The existence of consciousness in animals may have been overlooked. Continuity in consciousness between humans and animals is predicted by evolutionary theory. However, there are specific methodological difficulties associated with investigating such a phenomenon: it cannot be directly measured; animals, unlike humans, cannot directly tell us about their conscious experience; experiments which have made comparisons to human consciousness cannot detect consciousness of a different form; application of the law of parsimony in science has traditionally led to the conclusion that it (...) does not exist. (shrink)
The paper uses questionnaire responses provided by a sample of ethical investors to investigate willingness to sacrifice ethical considerations for financial reward. The paper examines the amount of financial reward necessary to cause an ethical investor to accept a switch from good ethical performance to poor ethical performance. Conjoint analysis is used to allow quantification of the utilities derived from different combinations of ethical and financial performance. Ethical investors are shown to vary in their willingness to sacrifice ethical for financial (...) performance, and hence to display more heterogeneity than the all-encompassing ‘ethical’ label implies. Because of the existence of sub-groups of ethical investors with different attitudes towards financial reward, an attempt has been made to associate observable investors’ characteristics with their level of willingness to trade-off morality for cash. One sub-group of investors in particular appears highly resistant to the idea of accepting higher financial return as compensation for poor ethical performance. This unwillingness casts doubt on Jensen and Meckling’s widely reported claim that trade-off behaviour is ubiquitous in all areas of life. (shrink)
This article explores the possibility that some of the advantages of prospective overruling can be achieved by deploying the weaker prospective lawmaking technique of ‘not following’ which the author claims is a well‐established feature of the common law as is illustrated most recently by Hall v Simons  3 All E R 673. On the analysis presented, that case abolished the barristerial immunity for the future only. Some of the problems of time can been seen at their most acute in (...) R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, ex parte Evans  4 All ER 15 and the author ventures to suggest that had sufficient attention been paid to the distinction between ‘authoritatively overruling’ and ‘not following’ the extreme and nonsensical (but legally correct) outcome in that case might have been avoided. The unsatisfactory outcome is traced to the influence of the declaratory theory of the common law which holds that judicial decisions, especially those changing or correcting earlier decisions, are ‘inevitably retrospective’. The author therefore considers time as a problem not only for practice but also for legal theory and is concerned to challenge the descriptive and normative claims of the declaratory theory of the common law, even in the reinterpreted and diluted form which emerged from judicial opinion in, and academic comment on, Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council  2 AC 349. (shrink)
The experience of newborn screening for Krabbe disease in New York State demonstrates the ethical problems that arise when screening programs are expanded in the absence of true understanding of the diseases involved. In its 5 years of testing and millions of dollars in costs, there have been very few benefits, and the testing has uncovered potential cases of late-onset disease that raise difficult ethical questions in their own right. For these reasons, we argue that Krabbe screening should only be (...) continued as a research project that includes the informed consent of parents to the testing. (shrink)
The first of these two volumes is a second edition of the first part of Jonas' comprehensive scholarly study of Gnosticism, first published in 1934. Except for minor corrections the first edition has been left unrevised. The second volume carries the study up to the third century A.D. A final volume completing the second part is promised for the near future.--R. H.
The author urges that psychology take a more liberal approach "without sacrificing its gains." Psychology, in trying to be too "scientific," has imposed upon itself artificial limits, which have become barriers to an adequate study of individual personality, especially in its moral and religious aspects. Given originally as the Yale University Terry Lectures for 1954.--R. H.
Recent experimental findings reveal dissociations of conscious and nonconscious performance in many fields of psychological research, suggesting that conscious and nonconscious effects result from qualitatively different processes. A connectionist view of these processes is put forward in which consciousness is the consequence of construction processes taking place in three types of working memory in a specific type of recurrent neural network. The recurrences arise by feeding back output to the input of a central (representational) network. They are assumed to be (...) intemalizations of motor-sensory feedback through the environment. In this manner, a subvocal-phonological, a visuo-spatial, and a somatosensory working memory may have developed. Representations in the central network, which constitutes long-term memory, can be kept active by rehearsal in the feedback loops. The sequentially recurrent architecture allows for recursive symbolic operations and the formation of (auditory, visual, or somatic) models of the external world which can be maintained, transformed and temporarily combined with other information in working memory. Moreover, the quasi-input from the loop directs subsequent attentional processing. The view may contribute to a formal framework to accommodate findings from disparate fields such as working memory, sequential reasoning, and conscious and nonconscious processes in memory and emotion. In theory, but probably not very soon in practice, such connectionist models might simulate aspects of consciousness. (shrink)
The chief topics discussed in this carefully written book are the nature of definitions in science, the distinction between observational and theoretical terms, changes in scientific concepts and the role of analogies and models in science. The unifying theme is that of meaning in the sciences. Its treatment by Achinstein indicates a trend in recent philosophy of science toward finding a middle ground between two antithetical positions on the topic of the meaning of scientific terms. On the one side stands (...) the traditional positivist and logical empiricist account which distinguishes sharply between the meaning of observational and theoretical terms, and on the other side, the more recent views of Feyerabend, Kuhn, Hanson, Toulmin and others who stress the dependence of the meaning of observational terms on that of theoretical terms and the change of meaning of all terms connected with a theory when the theory changes. Achinstein argues cogently that the extreme versions of these positions will not work. Their main problem is that their treatment of meaning is too rigid and monolithic. His own discussion of meaning in the early chapters on definition bristles with distinctions, nuances, and concrete examples from the sciences. In terms of the distinctions of this part of the book he is later able to argue against Feyerabend and Kuhn that in changes of scientific concepts such as characterize scientific revolutions not all of the meaning connections of the various terms need be altered. He also argues that of the many ways proposed to distinguish between theoretical and observational terms, no one is fundamental, though each may be relevant to certain categories of questions one might want to raise about scientific terms. This book thus leads away from the simpler doctrinal statements of the past about the meaning of scientific terms toward a theory of meaning requiring more distinctions, qualifications, nuances, and more subtlety all around.--R. H. K. (shrink)
Beginning with an overview of Galileo's earliest work on free fall, the paper examines the relationship between experiment and theory in his study of motion in the period immediately before and after 1604. The possible role of experiment is assessed in relation to the manuscript evidence and by means of reconstructed experiments.
The title essay was originally presented as two lectures inaugurating the John Dewey lectures at Columbia. It is an important essay for understanding Quine's work for it brings together many themes at the center of his thinking since Word and Object. Quine quotes with approval Dewey's statement "meaning is primarily a property of behavior" and then goes on to consider a thesis which, according to Quine, is a consequence of such a behavioral theory of meaning, i.e., the thesis of the (...) indeterminacy of meaning and translation. Quine relates this indeterminacy thesis, which he has been defending for some time, to language learning, the foundations of mathematics, and to a general view of ontological relativity. Other essays in the volume concern natural kinds and the various paradoxes of confirmation, propositional objects, quantification and existence and the empirical basis of science. All the essays are post-1965 except the introductory essay which was Quine's Presidential Address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1956. This address was something of an introduction to the ideas to appear in Word and Object and is placed at the beginning of this collection to emphasize that all the essays collected here expand on and defend some of the positions of Word and Object. Quine's fluid style is everywhere in evidence.--R. H. K. (shrink)