The European project European and Latin American Systems of Ethics Regulation of Biomedical Research Project (EULABOR) has carried out the first comparative analysis of ethics regulation systems for biomedical research in seven countries in Europe and Latin America, evaluating their roles in the protection of human subjects. We developed a conceptual and methodological framework defining ‘ethics regulation system for biomedical research’ as a set of actors, institutions, codes and laws involved in overseeing the ethics of biomedical research on humans. This (...) framework allowed us to develop comprehensive national reports by conducting semi-structured interviews to key informants. These reports were summarised and analysed in a comparative analysis. The study showed that the regulatory framework for clinical research in these countries differ in scope. It showed that despite the different political contexts, actors involved and motivations for creating the regulation, in most of the studied countries it was the government who took the lead in setting up the system. The study also showed that Europe and Latin America are similar regarding national bodies and research ethics committees, but the Brazilian system has strong and noteworthy specificities. (shrink)

This book is a collection of secondary essays on America's most important philosophic thinkers—statesmen, judges, writers, educators, and activists—from the colonial period to the present. Each essay is a comprehensive introduction to the thought of a noted American on the fundamental meaning of the American regime.

Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents: Rudolf HALLER: Zwei Vorworte in einem. Evelyn DÖLLING: Alexius Meinong: "Der blinde Seher Theiresias". Jaakko HINTIKKA: Meinong in a Long Perspective. Richard SYLVAN: Re-Exploring Item-Theory. Francesca MODENATO: Meinong's Theory of Objects: An Attempt at Overcoming Psychologism. Jan WOLE??N??SKI: Ways of Dealing with Non-existence. Karel LAMBERT: Substitution and the Expansion of the World. Terence PARSONS: Meinongian Semantics Generalized. Reinhardt GROSSMANN: Thoughts, Objectives and States of Affairs. Peter SIMONS: Meinong's Theory of Sense and Reference. Barry SMITH: More Things in (...) Heaven and Earth. Michele LENOCI: Meinongs unvollständige Gegenstände und das Universalienproblem. Maria E. REICHER: Gibt es unvollständige Gegenstände? Dale JACQUETTE: Meinong's Concept of Implexive Being and Nonbeing. Herbert HOCHBERG:s, Functions, Existence and Relations in the Russell-Meinong Dispute, the Bradley Paradox and the Realism-Nominalism Controversy. Jacek PA_NICZEK: Are Contradictions Still Lurking in Meinongian Theories of Objects? Marie-Luise SCHUBERT KALSI: Apriorische Elemente im Denken. Liliana ALBERTAZZI: Forms of Completion. Johann Ch. MAREK: Zwei Gegenstände und ein Inhalt. Zur Intentionalität bei Meinong. Wolfgang KÜNNE: Some Varieties of Thinking. Reflections on Meinong and Fodor. Alberto VOLTOLINI: Is Meaning Without Actually Existing Reference Naturalizable? Markus S. STEPANIANS: Russells Kritik an Meinongs Begriff des Annahmeschlusses. Nenad MIŠ_EVI_: Imagination and Necessity. R.D. ROLLINGER: Meinong on Perception: Two Questions Concerning Propositional Seeing. Wolfgang G. STOCK: Die Genese der Theorie der Vorstellungsproduktion der Grazer Schule. Rudolf HALLER: Über Meinongs Wissenschaftstheorie. Alfred SCHRAMM: Meinongs Wahrscheinlichkeit. Karl SCHUHMANN: Der Wertbegriff beim frühen Meinong. Wilhelm BAUMGARTNER: Wertpräsentation. Ursula ZEGLÉN: Meinong's Analysis of Lying. Seppo SAJAMA: Hitting Reality: France Veber's Concept of Zadevanje. Matja_ POTR_: Sensation According to Meinong and Veber. Róbert SOMOS: Zwei Schüler Brentanos: Ákos von Pauler und Meinong. J.C. NYÍRI: Palágyis Kritik an der Gegenstandstheorie. David M. ARMSTRONG: Reaction to Meinong. (shrink)

Extant literature on Goodman’s ‘New Riddle of Induction’ deals mainly with two versions. I consider both of them, starting from the (‘epistemic’) version of Goodman’s classic of 1954. It turns out that it belongs to the realm of applications of inductive logic, and that it can be resolved by admitting only significant evidence (as I call it) for confirmations of hypotheses. Sect. 1 prepares some ground for the argument. As much of it depends on the notion of evidential significance, this (...) concept is defined and its introduction motivated. Further, I introduce and explain the distinction between support and confirmation: put in a slogan, ‘confirmation is support by significant evidence’. The second section deals with the Riddle itself. I demonstrate that, given the provisions of the first section, not ‘anything confirms anything’: significant green-evidence confirms only green-hypotheses (and no grue-hypotheses), and significant grue-evidence confirms only grue-hypotheses (and no green-hypotheses), whichever terms we use for expressing these evidences or hypotheses. The third section rounds off my treatment. First I show that Frank Jackson’s use of his counterfactual condition is unsuccessful. Further, I argue that no unwanted consequences result, if one starts from the other, ‘objective’, definition of ‘grue’, as it constitutes no more than a mere fact of logic that cannot do any harm. Finally, I present a grue-case involving both kinds of definition, where the exclusive confirmation of either the green- or the grue-hypothesis is shown. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, Schramm presents what he takes to be an answer to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction. His solution relies on the technical notion of evidential significance, which is meant to distinguish two ways that evidence may bear on a hypothesis: either via support or confirmation. As he puts his view in slogan form: “confirmation is support by significant evidence”. Once we make this distinction, Schramm claims, we see that Goodman’s famous riddle is (...) dissolved, and we are no longer forced into the “intolerable result” that anything confirms anything. Schramm makes a number of incisive observations in his paper, but I do not think he has solved the New Riddle. There are two reasons for this. First, Schramm has an overly narrow conception of what the Riddle amounts to; I would venture to guess that it is narrower than that of most contemporary philosophers. Thus his proposal does not address the primary concern. Second, Schramm’s notion of significant evidence relies on a counterfactual condition that bears more than a passing resemblance to that made famous by Jackson in his paper on the topic. However, Jackson’s proposal faces several well-known counterexamples, some of which can be adapted into Schramm’s framework. Schramm’s solution thus inherits a number of outstanding problems from Jackson’s proposal, which he has not shown us how to handle. (shrink)

Upon separation of the protein from the nucleic acid component of tobacco mosaic virus by phenol, using a fast and gentle procedure, the nucleic acid is infective in assays on tobacco leaves. A series of qualitative and quantitative control experiments demonstrates that the biological activity cannot depend on residual proteins in the preparation, but is a property of isolated nucleic acid which is thus the genetic material of the virus.

In many European countries, the explicit discussion of race as a biological phenomenon has long been avoided. This has not meant that race has become obsolete or irrelevant all together. Rather, it is a slippery object that keeps shifting and changing. To understand its slippery nature, we suggest that race in Europe is best viewed as an absent presence, something that oscillates between reality and nonreality, which appears on the surface and then hides underground. In this special issue, we explore (...) how race has been configured in different practices and how race-based identities and technologies are entwined in various European settings. (shrink)

Seit vielen Jahren bemüht sich der Freiburger Historiker Gottfried Schramm als ex principio zur Geschichte umgeschwenkter Linguist auf einem selten besuchten Arbeitsfeld, indem er systematisch nachzuprüfen versucht, ob und inwieweit philologische Analyse von Namen- und sonstigem Wortgut aus verschiedenen Zeiten und Regionen zu historisch relevanten Schlüssen gelangen läßt. Eine stattliche Reihe von Monographien ist jetzt um einen weiteren Band ergänzt worden, wo der Verf. seine früheren Studien zum historischen „Wunder“ Altrußland gesammelt, vervollkommnet und weitergeführt hat. Altrußland wird als ein (...) einmaliges Staatsgebilde dargestellt, das aus Fernhandelsinteressen warägischer, zu festen Mannschaften organisierter Einkömmlinge entstanden, auf Beschaffung von Exportgütern aus dem slawischen und finnischen Hinterland ausgerichtet wäre, auf einem weitgespannten Netz von Stützpunkten an den wichtigsten Flußwegen basierte und, nachdem Zustrom des arabischen Münzensilbers nach Osteuropa um die Wende des 10. Jh. versiegt war, sich überraschend lebens- und wandlungsfähig erwiesen hätte. Die Leitidee, die den Verf. begeistert, nämlich eines warägischen Fernhandelsreiches in Osteuropa, ist nicht neu; neu dagegen ist der Versuch, dieses Konzept von seiten aller einschlägigen Disziplinen systematisch abzustützen. Eine oft neuartige Beweisführung, reich an wichtigen Nuancen und spezifischen Details, macht die Lage des Rezensenten, das Gesamte in notwendiger Kürze beurteilen zu müssen, besonders schwierig. (shrink)

Freitag (2015) and Schramm (2014) have proposed different, although converging, solutions of Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction. Answering their proposals, Dorst (2016 and 2018) has used the fictitious character of a ‘grue-speaker’ as his principal device for criticizing counterfactual-based treatments of the Riddle. In this paper, I argue that Dorst’s arguments fail: On the observation of no other than green emeralds, the ‘grue-speaker’ cannot use the symmetry between the ‘green’- and ‘grue’-languages for claiming ‘grue’- instead of ‘green’-evidence, and the (...) counterfactuals involved (explicitly by Schramm and implicitly by Freitag) remain unaffected by Dorst’s proposal for how to evaluate them. (shrink)

We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...) Mates cases, and we believe that there are many additional applications. (shrink)

Research on parasocial interactions and parasocial relationships refers back to a tradition of 50 years. However, research on both phenomena still suffers from overlapping definitions and resulting measurements that do not distinguish between PSI and PSR. The present study presents a post-exposure measurement tool that aims to measure PSI instead of PSR. It is derived from a theoretical model that specifically focuses on PSI. Psychometric analyses indicate the tool's high usability. It is capable of displaying both the intensity and the (...) dimensionality of PSI. It can be applied to measure both positive and negative PSI across all TV formats, without changing the item wording. In sum, the PSI-Process-Scales may offer a valuable alternative for researchers in the field, specifically if they want to assess parasocial processes that take place throughout TV exposure. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the conceptualisation of responsible innovation by proposing an evolutionary economic approach that focuses on the role of consumers in the innovation process. After a discussion of the philosophical foundations and ethical implications of this approach, which bears an explanatory potential that has not been adequately considered in previous discussions of responsible innovation, we present a first step towards capturing the important but often neglected role of consumers in innovation processes : We propose an agent-based model that (...) incorporates a multidimensional space of characteristics in which new products or services are represented by more than the mere aspect of price and quality. Instead, innovations are denoted by a large set of characteristics, including also negative or harmful ones. The model is used to illustrate that consumers’ heterogeneity and bounded rationality – even if considered in a simple manner – indeed play a crucial role in the creation and diffusion of responsible innovation which can and should be used for further work in this field and for possible extensions of the model. (shrink)

In today’s social online world there is a variety of interaction and participatory possibilities which enable web users to actively produce content themselves. This user-generated content is omnipresent in the web and there is growing evidence that it is used to select or evaluate professionally created online information. The present study investigated how this surrounding content affects online advertising by drawing from social influence theory. Specifically, it was assumed that web users sharing an interpersonal relationship and/or a group membership with (...) authors of user-generated content which appears next to advertising on the web page are more strongly influenced in their response to the advertising than unrelated users. These assumptions were tested in a 2 × 2 between-subject experiment with 118 students who were exposed to four different Facebook profiles that differed in terms of interpersonal connection to the source and collective connection to the source. The results show a significant impact in the case of collective influence, but not in the case of interpersonal influence. The underlying mechanisms of this effect and implications of the results for online advertising are discussed. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Obwohl sich Männer im Allgemeinen stärker für Fußball interessieren als Frauen, verfolgen Frauen die Spiele bei Fußballgroßereignissen wie Welt- oder Europameisterschaften mittlerweile genauso begeistert wie Männer. Was aber sind die Gründe für die Fußballrezeption bei Frauen und Männern? Diese explorative Studie untersucht die Intensität und den Verlauf von Rezeptionsmotiven während der Fußballeuropameisterschaft 2012 anhand von 904 Teilnehmerinnen einer Online-Befragung und analysiert dabei Unterschiede zwischen Männern und Frauen. Es lassen sich die vier Rezeptionsmotivfaktoren Mitfiebern, Information, Neugier auf Fußballteams und Erwartetes (...) Konfliktpotenfial ermitteln. Im Turnierverlauf bleiben die Intensität dieser Motive konstant, jedoch zeigen sich bedeutsame Unterschiede zwischen Männern und Frauen, selbst bei gleich starkem Fußballinteresse. (shrink)

Keith Lehrer describes in his Theory of Knowledge a Justification Game which is played by a Claimant who tries to establish his justification for some contingent claim and a rather harmless Skeptic who tries to stop the Claimant. The doubts of a serious philosophical skeptic are - in opposition to Lehrer - analyzed as doubts concerning the justification of our beliefs and not their contents. Making the reglementations for a solid philosophical argumentation more precise the setting of a Serious Justification (...) Game is defined and thus replaying the game it tums out that the philosophical skeptic succeeds in providing a profound philosophical argumentation for his denial of Lehrer's positive claim for justification. (shrink)

Chisholm definiert seine ''Begriffe der epistemischen Bewertung" (z.B. "gewiß", "evident") mithilfe der Undefinierten Relation "vernünftiger als". Diese Relation ist zweideutig und es wird gezeigt, daß sich, wenn man die beiden Bedeutungen sorgfältig auseinanderhält, in jedem Fall die Chisholmschen Begriffe der epistemischen Bewertung als nicht adäquat definiert herausstellen.

Chisholm definiert seine ''Begriffe der epistemischen Bewertung" mithilfe der Undefinierten Relation "vernünftiger als". Diese Relation ist zweideutig und es wird gezeigt, daß sich, wenn man die beiden Bedeutungen sorgfältig auseinanderhält, in jedem Fall die Chisholmschen Begriffe der epistemischen Bewertung als nicht adäquat definiert herausstellen.

This book is a thorough and critical, comparative analysis of the logic of modern scientific thought and of traditional teachings generally referred to as mythological and mystical. Different rationalities with different domains of interest and legitimacy exist, which should not be confused and cannot be unified in any theory of "Ultimate Reality." Atlan suggests they must coexist in practice, although each of them presents itself as an exclusive and all-encompassing truth. The book introduces teachings from Jewish talmudic, midrashic, and kabbalist (...) sources and text from Zen and Taoism to exemplify the kind of rationality or controlled irrationality at work in such traditional thinking. (shrink)

Abstrakt Der Artikel fragt nach der Rezeption von Platons Freundschafts- und Liebesbegriff bei Plotin. Zunächst wird gezeigt, dass Platons Liebestheorie im Symposion und im Phaidros gleichermaßen auf den Aufstieg zum Ideenhimmel und die Selbstvervollkommnung des Liebenden abzielt, wobei der Phaidros mit der Freundschaft als schwächerer, durch Reziprozität gekennzeichneter Form der Liebe die soziale Dimension des Aufstiegs und der Vervollkommnung thematisiert. Dann wird nachgezeichnet, inwiefern Plotins Liebes- und Freundschaftsbegriff Theorieelemente aus Platons Symposion und Phaidros fortentwickelt. Nach Plotin ist die Liebe das (...) Movens des Aufstiegs zum Einen und die Freundschaft das Movens des dazu komplementären Abstiegs zur Vielheit. Es wird schließlich gezeigt, dass Platon wie Plotin ausschließlich an der philosophischen Freundschaft und Liebe interessiert sind und diese zentral für ihr Konzept von Erziehung und Selbsterziehung sind. (shrink)

Es wird ein System von Postulaten entwickelt, welches unter Interpretation durch epistemische Wörter (Glauben, Wissen, gerechtfertigtes Glauben etc.) eine Explikation der einschlägigen Begriffe liefert. Die solcherart explizierten Begriffe ergeben, daß nur noch die Wahl zwischen Totalskepsis oder fundamentalistischer Erkenntnistheorie offen bleibt: kein gerechtfertigtes Glauben ist möglich ohne ein zugrundeHegendes Wissen vorauszusetzen. Der traditionellen Wissensdefinition (wahres gerechtfertigtes Glauben) wird ein guter Sinn unterlegt bei gleichzeitiger Vermeidung der bekannten Schwierigkeiten (z.B. Gettiers Problem).