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R. Matthew Shockey
Indiana University South Bend
  1.  83
    What's Formal About Formal Indication? Heidegger's Method in Sein Und Zeit.R. Matthew Shockey - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (6):525-539.
    Against the background of a recent exchange between Cristina Lafont and Hubert Dreyfus, I argue that Heidegger's method of ?formal indication? is at the heart of his attempt in Sein und Zeit to answer ?the ontological question of the being of the ?sum?? (SZ, p. 46). This method works reflexively, by picking out certain essential features of one's first-person singular being at the outset of its investigation that are implicit in the question ?what is it to be the entity I (...)
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  2.  43
    Forms Not Norms! On Haugeland on Heidegger on Being.R. Matthew Shockey - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):485-511.
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  3. Heidegger's Descartes and Heidegger's Cartesianism.R. Matthew Shockey - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):285-311.
    Abstract: Heidegger's Sein und Zeit (SZ) is commonly viewed as one of the 20th century's great anti-Cartesian works, usually because of its attack on the epistemology-driven dualism and mentalism of modern philosophy of mind or its apparent effort to ‘de-center the subject’ in order to privilege being or sociality over the individual. Most who stress one or other of these anti-Cartesian aspects of SZ, however, pay little attention to Heidegger's own direct engagement with Descartes, apart from the compressed discussion in (...)
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  4.  50
    Heidegger on Understanding One’s Own Being.R. Matthew Shockey - 2011 - New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 11:128-143.
    One of the characteristics that define us as Dasein, according to Heidegger, is that our being is at issue for us. Most readers interpret this to mean that we each, as individuals situated in the world with others, face the questions of who, how, and whether to be within our unique situations. Yet what Heidegger identifies as Dasein’s being is a general structure—care—that is the same for all individuals. Adapting and modifying John Haugeland’s account of understanding as projecting entities upon (...)
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  5.  33
    Basic Problems of Haugeland’s Phenomenology.R. Matthew Shockey - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
    John Haugeland aimed throughout his career to determine what it is for an entity to count as having intelligence or thought, and at each stage he developed the idea from the phenomenological tradition that genuine thought requires intentionality. His most mature essay to do this, “Authentic Intentionality,” shows how the intentional directedness of thought requires that thinkers understand themselves as responsive to entities they think about, that they be committed to maintaining the socially shared forms of understanding of those entities, (...)
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  6.  26
    Lockean Primary Quality Perception Reconstructed.R. Matthew Shockey - 2007 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 24 (3):221 - 235.
    With the exception of solidity, Locke's list of primary qualities matches his list of ideas of "divers senses," that is, ideas that are perceived in multiple sensory modalities. I argue that for these ideas, the fact that they are robust in our sensory experience in a way that single-modality ideas are not provides the main reason for taking them to be ideas of primary qualities. Solidity, however, is taken as primary because it is ineliminable from experience in a way that (...)
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