Results for 'Radical enactivism'

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  1. Memory Without Content? Radical Enactivism and (Post)Causal Theories of Memory.Kourken Michaelian & André Sant’Anna - forthcoming - Synthese:1-29.
    Radical enactivism, an increasingly influential approach to cognition in general, has recently been applied to memory in particular, with Hutto and Peeters (2018) providing the first systematic discussion of the implications of the approach for mainstream philosophical theories of memory. Hutto and Peeters argue that radical enactivism, which entails a conception of memory traces as contentless, is fundamentally at odds with current causal and postcausal theories, which remain committed to a conception of traces as contentful: on (...)
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  2. Radical Enactivism, Wittgenstein and the Cognitive Gap.Victor Loughlin - 2014 - Adaptive Behavior 22 (5):350-359.
    REC or Radical Enactive (or Embodied) Cognition (Hutto and Myin, 2013) involves the claim that certain forms of mentality do not involve informational content and are instead to be equated with temporally and spatially extended physical interactions between an agent and the environment. REC also claims however that other forms of mentality do involve informational content and are scaffolded by socially and linguistically enabled practices. This seems to raise what can be called a cognitive gap question, namely, how do (...)
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  3.  89
    The Revolution Will Not Be Optimised: Radical Enactivism, Extended Functionalism and the Extensive Mind.Michael Wheeler - 2017 - Topoi 36 (3):457-472.
    Optimising the 4E revolution in cognitive science arguably requires the rejection of two guiding commitments made by orthodox thinking in the field, namely that the material realisers of cognitive states and processes are located entirely inside the head, and that intelligent thought and action are to be explained in terms of the building and manipulation of content-bearing representations. In other words, the full-strength 4E revolution would be secured only by a position that delivered externalism plus antirepresentationalism. I argue that one (...)
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  4.  12
    Phenomenology and Naturalism in Autopoietic and Radical Enactivism: Exploring Sense-Making and Continuity From the Top Down.Hayden Kee - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    Radical and autopoietic enactivists disagree concerning how to understand the concept of sense-making in enactivist discourse and the extent of its distribution within the organic domain. I situate this debate within a broader conflict of commitments to naturalism on the part of radical enactivists, and to phenomenology on the part of autopoietic enactivists. I argue that autopoietic enactivists are in part responsible for the obscurity of the notion of sense-making by attributing it univocally to sentient and non-sentient beings (...)
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  5.  17
    Enactivism, Radical Enactivism and Predictive Processing: What is Radical in Cognitive Science?Robert W. Clowes & Klaus Gärtner - 2017 - Kairos 18 (1):54-83.
    According to Enactivism, cognition should be understood in terms of a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. Further, this view holds that organisms do not passively receive information from this environment, they rather selectively create this environment by engaging in interaction with the world. Radical Enactivism adds that basic cognition does so without entertaining representations and hence that representations are not an essential constituent of cognition. Some proponents think that getting rid of representations amounts (...)
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  6.  15
    Phenomenological Constraints: A Problem for Radical Enactivism.Michael Roberts - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):375-399.
    This paper does two things. Firstly, it clarifies the way that phenomenological data is meant to constrain cognitive science according to enactivist thinkers. Secondly, it points to inconsistencies in the ‘Radical Enactivist’ handling of this issue, so as to explicate the commitments that enactivists need to make in order to tackle the explanatory gap. I begin by sketching the basic features of enactivism in sections 1–2, focusing upon enactive accounts of perception. I suggest that enactivist ideas here rely (...)
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  7.  4
    Intensional Biases in Affordance Perception: An Explanatory Issue for Radical Enactivism.Silvano Zipoli Caiani - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    Radical Enactivism holds that the best explanation of basic forms of cognition is provided without involving information of any sort. According to this view, the ability to perceive visual affordances should be accounted for in terms of extensional covariations between variables spanning the agent’s body and the environment. Contrary to Radical Enactivism, I argue that the intensional properties of cognition cannot be ignored, and that the way in which an agent represents the world has consequences on (...)
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  8.  24
    Extended Functionalism, Radical Enactivism, and the Autopoietic Theory of Cognition: Prospects for a Full Revolution in Cognitive Science.Mario Villalobos & David Silverman - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):719-739.
    Recently, Michael Wheeler has argued that despite its sometimes revolutionary rhetoric, the so called 4E cognitive movement, even in the guise of ‘radicalenactivism, cannot achieve a full revolution in cognitive science. A full revolution would require the rejection of two essential tenets of traditional cognitive science, namely internalism and representationalism. Whilst REC might secure antirepresentationalism, it cannot do the same, so Wheeler argues, with externalism. In this paper, expanding on Wheeler’s analysis, we argue that what compromises REC’s (...)
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  9.  17
    Radical Enactivism and Ecological Psychology: Friends or Foes?K. Zahidi & J. V. Eemeren - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):320-322.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: We examine whether there are any irreducible contradictions between ecological psychology and radical enactivism. We concentrate on two points of contention between the two approaches: the relevance of neural structures in understanding perception and the use of semantically loaded concepts in theorizing about perception.
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  10.  14
    Not-Quite-So Radical Enactivism.D. Lloyd - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):361-363.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: Enactivism is a welcome development in cognitive science, but its “radical” rejection of representation poses problems for capturing phenomenality. The totality of our interactions exceeds our awareness, so circumscribing the activity that constitutes consciousness seems to require representational guidance.
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  11.  17
    Are Enactivists Radical? Book Review Of: Richard Menary (Ed.) (2006) Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative. Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. [REVIEW]D. Lubiszewski - 2009 - Constructivist Foundations 4 (3):170 - 171.
    Summary: What makes Hutto's account special is his commitment to the rejection of content, a point where he becomes a real radical. The book is not just another book about enactivism but it is an enactive book for everyone written by an enactivist.
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  12. Knowing What? Radical Versus Conservative Enactivism.Daniel D. Hutto - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):389-405.
    The binary divide between traditional cognitivist and enactivist paradigms is tied to their respective commitments to understanding cognition as based on knowing that as opposed to knowing how. Using O’Regan’s and No¨e’s landmark sensorimotor contingency theory of perceptual experience as a foil, I demonstrate how easy it is to fall into conservative thinking. Although their account is advertised as decidedly ‘skill-based’, on close inspection it shows itself to be riddled with suppositions threatening to reduce it to a rules-and-representations approach. To (...)
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  13. Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.Richard Menary - 2006 - Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
    This collection is a much-needed remedy to the confusion about which varieties of enactivism are robust yet viable rejections of traditional representionalism...
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  14. Radical Enactivism and Narrative Practice: Implications for Psychopathology.Daniel D. Hutto - 2010 - In T. Fuchs, P. Henningsen & H. Sattel (eds.), Coherence and Disorders of the Embodied Self. Schattauer.
    Many psychopathological disorders – clinical depression, borderline personality disorder, schizophrenia and autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) – are commonly classified as disorders of the self. In an intuitive sense this sort of classification is unproblematic. There can be no doubt that such disorders make a difference to one’s ability to form and maintain a coherent sense of oneself in various ways. However, any theoretically rigourous attempt to show that they relate to underlying problems with say, such things as minimal selves or, (...)
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  15.  39
    Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness.M. D. Kirchhoff & D. D. Hutto - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):346-353.
    Context: Neurophenomenology, as formulated by Varela, offers an approach to the science of consciousness that seeks to get beyond the hard problem of consciousness. There is much to admire in the practical approach to the science of consciousness that neurophenomenology advocates. Problem: Even so, this article argues, the metaphysical commitments of the enterprise require a firmer foundation. The root problem is that neurophenomenology, as classically formulated by Varela, endorses a form of non-reductionism that, despite its ambitions, assumes rather than dissolves (...)
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  16.  5
    Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Michael David Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):346–353.
    Context: Neurophenomenology, as formulated by Varela, offers an approach to the science of consciousness that seeks to get beyond the hard problem of consciousness. There is much to admire in the practical approach to the science of consciousness that neurophenomenology advocates. Problem: Even so, this article argues, the metaphysical commitments of the enterprise require a firmer foundation. The root problem is that neurophenomenology, as classically formulated by Varela, endorses a form of non-reductionism that, despite its ambitions, assumes rather than dissolves (...)
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  17.  4
    Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Michael David Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):346–353.
    Context: Neurophenomenology, as formulated by Varela, offers an approach to the science of consciousness that seeks to get beyond the hard problem of consciousness. There is much to admire in the practical approach to the science of consciousness that neurophenomenology advocates. Problem: Even so, this article argues, the metaphysical commitments of the enterprise require a firmer foundation. The root problem is that neurophenomenology, as classically formulated by Varela, endorses a form of non-reductionism that, despite its ambitions, assumes rather than dissolves (...)
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  18.  28
    Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology, and Narrative.Richard Menary - 2006 - John Benjamins.
    “ is collection is a much-needed remedy to the confusion about which varieties of enactivism are robust yet viable rejections of traditional representationalism approaches to cognitivism – and which are not. Hutto’s paper is the pivot around which the expert commentators, enactivists and non-enactivists alike, sketch out the implications of enactivism for a wide variety of issues: perception, emotion, the theory of content, cognition, development, social interaction, and more. e inclusion of thoughtful replies from Hutto gives the volume (...)
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  19. Radical Enactivism and Inter-Corporeal Affectivity.Joel Krueger - 2010 - In Thomas Fuchs, Heribert Sattel & Peter Heningnsen (eds.), The Embodied Self: Dimensions, Coherence, and Disorders. Schattauer.
  20.  15
    Does Separating Intentionality From Mental Representation Imply Radical Enactivism?Tobias Schlicht - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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    Radical Enactivism and Self-Knowledge.Giovanni Rolla - 2018 - Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 59 (141):723-743.
    ABSTRACT I propose a middle-ground between a perceptual model of self-knowledge, according to which the objects of self-awareness are accessed through some kind of causal mechanism, and a rationalist model, according to which self-knowledge is constituted by one's rational agency. Through an analogy with the role of the exercises of sensorimotor abilities in rationally grounded perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge is construed as an exercise of action-oriented and action-orienting abilities. This view satisfies the privileged access condition usually associated with self-knowledge without entailing (...)
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  22.  10
    Radical Enactivism: Rethinking Basic Minds.Daniel Hutto - unknown
    Dr. Daniel Hutto argues against some of the deepest and msot prevalent views on how we think. Hutto questions the widely accepted idea that our minds are in our heads and their contents are furnished by our senses, that eyes and ears transmit information from the world that is received by the brain, and that our brains then compile this information to construct models and representations of the outer world, allowing us to deal with it intelligently. Hutto discusses the possibility (...)
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  23. Enactivism and Cognitive Science: Triple Review of J. Stewart, O. Gapenne, and E. A. Di Paolo (Eds.), Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science; Anthony Chemero, Radical Embodied Cognitive Science; and Mark Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind”. [REVIEW]Robert D. Rupert - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):209-228.
  24.  28
    Introduction: The Varieties of Enactivism.Dave Ward, David Silverman & Mario Villalobos - 2017 - Topoi 36 (3):365-375.
    This introduction to a special issue of Topoi introduces and summarises the relationship between three main varieties of 'enactivist' theorising about the mind: 'autopoietic', 'sensorimotor', and 'radical' enactivism. It includes a brief discussion of the philosophical and cognitive scientific precursors to enactivist theories, and the relationship of enactivism to other trends in embodied cognitive science and philosophy of mind.
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  25.  58
    Ecological Psychology is Radical Enough. A Reply to Radical Enactivists.Miguel Segundo-Ortin, Manuel Heras Escribano & Vicente Raja - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Ecological psychology is one of the most influential theories of perception in the embodied, anti-representational, and situated cognitive sciences. However, radical enactivists claim that Gibsonians tend to describe ecological information and its ‘pick up’ in ways that make ecological psychology close to representational theories of perception and cognition (Myin 2016; Hutto 2017; Hutto and Myin 2017; see also van Dijk et al. 2015). Motivated by worries about the tenability of classical views of informational content and its processing, these authors (...)
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  26. Sensorimotor Knowledge and the Radical Alternative.Victor Loughlin - 2014 - In A. Martin (ed.), Contemporary Sensorimotor Theory, Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics. Springer Verlag. pp. 105-116.
    Sensorimotor theory claims that what you do and what you know how to do constitutes your visual experience. Central to the theory is the claim that such experience depends on a special kind of knowledge or understanding. I assess this commitment to knowledge in the light of three objections to the theory: the empirical implausibility objection, the learning/post-learning objection and the causal-constitutive objection. I argue that although the theory can respond to the first two objections, its commitment to know-how ultimately (...)
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  27.  85
    Thinking-is-Moving: Dance, Agency, and a Radically Enactive Mind. [REVIEW]Michele Merritt - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):95-110.
    Recently, in cognitive science, the enactivist account of cognition has been gaining ground, due in part to studies of movement in conjunction with thought. The idea, as Noë , has put it, that “cognition is not something happening inside us or to us, but it’s something we do, something we achieve,” is increasingly supported by research on joint attention, movement coordination, and gesture. Not surprisingly, therefore, enactivists have also begun to look at “movement specialists”—dancers—for both scientific and phenomenological accounts of (...)
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  28.  39
    REC: Revolution Effected by Clarification.Daniel Hutto - 2017 - Topoi 36 (3):377-391.
    This paper shows how a radical approach to enactivism provides a way of clarifying and unifying different varieties of enactivism and enactivist-friendly approaches so as to provide a genuine alternative to classical cognitivism. Section 1 reminds readers of the broad church character of the enactivism framework. Section 2 explicates how radical enactivism is best understood not as a kind of enactivism per se but as a programme for radicalizing and consolidating the many different (...)
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  29.  13
    The Natural Origins of Convention.Ian Ravenscroft - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):731-739.
    Neo-pragmatists propose that content is determined by social convention. A convention is a coordination problem in which each agent prefers any solution to none, yet has no preference amongst the alternative solutions. This paper argues that the best known theory of convention, David Lewis’, cannot yield a theory of content because it appeals to beliefs and other states that themselves have content. The question then arises whether a theory of convention that does not appeal to states with content can be (...)
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  30.  29
    Why Imagining Requires Content: A Reply to a Reply to an Objection to Radical Enactive Cognition.Luke Roelofs - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):246-254.
    Radical enactivism’ (Hutto and Myin 2013, 2017) eschews representational content for all ‘basic’ mental activities. Critics have argued that this view cannot make sense of the workings of the imagination. In their recent book (2017), Hutto and Myin respond to these critics, arguing that some imaginings can be understood without attributing them any representational content. Their response relies on the claim that a system can exploit a structural isomorphism between two things without either of those things being a (...)
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  31.  47
    Where There is Life There is Mind: In Support of a Strong Life-Mind Continuity Thesis.Michael David Kirchhoff & Tom Froese - 2017 - Entropy 19.
    This paper considers questions about continuity and discontinuity between life and mind. It begins by examining such questions from the perspective of the free energy principle (FEP). The FEP is becoming increasingly influential in neuroscience and cognitive science. It says that organisms act to maintain themselves in their expected biological and cognitive states, and that they can do so only by minimizing their free energy given that the long-term average of free energy is entropy. The paper then argues that there (...)
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  32.  23
    Dewey, Enactivism and Greek Thought.Matthew Crippen - 2016 - In Roman Madzia & Matthaus Jung (eds.), Pragmatism and Embodied Cognitive Science: From Bodily Interaction to Symbolic Articulation. De Gruyter. pp. 229-246.
    In this chapter, I examine how Dewey circumnavigated debates between empiricists and a priorists by showing that active bodies can perform integrative operations traditionally attributed to “inner” mechanisms, and how he thereby realized developments at which the artificial intelligence, robotics and cognitive science communities only later arrived. Some of his ideas about experience being constituted through skills actively deployed in cultural settings were inspired by ancient Greek sources. Thus in some of his more radical moments, Dewey refined rather than (...)
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  33.  6
    Merleau-Ponty and the Radical Sciences of Mind.Robin M. Muller - forthcoming - Synthese:1-35.
    In this paper, I critically reconstruct the development of Merleau-Pontyan phenomenology and “radical embodied cognitive science” out of Berlin-School Gestalt theory. I first lay out the basic principles of Gestalt theory and then identify two ways of revising that theory: one route, followed by enactivism and ecological psychology, borrows Gestaltist resources to defend a pragmatic ontology. I argue, however, that Merleau-Ponty never endorses this kind of ontology. Instead, I track his second route toward an ontology of “flesh.” I (...)
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  34. The Roots of Remembering: Radically Enactive Recollecting.Daniel D. Hutto & Anco Peeters - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 97-118.
    This chapter proposes a radically enactive account of remembering that casts it as creative, dynamic, and wide-reaching. It paints a picture of remembering that no longer conceives of it as involving passive recollections – always occurring wholly and solely inside heads. Integrating empirical findings from various sources, the chapter puts pressure on familiar cognitivist visions of remembering. Pivotally, it is argued, that we achieve a stronger and more elegant account of remembering by abandoning the widely held assumption that it is (...)
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  35. Elementary Mind Minding, Enactivist-Style.Daniel D. Hutto - 2011 - In A. Seemann (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments in Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience. MIT Press.
    The core claim of this paper is that mind minding of the sort required for the simplest and most pervasive forms of joint attentional activity is best understood and explained in non-representational, enactivist terms. In what follows I will attempt to convince the reader of its truth in three steps. The first step, section two, clarifies the target explanandum. The second step, section three, is wholly descriptive. It highlights the core features of a Radically Enactivist proposal about elementary mind minding, (...)
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  36.  74
    Jakob Hohwy: The Predictive Mind. [REVIEW]Victor Loughlin - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (4):753-758.
    In the following review of Hohwy ‘The Predictive Mind’, I argue that enactive considerations can be used to challenge Hohwy’s claim that the brain is a ‘truth tracker’.
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  37.  25
    Introduction: Searching for the Natural Origins of Content.Daniel D. Hutto & Glenda Satne - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):505-519.
    This paper introduces this special issue which is focused on its target paper - The Natural Origins of Content. The target paper has had a robust and considered set of fifteen replies; a literal A to Z of papers. This extended introduction explains the background thinking and challenges that motivated the target article's proposed research programme. It also provides a sneak peak preview and navigational aid to the special issue’s contents. Brief highlights of each commentary are provided and they are (...)
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  38.  26
    Extensive Enactivism: Why Keep It All In?Daniel D. Hutto, Michael D. Kirchhoff & Erik Myin - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
    Radical enactive and embodied approaches to cognitive science oppose the received view in the sciences of the mind in denying that cognition fundamentally involves contentful mental representation. This paper argues that the fate of representationalism in cognitive science matters significantly to how best to understand the extent of cognition. It seeks to establish that any move away from representationalism toward pure, empirical functionalism fails to provide a substantive “mark of the cognitive” and is bereft of other adequate means for (...)
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  39.  40
    Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds with Content By Daniel F. Hutto and Erik Myin.Douglas Campbell - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):ant102.
    In Radicalizing Enactivism, D. D. Hutto and E. Myin develop a theory of mind they call ‘Radical Enactive (or Embodied) Cognition’ (REC). They argue that extant enactivist and embodied theories of mind are, although pretty radical, not radical enough, because such theories buy into the representationalist doctrine that perceptual experience (along with other forms of ‘basic’ mentality) possesses representational content. REC denies this doctrine. It implies that perceptual experience lacks reference, truth conditions, accuracy conditions, or conditions (...)
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  40.  24
    Epistemological Odyssey: Introduction to Special Issue on the Diversity of Enactivism and Neurophenomenology.S. Vörös, T. Froese & A. Riegler - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):189-204.
    Context: In the past two decades, the so-called 4E approaches to the mind and cognition have been rapidly gaining in recognition and have become an integral part of various disciplines. Problem: Recently, however, questions have been raised as to whether, and to what degree, these different approaches actually cohere with one another. Specifically, it seems that many of them endorse mutually incompatible, perhaps even contradictory, epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions. Method: By retracing the roots of an alternative conception of mind and (...)
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  41.  10
    Enactivism, Pragmatism…Behaviorism?Louise Barrett - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):807-818.
    Shaun Gallagher applies enactivist thinking to a staggeringly wide range of topics in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, even venturing into the realms of biological anthropology. One prominent point Gallagher makes that the holistic approach of enactivism makes it less amenable to scientific investigation than the cognitivist framework it seeks to replace, and should be seen as a “philosophy of nature” rather than a scientific research program. Gallagher also gives truth to the saying that “if you want new (...)
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  42.  14
    Review of HUTTO, Daniel and MYIN, Erik, Evolving Enactivism - Basic Minds Meet Content. [REVIEW]Laura Nascimento - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (1):177-184.
    ABSTRACT The following review presents some of the themes developed in Evolving Enactivism - basic minds meet content. Hutto and Myin's new book on the Radical Enactive approach to Cognition aims to provide a thoroughy naturalistic explanation for cognitive phenomena. The main themes investigated here concern Hutto and Myin's criticisms of the nature and role that the notion of content traditionally plays in mainstream cognitive science explanations of cognition and their attempt to provide an account for a variety (...)
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  43.  16
    Enactivism, Second-Person Engagement and Personal Responsibility.Janna van Grunsven - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):131-156.
    Over the course of the past few decades 4E approaches that theorize cognition and agency as embodied, embedded, extended, and/or enactive have garnered growing support from figures working in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Correspondingly, there has been a rising interest in the wider conceptual and practical implications of 4E views. Several proposals have for instance been made regarding 4E’s bearing on ethical theory, 505–526, 2009; Cash, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9, 645–671 2010). In this paper I contribute (...)
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  44.  24
    Expanding the Extended Mind: Merleau-Ponty’s Late Ontology as Radical Enactive Cognition.Gina Zavota - 2016 - Essays in Philosophy 17 (2):94-124.
    In this essay, I argue that the late ontology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in particular the system he began to develop in The Visible and the Invisible, can be conceived of as a form of Radical Enactive Cognition, as described by Hutto and Myin in Radicalizing Enactivism. I will begin by discussing Clark and Chalmers’ extended mind hypothesis, as well as the enactive view of consciousness proposed by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch in The Embodied Mind. However, neither Clark and (...)
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  45. Enactivism, Second-Person Engagement and Personal Responsibility.Janna Grunsven - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):131-156.
    Over the course of the past few decades 4E approaches that theorize cognition and agency as embodied, embedded, extended, and/or enactive have garnered growing support from figures working in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Correspondingly, there has been a rising interest in the wider conceptual and practical implications of 4E views. Several proposals have for instance been made regarding 4E’s bearing on ethical theory, 505–526, 2009; Cash, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9, 645–671 2010). In this paper I contribute (...)
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  46.  48
    Interactionism and Mindreading.John Michael - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):559-578.
    In recent years, a number of theorists have developed approaches to social cognition that highlight the centrality of social interaction as opposed to mindreading (e.g. Gallagher and Zahavi 2008 ; Gallagher 2001 , 2007 , 2008 ; Hobson 2002 ; Reddy 2008 ; Hutto 2004 ; De Jaegher 2009 ; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007 ; Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009 ; De Jaegher et al. 2010 ). There are important differences among these approaches, as I will discuss, but (...)
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  47. Embodied Expectations and Extended Possibilities: Reply to Goldie.Daniel D. Hutto - 2006 - In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.
  48. The Narrative Alternative to Theory of Mind.Shaun Gallagher - 2006 - In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.
  49. Feelings and Objects.Erik Myin & Lars De Nul - 2006 - In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.
  50. Unnatural Feelings: A Non-Naturalistic Perspective on the Emotions.Anthony Rudd - 2006 - In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.
     
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