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R. M. Sainsbury [83]R. Mark Sainsbury [2]
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Profile: Mark Sainsbury (University of Texas at Austin)
  1.  12
    Paradoxes.R. M. Sainsbury - 1995 - Cambridge University Press.
    A paradox can be defined as an unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises. Unlike party puzzles or brain teasers, many paradoxes are serious in that they raise serious philosophical problems, and are associated with crises of thought and revolutionary advances. To grapple with them is not merely to engage in an intellectual game, but to come to grips with issues of real import. The second, revised edition of this intriguing book expands and updates the text (...)
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  2. Concepts Without Boundaries.R. M. Sainsbury - 1996 - In Rosanna Keefe & Peter Smith (eds.), Vagueness: A Reader. MIT Press. pp. 186-205.
  3.  83
    Easy Possibilities.R. M. Sainsbury - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):907-919.
  4. Two Ways to Smoke a Cigarette.R. M. Sainsbury - 2001 - Ratio 14 (4):386–406.
    In the early part of the paper, I attempt to explain a dispute between two parties who endorse the compositionality of language but disagree about its implications: Paul Horwich, and Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore. In the remainder of the paper, I challenge the thesis on which they are agreed, that compositionality can be taken for granted. I suggest that it is not clear what compositionality involves nor whether it obtains. I consider some kinds of apparent counterexamples, and compositionalist responses (...)
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  5. Logical Forms: An Introduction to Philosophical Logic.R. M. Sainsbury - 2001 - Blackwell.
  6.  74
    Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts.R. M. Sainsbury & Michael Tye - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Sainsbury and Tye present a new theory, 'originalism', which provides natural, simple solutions to puzzles about thought that have troubled philosophers for centuries. They argue that concepts are to be individuated by their origin, rather than epistemically or semantically. Although thought is special, no special mystery attaches to its nature.
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  7.  10
    Russell.R. M. Sainsbury - 1979 - Routledge.
    This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.
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  8. Intentionality Without Exotica.R. M. Sainsbury - 2010 - In Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought.
    The paper argues that intensional phenomena can be explained without appealing to "exotic" entities: one that don't exist, are merely possible, or are essentially abstract.
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  9. Fiction and Acceptance-Relative Truth, Belief and Assertion.R. M. Sainsbury - 2011 - In Franck Lihoreau (ed.), Truth in Fiction. Ontos Verlag. pp. 38--137.
     
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  10. The Essence of Reference.R. M. Sainsbury - 2008 - In Ernest Lepore & Barry Smith (eds.), he Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.
    People use words and concepts to refer to things. There are agents who refer, there are acts of referring, and there are tools to refer with: words and concepts. Reference is a relation between people and things, and also between words or concepts and things, and perhaps it involves all three things at once. It is not just any relation between an action or word and a thing; the list of things which can refer, people, words and concepts, is probably (...)
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  11. An Originalist Theory of Concepts.R. M. Sainsbury & Michael Tye - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):101-124.
    We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...)
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  12. Scott Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century: Volume 1: The Dawn of Analysis. [REVIEW]R. M. Sainsbury - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (3):637 - 643.
    The review praises the philosophical quality, but is less enthusiastic about the scholarship and historical accuracy.
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  13.  60
    Why the World Cannot Be Vague.R. M. Sainsbury - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):63-81.
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  14. Understanding as Immersion.R. M. Sainsbury - 2006 - Philosophical Issues 16 (1):246–262.
    Understanding has often been regarded as a kind of knowledge. This paper argues that this view is very implausible for understanding words. Instead, a proper account will be of the “analytic-genetic” variety: it will describe immersion in the practice of using a word in such a way that even those not previously equipped with the concepts the word expresses can become immersed. Meeting this condition requires attention to findings in developmental psychology. If you understand a declarative utterance, you thereby know (...)
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  15.  93
    Vagueness, Ignorance, and Margin for Error. [REVIEW]R. M. Sainsbury - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.
  16.  68
    What is a Vague Object?R. M. Sainsbury - 1989 - Analysis 49 (3):99-103.
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  17.  60
    Review: Crispin Wright: Truth and Objectivity. [REVIEW]R. M. Sainsbury - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):899 - 904.
    This belongs to a symposium about Crispin Wright's Truth\nand Objectivity. Wright entertains the "possibility of a\npluralist view of truth." I suggest that this should not\nentail ambiguity in the word "true." For truth to amount to\ndifferent things for different kinds of subject matter no\nmore entails ambiguity than does the fact that existence\namounts to different things for different kinds of entity.\nTurning to cognitive command, I argue that it is trivially\nsatisfied: if I judge that p and you disagree, then under\nsuitable conditions I must (...)
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  18.  50
    Projections and Relations.R. M. Sainsbury - 1998 - The Monist 81 (1):133-160.
    The paper evaluates Hume's alleged projectivism about causation and moral values.
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  19.  31
    Degrees of Belief and Degrees of Truth.R. M. Sainsbury - 1986 - Philosophical Papers 15 (2-3):97-106.
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  20. Fiction and Fictionalism.R. M. Sainsbury - 2009 - Routledge.
    Are fictional characters such as Sherlock Holmes real? What can fiction tell us about the nature of truth and reality? In this excellent introduction to the problem of fictionalism R. M. Sainsbury covers the following key topics: what is fiction? realism about fictional objects, including the arguments that fictional objects are real but non-existent; real but non-factual; real but non-concrete the relationship between fictional characters and non-actual worlds fictional entities as abstract artefacts fiction and intentionality and the problem of irrealism (...)
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  21.  75
    Spotty Scope.R. M. Sainsbury - 2006 - Analysis 66 (289):17–22.
  22.  22
    Reference And Anaphora.R. M. Sainsbury - 2002 - Noûs 36 (s16):43-71.
  23.  39
    Warrant-Transmission, Defeaters and Disquotation.R. M. Sainsbury - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):191 - 200.
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  24.  76
    On a Fregean Argument for the Distinctness of Sense and Reference.R. M. Sainsbury - 1983 - Analysis 43 (1):12 - 14.
  25.  41
    Semantics by Proxy.R. M. Sainsbury - 1977 - Analysis 37 (2):86 - 96.
    Many theories provide semantics for English by proxy of semantics for the "logical form" of English sentences. The paper presents a dilemma: if there is no algorithm for moving between English and logical form, English itself has not been given a semantic theory. But if there is an algorithm, it can be incorporated in the theory, which would then apply directly to English. In the worst case, logical form is an obstacle to providing semantics for English. In the best case, (...)
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  26. Referring Descriptions.R. M. Sainsbury - 2004 - In Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond. Oxford University Press. pp. 369--89.
     
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  27.  75
    Benevolence and Evil.R. M. Sainsbury - 1980 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):128 – 134.
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  28.  65
    Rejoinder to Rasmussen.R. M. Sainsbury - 1984 - Analysis 44 (3):111 - 113.
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  29.  22
    Is There Higher-Order Vagueness?R. M. Sainsbury - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (163):167-182.
    I argue against a standard conception of classification, according to which concepts classify by drawing boundaries. This conception cannot properly account for "higher-order vagueness." I discuss in detail claims by Crispin Wright about "definitely," and its connection with higher-order vagueness. Contrary to Wright, I argue that the line between definite cases of red and borderline ones is not sharp. I suggest a new conception of classification: many concepts classify without drawing boundaries; they are boundaryless. Within this picture, there are no (...)
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  30.  60
    Review: Vagueness, Ignorance, and Margin for Error. [REVIEW]R. M. Sainsbury - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589 - 601.
  31.  37
    Departing From Frege: Essays in the Philosophy of Language.R. M. Sainsbury - 2002 - Routledge.
    This text argues that we must depart considerably from Frege's own views if we are to work towards an adequate conception of natural language.
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  32. Philosophical Logic.R. M. Sainsbury - 2008 - In Dermot Moran (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, Abingdon, Routledge 2008: 347–81.
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  33.  50
    Empty Names.R. Mark Sainsbury - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:57-66.
    This paper explores the idea that a name should be associated with a reference condition, rather than with a referent, just as a sentence should be associated with a truth condition, rather than with a truth value. The suggestion, to be coherent, needs to be set in a freelogical framework (following Burge). A prominent advantage of the proposal is that it gives a straight-forward semantics for empty names. A problem discussed in this paper is that of reconciling the rigidity of (...)
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  34. Meeting the Hare in Her Doubles : Causal Belief and General Belief.R. M. Sainsbury - 2005 - In Marina Frasca-Spada & P. J. E. Kail (eds.), Impressions of Hume. Oxford University Press.
  35.  41
    Russell on Acquaintance.R. M. Sainsbury - 1986 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 20:219-244.
    In Russell's Problems of Philosophy , acquaintance is the basis of thought and also the basis of empirical knowledge. Thought is based on acquaintance, in that a thinker has to be acquainted with the basic constituents of his thoughts. Empirical knowledge is based on acquaintance, in that acquaintance is involved in perception, and perception is the ultimate source of all empirical knowledge.
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  36.  53
    Paderewski Variations.R. Mark Sainsbury - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (4):483-502.
    How successful are Fregean theories compared with guise-theoretic Millian theories in dealing with a range of problematic propositional attitude ascriptions? The range considered is roughly that of Paderewski puzzles and their relatives. I argue that these fall into two categories: in one category, the Fregean theory looks to be under pressure from guise-theoretic rivals, though I argue that Fregeans can, to advantage, borrow some guise-theoretic machinery. Concerning the other category, which includes Kripke's two Paderewski puzzles, I argue that these puzzles (...)
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  37.  2
    What Logic Should We Think With?: R. M. Sainsbury.R. M. Sainsbury - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:1-17.
    Logic ought to guide our thinking. It is better, more rational, more intelligent to think logically than to think illogically. Illogical thought leads to bad judgment and error. In any case, if logic had no role to play as a guide to thought, why should we bother with it? The somewhat naïve opinions of the previous paragraph are subject to attack from many sides. It may be objected that an activity does not count as thinking at all unless it is (...)
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  38.  22
    What Logic Should We Think With?R. M. Sainsbury - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:1-17.
    Logic ought to guide our thinking. It is better, more rational, more intelligent to think logically than to think illogically. Illogical thought leads to bad judgment and error. In any case, if logic had no role to play as a guide to thought, why should we bother with it? The somewhat naïve opinions of the previous paragraph are subject to attack from many sides. It may be objected that an activity does not count as thinking at all unless it is (...)
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  39.  32
    Russell on Constructions and Fictions.R. M. Sainsbury - 1980 - Theoria 46 (1):19-36.
    Russell says that logical constructions are fictions. Does this show that he took them not to be real things?
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  40.  60
    Names, Fictional Names, and 'Really'.R. M. Sainsbury - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):243–269.
    [R. M. Sainsbury] Evans argued that most ordinary proper names were Russellian: to suppose that they have no bearer is to suppose that they have no meaning. The first part of this paper addresses Evans's arguments, and finds them wanting. Evans also claimed that the logical form of some negative existential sentences involves 'really' (e.g. 'Hamlet didn't really exist'). One might be tempted by the view, even if one did not accept its Russellian motivation. However, I suggest that Evans gives (...)
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  41.  46
    Sameness and Difference of Sense.R. M. Sainsbury - 2004 - Philosophical Books 45 (3):209-217.
  42. Facts and Free Logic.R. M. Sainsbury - 2006 - ProtoSociology 26:119–27.
    Comment on S. Neale's, "Facts and Free Logic".
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  43. Evans, G. "The Varieties of Reference". [REVIEW]R. M. Sainsbury - 1985 - Mind 94:120.
     
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  44.  15
    Understanding and Theories of Meaning.R. M. Sainsbury - 1979 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80:127 - 144.
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  45.  40
    Cartesian Possibilities and the Externality and Extrinsicness of Content.R. M. Sainsbury - 1991 - Synthese 89 (3):407-424.
  46.  22
    Tolerating Vagueness.R. M. Sainsbury - 1988 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89:33 - 48.
  47.  12
    Of Course there are Fictional Characters.R. M. Sainsbury - 2012 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4:615-630.
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  48.  1
    Spotty Scope.R. M. Sainsbury - 2006 - Analysis 66 (1):17-22.
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  49.  3
    I—R. M. Sainsbury and Michael Tye: An Originalist Theory of Concepts.R. M. Sainsbury & Michael Tye - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):101-124.
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  50.  19
    Intensional Transitives and Presuppositions (Transitivos Intensionales y Presuposiciones).R. M. Sainsbury - 2008 - Critica 40 (120):129 - 139.
    My commentators point to respects in which the picture provided in Reference without Referents is incomplete. The picture provided no account of how sentences constructed from intensional verbs (like "John thought about Pegasus") can be true when one of the referring expressions fails to refer. And it gave an incomplete, and possibly misleading, account of how to understand certain serious uses of fictional names, as in "Anna Karenina is more intelligent than Emma Bovary" and "Anna Karenina does not exist". In (...)
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