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Rachel Cohon
State University of New York, Albany
  1.  50
    Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication.Rachel Cohon - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Rachel Cohon offers an original interpretation of the moral philosophy of David Hume, focusing on two areas.
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  2. Hume on Representation, Reason and Motivation.Rachel Cohon & David Owen - 1997 - Manuscrito 20:47-76.
  3. Hume's Moral Philosophy.Rachel Cohon - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Hume's position in ethics, which is based on his empiricist theory of the mind, is best known for asserting four theses: (1) Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the slave of the passions (see Section 3) (2) Moral distinctions are not derived from reason (see Section 4). (3) Moral distinctions are derived from the moral sentiments: feelings of approval (esteem, praise) and disapproval (blame) felt by spectators who contemplate a character trait or action (see (...)
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  4. Are External Reasons Impossible?Rachel Cohon - 1986 - Ethics 96 (3):545-556.
  5. The Common Point of View in Hume’s Ethics.Rachel Cohon - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):827-850.
    Hume's moral philosophy makes sentiment essential to moral judgment. But there is more individual consistency and interpersonal agreement in moral judgment than in private emotional reactions. Hume accounts for this by saying that our moral judgments do not manifest our approval or disapproval of character traits and persons "only as they appear from [our] peculiar point of view..." Rather, "we fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be (...)
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  6.  17
    Hume’s practice theory of promises and its dissimilar descendants.Rachel Cohon - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
    Why do we have a moral duty to fulfill promises? Hume offers what today is called a practice theory of the obligation of promises: he explains it by appeal to a social convention. His view has inspired more recent practice theories. All practice theories, including Hume’s, are assumed by contemporary philosophers to have a certain normative structure, in which the obligation to fulfill a promise is warranted or justified by a more fundamental moral purpose that is served by the social (...)
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  7. The Roots of Reasons.Rachel Cohon - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (1):63-85.
    Normative reasons for action are considerations in favor of doing something.
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  8. Is Hume a Noncognitivist in the Motivation Argument?Rachel Cohon - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 85 (2-3):251-266.
  9.  30
    The Common Point of View in Hume’s Ethics.Rachel Cohon - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):827-850.
    Hume’s moral philosophy makes sentiment essential to moral judgment. But there is more individual consistency and interpersonal agreement in moral judgment than in private emotional reactions. Hume accounts for this by saying that our moral judgments do not manifest our approval or disapproval of character traits and persons “only as they appear from [our] peculiar point of view... ” Rather, “we fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may (...)
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  10. Hume on Promises and the Peculiar Act of the Mind.Rachel Cohon - 2006 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (1):25-45.
    : Hume's account of the virtue of fidelity to promises contains two surprising claims: 1) Any analysis of fidelity that treats it as a natural (nonconventional) virtue is incorrect because it entails that in promising we perform a "peculiar act of the mind," an act of creating obligation by willing oneself to be obligated. No such act is possible. 2) Though the obligation of promises depends upon social convention, not on such a mental act, we nonetheless "feign" that whenever someone (...)
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  11. On an Unorthodox Account of Hume's Moral Psychology.Rachel Cohon - 1994 - Hume Studies 20 (2):179-194.
    A version of this paper was presented at the symposium on A Progress ofSentirnents by Annette C. Baier, held at the Pacific Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association, Los Angeles, March 1994.
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  12. Hume and Humeanism in Ethics.Rachel Cohon - 1988 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (2):99.
    Present-Day humeans think hume was largely right that moral judgments cannot be principles of reason because reason alone cannot move us to action. None of the textually supported interpretations of the claim that "reason is inert" can save hume's antirationalist argument; it is either invalid, Or rests upon assumptions that contradict hume's other views and are probably false. Present-Day humeans reject hume's narrow conceptions of reason and desire, And so have a valid version of hume's antirationalist argument and can consistently (...)
     
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  13. Internalism About Reasons for Action.Rachel Cohon - 1993 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (4):265-288.
  14.  12
    The Roots of Reasons.Rachel Cohon - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (1):63.
    Normative reasons for action are considerations in favor of doing something.
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  15.  41
    Hume's Artificial and Natural Virtues.Rachel Cohon - 2006 - In Saul Traiger (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Hume's Treatise. Blackwell. pp. 256--275.
  16. Hume’s Moral Sentiments As Motives.Rachel Cohon - 2010 - Hume Studies 36 (2):193-213.
    Do the moral sentiments move us to act, according to Hume? And if so, how? Hume famously deploys the claim that moral evaluations move us to act to show that they are not derived from reason alone. Presumably, moral evaluations move us because they are, or are the product of, moral sentiments. So, it would seem that moral approval and disapproval are or produce motives to action. This raises three interconnected interpretive questions. First, on Hume’s account, we are moved to (...)
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  17. A Very Brief Summary of Hume’s Morality: Feeling and Fabrication.Rachel Cohon - 2008 - Hume Studies 34 (2):253-256.
    Earlier versions of the four articles which follow were presented at a book panel session, on Rachel Cohon's Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication, at the Hume Society meetings in Halifax, Nova Scotia, in August 2009.I am deeply grateful to Lívia Guimarães and Donald L. M. Baxter for planning this session, and to Elizabeth S. Radcliffe and Don Garrett for serving as my critics. I have been asked to begin by summarizing my book in a few minutes.Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication (...)
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  18.  65
    Hume’s Difficulty with the Virtue of Honesty.Rachel Cohon - 1997 - Hume Studies 23 (1):91-112.
  19. Hume Moral and Political Philosophy.Rachel Cohon - 2001
  20.  14
    Hume, Passion, and Action.Rachel Cohon - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (2):303-307.
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  21.  5
    Morals, Motivation and Convention: Hume's Influential Doctrines. [REVIEW]Rachel Cohon - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):401-405.
  22.  8
    Nuovi Libri.Rachel Cohon - 2010 - Rivista di Filosofia 101 (3).
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  23. Promises and Consistency.Rachel Cohon & Jason D'Cruz - 2017 - In Iskra Fileva (ed.), Questions of Character. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 215-230.
    Situationists in moral philosophy infer from empirical studies in social psychology that human beings lack cross-situational behavioral consistency: that is, for the most part, we human beings are not able to act in the same trait-relevant way across a range of distinct types of situations, because those situational differences trigger differences in behavior. In this paper we defend the following thesis: one who accepts this conclusion (that is, one who judges that human beings in general are not possessed of behavioral (...)
     
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  24.  72
    Reply to Radcliffe and Garrett.Rachel Cohon - 2008 - Hume Studies 34 (2):277-288.
    I thank both my critics for their praise, their searching comments and objections, and their careful attention to my book. In the very short time allotted to respond to them both, I will address their objections in an integrated way, following the order of my book.Both Elizabeth Radcliffe and Don Garrett protest that for the last twenty years the noncognitivist reading has not dominated Hume scholarship in the way that I suggest when I include it in the common reading of (...)
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  25. The Rationality of Moral Conduct: A Preliminary Study.Rachel Cohon - 1986 - Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    The present work lays the foundations for a proposed longer work in which I shall defend an answer to the question whether immoral action is necessarily irrational. Here I first examine the traditional formulations, by Hume and Kant, of the crucial positions in the controversy over whether reason does or does not require us to do right or act well, or forbid us to do wrong or be villainous, and I criticize the views of each of these philosophers. I then (...)
     
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  26.  36
    The Shackles of Virtue: Hume on Allegiance to Government.Rachel Cohon - 2001 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 18 (4):393 - 413.
  27.  17
    University at Albany, State University of New York.Rachel Cohon - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4).
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