forms of scientific explanation for qualia. The modern ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ is an updated way of defending problematic intuitions like these, but I show that it cannot help to recover standard scientific explanation. I argue that Chalmers is right: we should accept the falsity of physicalism if we accept this problematic starting point. I further argue (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  13. Qualia, Space, and Control.Pete Mandik - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):47-60.
    According to representionalists, qualia-the introspectible properties of sensory experience-are exhausted by the representational contents of experience. Representationalists typically advocate an informational psychosemantics whereby a brain state represents one of its causal antecedents in evolutionarily determined optimal circumstances. I argue that such a psychosemantics may not apply to certain aspects of our experience, namely, our experience of space in vision, hearing, and touch. I offer that these cases can be handled by supplementing informational psychosemantics with a procedural psychosemantics whereby a (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  14. Qualia.Ned Block - 2004 - In Richard L. Gregory (ed.), Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford University Press.
    Qualia include the ways things look, sound and smell, the way it feels to have a pain; more generally, what it's like to have mental states. Qualia are experiential properties of sensations, feelings, perceptions and, in my view, thoughts and desires as well. But, so defined, who could deny that qualia exist? Yet, the existence of qualia is controversial. Here is what is controversial: whether qualia, so defined, can be characterized in intentional, functional or purely (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  15. Functionalism, Qualia and Intentionality.Paul M. Churchland & Patricia Smith Churchland - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (1):121-145.
  16. I: The Knowledge Argument for Qualia.Epiphenomenal Qualia - 2006 - In Maureen Eckert (ed.), Theories of Mind: An Introductory Reader. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 102.
  17. Inverted Qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Qualia inversion thought experiments are ubiquitous in contemporary philosophy of mind. The most popular kind is one or another variant of Locke's hypothetical case of.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  18. Qualia and Intentional Content: Reply to Block.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. pp. 405--415.
  19. Visual Qualia and Visual Content.Michael Tye - 1992 - In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press. pp. 158--176.
  20. Bayesing Qualia: Consciousness as Inference, Not Raw Datum.A. Clark, K. Friston & S. Wilkinson - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):19-33.
    The meta-problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 2018) is the problem of explaining the behaviours and verbal reports that we associate with the so-called 'hard problem of consciousness'. These may include reports of puzzlement, of the attractiveness of dualism, of explanatory gaps, and the like. We present and defend a solution to the meta-problem. Our solution takes as its starting point the emerging picture of the brain as a hierarchical inference engine. We show why such a device, operating under familiar forms of (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  21.  92
    Qualia.Michael Tye - 1997 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  22. Qualia, Properties, Modality.Brian Loar - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):113-129.
  23. Absent Qualia Are Impossible -- A Reply to Block.Sydney Shoemaker - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (October):581-99.
  24. Comparing Qualia Across Persons.Robert Stalnaker - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):385-406.
    Sydney Shoemaker has reconciled a broadly functionalist and materialist conception of the mind with what he calls “the common-sense view‘ of the inverted spectrum. This paper explores Shoemaker’s articulation and defence of the common sense view, and the conception of the content of qualitative experience the lies behind it. It examines the Frege-Schlick view, and a counterargument that Shoemaker uses to raise a prima facie problem for the view he is defending. It is argued that when Shoemaker’s account of (...) is developed in response to the paradox, it loses its intuitive appeal and its claim on the label “common-sense view‘. (shrink)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  25. Visual Qualia and Visual Content Revisited.Michael Tye - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.
    Experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is _like_ for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philoso- phers often use the term 'qualia' to refer to the introspectively accessible properties of (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  26. Qualia and Vagueness.Anthony Everett - 1996 - Synthese 106 (2):205-226.
    In this paper I present two arguments against the thesis that we experience qualia. I argue that if we experienced qualia then these qualia would have to be essentially vague entities. And I then offer two arguments, one a reworking of Gareth Evans' argument against the possibility of vague objects, the other a reworking of the Sorites argument, to show that no such essentially vague entities can exist. I consider various objections but argue that ultimately they all (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  27. Musical Qualia, Context, Time and Emotion.J. Goguen - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (3-4):117-147.
    Nearly all listeners consider the subjective aspects of music, such as its emotional tone, to have primary importance. But contemporary philosophers often downplay, ignore, or even deny such aspects of experience. Moreover, traditional philosophies of music try to decontextualize it. Using music as an example, this paper explores the structure of qualitative experience, demonstrating that it is multi-layer emergent, non-compositional, enacted, and situation dependent, among other non-Cartesian properties. Our explanations draw on recent work in cognitive science, including blending, image schemas, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  28. Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap.Joseph Levine - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.
  29. Hidden Qualia.Derek Shiller - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):165-180.
    In this paper, I propose that those who reject higher-order theories of consciousness should not rule out the possibility of having conscious experiences that they cannot introspect. I begin by offering four arguments that such non-introspectible conscious experiences are possible. Next, I offer two arguments for thinking that we actually have such experiences. According to the first argument, it is unlikely that evolution would have furnished us with a faculty of introspection that worked flawlessly. According to the second argument, there (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. Qualia Qua Qualitons: Mental Qualities as Abstract Particulars.Hilan Bensusan & Eros Moreira De Carvalho - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (2):155-163.
    In this paper we advocate the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. The main advantage of the thesis is that we can accept both the Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian assault on the given and the claim that only subjective and private states can do justice to the qualitative character of experience. We hint that if we take qualia to be tropes, we dissolve the problem of inverted qualia. We develop an account of sensory (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31. Qualia: They’Re Not What They Seem.John Gibbons - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):397-428.
    Whether or not qualia are ways things seem, the view that qualia have the properties typically attributed to them is unjustified. Ways things seem do not have many of the properties commonly attributed to them. For example, inverted ways things seem are impossible. If ways things seem do not have the features commonly attributed to them, and qualia do have those same features, this looks like good reason to distinguish the two. But if your reasons for believing (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  32. Qualia: The Knowledge Argument.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2002 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  33. Knowing Qualia: A Reply to Jackson.Paul M. Churchland - 1989 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), A Neurocomputational Perspective. MIT Press. pp. 163--178.
  34. Wittgenstein and Qualia.Ned Block - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.
    endorsed one kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis and rejected another. This paper argues that the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis that Wittgenstein endorsed is the thin end of the wedge that precludes a Wittgensteinian critique of the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis he rejected. The danger of the dangerous kind is that it provides an argument for qualia, where qualia are contents of experiential states which cannot be fully captured in natural language. I will pinpoint the difference between (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  35.  50
    Are Qualia a Pain in the Neck for Functionalists?George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens - 1985 - American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1):73-80.
  36. Qualia That It is Right to Quine.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):357-377.
    Dennett provides a much discussed argument for the nonexistence of qualia, as conceived by philosophers like Block, Chalmers, Loar and Searle. My goal in this paper is to vindicate Dennett's argument, construed in a certain way. The argument supports the claim that qualia are constitutively representational. Against Block and Chalmers, the argument rejects the detachment of phenomenal from information-processing consciousness; and against Loar and Searle, it defends the claim that qualia are constitutively representational in an externalist understanding (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  37. Pain, Qualia, and the Explanatory Gap.Donald F. Gustafson - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):371-387.
    This paper investigates the status of the purported explanatory gap between pain phenomena and natural science, when the “gap” is thought to exist due to the special properties of experience designated by “ qualia ” or “the pain quale” in the case of pain experiences. The paper questions the existence of such a property in the case of pain by: looking at the history of the conception of pain; raising questions from empirical research and theory in the psychology of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  38. Explaining Temporal Qualia.Matt Farr - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-24.
    Experiences of motion and change are widely taken to have a ‘flow-like’ quality. Call this ‘temporal qualia’. Temporal qualia are commonly thought to be central to the question of whether time objectively passes: (1) passage realists take temporal passage to be necessary in order for us to have the temporal qualia we do; (2) passage antirealists typically concede that time appears to pass, as though our temporal qualia falsely represent time as passing. I reject both claims (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  39. Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem.Michael Tye - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168.
    At the very heart of the mind-body problem is the question of the nature of consciousness. It is consciousness, and in particular _phenomenal_ consciousness, that makes the mind-body relation so deeply perplexing. Many philosophers hold that no defi nition of phenomenal consciousness is possible: any such putative defi nition would automatically use the concept of phenomenal consciousness and thus render the defi nition circular. The usual view is that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is one that must be explained by (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  40. Qualia and Materialism: Closing the Explanatory Gap.Clyde L. Hardin - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (December):281-98.
  41.  95
    Qualifying Qualia Through the Skyhook Test.Tere Vadén - 2001 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):149-169.
    If we are to preserve qualia, one possibility is to take the current academic, philosophical, and theoretical notion less seriously and current natural science and some pre-theoretical intuitions about qualia more seriously. Dennett (1997) is instrumental in showing how ideas of the intrinsicalness and privacy of qualia are misguided and those of ineffability and immediacy misinterpreted. However, by combining ideas of non-mechanicalness used in contemporary natural science with the pre-theoretical idea that qualia are special because they (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  42. Three Laws of Qualia: What Neurology Tells Us About the Biological Functions of Consciousness.Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & William Hirstein - 1997 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (5-6):429-457.
    Neurological syndromes in which consciousness seems to malfunction, such as temporal lobe epilepsy, visual scotomas, Charles Bonnet syndrome, and synesthesia offer valuable clues about the normal functions of consciousness and ‘qualia’. An investigation into these syndromes reveals, we argue, that qualia are different from other brain states in that they possess three functional characteristics, which we state in the form of ‘three laws of qualia’. First, they are irrevocable: I cannot simply decide to start seeing the sunset (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  43.  81
    Why Qualia Are Not Epiphenomenal.Hans Muller - 2008 - Ratio 21 (1):85–90.
    In this article, I give an original objection to Frank Jackson's argument for the conclusion that the subjective, felt properties of experience are causally inert. I show that the very act of asserting the existence of these properties undermines the claim that they are epiphenomenal. If this objection goes through, it is fatal to the argument in question.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  44.  65
    Absent Qualia and Categorical Properties.Brendan O’Sullivan - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (3):353-371.
    Qualia have proved difficult to integrate into a broadly physicalistic worldview. In this paper, I argue that despite popular wisdom in the philosophy of mind, qualia’s intrinsicality is not sufficient for their non-reducibility. Second, I diagnose why philosophers mistakenly focused on intrinsicality. I then proceed to argue that qualia are categorical and end with some reflections on how the conceptual territory looks when we keep our focus on categoricity.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  45. Qualia! (Now Showing at a Theater Near You).Eric Lormand - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):127-156.
    Despite such widespread acclaim, there are some influential theater critics who have panned Qualia!
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  46. Supervenient Qualia.Terence Horgan - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (October):491-520.
  47. Functionalism and Qualia.Sydney Shoemaker - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315.
  48.  55
    Qualia Space.Richard P. Stanley - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (1):49-60.
    We define qualia space Q to be the space of all possible conscious experience. For simplicity we restrict ourselves to perceptual experience only, though other kinds of experience could also be considered. Qualia space is a highly idealized concept that unifies the perceptual experience of all possible brains. We argue that Q is a closed pointed cone in an infinite-dimensional separable real topological vector space. This quite technical structure can be explained for the most part in a simple, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  49. Qualia and the Psychophysiological Explanation of Color Perception.Austen Clark - 1985 - Synthese 65 (3):377-405.
    Can psychology explain the qualitative content of experience? A persistent philosophical objection to that discipline is that it cannot. Qualitative states or 'qualia' are argued to have characteristics which cannot be explained in terms of their relationships to other psychological states, stimuli, and behavior. Since psychology is confined to descriptions of such relationships, it seems that psychology cannot explain qualia. A paradigm case of qualia is provided by simultaneous color contrast effects, in which a neutral grey patch (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  50. Qualia, Content, and the Inverted Spectrum.Michael Tye - 1993 - Noûs 27 (2):159-183.
1 — 50 / 1000