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Rory Smead [18]R. Smead [1]
  1. Evolutionary Dynamics of Lewis Signaling Games: Signaling Systems Vs. Partial Pooling.M. Huttegger Simon, Skyrms Brian, Smead Rory & J. S. Zollman Kevin - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):177-191.
    Transfer of information between senders and receivers, of one kind or another, is essential to all life. David Lewis introduced a game theoretic model of the simplest case, where one sender and one receiver have pure common interest. How hard or easy is it for evolution to achieve information transfer in Lewis signaling?. The answers involve surprising subtleties. We discuss some if these in terms of evolutionary dynamics in both finite and infinite populations, with and without mutation.
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  2. A Bargaining Game Analysis of International Climate Negotiations.John Basl, Ronald Sandler, Rory Smead & Patrick Forber - 2014 - Nature Climate Change 4:442-445.
    Climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change have so far failed to achieve a robust international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Game theory has been used to investigate possible climate negotiation solutions and strategies for accomplishing them. Negotiations have been primarily modelled as public goods games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, though coordination games or games of conflict have also been used. Many of these models have solutions, in the form of equilibria, corresponding to possible (...)
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  3.  43
    An Evolutionary Paradox for Prosocial Behavior.Patrick Forber & Rory Smead - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (3):151-166.
    We investigate how changes to the payoffs of cooperative behavior affect the evolutionary dynamics. Paradoxically, the larger the benefits of cooperation, the less likely it is to evolve. This holds true even in cases where cooperation is strictly dominant. Increasing the benefits from prosocial behavior has two effects: first, in some circumstances it promotes the evolution of spite; and second, it can decrease the strength of selection leading to nearly neutral evolution of strategies. In light of these results we must (...)
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  4.  8
    The Role of Social Interaction in the Evolution of Learning.R. Smead - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):161-180.
    It is generally thought that cognition evolved to help us navigate complex environments. Social interactions make up one part of a complex environment, and some have argued that social settings are crucial to the evolution of cognition. This article uses the methods of evolutionary game theory to investigate the effect of social interaction on the evolution of cognition broadly construed as strategic learning or plasticity. I delineate the conditions under which social interaction alone, apart from any additional external environmental variation, (...)
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  5.  29
    The Evolution of Cooperation in the Centipede Game with Finite Populations.Rory Smead - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (2):157-177.
    The partial cooperation displayed by subjects in the Centipede Game deviates radically from the predictions of traditional game theory. Even standard, infinite population, evolutionary settings have failed to provide an explanation for this behavior. However, recent work in finite population evolutionary models has shown that such settings can produce radically different results from the standard models. This paper examines the evolution of partial cooperation in finite populations. The results reveal a new possible explanation that is not open to the standard (...)
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  6.  23
    Plasticity and Language: An Example of the Baldwin Effect?Kevin J. S. Zollman & Rory Smead - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):7-21.
    In recent years, many scholars have suggested that the Baldwin effect may play an important role in the evolution of language. However, the Baldwin effect is a multifaceted and controversial process and the assessment of its connection with language is difficult without a formal model. This paper provides a first step in this direction. We examine a game-theoretic model of the interaction between plasticity and evolution in the context of a simple language game. Additionally, we describe three distinct aspects of (...)
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  7.  13
    The Stability of Strategic Plasticity.Rory Smead & Kevin J. S. Zollman - unknown
    Recent research into the evolution of higher cognition has piqued an interest in the effect of natural selection on the ability of creatures to respond to their environment. It is believed that environmental variation is required for plasticity to evolve in cases where the ability to be plastic is costly. We investigate one form of environmental variation: frequency dependent selection. Using tools in game theory, we investigate a few models of plasticity and outline the cases where selection would be expected (...)
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  8.  8
    Deception and the Evolution of Plasticity.Rory Smead - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):852-865.
    Recent models using simple signaling games provide a theoretical setting for investigating the evolutionary connection between signaling and behavioral plasticity. These models have shown that plasticity is typically eliminated in common-interest signaling games. In many real cases of signaling, however, interests do not align. Here, I present a model of the evolution of plasticity in signaling games and consider games of common, opposed, and partially aligned interests. I find that the setting of partial common interest is most conducive to the (...)
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  9.  32
    The Stability of Strategic Plasticity.Rory Smead & Kevin J. S. Zollman - manuscript
    Recent research into the evolution of higher cognition has piqued an interest in the effect of natural selection on the ability of creatures to respond to their environment (behavioral plasticity). It is believed that environmental variation is required for plasticity to evolve in cases where the ability to be plastic is costly. We investigate one form of environmental variation: frequency dependent selection. Using tools in game theory, we investigate a few models of plasticity and outline the cases where selection would (...)
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  10.  36
    Efficient Social Contracts and Group Selection.Simon Huttegger & Rory Smead - 2011 - Biology and Philosophy 26 (4):517-531.
    We consider the Stag Hunt in terms of Maynard Smith’s famous Haystack model. In the Stag Hunt, contrary to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, there is a cooperative equilibrium besides the equilibrium where every player defects. This implies that in the Haystack model, where a population is partitioned into groups, groups playing the cooperative equilibrium tend to grow faster than those at the non-cooperative equilibrium. We determine under what conditions this leads to the takeover of the population by cooperators. Moreover, we compare (...)
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  11.  15
    Brian Skyrms , Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information . New York: Oxford University Press (2010), 208 Pp., $27.00 (Paper). [REVIEW]Rory Smead - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (4):702-705.
  12.  37
    Indirect Reciprocity and the Evolution of “Moral Signals”.Rory Smead - 2010 - Biology and Philosophy 25 (1):33-51.
    Signals regarding the behavior of others are an essential element of human moral systems and there are important evolutionary connections between language and large-scale cooperation. In particular, social communication may be required for the reputation tracking needed to stabilize indirect reciprocity. Additionally, scholars have suggested that the benefits of indirect reciprocity may have been important for the evolution of language and that social signals may have coevolved with large-scale cooperation. This paper investigates the possibility of such a coevolution. Using the (...)
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  13.  4
    The Evolution of Spite, Recognition, and Morality.Patrick Forber & Rory Smead - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):884-896.
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  14.  15
    The Ontogeny and Evolution of Human Collaboration.Brian McLoone & Rory Smead - 2014 - Biology and Philosophy 29 (4):559-576.
    How is the human tendency and ability to collaborate acquired and how did it evolve? This paper explores the ontogeny and evolution of human collaboration using a combination of theoretical and empirical resources. We present a game theoretic model of the evolution of learning in the Stag Hunt game, which predicts the evolution of a built-in cooperative bias. We then survey recent empirical results on the ontogeny of collaboration in humans, which suggest the ability to collaborate is developmentally stable across (...)
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  15.  9
    On the Rationality of Inconsistent Predictions: The March Madness Paradox.Rory Smead - 2016 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 43 (1):163-169.
    There are circumstances in which we want to predict a series of interrelated events. Faced with such a prediction task, it is natural to consider logically inconsistent predictions to be irrational. However, it is possible to find cases where an inconsistent prediction has higher expected accuracy than any consistent prediction. Predicting tournaments in sports provides a striking example of such a case and I argue that logical consistency should not be a norm of rational predictions in these situations.
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  16.  10
    Evolution and the Classification of Social Behavior.Patrick Forber & Rory Smead - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (3):405-421.
    Recent studies in the evolution of cooperation have shifted focus from altruistic to mutualistic cooperation. This change in focus is purported to reveal new explanations for the evolution of prosocial behavior. We argue that the common classification scheme for social behavior used to distinguish between altruistic and mutualistic cooperation is flawed because it fails to take into account dynamically relevant game-theoretic features. This leads some arguments about the evolution of cooperation to conflate dynamical scenarios that differ regarding the basic conditions (...)
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  17.  5
    Game Theory and the Ethics of Global Climate Change.Rory Smead - forthcoming - Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche.
  18.  1
    Evolution and Rationality: Decisions, Co-Operation and Strategic Behavior. [REVIEW]Rory Smead - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 44 (3):451-454.
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  19.  3
    Evolution and Apparent Irrationality.Rory Smead - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (3):451-454.
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