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  1. .R. G. Swinburne - 1989 - Cambridge University Press.
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  2. Grue.R. G. Swinburne - 1968 - Erkenntnis 28 (4):123.
    CONTRARY TO GOODMAN’S VIEW, A CLEAR DISTINCTION CAN BE MADE BETWEEN QUALITATIVE AND POSITIONAL PREDICATES. HENCE WE CAN EXPLAIN THAT WE OUGHT TO PROJECT ’GREEN’ RATHER THAN ’GRUE’ BECAUSE THE LATTER IS A POSITIONAL PREDICATE, RATHER THAN BECAUSE THE LATTER IS LESS WELL ENTRENCHED. A PREDICATE IS POSITIONAL IF, TO FIND OUT AS CERTAINLY AS WE CAN WHETHER IT APPLIES TO AN OBJECT, WE HAVE TO FIND OUT THE LATTER’S SPATIO-TEMPORAL LOCATION.
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  3.  89
    Primary and secondary tests.R. G. Swinburne - 1969 - Erkenntnis 29 (6):203.
    THIS ARTICLE CLARIFIES A DISTINCTION MADE BY ME ELSEWHERE BETWEEN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY TESTS FOR THE APPLICATION OF A CONCEPT. IF THE PRIMARY TESTS ARE SATISFIED, THEN OF LOGICAL NECESSITY THE CONCEPT APPLIES, BUT SATISFACTION OF THE SECONDARY TESTS IS ONLY GOOD EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONCEPT. THIS ARTICLE IS A REPLY TO ONE BY SLOTE (’A GENERAL SOLUTION TO GOODMAN’S RIDDLE?’ ANALYSIS, DECEMBER 1968) CHALLENGING MY EARLIER USE OF THIS DISTINCTION (’GRUE’ ANALYSIS, MARCH 1968) TO PROVIDE (...)
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  4.  76
    Knowledge of past and future.R. G. Swinburne - 1966 - Erkenntnis 26 (5):166.
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  5.  25
    Times.R. G. Swinburne - 1965 - Erkenntnis 25 (6):185.
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  6. Personal Identity.R. G. Swinburne - 1973 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74:231 - 247.
    EMPIRICIST THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY STATE THAT THE IDENTITY OF A PERSON OVER TIME IS A MATTER OF BODILY CONTINUITY AND/OR SIMILARITY OF MEMORY AND CHARACTER. IN CONTRAST, THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT WHILE BODILY CONTINUITY AND SIMILARITY OF MEMORY AND CHARACTER ARE EVIDENCE OF PERSONAL IDENTITY, THEY DO NOT CONSTITUTE IT. IT IS SOMETHING UNDEFINABLE. THE DIFFICULTY OF KNOWING WHAT TO SAY IN PUZZLE CASES DOES NOT SHOW THAT PERSONAL IDENTITY EXISTS IN DIFFERENT DEGREES OR THAT WE HAVE TO MAKE (...)
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  7.  55
    Falsifiability of Scientific Theories.R. G. Swinburne - 1964 - Mind 73 (291):434-436.
  8. The Argument From Design—a Defence: R. G. SWINBURNE.R. G. Swinburne - 1972 - Religious Studies 8 (3):193-205.
    Mr Olding's recent attack on my exposition of the argument from design gives me an opportunity to defend the central theses of my original article. My article pointed out that there were arguments from design of two types—those which take as their premisses regularities of copresence and those which take as their premisses regularities of succession. I sought to defend an argument of the second type. One merit of such an argument is that there is no doubt about the truth (...)
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  9. Miracles.R. G. Swinburne - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 18 (73):320-328.
    (I UNDERSTAND BY A MIRACLE, A VIOLATION OF A LAW OF NATURE BY A GOD.) A VIOLATION OF A LAW OF NATURE IS THE OCCURRENCE OF A NON-REPEATABLE COUNTER-INSTANCE TO IT. CONTRARY TO HUME’S VIEW, THERE COULD BE GOOD HISTORICAL EVIDENCE BOTH THAT A VIOLATION HAD OCCURRED AND THAT IT WAS DUE TO THE ACT OF A GOD.
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  10. The Argument From Design.R. G. Swinburne - 1968 - Philosophy 43 (165):199 - 212.
    ARGUMENTS FROM DESIGN TO THE EXISTENCE OF GOD MAY TAKE AS THEIR PREMISS EITHER THE EXISTENCE OF REGULARITIES OF COPRESENCE OR THE EXISTENCE OF REGULARITIES OF SUCCESSION. THERE ARE NO VALID FORMAL OBJECTIONS TO A CAREFULLY ARTICULATED ARGUMENT OF THE LATTER TYPE. AGAINST SUCH AN ARGUMENT NONE OF THE OBJECTIONS IN HUME’S "DIALOGUES" HAVE ANY WORTH. THE ARGUMENT MAY HOWEVER GIVE ONLY A SMALL DEGREE OF SUPPORT TO ITS CONCLUSION.
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  11.  70
    The Objectivity of Morality: R. G. Swinburne.R. G. Swinburne - 1976 - Philosophy 51 (195):5-20.
    If I say “we are now living in England” or “grass is green in summer’ or ‘the cat is on the mat’ what I say will normally be true or false—the statements are true if they correctly report how things are, or correspond to the facts; and if they do not do these things, they are false. Such a statement will only fail to have a truth-value if its referring expressions fail to refer ; or if the statement lies on (...)
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  12.  15
    The Philosophy of Karl Popper.R. G. Swinburne & P. A. Schilpp - 1975 - Philosophical Quarterly 25 (101):365.
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  13. Analyticity, Necessity and Apriority.R. G. Swinburne - 1975 - Mind 84 (334):225-243.
    THE PAPER BEGINS BY CONSIDERING THREE ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF "ANALYTIC," ONE IN TERMS OF LOGICAL TRUTH, ONE IN TERMS OF THE MEANINGS OF WORDS, AND ONE IN TERMS OF SELF-CONTRADICTION OR INCOHERENCE. NEXT, FIVE DEFINITIONS OF "NECESSARY" ARE CONSIDERED, ONE IN TERMS OF ANALYTICITY, AND ONE PICKING OUT THE BROADER KIND OF LOGICAL NECESSITY DISCUSSED BY KRIPKE AND PLANTINGA. FINALLY, THREE DEFINITIONS OF "A PRIORI" ARE CONSIDERED. ONLY ON A FEW OF THESE DEFINITIONS DO THE CATEGORIES OF ANALYTIC, NECESSARY, AND (...)
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  14. Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy.R. G. Swinburne - 1993 - Religious Studies 29 (3):381-394.
     
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  15.  67
    Meaningfulness Without Confirmability: A Reply.R. G. Swinburne - 1974 - Analysis 35 (1):22.
    IN THE COURSE OF "CONFIRMABILITY AND FACTUAL MEANINGFULNESS" ("ANALYSIS" VOL. 33) I ARGUED THAT THE CONFIRMATIONIST PRINCIPLE IS FALSE. THIS IS THE PRINCIPLE THAT A STATEMENT IS FACTUALLY MEANINGFUL IF AND ONLY IF IT IS AN OBSERVATION STATEMENT OR CONFIRMABLE BY OBSERVATION STATEMENTS. MY ARGUMENT CONSISTED IN PRODUCING EXAMPLES OF FACTUALLY MEANINGFUL STATEMENTS WHICH FAIL TO SATISFY THE PRINCIPLE. IN "CONFIRMABILITY AND MEANINGFULNESS" ("ANALYSIS" VOL. 34) R I SIKORA ARGUED THAT MY EXAMPLES DO NOT SUPPORT MY CONCLUSION. HERE I REPHRASE (...)
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  16. New Books. [REVIEW]H. H. Price, William Kneale, Antony Flew, R. G. Swinburne, D. Taylor & C. H. Whiteley - 1967 - Mind 76 (302):287-307.
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  17. Affecting the Past.R. G. Swinburne - 1966 - Philosophical Quarterly 16 (65):341-347.
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  18.  10
    Selected Writings, 1909-1953.R. G. Swinburne, Hans Reichenbach, Maria Reichenbach & Robert S. Cohen - 1980 - Philosophical Quarterly 30 (119):152.
  19.  80
    Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind By Paul M. Churchland Cambridge University Press, 1979, 157 Pp., £8.50. [REVIEW]R. G. Swinburne - 1980 - Philosophy 55 (212):273-.
  20.  43
    Duty and the Will of God.R. G. Swinburne - 1974 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):213 - 227.
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  21.  80
    Confirmability and Factual Meaningfulness.R. G. Swinburne - 1973 - Analysis 33 (3):71 - 76.
    THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE CONFIRMATIONIST PRINCIPLE, THAT A STATEMENT IS FACTUALLY MEANINGFUL IF AND ONLY IF IT IS AN OBSERVATION-STATEMENT, OR THERE ARE OBSERVATION STATEMENTS WHICH WOULD CONFIRM OR DISCONFIRM IT. THIS PRINCIPLE IS THE FINAL WEAK CLAIM OF VERIFICATIONISM. EVEN IF TRUE, IT WOULD NOT BE OF GREAT USE IN SORTING OUT THE MEANINGFUL FROM THE MEANINGFULNESS, BUT IT IS SHOWN CONCLUSIVELY TO BE FALSE. A CLAIM THAT THERE IS A DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE BEST EVIDENCE THAT MEN WILL EVER (...)
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  22.  40
    The Argument for Design.R. G. Swinburne - 1984 - In J. Houston (ed.), Philosophy. Handsel Press. pp. 199-.
    The object of this paper is to show that there are no valid formal objections to the argument from design, so long as the argument is articulated with sufficient care. In particular I wish to analyse Hume's attack on the argument in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and to show that none of the formal objections made therein by Philo have any validity against a carefully articulated version of the argument.
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  23. New Books. [REVIEW]J. M. E. Moravcsik, G. P. Henderson, R. G. Swinburne, J. Gosling, C. C. W. Taylor, Martin Kramer, Arthur Thomson & Dolores Wright - 1964 - Mind 73 (289):142-154.
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  24.  63
    Conditions for Bitemporality.R. G. Swinburne - 1965 - Analysis 26 (2):47 - 50.
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  25.  12
    Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach.R. G. Swinburne - 1973 - Philosophical Books 14 (2):17-20.
  26.  5
    XIII—Personal Identity.R. G. Swinburne - 1974 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (1):231-247.
  27. Projectible predicates.R. G. Swinburne - 1969 - Analysis 30 (1):1 - 11.
    IF "ALL A’S ARE B" AND "ALL A’S ARE C" ARE BOTH EQUALLY WELL SUPPORTED BY OBSERVATIONS SO FAR, YET YIELD CONFLICTING PREDICTIONS, WHICH OUGHT WE TO ADOPT? GOODMAN’S CONFLICT BETWEEN "ALL EMERALDS ARE GREEN" AND "ALL EMERALDS ARE GRUE" IS A SPECIAL CASE OF SUCH CONFLICT, WHICH MAY BE DEALT WITH BY A RULE STATING THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO PROJECT POSITIONAL IN PREFERENCE TO QUALITATIVE PREDICATES. THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO ELUCIDATE THE RULES GOVERNING A LARGER CLASS OF SUCH (...)
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  28.  41
    Popper's Account of Acceptability.R. G. Swinburne - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):167 – 176.
    ACCORDING TO POPPER, SCIENTIFIC THEORIES ARE TO BE ACCEPTED IN SO FAR AS THEY ARE FALSIFIABLE AND IN SO FAR AS THEY HAVE BEEN CORROBORATED. THE CONCEPTS OF FALSIFIABILITY AND CORROBORATION ARE SUBMITTED TO DETAILED ANALYSIS. THE POINT OF ACCEPTING THEORIES, ACCORDING TO POPPER, IS TO OBTAIN THEORIES OF HIGH VERISIMILITUDE. HOWEVER THE BEST WE CAN DO IS TO OBTAIN THEORIES OF HIGH PROBABLE VERISIMILITUDE. POPPER’S CRITERIA FOR ACCEPTING THEORIES WILL ONLY LEAD TO THEORIES OF HIGH PROBABLE VERISIMILITUDE ON NON-POPPERIAN (...)
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  29.  50
    New Books. [REVIEW]R. G. Swinburne - 1973 - Mind 82 (328):624-626.
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  30.  53
    The Cosmological Argument.R. G. Swinburne - 1976 - Philosophical Books 17 (2):60-62.
  31.  14
    The Christian Wager: R. G. SWINBURNE.R. G. Swinburne - 1969 - Religious Studies 4 (2):217-228.
    On what grounds will the rational man become a Christian? It is often assumed by many, especially non-Christians, that he will become a Christian if and only if he judges that the evidence available to him shows that it is more likely than not that the Christian theological system is true, that, in mathematical terms, on the evidence available to him, the probability of its truth is greater than half. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate whether or (...)
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  32.  47
    Choosing Between Confirmation Theories.R. G. Swinburne - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (4):602-613.
    ON WHAT GROUNDS OUGHT WE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN COMPETING CONFIRMATION THEORIES? THE ARTICLE BEGINS BY DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CONFIRMATION THEORIES AND OTHER THEORIES WHICH MIGHT BE CONFUSED WITH THEM, SUCH AS THEORIES OF ACCEPTABILITY. IT THEN ARGUES THAT A CONFIRMATION THEORY OUGHT TO ANALYSE RATHER THAN EXPLICATE OUR ORDINARY STANDARDS OF CONFIRMATION. IT WILL DO THIS IN SO FAR AS IT IS COHERENT AND DOES NOT YIELD COUNTERINTUITIVE JUDGMENTS.
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  33.  16
    Faith and the Existence of God: R. G. Swinburne.R. G. Swinburne - 1988 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 24:121-143.
    Arguments move from premises to conclusions. The premises state things taken temporally for granted; if the argument works, the premises provide grounds for affirming the conclusion. A valid deductive argument is one in which the premises necessitate, that is, entail, the conclusion. What I shall call a ‘correct’ inductive argument is one in which the premises in some degree probabilify the conclusion, but do not necessitate it. More precisely, in what I shall call a correct P -inductive argument the premises (...)
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  34. The Christian Wager.R. G. Swinburne - 1969 - Religious Studies 4 (2):217-228.
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  35.  32
    The Christian Wager.R. G. Swinburne - 1984 - In J. Houston (ed.), Religious Studies. Handsel Press. pp. 217--228.
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  36.  11
    Reviews. [REVIEW]R. G. Swinburne - 1970 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (3):308-311.
  37.  28
    Cosmological Horizons.R. G. Swinburne - 1966 - Philosophy of Science 33 (3):210-214.
    HORIZONS ARE FRONTIERS BETWEEN THINGS OBSERVABLE AND THINGS UNOBSERVABLE. EVEN IS SUCH HORIZONS EXIST WE MAY LEARN ABOUT UNOBSERVABLE REGIONS OF THE UNIVERSE BY, (A) USING THE LAWS OF PHYSICS WHICH TELL US HOW A PRESENTLY OBSERVABLE GALAXY WILL EVOLVE WHEN NO LONGER OBSERVABLE OR, (B) USING THE COSMOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE.
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  38. Arguments for the Existence of God IN Key Themes in Philosophy.R. G. Swinburne - 1989 - In . Cambridge University Press.
    In an inductive argument data increase the probability of a hypothesis insofar as the hypothesis makes probable the data, the data are otherwise not likely to occur, and the hypothesis is simple. The Cosmological argument from the existence of the universe, the Teleological argument from its conformity to natural law, and other arguments from more detailed features of the universe each increase the probability that there is a God. I thus summarize in simple form the main points of my book (...)
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  39.  57
    New Books. [REVIEW]C. J. F. Williams, Anthony Savile, Richard Norman, Robert Black, R. G. Swinburne, David Holdcroft, Eva Schaper, Thomas McPheron & Karl Britton - 1973 - Mind 82 (328):617-638.
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  40.  12
    Reviews. [REVIEW]R. G. Swinburne - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (3):308-311.
  41.  9
    The Beginning of the Universe.R. G. Swinburne & J. H. Bird - 1966 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 40 (1):125-150.
  42.  45
    Vagueness, Inexactness, and Imprecision.R. G. Swinburne - 1969 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (4):281-299.
    THERE IS OFTEN UNCERTAINTY ABOUT WHETHER SOME PREDICATE APPLIES TO SOME PHYSICAL OBJECT OR STATE. THIS UNCERTAINTY MAY HAVE ANY OF THREE SOURCES - VAGUENESS OF A TERM, INEXACTNESS OF A CONCEPT, OR PRACTICAL DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING ITS APPLICABILITY. VARIOUS WAYS IN WHICH CONCEPTUAL INEXACTNESS OR PRACTICAL DIFFICULTY MAY PRODUCE UNCERTAINTY ARE DISTINGUISHED. NEITHER TERMINOLOGICAL VAGUENESS, NOR PRACTICAL DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING THE APPLICABILITY OF A CONCEPT ARE NECESSARY FEATURES OF EVERY LANGUAGE IN EVERY PHYSICAL WORLD, BUT CONCEPTUAL INEXACTNESS IS A (...)
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  43.  37
    The Probability of Particular Events.R. G. Swinburne - 1971 - Philosophy of Science 38 (3):327-343.
    The paper investigates what are the proper procedures for calculating the probability on certain evidence of a particular object e having a property, Q, e.g. of Eclipse winning the Derby. Let `α ' denote the conjunction of properties known to be possessed by e, and P(Q)/α the probability of an object which is α being Q. One view is that the probability of e being Q is given by the best confirmed value of P(Q)/α . This view is shown not (...)
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  44.  17
    Anomalies and Scientific Theories. By Willard C. Humphreys. (San Fransisco: Freeman, Cooper and Co. 1968. Pp. 318. No Price Given). [REVIEW]R. G. Swinburne - 1969 - Philosophy 44 (168):166-.
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  45.  13
    History and Philosophy of Science Science, Folklore, and Philosophy. By Harry Girvetz, George Geiger, Harold Hantz, and Bertram Morris. Pp. X + 547. New York and London: Harper and Row, 1966. 72s. [REVIEW]R. G. Swinburne - 1967 - British Journal for the History of Science 3 (4):399-399.
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  46.  10
    Galton's Law—Formulation and Development.R. G. Swinburne - 1965 - Annals of Science 21 (1):15-31.
  47.  39
    Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Baruch Brody, R. G. Swinburne, Alex C. Michalos, Gershon Weiler, Geoffrey Sampson, Marcelo Dascal, Shalom Lappin, Yehuda Melzer, Joseph Horovitz, Haim Marantz, Marcelo Dascal, M. Magidor & Michael Katz - 1974 - Philosophia 4 (2-3):279-281.
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  48. Arguments for the Existence of God.R. G. Swinburne - 1984 - In J. Houston (ed.), Is It Reasonable to Believe in God? Handsel Press. pp. 121 - 133.
    In an inductive argument data increase the probability of a hypothesis insofar as the hypothesis makes probable the data, the data are otherwise not likely to occur, and the hypothesis is simple. The cosmological argument from the existence of the universe, the teleological argument from its conformity to natural law, and other arguments from more detailed features of the universe each increase the probability that there is a God. I thus summarize in a simple form the main points of my (...)
     
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  49.  20
    Three Types of Thesis About Fact and Value.R. G. Swinburne - 1961 - Philosophical Quarterly 11 (45):301-307.
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  50.  1
    The Presence-and-Absence Theory.R. G. Swinburne - 1962 - Annals of Science 18 (3):131-145.
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