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Robert H. Myers
York University
  1.  32
    Desires and Normative Truths: A Holist's Response to the Sceptics.R. H. Myers - 2012 - Mind 121 (482):375-406.
    According to the practicality requirement, there could be truths about what people have reason to do only if people’s motivating states could be, in an appropriate sense, either correct or incorrect. Yet according to the Humean theory of motivation, people’s motivating states are a species of desire, and these desires are not a species of belief, being neither identical to nor entailed by them; and according to the standard view of desire, P’s desire to is, at bottom, a disposition to (...)
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  2.  24
    Prerogatives and Restrictions From the Cooperative Point of View.R. H. Myers - 1994 - Ethics 105 (1):128-152.
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  3.  52
    The Inescapability of Moral Reasons.R. H. Myers - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):281-307.
    According to Thomas Nagel, morality's authority is determined by the extent to which its way of balancing agent-neutral and agent-relative values resembles reason's. He himself would like to think that the resemblance is close enough to ensure that it will always be reasonable to act as morality demands. But his attempts to establish this never really get off the ground, in large part because he never makes it very clear how these two perspectives on value are to be characterized. My (...)
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    The Inescapability of Moral Reasons.R. H. Myers - 1999 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):281-307.
    According to Thomas Nagel, morality's authority is determined by the extent to which its way of balancing agent-neutral and agent-relative values resembles reason's. He himself would like to think that the resemblance is close enough to ensure that it will always be reasonable to act as morality demands. But his attempts to establish this never really get off the ground, in large part because he never makes it very clear how these two perspectives on value are to be characterized. My (...)
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