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Rachel Fredericks
Ball State University
  1. Moral Responsibility for Concepts.Rachel Fredericks - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1381-1397.
    I argue that we are sometimes morally responsible for having and using (or not using) our concepts, despite the fact that we generally do not choose to have them or have full or direct voluntary control over how we use them. I do so by extending an argument of Angela Smith's; the same features that she says make us morally responsible for some of our attitudes also make us morally responsible for some of our concepts. Specifically, like attitudes, concepts can (...)
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    Troubling Others and Tormenting Ourselves: The Nature and Moral Significance of Jealousy.Rachel Fredericks - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Washington
    Jealousy is an emotion that arises in diverse circumstances and is experienced in phenomenologically diverse ways. In part because of this diversity, evaluations of jealous subjects tend to be conflicting and ambiguous. Thus philosophers who are interested in the moral status of jealousy face a challenge: to explain how, despite the diversity of jealous subjects and experiences of jealousy, our moral evaluations of those subjects in light of those experiences might be unified. In this project, I confront and respond to (...)
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    When Wanting the Best Is Bad.Rachel Fredericks - 2018 - Social Theory and Practice 44 (1):95-119.
    Here I call attention to a class of desires that I call exclusionary desires. To have an exclusionary desire is to desire something under a description such that, were the desire satisfied, it would be logically impossible for people other than the desiring subject to possess the desired object. Assuming that we are morally responsible for our desires insofar as and because they reflect our evaluative judgments and are in principle subject to rational revision, I argue that we should, morally (...)
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    Courage as an Environmental Virtue.Rachel Fredericks - 2014 - Environmental Ethics 36 (3):339-355.
    We should give courage a more significant place in our understanding of how familiar virtues can and should be reshaped to capture what it is to be virtuous relative to the environment. Matthew Pianalto’s account of moral courage helps explain what a specifically environmental form of moral courage would look like. There are three benefits to be gained by recognizing courage as an environmental virtue: it helps us to recognize the high stakes nature of much environmental activism and to act (...)
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    How We Hope: A Moral Psychology, by Adrienne M. Martin. [REVIEW]Rachel Fredericks - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):906-909.
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    Review of Love and Its Objects: What Can We Care For? [REVIEW]Rachel Fredericks - 2016 - Hypatia Reviews Online:NA.
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    Sagoff on Ecosystems as Self-Organizing Systems.Rachel Fredericks - 2013 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 16 (3):258-261.
    In “What Does Environmental Protection Protect?” Mark Sagoff argues that there is no ecological way to test the claim that natural ecosystems are complex adaptive systems. In this critical commentary, I recreate that argument, object to it, and attempt to clarify its normative upshot. I show that Sagoff relies on substantive assumptions about (1) the tools and methods of ecological science, (2) what can be done with those tools and methods, and (3) ecology’s being separable from other disciplines, all of (...)
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    Review of Christine Overall, Why Have Children? The Ethical Debate. [REVIEW]Rachel Fredericks - 2013 - Hypatia Reviews Online.