R.I.G. Hughes presents a series of eight philosophical essays on the theoretical practices of physics. The first two essays examine these practices as they appear in physicists' treatises (e.g. Newton's Principia and Opticks ) and journal articles (by Einstein, Bohm and Pines, Aharonov and Bohm). By treating these publications as texts, Hughes casts the philosopher of science in the role of critic. This premise guides the following 6 essays which deal with various concerns of philosophy of physics such as laws, (...) disunities, models and representation, computer simulation, explanation, and the discourse of physics. (shrink)
Probability kinematics is the theory of how subjective probabilities change with time, in response to certain constraints . Rules are classified by the imposed constraints for which the rules prescribe a procedure for updating one's opinion. The first is simple conditionalization , and the second Jeffrey conditionalization . It is demonstrated by a symmetry argument that these rules are the unique admissible rules for those constraints, and moreover, that any probability kinematic rule must be equivalent to a conditionalization preceded by (...) a determination of the values x i to be given to the members of such a partition. Next two rival rules which can go beyond such conditionalization are described. INFOMIN and MTP . Their properties are investigated and compared. (shrink)
The pair (A, Δ ), where A is a physical quantity (an observable) and Δ a subset of the reals, may be called an 'experimental question'. The set Q of experimental questions is, in classical mechanics, a Boolean algebra, and in quantum mechanics an orthomodular lattice (and also a transitive partial Boolean algebra). The question is raised: can we specify a priori what algebraic structure Q must have in any theory whatsoever? Several proposals suggesting that Q must be a lattice (...) are discussed, and rejected in favor of the weak claim that Q must be a Boolean atlas. (shrink)
This volume of recent writings, some previously unpublished, follows the sequence of a typical intermediate or upper-level logic course and allows teachers to enrich their presentations of formal methods and results with readings on corresponding questions in philosophical logic.
One problem with assessing quantum logic is that there are considerable differences between its practitioners. In particular they offer different versions of the set of sentences which the logic governs. On some accounts the sentences involved describe events, on others they are ascriptions of properties. In this paper a framework is offered within which to discuss different quantum logical interpretations of quantum theory, and then the works of Jauch, Putnam, van Fraassen and Kochen are located within it.
R.I.G. Hughes presents a series of eight philosophical essays on the theoretical practices of physics. The first two essays examine these practices as they appear in physicists' treatises and journal articles. By treating these publications as texts, Hughes casts the philosopher of science in the role of critic. This premise guides the following six essays which deal with various concerns of philosophy and physics such as laws, disunities, models and representation, computer simulation, explanation, and the discourse of physics.