8 found
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  1.  57
    Self-deception as omission.Quinn Hiroshi Gibson - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (5):657-678.
    In this paper I argue against three leading accounts of self-deception in the philosophical literature and propose a heretofore overlooked route to self-deception. The central problem with extant accounts of self-deception is that they are unable to balance two crucial desiderata: (1) to make the dynamics of self-deception (e.g., the formation of self-deceptive beliefs) psychologically plausible and (2) to capture self-deception as an intentional phenomenon for which the self-deceiver is responsible. I argue that the three leading views all fail on (...)
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  2.  40
    Rawlsian Contractualism and Healthcare Allocation: A response to Torbjörn Tännsjö.Quinn Hiroshi Gibson - 2021 - Diametros 18 (68):9-23.
    The consideration of the problem of healthcare allocation as a special case of distributive justice is especially alluring when we only consider consequentialist theories. I articulate here an alternative Rawlsian non-consequentialist theory which prioritizes the fairness of healthcare allocation procedures rather than directly setting distributive parameters. The theory in question stems from Rawlsian commitments that, it is argued, have a better Rawlsian pedigree than those considered as such by Tännsjö. The alternative framework is worthy of consideration on its own merits, (...)
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  3.  31
    Interventionism and Intelligibility: Why Depression is not (Always) a Brain Disease.Quinn Hiroshi Gibson - 2024 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 49 (2):160-177.
    Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) is a serious condition with a large disease burden. It is often claimed that MDD is a “brain disease.” What would it mean for MDD to be a brain disease? I argue that the best interpretation of this claim is as offering a substantive empirical hypothesis about the causes of the syndrome of depression. This syndrome-causal conception of disease, combined with the idea that MDD is a disease of the brain, commits the brain disease conception of (...)
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  4. Self-deception in and out of Illness: Are some subjects responsible for their delusions?Quinn Hiroshi Gibson - 2017 - Palgrave Communications 15 (3):1-12.
    This paper raises a slightly uncomfortable question: are some delusional subjects responsible for their delusions? This question is uncomfortable because we typically think that the answer is pretty clearly just ‘no’. However, we also accept that self-deception is paradigmatically intentional behavior for which the self-deceiver is prima facie blameworthy. Thus, if there is overlap between self-deception and delusion, this will put pressure on our initial answer. This paper argues that there is indeed such overlap by offering a novel philosophical account (...)
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  5.  30
    Philosophy's Role in Theorizing Psychopathology.Quinn Hiroshi Gibson - 2024 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 31 (1):1-12.
    It is a mistake to think that any philosophical contribution to the study of psychopathology is otiose. I identify three non-exhaustive roles that philosophy can and does occupy in the study of mental disorder, which I call the agenda-setting role, the synthetic role, and the regulative role. The three roles are illustrated via consideration of the importance of Jaspers' notion of understanding and its application to specific examples of mental disorder, including delusions of reference, Capgras delusion and other monothematic delusions, (...)
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  6.  8
    Understanding, The Manifest Image, and 'Postmodernism' in Philosophy of Psychiatry.Quinn Hiroshi Gibson - 2024 - Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 31 (1):21-24.
    Despite how he begins, suggesting that it is somehow a problem for me that I think "there is such a thing as philosophy, which could then be useful for psychopathology," ultimately it is clear that the possibility of philosophy is not the issue for Ghaemi. Rather, his issue is with academic philosophy of psychiatry, as he sees it, and with my failure to ask what underlying assumptions typically operate in it.I do not dispute that someone like Jaspers would want to (...)
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  7.  86
    Monothematic Delusions and the Limits of Rationality.Adam Bradley & Quinn Hiroshi Gibson - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (3):811-835.
    Monothematic delusions are delusions whose contents pertain to a single subject matter. Examples include Capgras delusion, the delusion that a loved one has been replaced by an impostor, and Cotard delusion, the delusion that one is dead or does not exist. Two-factor accounts of such delusions hold that they are the result of both an experiential deficit, for instance flattened affect, coupled with an aberrant cognitive response to that deficit. In this paper we develop a new expressivist two-factor account of (...)
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  8.  19
    Rationalism, Optimism, and the Moral Mind.Quinn Hiroshi Gibson - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42.
    I welcome many of the conclusions of May's book, but I offer a suggestion – and with it what I take to be a complementary strategy – concerning the core commitments of rationalism across the domains of moral psychology in the hopes of better illuminating why a rationalist picture of the mind can deliver us from pessimism.
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