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Ruth M. J. Byrne [33]Richard W. Byrne [18]R. W. Byrne [8]Ruth Mj Byrne [8]
R. Byrne [3]Richard Byrne [3]Ruth M. Byrne [2]Ruth Byrne [2]

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Ruth Mary Josephine Byrne
Trinity College, Dublin
  1. Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans.Richard W. Byrne & Andrew Whiten (eds.) - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
    This book presents an alternative to conventional ideas about the evolution of the human intellect.
  2. Deduction.P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1991
     
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  3. The Rational Imagination: How People Create Alternatives to Reality.Ruth M. J. Byrne - 2005 - MIT Press.
    A leading scholar in the psychology of thinking and reasoning argues that the counterfactual imagination—the creation of "if only" alternatives to ...
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  4.  24
    Conditionals: A Theory of Meaning, Pragmatics, and Inference.Philip Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 2002 - Psychological Review 109 (4):646-678.
    The authors outline a theory of conditionals of the form If A then C and If A then possibly C. The 2 sorts of conditional have separate core meanings that refer to sets of possibilities. Knowledge, pragmatics, and semantics can modulate these meanings. Modulation can add information about temporal and other relations between antecedent and consequent. It can also prevent the construction of possibilities to yield 10 distinct sets of possibilities to which conditionals can refer. The mental representation of a (...)
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  5.  92
    Tactical Deception in Primates.A. Whiten & R. W. Byrne - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):233-244.
  6.  25
    Suppressing Valid Inferences with Conditionals.Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1989 - Cognition 31 (1):61-83.
    Three experiments are reported which show that in certain contexts subjects reject instances of the valid modus ponens and modus tollens inference form in conditional arguments. For example, when a conditional premise, such as: If she meets her friend then she will go to a play, is accompanied by a conditional containing an additional requirement: If she has enough money then she will go to a play, subjects reject the inference from the categorical premise: She meets her friend, to the (...)
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  7.  12
    Propositional Reasoning by Model.Philip N. Johnson-Laird, Ruth M. Byrne & Walter Schaeken - 1992 - Psychological Review 99 (3):418-439.
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  8. The Thinking Ape: Evolutionary Origins of Intelligence.Richard Byrne - 1995 - Oxford University Press UK.
    "Intelligence" has long been considered to be a feature unique to human beings, giving us the capacity to imagine, to think, to deceive, to make complex connections between cause and effect, to devise elaborate stategies for solving problems. However, like all our other features, intelligence is a product of evolutionary change. Until recently, it was difficult to obtain evidence of this process from the frail testimony of a few bones and stone tools. It has become clear in the last 15 (...)
     
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  9.  44
    ‘If’ and the Problems of Conditional Reasoning.Ruth M. J. Byrne & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2009 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (7):282-287.
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  10.  38
    Learning by Imitation: A Hierarchical Approach.Richard W. Byrne & Anne E. Russon - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):667-684.
    To explain social learning without invoking the cognitively complex concept of imitation, many learning mechanisms have been proposed. Borrowing an idea used routinely in cognitive psychology, we argue that most of these alternatives can be subsumed under a single process, priming, in which input increases the activation of stored internal representations. Imitation itself has generally been seen as a This has diverted much research towards the all-or-none question of whether an animal can imitate, with disappointingly inconclusive results. In the great (...)
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  11.  21
    Meta-Logical Problems: Knights, Knaves, and Rips.P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1990 - Cognition 36 (1):69-84.
  12.  8
    Reasoning by Model: The Case of Multiple Quantification.P. N. Johnson-Laird, Ruth M. J. Byrne & Patrizia Tabossi - 1989 - Psychological Review 96 (4):658-673.
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  13.  16
    Modal Reasoning, Models, and Manktelow and Over.Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1992 - Cognition 43 (2):173-182.
  14.  13
    Can Valid Inferences Be Suppressed?Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1991 - Cognition 39 (1):71-78.
  15.  16
    In Defense of Reasoning: A Reply to Greene.P. N. Johnson-Laird, Ruth M. Byrne & Patrizia Tabossi - 1992 - Psychological Review 99 (1):188-190.
  16.  98
    Mental Models and Counterfactual Thoughts About What Might Have Been.Ruth M. J. Byrne - 2002 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (10):426-431.
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  17. Evolutionary Psychology and Primate Cognition.Richard W. Byrne - 2002 - In Marc Bekoff, Colin Allen & Gordon M. Burghardt (eds.), The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition. MIT Press. pp. 393--398.
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  18. The Mental Model Theory of Conditionals: A Reply to Guy Politzer.Philip N. Johnson-Laird, Ruth M. J. Byrne & Vittorio Girotto - 2009 - Topoi 28 (1):75-80.
    This paper replies to Politzer’s ( 2007 ) criticisms of the mental model theory of conditionals. It argues that the theory provides a correct account of negation of conditionals, that it does not provide a truth-functional account of their meaning, though it predicts that certain interpretations of conditionals yield acceptable versions of the ‘paradoxes’ of material implication, and that it postulates three main strategies for estimating the probabilities of conditionals.
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  19.  24
    Toward the Next Generation in Data Quality: A New Survey of Primate Tactical Deception.R. W. Byrne & A. Whiten - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):267-273.
  20.  20
    Facts and Possibilities: A Model‐Based Theory of Sentential Reasoning.Sangeet S. Khemlani, Ruth M. J. Byrne & Philip N. Johnson-Laird - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (6):1887-1924.
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  21.  47
    Exorcising Grice’s Ghost: An Empirical Approach to Studying Intentional Communication in Animals.Simon Townsend, Sonja Koski, Richard Byrne, Katie Slocombe, Balthasar Bickel, Markus Boeckle, Ines Braga Goncalves, Judith Burkart, Tom Flower, Florence Gaunet, Hans Johann Glock, Thibaud Gruber, David Jansen, Katja Liebal, Angelika Linke, Adam Miklosi, Richard Moore, Carel van Schaik, Sabine Stoll, Alex Vail, Bridget Waller, Markus Wild, Klaus Zuberühler & Marta Manser - 2016 - Biological Reviews 3.
    Language’s intentional nature has been highlighted as a crucial feature distinguishing it from other communication systems. Specifically, language is often thought to depend on highly structured intentional action and mutual mindreading by a communicator and recipient. Whilst similar abilities in animals can shed light on the evolution of intentionality, they remain challenging to detect unambiguously. We revisit animal intentional communication and suggest that progress in identifying analogous capacities has been complicated by (i) the assumption that intentional (that is, voluntary) production (...)
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  22.  39
    Dual Processes of Emotion and Reason in Judgments About Moral Dilemmas.Eoin Gubbins & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 2014 - Thinking and Reasoning 20 (2):245-268.
  23.  17
    Why Models Rather Than Rules Give a Better Account of Propositional Reasoning: A Reply to Bonatti and to O'Brien, Braine, and Yang.P. N. Johnson-Laird, Ruth M. J. Byrne & Walter Schaeken - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (4):734-739.
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  24.  13
    Thinking About the Opposite of What Is Said: Counterfactual Conditionals and Symbolic or Alternate Simulations of Negation.Orlando Espino & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (8):2459-2501.
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  25.  13
    Reasoning Strategies for Suppositional Deductions.R. Byrne - 1997 - Cognition 62 (1):1-49.
    Deductive reasoning shares with other forms of thinking a reliance on strategies, as shown by the results of three experiments on the nature and development of control strategies to solve suppositional deductions. These puzzles are based on assertors who may or may not be telling the truth, and their assertions about their status as truthtellers and liars. The first experiment shows that reasoners make backward inferences as well as forward inferences, to short-cut their way through the alternatives, and the generation (...)
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  26.  55
    Differentiation in Cognitive and Emotional Meanings: An Evolutionary Analysis.Philip J. Barnard, David J. Duke, Richard W. Byrne & Iain Davidson - 2007 - Cognition and Emotion 21 (6):1155-1183.
  27.  7
    Reasoning From Suppositions.Ruth M. J. Byrne, Simon J. Handley & Philip N. Johnson-Laird - 1995 - Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A 48 (4):915-944.
    Two experiments investigated inferences based on suppositions. In Experiment 1, the subjects decided whether suppositions about individuals' veracity were consistent with their assertions—for example, whether the supposition “Ann is telling the truth and Beth is telling a lie”, is consistent with the premises: “Ann asserts: I am telling the truth and Beth is telling the truth. Beth asserts: Ann is telling the truth”. It showed that these inferences are more difficult than ones based on factual premises: “Ann asserts: I live (...)
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  28.  55
    Spontaneous Counterfactual Thoughts and Causal Explanations.Alice McEleney & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 2006 - Thinking and Reasoning 12 (2):235 – 255.
    We report two Experiments to compare counterfactual thoughts about how an outcome could have been different and causal explanations about why the outcome occurred. Experiment 1 showed that people generate counterfactual thoughts more often about controllable than uncontrollable events, whereas they generate causal explanations more often about unexpected than expected events. Counterfactual thoughts focus on specific factors, whereas causal explanations focus on both general and specific factors. Experiment 2 showed that in their spontaneous counterfactual thoughts, people focus on normal events (...)
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  29.  98
    Semifactual ''Even If'' Thinking.Rachel McCloy & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 2002 - Thinking and Reasoning 8 (1):41 – 67.
    Semifactual thinking about what might have been the same, e.g., ''even if Philip had not chosen the chocolate ice-cream sundae, he would have developed an allergic reaction'' has been neglected compared to counterfactual thinking about what might have been different, e.g., ''if only Philip had not chosen the chocolate ice-cream sundae, he would not have developed an allergic reaction''. We report the first systematic comparison of the two sorts of thinking in two experiments. The first experiment showed that counterfactual ''if (...)
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  30.  59
    Counterfactual Thoughts About Experienced, Observed, and Narrated Events.Stefania Pighin, Ruth M. J. Byrne, Donatella Ferrante, Michel Gonzalez & Vittorio Girotto - 2011 - Thinking and Reasoning 17 (2):197 - 211.
    Four studies show that observers and readers imagine different alternatives to reality. When participants read a story about a protagonist who chose the more difficult of two tasks and failed, their counterfactual thoughts focused on the easier, unchosen task. But when they observed the performance of an individual who chose and failed the more difficult task, participants' counterfactual thoughts focused on alternative ways to solve the chosen task, as did the thoughts of individuals who acted out the event. We conclude (...)
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  31.  10
    Evolution of Primate Cognition.Richard W. Byrne - 2000 - Cognitive Science 24 (3):543-570.
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  32.  80
    Understanding Culture Across Species.Richard W. Byrne, Philip J. Barnard, Iain Davidson, Vincent M. Janik, William C. McGrew, Ádam Miklósi & Polly Wiessner - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (8):341-346.
  33.  40
    Precis of the Rational Imagination: How People Create Alternatives to Reality.Ruth Mj Byrne - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):439-452.
    The human imagination remains one of the last uncharted terrains of the mind. People often imagine how events might have turned out something had been different. The of reality, those aspects more readily changed, indicate that counterfactual thoughts are guided by the same principles as rational thoughts. In the past, rationality and imagination have been viewed as opposites. But research has shown that rational thought is more imaginative than cognitive scientists had supposed. In The Rational Imagination, I argue that imaginative (...)
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  34. Reasoning with Deontic and Counterfactual Conditionals.Ana Cristina Quelhas & Ruth Byrne - 2003 - Thinking and Reasoning 9 (1):43 – 65.
    We report two new phenomena of deontic reasoning: (1) For conditionals with deontic content such as, "If the nurse cleaned up the blood then she must have worn rubber gloves", reasoners make more modus tollens inferences (from "she did not wear rubber gloves" to "she did not clean up the blood") compared to conditionals with epistemic content. (2) For conditionals in the subjunctive mood with deontic content, such as, "If the nurse had cleaned up the blood then she must have (...)
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  35.  16
    Conditionals and Possibilities.Ruth Mj Byrne, Philip N. Johnson-Laird, M. Oaksford & N. Chater - 2010 - In M. Oaksford & N. Chater (eds.), Cognition and Conditionals: Probability and Logic in Human Thought. Oxford University Press.
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  36.  33
    How People Think “If Only …” About Reasons for Actions.Clare R. Walsh & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 13 (4):461 – 483.
    When people think about how a situation might have turned out differently, they tend to imagine counterfactual alternatives to their actions. We report the results of three experiments which show that people imagine alternatives to actions differently when they know about a reason for the action. The first experiment ( n = 36) compared reason - action sequences to cause - effect sequences. It showed that people do not imagine alternatives to reasons in the way they imagine alternatives to causes: (...)
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  37. Imagination is Only as Rational as the Purpose to Which It is Put.Andrew Shtulman & Ruth Mj Byrne - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):465-465.
    Byrne's criteria for considering imagination rational do not accord with standard notions of rationality. A different criterion is offered and illustrated with recent work on possibility judgment. This analysis suggests that, although imagination can be put to rational purposes, imagination itself should not be considered rational.
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  38.  25
    Précis of Deduction.Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):323-333.
  39.  17
    The Quest for Plausibility: A Negative Heuristic for Science?R. W. Byrne - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (2):217-218.
  40.  29
    A Model Point of View.P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1995 - Thinking and Reasoning 1 (4):339 – 350.
  41.  8
    The Comprehension of Counterfactual Conditionals: Evidence From Eye-Tracking in the Visual World Paradigm.Isabel Orenes, Juan A. García-Madruga, Isabel Gómez-Veiga, Orlando Espino & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
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  42. Novelty in Deceit.Richard W. Byrne - 2003 - In Simon M. Reader & Kevin N. Laland (eds.), Animal Innovation. Oxford University Press.
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  43.  46
    Models Rule, OK? A Reply to Fetzer.P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1999 - Minds and Machines 9 (1):111-118.
  44.  19
    Mental Models or Formal Rules?Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):368-380.
  45. What's the Use of Anecdotes? Attempts to Distinguish Psychological Mechanisms in Primate Tactical Deception.Richard W. Byrne - 1997 - In R. Mitchell, Nicholas S. Thompson & H. L. Miles (eds.), Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals. Suny Press. pp. 134--150.
     
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  46. Culture in Great Apes: Using Intricate Complexity in Feeding Skills to Trace the Evolutionary Origin of Human Technical Prowess.Richard W. Byrne - 2007 - In Nathan Emery, Nicola Clayton & Chris Frith (eds.), Social Intelligence: From Brain to Culture. Oxford University Press.
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  47.  15
    Models, Necessity, and the Search for Counterexamples.P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):775-777.
  48.  17
    Moral Hindsight for Good Actions and the Effects of Imagined Alternatives to Reality.Ruth M. J. Byrne & Shane Timmons - 2018 - Cognition 178:82-91.
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  49.  17
    Do Elephants Show Empathy?Richard Byrne, Phyllis C. Lee, Norah Njiraini, Joyce H. Poole, Katito Sayialel, Soila Sayialel, L. A. Bates & C. J. Moss - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (10-11):10-11.
    Elephants show a rich social organization and display a number of unusual traits. In this paper, we analyse reports collected over a thirty-five year period, describing behaviour that has the potential to reveal signs of empathic understanding. These include coalition formation, the offering of protection and comfort to others, retrieving and 'babysitting' calves, aiding individuals that would otherwise have difficulty in moving, and removing foreign objects attached to others. These records demonstrate that an elephant is capable of diagnosing animacy and (...)
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  50.  21
    Counterfactual and Semi-Factual Thoughts in Moral Judgements About Failed Attempts to Harm.Mary Parkinson & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (4):409-448.
    People judge that an individual who attempts to harm someone but fails should be blamed and punished more when they imagine how things could have turned out worse, compared to when they imagine how things could have turned out the same, or when they think only about what happened. This moral counterfactual amplification effect occurs when people believe the protagonist had no reason for the attempt to harm, and not when the protagonist had a reason, as Experiment 1 shows. It (...)
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