The primary narrative problem of the analyst is, then, not how to tell a normative chronological life history; rather, it is how to tell the several histories of each analysis. From this vantage point, the event with which to start the model analytic narration is not the first occasion of thought—Freud's wish-fulfilling hallucination of the absent breast; instead, one should start from a narrative account of the psychoanalyst's retelling of something told by an analysand and the analysand's response to that (...) narrative transformation. In the narration of this moment of dialogue lies the structure of the analytic past, present, and future. It is from this beginning that the accounts of early infantile development are constructed. Those traditional developmental accounts, over which analysts labored so hard, may now be seen in a new light: less as positivistic sets of factual findings about mental development and more as hermeneutically filled-in narrative structures. The narrative structures that have been adopted control the telling of the events of the analysis, including the many tellings and retellings of the analysand's life history. The time is always present. The event is always an outgoing dialogue. Roy Schafer is clinical professor of psychology and psychiatry at Cornell University Medical College, adjunct professor of psychology at New York University, and a supervising and training analyst at Columbia University's Center for Psychoanalytic Training and Research. He is the author of A New Language for Psychoanalysis, Language and Insight, and Narrative Actions in Psychoanalysis: Narratives of Space and Narratives of Time. (shrink)

Schafer contends that we suffer from an overabundance of acoustic information, and explores ways to restore our ability to hear the nuances of sounds around us.

In this paper, I focus on Kant’s doctrine of figurative synthesis. Figurative synthesis is the result of the activity of productive transcendental imagination. This is the chief problem of the so-called “second proof step” in Kant’s deduction of the categories according to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. The pure original synthetic apperception forms in the inner and outer sense - i. e. in time and space - by self-affection structures of order that make it possible to (...) cognize empirical objects. The order of space and time through figurative syntheses must be distinguished on the one hand from space and time as forms of intuition and on the other hand from the order of the manifold given in space and time. This clarifies the differences and relations between the constitutive noetic faculties of our knowledge apparatus. (shrink)

Journal Name: Cognitive Linguistics Issue: Ahead of print.

The debate between metaphor theorists and conceptual historians has been intensifying in recent years. This article takes this debate beyond the bias toward Blumenberg's metaphorology, and starts from the interaction view of metaphor as formulated by Max Black. The article opens with a theoretical framework that reformulates Black's notions of metaphorical resonance and emphasis. It adapts them to the requirements of Conceptual History, and adds a third, historical criterion for metaphoricity. It then applies these suggestions to the history of the (...) metaphor play/game/Spiel/jeu within twentieth-century political thought. Here, the focus lies on the role this metaphor plays in the conceptual relations between the ideas of political order, conflict, and immanence. (shrink)

Experimental results on spectra and wave functions of a ray-splitting microwave billiard are presented. The billiard is formed by a flat rectangular microwave cavity with a quarter-circle insert made of teflon in one of the corners. Using the Gutzwiller trace formula, the contribution of the periodic orbits of the billiard to the density of states are determined. The wave functions, many of them showing scars associated with periodic orbits, are interpreted in terms of the semiclassical Green function.

Name der Zeitschrift: Paragrana Jahrgang: 25 Heft: 1 Seiten: 176-191.

In dieser Untersuchung wird Descartes' Hervorhebung der Rolle der Subjektivität in der Begründung von Wahrheit und Erkenntnis verteidigt. Die Subjektivität generiert einerseits durch eine von ihr hergestellte Erkenntnisordnung und Wissensökonomie Einsicht in neue Wahrheiten und andererseits folgt aus dem wissenden und unbezweifelbaren Selbstverhältnis des endlichen Subjekts die Evidenz als Wahrheitskriterium. Dadurch gelingt es Descartes den notwendigen Zusammenhang von Wahrheitsgeltung und Verifikation in den kognitiven Leistungen des Subjekts zu plausibilisieren. Neuartig ist die hier vertretene These, dass sich das Wahrheitskonzept der Evidenz (...) gegen den Vorwurf des Psychologismus verteidigen lässt. (shrink)