65 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Richard Rowland [22]R. A. Rowland [12]Robert C. Rowland [9]R. J. Rowland [7]
Robyn Rowland [6]R. Rowland [5]Rosanna Rowland [5]Robert J. Rowland [5]

Not all matches are shown. Search with initial or firstname to single out others.

See also
  1. The Normative and the Evaluative: The Buck-Passing Account of Value.Richard Rowland - 2019 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Many have been attracted to the idea that for something to be good there just have to be reasons to favour it. This view has come to be known as the buck-passing account of value. According to this account, for pleasure to be good there need to be reasons for us to desire and pursue it. Likewise for liberty and equality to be values there have to be reasons for us to promote and preserve them. Extensive discussion has focussed on (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  2. Moral Error Theory and the Argument from Epistemic Reasons.Richard Rowland - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1):1-24.
    In this paper I defend what I call the argument from epistemic reasons against the moral error theory. I argue that the moral error theory entails that there are no epistemic reasons for belief and that this is bad news for the moral error theory since, if there are no epistemic reasons for belief, no one knows anything. If no one knows anything, then no one knows that there is thought when they are thinking, and no one knows that they (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  3. The epistemology of moral disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (2):1-16.
    This article is about the implications of a conciliatory view about the epistemology of peer disagreement for our moral beliefs. Many have endorsed a conciliatory view about the epistemology of peer disagreement according to which if we find ourselves in a disagreement about some matter with another whom we should judge to be our epistemic peer on that matter, we must revise our judgment about that matter. This article focuses on three issues about the implications of conciliationism for our moral (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  4. The Authoritative Normativity of Fitting Attitudes.R. A. Rowland - 2022 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 17:108-137.
    Some standards, such as moral and prudential standards, provide genuinely or authoritatively normative reasons for action. Other standards, such as the norms of masculinity and the mafia’s code of omerta, provide reasons but do not provide genuinely normative reasons for action. This paper first explains that there is a similar distinction amongst attitudinal standards: some attitudes (belief, desire) have standards that seem to give rise to genuine normativity; others (boredom, envy) do not. This paper gives a value-based account of which (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  5. Fittingness: A User’s Guide.Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland - 2023 - In Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.
    The chapter introduces and characterizes the notion of fittingness. It charts the history of the relation and its relevance to contemporary debates in normative and metanormative philosophy and proceeds to survey issues to do with fittingness covered in the volume’s chapters, including the nature and epistemology of fittingness, the relations between fittingness and reasons, the normativity of fittingness, fittingness and value theory, and the role of fittingness in theorizing about responsibility. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of issues to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. In defence of good simpliciter.Richard Rowland - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1371-1391.
    Many including Judith Jarvis Thomson, Philippa Foot, Peter Geach, Richard Kraut, and Paul Ziff have argued for good simpliciter skepticism. According to good simpliciter skepticism, we should hold that there is no concept of being good simpliciter or that there is no property of being good simpliciter. I first show that prima facie we should not accept either form of good simpliciter skepticism. I then show that all of the arguments that good simpliciter skeptics have proposed for their view fail (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  7. Rescuing Companions in Guilt Arguments.Richard Rowland - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):161–171.
    Christopher Cowie has recently argued that companions in guilt arguments against the moral error theory that appeal to epistemic reasons cannot work. I show that such companions in guilt arguments can work if, as we have good reason to believe, moral reasons and epistemic reasons are instances of fundamentally the same relation.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  8. The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):802-831.
    This paper is about how moral disagreement matters for metaethics. It has four parts. In the first part I argue that moral facts are subject to a certain epistemic accessibility requirement. Namely, moral facts must be accessible to some possible agent. In the second part I show that because this accessibility requirement on moral facts holds, there is a route from facts about the moral disagreements of agents in idealized conditions to conclusions about what moral facts there are. In the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  9. The normativity of gender.R. A. Rowland - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):244-270.
    There are important similarities between moral thought and talk and thought and talk about gender: disagreements about gender, like disagreements about morality, seem to be intractable and to outstrip descriptive agreement; and it seems coherent to reject any definition of what it is to be a woman in terms of particular social, biological, or other descriptive features, just as it seems coherent to reject any definition of what it is to be good or right in terms of any set of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10.  27
    Moral Disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2020 - Abingdon: Routledge.
    Widespread moral disagreement raises ethical, epistemological, political, and metaethical questions. Is the best explanation of our widespread moral disagreements that there are no objective moral facts and that moral relativism is correct? Or should we think that just as there is widespread disagreement about whether we have free will but there is still an objective fact about whether we have it, similarly, moral disagreement has no bearing on whether morality is objective? More practically, is it arrogant to stick to our (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  11. Dissolving the wrong kind of reason problem.Richard Rowland - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1455-1474.
    According to fitting-attitude (FA) accounts of value, X is of final value if and only if there are reasons for us to have a certain pro-attitude towards it. FA accounts supposedly face the wrong kind of reason (WKR) problem. The WKR problem is the problem of revising FA accounts to exclude so called wrong kind of reasons. And wrong kind of reasons are reasons for us to have certain pro-attitudes towards things that are not of value. I argue that the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  12. Epistemic Permissivism and Reasonable Pluralism.R. Rowland & Robert Mark Simpson - 2021 - In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 112-122.
    There is an intuitive difference in how we think about pluralism and attitudinal diversity in epistemological contexts versus political contexts. In an epistemological context, it seems problematically arbitrary to hold a particular belief on some issue, while also thinking it perfectly reasonable to hold a totally different belief on the same issue given the same evidence. By contrast, though, it doesn’t seem problematically arbitrary to have a particular set of political commitments, while at the same time thinking it perfectly reasonable (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  13. Fittingness.Christopher Howard & Richard Rowland (eds.) - 2022 - Oxford University Press.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14. Reasons or Fittingness First?Richard Rowland - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):212-229.
    Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way argue that we should put fittingness rather than reasons first because we can provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative only if we put fittingness rather than reasons first. I argue that it is no more difficult to provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative if we put reasons rather than fittingness first.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  15. Reasons as the Unity Among the Varieties of Goodness.Richard Rowland - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):200-227.
    Our concepts of good simpliciter, good for, and good as a particular kind of thing must share some common element. I argue that all three types of goodness can be analysed in terms of the reasons that there are for a certain sets of agents to have pro-attitudes. To this end I provide new and compelling accounts of good for and goodness of a kind in terms of reasons for pro-attitudes that are more explanatorily illuminating than competing accounts and that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  16. Our Intuitions About the Experience Machine.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (1):110-117.
    This article responds to a recent empirical study by De Brigard and Weijers on intuitions about the experience machine and what it tells us about hedonism.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  17. The intelligibility of moral intransigence: A dilemma for cognitivism about moral judgment.Richard Rowland - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):266-275.
    Many have argued that various features of moral disagreements create problems for cognitivism about moral judgment, but these arguments have been shown to fail. In this paper, I articulate a new problem for cognitivism that derives from features of our responses to moral disagreement. I argue that cognitivism entails that one of the following two claims is false: (1) a mental state is a belief only if it tracks changes in perceived evidence; (2) it is intelligible to make moral judgments (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  18. Wrong Kind of Reasons and Consequences.Richard Rowland - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (3):405-416.
    In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provided an appealing new solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem for the buck-passing account of value. In subsequent issues Jonas Olson and John Brunero have provided objections to Lang's solution. I argue that Brunero's objection is not a problem for Lang's solution, and that a revised version of Lang's solution avoids Olson's objections. I conclude that we can solve the Wrong Kind of Reason problem, and that the wrong kind of (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  19.  7
    Argument fields.Robert Rowland - 1992 - In William L. Benoit, Dale Hample & Pamela J. Benoit (eds.), Readings in Argumentation. Foris Publications.
  20. Gender Identity and Gender.R. A. Rowland - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Our gender identity is our sense of ourselves as a woman, a man, as genderqueer, or as another gender. Our gender is the property we have of being a woman, being a man, being non-binary, or being another gender. What is the relationship between our gender identity and our gender? Recently, much work has been done on ameliorative accounts of the gender concepts that we should accept and on the metaphysics of gender properties. From this work 4 views of the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Routledge Handbook of Disagreement.Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Richard Rowland (eds.) - 2021 - Routledge.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. Value-First Accounts of Reasons and Fit.R. A. Rowland - 2023 - In Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.
    It is tempting to think that all of normativity, such as our reasons for action, what we ought to do, and the attitudes that it is fitting for us to have, derives from what is valuable. But value-first approaches to normativity have fallen out of favour as the virtues of reasons- and fittingness-first approaches to normativity have become clear. On these views, value is not explanatorily prior to reasons and fit; rather the value of things is understood in terms of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Local Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.Richard Rowland - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):170-199.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments in ethics aim to use facts about the evolutionary causes of ethical beliefs to undermine their justification. Global Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (GDAs) are arguments made in metaethics that aim to undermine the justification of all ethical beliefs. Local Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (LDAs) are arguments made in first‐order normative ethics that aim to undermine the justification of only some of our ethical beliefs. Guy Kahane, Regina Rini, Folke Tersman, and Katia Vavova argue for skepticism about the possibility of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24.  48
    Companions in Guilt: Arguments in Metaethics.Christopher Cowie & Richard Rowland (eds.) - 2019 - Routledge.
    Comparisons between morality and other 'companion' disciplines - such as mathematics, religion, or aesthetics - are commonly used in philosophy, often in the context of arguing for the objectivity of morality. This is known as the 'companions in guilt' strategy. It has been the subject of much debate in contemporary ethics and metaethics. This volume, the first full length examination of companions in guilt arguments, comprises an introduction by the editors and a dozen new chapters by leading authors in the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25.  62
    Guest Editors’ Introduction: De-moralizing Ethics.Roger Crisp, Tyler Paytas & R. A. Rowland - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-6.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Reasons as Reasons for Preferences.R. A. Rowland - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (3):297-311.
    I argue that all reasons for actions and attitudes consist in reasons for preferences; call this view RP. According to RP, reasons for A to believe that p just consist in reasons for A to prefer their believing that p to their not believing that p, and reasons for A to have a pro-attitude or perform an action just consist in reasons for A to prefer that she has that attitude/performs that action. I argue that we have strong reason to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27.  30
    Correction to: Guest Editors’ Introduction: De-moralizing Ethics.Roger Crisp, Tyler Paytas & R. A. Rowland - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-1.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28.  40
    Virtual Learning in a Socially Digitized World.Alexander Laszlo, Regina Rowland, Todd Johnston & Gail Taylor - 2012 - World Futures 68 (8):575-594.
    Contemporary education is awakening from a crisis that has held the development of its potential and its relevance at bay for well over a century. Revolutions in science and spirituality are emerging a new relational intelligence that demands commensurate educational paradigms for its blossoming into daily engagements with life and the world around us. At the same time as people are leading increasingly interconnected lives, aware of and often participating in the narratives of people and ecosystems in other parts of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  29. Integrity and rights to gender-affirming healthcare.R. Rowland - 2022 - Journal of Medical Ethics 48 (11):832-837.
    Gender-affirming healthcare interventions are medical or surgical interventions that aim to allow trans and non-binary people to better affirm their gender identity. It has been argued that rights to GAH must be grounded in either a right to be cured of or mitigate an illness—gender dysphoria—or in harm prevention, given the high rates of depression and suicide among trans and non-binary people. However, these grounds of a right to GAH conflict with the prevalent view among theorists, institutions and activists that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Gender Incongruence and Fit.R. A. Rowland - forthcoming - Australasian Philosophical Review.
    According to the ICD-11 and DSM-5, transgender people’s experienced gender is incongruent with their natal sex or gender and the purpose of gender affirming-healthcare (GAH) interventions is to reduce this incongruence. Vincent and Jane argue that this view is conceptually incoherent—the incoherence thesis—and propose that the ICD and DSM should be revised to understand transgender people as experiencing a merely felt incongruence between their gender and their natal sex or gender—the feelings revision. I argue that (i) Vincent and Jane in (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31.  14
    Making women visible in the embryo experimentation debate.Robyn Rowland - 1987 - Bioethics 1 (2):179–188.
  32.  10
    Making Women Visible in the Embryo Experimentation Debate.Robyn Rowland - 1987 - Bioethics 1 (2):179-188.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  33. Companions in Guilt Arguments in the Epistemology of Moral Disagreement.R. A. Rowland - 2019 - In Christopher Cowie & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 187-205.
    A popular argument is that peer disagreement about controversial moral topics undermines justified moral belief in a way that peer disagreement about non-moral topics does not undermine justified non-moral belief. Call this argument the argument for moral skepticism from peer disagreement. Jason Decker and Daniel Groll have recently made a companions in guilt response to this argument. Decker and Groll argue that if peer disagreement undermines justified moral belief, then peer disagreement undermines much non-moral justified belief; if the argument for (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Radical feminism: History, politics, action.Robyn Rowland & Renate Klein - 1996 - In Diane Bell & Renate Klein (eds.), Radically Speaking: Feminism Reclaimed. Spinifex Press. pp. 9--36.
  35. Moral Error Theory Without Epistemic Error Theory: Scepticism About Second-Personal Reasons.Richard Rowland - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):547-569.
    Proponents of the epistemic companions in guilt argument argue that we should reject the moral error theory because it entails that there are no epistemic reasons. In this paper, I investigate whether a plausible version of the moral error theory can be constructed that does not entail an error theory about epistemic reasons. I argue that there are no irreducibly normative second-personal reasons even if there are irreducibly normative reasons. And epistemic reasons are not second-personal reasons. In this case, a (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Fittingness.Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland (eds.) - 2023 - OUP.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37.  47
    Purpose, Argument Fields, and Theoretical Justification.Robert C. Rowland - 2008 - Argumentation 22 (2):235-250.
    Twenty-five years ago, field theory was among the most contested issues in argumentation studies. Today, the situation is very different. In fact, field theory has almost disappeared from disciplinary debates, a development which might suggest that the concept is not a useful aspect of argumentation theory. In contrast, I argue that while field studies are rarely useful, field theory provides an essential underpinning to any close analysis of an argumentative controversy. I then argue that the conflicting approaches to argument fields (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  38.  5
    Women who Do and Women who Don't Join the Women's Movement.Robyn Rowland - 1984 - Routledge.
    24 women including E. Feal and B. Sykes describe their alignment with womens movement; Both argue that sexism runs second to racism as oppressive agent of black women, womens movement doesnt address their problems.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  39. A Pandora's Box of social and moral problems.Margaret Tighe, N. Tonti‐Filippini, R. Rowland & P. Singer - forthcoming - Bioethics: An Anthology.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40. Writing, Myth and Creativity in Pharaonic Egypt.Marina Scriabine & Rosanna Rowland - 1976 - Diogenes 24 (93):46-66.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. The Stone Men of the Canadian Arctic.Roger Caillois & Rosanna Rowland - 1976 - Diogenes 24 (94):78-93.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Wittgenstein and Contemporary Moral Philosophy.Jonathan Beale & Richard Rowland (eds.) - forthcoming
  43. Routledge Handbook of Disagreement.Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Richard Rowland (eds.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Routledge Handbook of Disagreement.Maria Baghramian, Adam Carter & R. Rowland (eds.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. History and Philosophy: The Birth of Political Philosophy in Greece.Jacqueline De Romilly & Rosanna Rowland - 1974 - Diogenes 22 (88):50-68.
  46.  45
    Counterfeiting.Jean Nepote & Rosanna Rowland - 1978 - Diogenes 26 (101-102):89-104.
    The history of money is several thousand years old., since, it is said, the Chinese first put coins into circulation in about 1100 B.C.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Messianic Myths and Movements.Maria Isaura Pereira de Queiroz & Rosanna Rowland - 1975 - Diogenes 23 (90):78-99.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48.  6
    A Survey of Selected Ciceronian Bibliography, 1953-1965, II.R. J. Rowland - 1966 - Classical World: A Quarterly Journal on Antiquity 60 (3):101.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  8
    A Survey of Selected Ciceronian Bibliography, 1953-1965, I.R. J. Rowland - 1966 - Classical World: A Quarterly Journal on Antiquity 60 (2):51.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Cicero, ad Fam. 7.23.R. J. Rowland - 1969 - Classical World: A Quarterly Journal on Antiquity 62 (9):347.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 65