In C.Q. N.S. vii , 164 ff. Professor Demos raises the question in what sense, if at all, the state which Plato describes in the Republic can be regarded as ideal, if the warrior-class and the masses are ‘deprived of reason’ and therefore imperfect. The ideal state, he thinks, appears at first sight to be composed of un-ideal individuals. But ‘the problem is resolved by separating the personal from the political-technical areas of control. In so far as they are citizens, (...) men in the ideal city will indeed represent one part of the soul and one function.…. (shrink)
In a recent article in the Philosophical Review Professor Gregory Vlastos has given an acute analysis of the ‘Third Man’ Argument as it appears in the Parmenides for which all Platonic scholars will be grateful. In view of the importance of the article and the interest that it has aroused, I should like to offer one or two criticisms of his conclusions.
The arguments usually propounded to show that the Greater Alcibiades was not written by Plato seem to me, by themselves, inconclusive. I believe that it would be better to begin by arguing that we are given a suggestion of a generic or universal likeness between one innermost ‘self’ and another, and a method of acquiring wisdom and of apprehending God that are hardly in keeping with Plato's dialogues. My present purpose, however, is to draw attention to a striking parallelism between (...) the Alcibiades and early works of Aristotle, as well as certain other compositions that probably belong to the same period as the latter. (shrink)
Plato's Meno and Phaedo are two of the most important works of ancient western philosophy and continue to be studied around the world. The Meno is a seminal work of epistemology. The Phaedo is a key source for Platonic metaphysics and for Plato's conception of the human soul. Together they illustrate the birth of Platonic philosophy from Plato's reflections on Socrates' life and doctrines. This edition offers new and accessible translations of both works, together with a thorough introduction that explains (...) the arguments of the two dialogues and their place in Plato's thought. (shrink)
Chapters 12 and 13 of the De Interpretations present some puzzles, which it is my purpose to try to solve. The latest commentator, Professor Jaakke Hintikka, attempts in Acta Philosophica Fennica xiv , 5–22, to abolish the difficulties by taking certain verbs in an unusual way. He suggests that in these chapters , which is usually taken to denote logical consequence, sometimes expresses simply compatibility , sometimes equivalence , and that at 22a38ff., 22b3O, and 23a17 , which again is usually (...) taken to denote consequence, in fact expresses compatibility. I propose to counter Hintikka's arguments and to maintain that both verbs express consequence; but as my main purpose is to give my own explanation of the general trend of Aristotle's remarks, I shall take the passages discussed by Hintikka in the order in which they occur in Aristotle's text. (shrink)
The first question here is the interpretation of line 638. Burges wrote: ‘Constructio sic solvenda est: M. Parmentier in the Budé edition translates, ‘On ne souffre pas quand on n'a nul sentiment de ses maux’, likewise assuming that is doing double work. For this he compares Andromache 706 f., Electra, 383, and Orestes 393. None of these passages is in fact an example of how a negative can negative simultaneously a finite verb and a participle. But in any case, what (...) is the subject of Burges supposed that a line was lost ; Parmentier does not explain his ‘On’. (shrink)