Moral philosophy is the study of what morality is and what it requires of us. As Socrates said, it's about "how we ought to live"-and why. It would be helpful if we could begin with a simple, uncontroversial definition of what morality is. Unfortunately, we cannot. There are many rival theories, each expounding a different conception of what it means to live morally, and any definition that goes beyond Socrates's simple formula-tion is bound to offend at least one of them. (...) This should make us cautious, but it need not paralyze us. In this chapter, I will describe the "minimum conception" of morality. (shrink)

Après le succès du Courage de la nuance, Jean Birnbaum poursuit son enquête sur l''héroïsme du doute' avec une réflexion personnelle et politique sur l'enfance. Dans ce nouveau livre, il montre comment la naissance d'un enfant fait vaciller toute certitude. Ce qui l'intéresse, c'est une expérience banale mais qui a peu attiré l'attention des penseurs: devenir le parent d'un enfant, c'est constater ses effets sur notre rapport aux autres et sur notre vision politique des choses. Si, depuis Socrate, le (...) philosophe est celui qui dynamite nos préjugés, alors le bébé s'impose comme le plus subversif des philosophes. Cette fois encore, Jean Birnbaum mêle réflexions et émotions. Il se tourne vers des auteurs aimés (Hannah Arendt, Georges Bernanos, Roland Barthes, Rosa Luxemburg...) et puise dans sa propre expérience. À l'heure où le mouvement 'No kids' dénonce la procréation comme une catastrophe intime et écologique, ce livre proclame la solidarité essentielle entre espoir d'une société meilleure et promesse de la vie donnée, transmise, sauvée ; il n'y a pas d'émancipation sans générations, pas d'avenir sans enfants, pas de fraternité sans bébés."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Avec l’espace, disait Emmanuel Kant, le temps constitue la « forme a priori » de notre sensibilité. Autrement dit, le temps est l’horizon à travers lequel nous faisons l’expérience du monde, il structure notre façon d'aller à la rencontre de ce qui est. Or la modernité semble désormais compromettre les conditions de cette rencontre. Tout va de plus en plus vite : entre « fast-food », « speed dating » et haut débit, notre époque se distingue par la toute-puissance de (...) la vitesse. Ce qui est en jeu, ici, ce n’est plus seulement l’emballement de l’innovation technique, mais l’accélération du réel lui-même. Voilà l’une des désillusions du progrès : plus nous sommes équipés de machines, d’appareils censés nous faire gagner du temps, et plus nous avons le sentiment d’en manquer. Dans les relations sociales comme dans la vie intime, en politique comme en amour, notre quotidien est marqué par l’urgence, la peur de ne pouvoir suivre. La tyrannie du court terme comprime l’espace. Le triomphe de l’immédiat rend impossible toute vie au présent. Le règne de l’instantanéité enterre la mémoire et dynamite l’avenir. Bref, l’accélération des choses rétrécit le champ de l’expérience, à commencer par cette condition de toute vie humaine qu’on nomme confiance : « La confiance ne saurait être de l'ordre de l'instantané, écrit le philosophe Paul Virilio. Elle doit se construire, se mériter, dans le temps. La confiance instantanée, la foi instantanée, cela ne marche pas. Il faut du temps pour avoir confiance ». Reconstruire un espace de discussion, d’amitié et de justice, c’est donc ralentir le rythme, repartir à la conquête du temps long. Artistes, philosophes, géographes ou historiens, hommes d’images ou femmes de lettres, les intervenants tenteront de répondre ensemble à cette question : « Où est passé le temps? ». Trois jours durant, fidèle à sa tradition d'échanges et de dialogue, le Forum a confronté leurs réponses aux interrogations et aux objections du public. (shrink)

A joke is amusing if and only if it’s fitting to be amused by it; an act is regrettable if and only if it’s fitting to regret it. Many philosophers accept these biconditionals and hold that analogous ones obtain between a wide range of additional evaluative properties and the fittingness of corresponding responses. Call these the _fit–value biconditionals_. The biconditionals give us a systematic way of recognizing the role of fit in our ethical practices; they also serve as the bedrock (...) of various metaethical projects, such as fitting-attitude analysis of value and the ‘fittingness first’ approach. Yet despite the importance of the biconditionals, there is very little discussion of their proper interpretation. This paper argues that any plausible interpretation of the fit_–_value biconditionals must disarm several kinds of apparent counterexample. For instance, that an achievement is pride-worthy doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to take pride in it because the achievement might not be mine or that of anyone close to me; that a joke is amusing doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to be amused by it for six straight months; and that a person is loveable doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to love him romantically because that person might be my sibling. We consider possible responses to such counterexamples and develop what we consider the most promising interpretation of the biconditionals. The upshot is that certain widespread assumptions about fit and its relation to value and reasons should be reconsidered. (shrink)

Lucidly and persuasively written, this book will be an invaluable resource for students and scholars seeking to understand Irigaray's original contribution to philosophical and feminist thought.

On the Life of Abraham displays Philo's philosophical, exegetical, and literary genius at its best. Philo begins by introducing the biblical figures Enos, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob as unwritten laws. Then, interweaving literal, ethical, and allegorical interpretations, Philo presents the life and achievements of Abraham, founder of the Jewish nation, in the form of a Greco-Roman bios, or biography. Ellen Birnbaum and John Dillon explain why and how this work is important within the context of Philo's own (...) oeuvre, early Jewish and Christian exegesis, and ancient philosophy. They also offer a new English translation and detailed analyses, in which they elucidate the meaning of Philo's thought, including his perplexing notion that Israel's ancestors were laws in themselves. (shrink)

Il y a quelques années, un Forum Philo Le Monde/ Le Mans entièrement consacré au thème de la "peur" aurait été impensable. Trop étroit, ou trop sombre. Pourtant, lorsque cette idée a été suggérée à l'automne 2016, la réaction a été unanime : ce qui aurait naguère suscité une réticence relevait maintenant de l'urgence. La peur s'imposait comme une évidence. Est-ce un effet des attentats djihadistes? Le résultat de la précarité sociale, des nouvelles tensions géopolitiques ou des multiples dérèglements climatiques? (...) Quoi qu'il en soit, la peur est là, multiforme et solide. Plutôt que de l'écarter d'un revers de main en affirmant qu'elle est sans objet ou qu'elle relève d'une orchestration politique (le fameux "gouvernement de la peur"), il convient de l'affronter. L'enjeu importe. En effet, si la crainte est classiquement envisagée comme le ressort du despotisme, la communauté de la peur ne saurait tenir lieu de communauté politique. D'où la nécessité de la surmonter, ou du moins de la déconstruire. Des philosophes, des historiens mais aussi des écrivains, un comédien, un cinéaste et même un artiste de cirque ont tenté de penser cet effroi collectif qui entrave le présent et menace d'annuler l'avenir. Voici le fruit de leurs réflexions. (shrink)

Le mouvement ouvrier et étudiant de 68 a fissuré l'assise savante du pouvoir. Jacques Rancière, qui en prend acte, instaure un renversement fondamental : il ne saisit plus l'égalité comme but, mais comme point de départ. C'est d'une déconnexion avec l'ordre hiérarchique qu'elle procède. Sont ainsi mises en avant les capacités des opprimés à inventer des pratiques indociles. Pourtant, depuis une vingtaine d'années, Rancière tend à rétrécir la portée de ce geste : en le déplaçant vers le champ esthétique, il (...) le limite à des "redistributions polémiques du dicible et du visible". Ce livre rompt avec une telle orientation. Il élucide l'égalité dans des luttes impliquant la violence, réintroduit une rationalité du désir et de l'antagonisme. L'aspiration à abolir le rapport capitaliste fait pleinement partie de l'obstination lucide qui anime la confiance égalitaire. Ainsi radicalisée, l'égalité noue l'antagonisme, qui combat un ennemi à détruire, au litige, qui s'inclut dans le monde de l'adversaire par polémique. Elle rencontre les questions que le féminisme pose à l'universel, et s'empare de la défaite comme d'un moment immanent à sa pratique, tirant ses ressources de possibles déjà accomplis, mais aussi des chances manquées d'une lutte."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Anthology of readings in moral philosophy.

This article draws on the philosophical work on dialogic rationality offered by Charles Taylor as well as qualitative studies of dialogues between politically opposed college students to argue that these conversations succeed as tools of democracy precisely because they fail as interventions. That is, the democratic strength of such dialogue is the way in which it is unreliable as a means of producing particular outcomes. Students whose political views eventually shifted partly in response to dialogue understood this not as a (...) process of changing their commitments, but rather of finding a better expression for the commitments they already held. But the interviews show, too, just how rare it is for such shifts to occur at all, at least for these students in a period of political polarization and mutual distrust. The interviews suggest as well that the appeal to already shared ground is not the whole story of what prompts people to change their minds in these kinds of conversations. Rather the asking of direct but respectful questions was a crucial ingredient. Finally, dialogue did not independently cause the most profound changes in political views. Instead, it was the direction of students' lives that over time shifted their outlook. Their dialogue experience then gained meaning in retrospect, as the beginning of a process of self-questioning that was brought to fruition only later, as a first time that they had heard alternative possibilities for how value commitments can be expressed through politics. (shrink)

The postwar welfare state provides social insurance against economic, health, and related risks in an uncertain world. Because everyone can envision themselves to be among the unfortunate, social insurance fuses self-interest and solidarism in a normative principle Friedman (2020) calls probabilistic justice. But there is a competing principle of status defense, where the aim is to erect boundaries between socioeconomic strata and discourage cross-class mobility. We argue that this principle dominates when inequality is high and uncertainty low. The current moment (...) is one of high inequality and high uncertainty, which results in intense status anxiety, yet does not rule out solidaristic solutions. Our contributions are to diagnose the causes of our current malaise, and to theorize the normative bases for the political choice facing contemporary western democracies. (shrink)

In Talking about, Unnsteinsson defends an intentionalist theory of reference by arguing that confused referential intentions degrade reference. Central to this project is a “belief model” of both identity confusion and unconfused thought. By appealing to a well‐known argument from Campbell, I argue that this belief model falls short, because it fails to explain the inferential behavior it promises to explain. Campbell's argument has been central in the contemporary literature on Frege's puzzle, but Unnsteinsson's account of confusion provides an opportunity (...) for more clarity about how the argument is best interpreted, and what it shows. (shrink)

The so-called ‘mental files theory’ in the philosophy of mind stems from an analogy comparing object-concepts to ‘files’, and the mind to a ‘filing system’. Though this analogy appears in philosophy of mind and language from the 1970s onward, it remains unclear to many how it should be interpreted. The central commitments of the mental files theory therefore also remain unclear. Based on influential uses of the file analogy within philosophy, I elaborate three central explanatory roles for mental files. Next, (...) I outline several common criticisms of the file picture, which have been a source of resistance to the view. Finally, I outline several interpretations of the theory, thus highlighting that the best interpretation of the file-theory's central analogy remains a live issue. (shrink)

Scholars have critiqued mainstream economic approaches to environmental valuation for decades. These critiques have intensified with the increased prominence of environmental valuation in decision-making. This paper has three goals. First, we summarise prominent critiques of monetary valuation, drawing mostly on the work of Clive Spash, who worked extensively on cost–benefit analysis early in his career and then became one of monetary valuation's most thorough and ardent critics. Second, we, as a group of scholars who study relational values, describe how relational (...) values research engages with and addresses many of the critiques of monetary valuation. Third, we offer suggestions for relational values research that continues and deepens its ability to respond to critiques of monetary valuation and contributes to transformative change towards sustainability. (shrink)

Abstract The principal aim of this paper is to give a positive analysis of self-deception. I argue that self-deception is a species ?self-emplotment?. Through narrative self-emplotment one groups the events of one's life thematically in order to understand and monitor oneself. I argue that self-emplotment is an unextraordinary feature of mental life that is a precondition of agency. Self-emplotment, however, proceeds according to certain norms, some of which provide apparent justification for self-deceptive activity. A secondary aim of the paper is (...) to sketch the common characteristics between self-deception and self-knowledge. The framework of self-emplotment from which self-deception can emerge is also the framework that delivers self-knowledge; to the extent that the activity of self-emplotment is partially constitutive of what it means to possess self-knowledge, the self-deceiver may be closer to a state of self-knowledge than the person who fails to engage in significant introspective narrative. (shrink)

In the Republic, Phaedrus, and Timaeus, Socrates holds that the psyche is complex, or has three distinct and semi-autonomous sources of motivation, which he calls the reasoning, spirited, and appetitive parts. While the rational part determines what is best overall and motivates us to pursue it, the spirited and appetitive parts incline us toward different objectives, such as victory, honor, and esteem, or the satisfaction of our desires for food, drink, and sex. While it is obvious that Socrates primarily characterizes (...) and distinguishes the parts in terms of what each desires and pursues, what is less often brought to the fore is that he also characterizes and distinguishes the parts in terms of how they think. More specifically, he claims that the rational part forms its beliefs on the basis of rational calculation, while the spirited and appetitive parts form their beliefs on the basis of how things appear, without scrutinizing those appearances. Socrates’ dual characterization of the parts of the soul raises a question: why does he characterize each part as having the particular desires and cognitive abilities that he does? In general, how do facts about what a part desires relate to facts about how it thinks? In this paper, I suggest an answer to this question, one that I hope sheds light on the nature of the parts of the soul and so on Plato’s theory of tripartition more generally. I conclude by showing that Socrates’ theory bears a notable resemblance to contemporary dual process theories of judgment, according to which we have two distinct processes for forming judgments, one which is broadly akin to reflection and another to intuition. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that Aristotelian accounts of disease cannot provide us with an adequate descriptive account of our concept of disease. In other words, they fail to classify conditions as either diseases, or non-diseases, in a way that is consistent with commonplace intuitions. This being said, Aristotelian accounts of disease are not worthless. Aristotelian approaches cannot offer a decent descriptive account of our concept of disease, but they do offer resources for improving on the ways in which (...) we think about the harms that afflict human beings. While they cannot offer an account of ‘disease' they can offer an account of ‘harm'—and this it turns out, is ultimately of greater importance. (shrink)

From nearly the author's first experience entering the underwater city of Rapture in BioShock, she is treated to a taste of Andrew Ryan's propaganda. Andrew Ryan regularly says that citizens of Rapture need to avoid all contact with the surface world because it's filled with parasites who seek to destroy Rapture. Even though what Ryan says about the outside world is true, he's lying because he believes it to be false. According to Harry Frankfurt, bullshit is when the speaker doesn't (...) particularly care whether what she says is true or false. The analysis in this chapter suggests that propaganda is more closely connected to bullshitting than lying. The author says that if propaganda is more closely associated with bullshit than lies, then this also means that one should be particularly worried by governments (or individuals with power, such as Andrew Ryan) that engage in lots of propaganda. (shrink)

Kant's Critique of Judgment has often been interpreted by scholars as comprising separate treatments of three uneasily connected topics: beauty, biology, and empirical knowledge. Rachel Zuckert's book interprets the Critique as a unified argument concerning all three domains. She argues that on Kant's view, human beings demonstrate a distinctive cognitive ability in appreciating beauty and understanding organic life: an ability to anticipate a whole that we do not completely understand according to preconceived categories. This ability is necessary, moreover, for (...) human beings to gain knowledge of nature in its empirical character as it is, not as we might assume it to be. Her wide-ranging and original study will be valuable for readers in all areas of Kant's philosophy. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: A Permanent Collection? The Phenomenology of Determining a Changing Object in a Moving Subject Visible Freedom: Nineteenth‐Century German Aesthetic Theories and Legacies Transformation A Lasting Impression.

Rachel Loewen Walker's original study of Deleuze's theory of temporality critically expands our understanding of non-linear time through engagement with queer theory and new feminist materialisms. Walker draws on the notion of non-linear time in Deleuze's work to advance a conception of 'the living present' as a critical juncture through which new meanings and activism in the fields of feminism, environment, and queerness may be realised. Using literary texts by Jeanette Winterson, and philosophical texts by Julia Kristeva and Luce (...) Irigaray, Walker reflects on monomythic stories about gender, sexuality, and identity in the context of rapid climate change, and posthumanist politics to tread new ground for Deleuzian studies of time. Speaking to and from feminist, queer, environmental, trans, and crip political movements, Walker uses Deleuze to argue for a 'lived present' which is both mutable and embodied. Such characteristics are presented as essential components in the construction of meaning that is not bound by a static present, past or future. Queer and Deleuzian Temporalities pinpoints the importance of feminist and queer theory to a critical re-evaluation of time. Through a wide-ranging analysis we are able to see how everyone is embedded within rather than outside of time, opening up the possibility for imagining and realising alternate futures both for ourselves and the environment. (shrink)

In considering the debate about the meaning of ‘disease’, the positions are generally presented as falling into two categories: naturalist, e.g., Boorse, and normativist, e.g., Engelhardt and many others. This division is too coarse, and obscures much of what is going on in this debate. I therefore propose that accounts of the meaning of ‘disease’ be assessed according to Hare's (1997) taxonomy of evaluative terms. Such an analysis will allow us to better understand both individual positions and their interrelationships. Most (...) importantly, it will show that it is unlikely that there is a single unique disease-concept at issue. Rather, different authors are, for the most part, considering different concepts. (shrink)

La notion d'enchantement se prête à une grande diversité d'usages qui ne se réduisent pas à des antonymes du "désenchantement du monde" au sens de Max Weber. Qu'en est-il de ces approches contemporaines et quelles en seraient les vertus heuristiques? S'agit-il de poser un constat sur le monde contemporain, tour à tour enchanté et désenchanté? D'évoquer des expériences spécifiques, au caractère quelque peu magique? De s'intéresser à des lieux, scènes, processus, "modes d'être" ou régimes d'interactivité particuliers? La labilité du terme (...) ouvre à de multiples terrains d'investigation, tant théoriques que pratiques. De telles questions ont traversé un colloque organisé à Cerisy (2021) où cette notion d'enchantement a été explorée dans ses liens avec le vivant ; ses proximités avec les notions voisines d'ambiance, de présence et/ou de résonance ; la rencontre avec des fictions, des formes d'arts ou de vies alternatives ; des descriptions de fantasmagories urbaines ; ou encore au travers de quelques manifestations des puissances de l'imaginaire. (shrink)

For Pleasure argues that aesthetic pleasure and formal experimentalism hold the twinned capacity to maintain a global racial order and also to undo it.