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  1.  79
    Rae Langton (1998). Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves. Oxford University Press.
    Rae Langton offers a new interpretation and defense of Kant's doctrine of things in themselves. Kant distinguishes things in themselves from phenomena, and in so doing he makes a metaphysical distinction between intrinsic and relational properties of substances. Langton argues that his claim that we have no knowledge of things in themselves is not idealism, but epistemic humility: we have no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of substances. This interpretation vindicates Kant's scientific realism, and shows his primary/secondary quality distinction to (...)
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  2. Rae Langton & David Lewis (1998). Defining 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.
    Something could be round even if it were the only thing in the universe, unaccompanied by anything distinct from itself. Jaegwon Kim once suggested that we define an intrinsic property as one that can belong to something unaccompanied. Wrong: unaccompaniment itself is not intrinsic, yet it can belong to something unaccompanied. But there is a better Kim-style definition. Say that P is independent of accompaniment iff four different cases are possible: something accompanied may have P or lack P, something unaccompanied (...)
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  3. Rae Langton (1993). Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts. Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (4):293-330.
  4. Rae Langton (2009). Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification. Oxford University Press.
    Rae Langton here draws together her ground-breaking and contentious work on pornography and objectification. She shows how women come to be objectified -- made subordinate and treated as things -- and she argues for the controversial feminist conclusions that pornography subordinates and silences women, and women have rights against pornography.
     
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  5. Frank Jackson, Graham Priest & Rae Langton (2004). Elusive Knowledge of Things in Themselves. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):129 – 136.
    Kant argued that we have no knowledge of things in themselves, no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of things, a thesis that is not idealism but epistemic humility. David Lewis agrees (in 'Ramseyan Humility'), but for Ramseyan reasons rather than Kantian. I compare the doctrines of Ramseyan and Kantian humility, and argue that Lewis's contextualist strategy for rescuing knowledge from the sceptic (proposed elsewhere) should also rescue knowledge of things in themselves. The rescue would not be complete: for knowledge of (...)
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  6.  8
    David Lewis & Rae Langton (2014). Defining ‘Intrinsic’. In Robert M. Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter. pp. 17-30.
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  7. Rae Langton & Jennifer Hornsby (1998). Free Spech and Illocution. Legal Theory 4 (1):21-37.
    We defend the view of some feminist writers that the notion of silencing has to be taken seriously in discussions of free speech. We assume that what ought to be meant by ‘speech’, in the context ‘free speech’, is whatever it is that a correct justification of the right to free speech justifies one in protecting. And we argue that what one ought to mean includes illocution, in the sense of J.L. Austin.
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  8. Rae Langton (2007). Objective and Unconditioned Value. Philosophical Review 116 (2):157-185.
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  9. Rae Langton & Caroline West (1999). Scorekeeping in a Pornographic Language Game. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):303 – 319.
    If, as many suppose, pornography changes people, a question arises as to how.1 One answer to this question offers a grand and noble vision. Inspired by the idea that pornography is speech, and inspired by a certain liberal ideal about the point of speech in political life, some theorists say that pornography contributes to that liberal ideal: pornography, even at its most violent and misogynistic, and even at its most harmful, is political speech that aims to express certain views about (...)
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  10. Luvell Anderson, Sally Haslanger & Rae Langton (2012). Language and Race. In Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language. Routledge.
  11. Rae Langton (2010). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. By MIRANDA FRICKER. Hypatia 25 (2):459-464.
  12.  52
    Rae Langton (2012). Beyond Belief: Pragmatics in Hate Speech and Pornography1. In Mary Kate McGowan Ishani Maitra (ed.), Speech and Harm: Controversies Over Free Speech. pp. 72.
  13. Rae Langton (2001). Review: Van Cleve, Problems From Kant. Philosophical Review 110 (3):451-454.
  14. Richard Holton & Rae Langton (1998). Empathy and Animal Ethics. In Dale Jamieson (ed.), Singer and His Critics. Oxford University Press.
    In responding to the challenge that we cannot know that animals feel pain, Peter Singer says: We can never directly experience the pain of another being, whether that being is human or not. When I see my daughter fall and scrape her knee, I know that she feels pain because of the way she behaves—she cries, she tells me her knee hurts, she rubs the sore spot, and so on. I know that I myself behave in a somewhat similar—if more (...)
     
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  15. Rae Langton (1990). Whose Right? Ronald Dworkin, Women, and Pornographers. Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (4):311-359.
  16. Rae Langton (1992). Duty and Desolation. Philosophy 67 (262):481 - 505.
    This is a paper about two philosophers who wrote to each other. One is famous; the other is not. It is about two practical standpoints, the strategic and the human, and what the famous philosopher said of them. And it is about friendship and deception, duty and despair. That is enough by way of preamble.
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  17. Rae Langton (2006). Kant's Phenomena: Extrinsic or Relational Properties? A Reply to Allais. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):170–185.
    Kant’s claim that we are ignorant of things in themselves is a claim that we cannot know ‘the intrinsic nature of things’, or so at least I argued in Kantian Humility.2 I’m delighted to find that Lucy Allais is in broad agreement with this core idea, thinking it represents, at the very least, a part of Kant’s view. She sees some of the advantages of this interpretation. It has significant textual support. It does justice to Kant’s sense that we are (...)
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  18.  85
    Rae Langton, Whose Right?
    This article has benefited from the thoughtful comments and suggestions of many, including Susan Brison, Gilbert Harman, Sally Haslanger, Richard Holton, Win Kymlicka, Mark van Roojen, Michael Smith, Scott Schon, Katalie Stoljar, and the Editors of Philoso- phy & Public Affairs, I am grateful to them all. r, American Booksellers, Inc, v, Hudnut, 5g8 F. Supp. I327 (S.D. Ind. zgsA) (heresfter Hudnut).
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  19. Jennifer Hornsby, Louise Antony, Jennifer Saul, Natalie Stoljar, Nellie Wieland & Rae Langton (2011). Subordination, Silencing, and Two Ideas of Illocution. Jurisprudence 2 (2):379-440.
    This section gathers together five reviews of Rae Langton?s book Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification followed by a response from the author.
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  20.  60
    Rae Langton (2016). Hate Speech and the Epistemology of Justice. Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (4):865-873.
    In ‘The Harm in Hate Speech’ Waldron’s most interesting and ground-breaking contribution lies in a distinctive epistemological role he assigns to hate speech legislation: it is necessary for assurance of justice, and thus for justice itself. He regards public social recognition of what is owed to citizens as a public good, contributing to basic dignity and social standing of citizens. His claim that hate speech in the public social environment damages assurance of justice has wider implications, I argue: for hate (...)
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  21.  26
    Lauren Ashwell & Rae Langton (2011). Slaves to Fashion? In Jessica Wolfendale & Jeanette Kennett (eds.), Fashion – Philosophy for Everyone: Thinking with Style. Blackwell. pp. 135--150.
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  22. Rae Langton (2007). Disenfranchised Silence. In Michael Smith, Robert Goodin & Geoffrey Geoffrey (eds.), Common Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 199.
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  23.  35
    Rae Langton (2000). Locke's Relations and God's Good Pleasure. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):75–91.
    Did God give things 'accidental powers not rooted in their natures', powers not rooted in intrinsic properties? For Leibniz, no. For Locke, the answer is disputed. On a voluntarist reading, yes, secondary and tertiary qualities are superadded (Margaret Wilson). On a mechanist reading, no, as for Leibniz (Michael Ayers). Since Locke viewed these qualities as relational, his view of relations ought to bear on the dispute. Locke said relation is 'not contained in the real existence of things'. Bennett says Locke (...)
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  24. Rae Langton (1997). Pornography, Speech Acts, and Silence. In Hugh LaFollette - (ed.), Ethics in Practice. Blackwell. pp. 338--349.
  25.  9
    David Armstrong, Rae Langton, Robert Audi, Jerrold Levinson, John Bacon, David Lewis, Rick Benitez, Gary Malinas, John Biro & Jeff Malpas (1995). The Editor and the Associate Editors Thank the Consulting Editors, the Members of the Editorial Board and the Following Philosophers for Their Help with Refereeing Papers During the Period July 1994 to June 1995. Adeney, Douglas Kennett, Jeanette Agar, Nicholas Lamarque, Peter. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (4).
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  26.  38
    Rae Langton (1995). Sexual Solipsism. Philosophical Topics 23 (2):149-187.
  27. Rae Langton (1995). Kantian Humility. Dissertation, Princeton University
    The distinction at the heart of Kant's philosophy is a metaphysical distinction: things in themselves are substances, bearers of intrinsic properties; phenomena are relational properties of substances. Kant says that things as we know them are composed "entirely of relations", by which he means forces. Kant's claim that we have no knowledge of things in themselves is not idealism, but humility: we have no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of substances. Kant has an empiricist starting-point. Human beings are receptive creatures. (...)
     
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  28.  54
    Rae Langton (2001). Virtues of Resentment. Utilitas 13 (2):255.
    On a consequentialist account of virtue, a trait is virtuous if it has good consequences, vicious if it has bad. Clumsiness and dimness are therefore vices. Should I resent the clumsy and the dim?, says the consequentialist, counterintuitively - at any rate, Yes’ on an accuracy measure of resentment's virtue: resentment should be an accurate response to consequentialist vice, and these are vices. On a usefulness measure of resentment's virtue, the answer may be different: whether resentment is virtuous depends on (...)
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  29.  19
    Rae Langton (2000). Feminism in Epistemology: Exclusion and Objectification. In Miranda Fricker & Jennifer Hornsby (eds.), Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 127--45.
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  30.  68
    Rae Langton (2000). Pornography and Free Speech. The Philosophers' Magazine 11 (11):41-42.
  31.  61
    Rae Langton (1993). Beyond a Pragmatic Critique of Reason. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (4):364 – 384.
  32.  84
    Rae Langton (2004). Intention as Faith. In H. Steward & J. Hyman (eds.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press Press. pp. 243-258.
    What, if anything, has faith to do with intention?1 By ‘faith’ I have in mind the attitude described by William James: Suppose...that I am climbing in the Alps, and have had the ill-luck to work myself into a position from which the only escape is by a terrible leap. Being without similar experience, I have no evidence of my ability to perform it successfully; but hope and confidence in myself make me sure I shall not miss my aim, and nerve (...)
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  33.  4
    David K. Lewis & Rae Langton (2001). Marshall and Parsons On. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):353-356.
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  34.  18
    Rae Langton (2001). Reply to Lorne Falkenstein. Kantian Review 5 (1):64-72.
    In Kantian Humility I argue that, for Kant, ignorance of things in themselves is ignorance of the intrinsic properties of substances, and that this is epistemic humility, rather than idealism: some aspects of reality, the intrinsic aspects, are beyond our epistemic grasp.The interpretation draws upon what Falkenstein takes to be ‘a novel and not implausible understanding of Kant's distinction between things in themselves and appearances’ which views it as a distinction between the intrinsic and the relational. He concedes that Kant (...)
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  35.  23
    Rae Langton (2004). Projection and Objectification. In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 285--303.
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  36.  59
    Rae Langton (2009). Esteem in the Moral Economy of Oppression. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):273-291.
  37. Rae Langton (1997). Love and Solipsism. In Roger E. Lamb (ed.), Love Analyzed. Westview Press. pp. 123--52.
     
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  38.  29
    David Lewis & Rae Langton (2002). Comment définir « intrinsèque ». Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 4 (4):511-527.
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  39.  13
    Rae Langton (2008). Symposia on Gender, Race and Philosophy. Philosophy 4 (2).
  40.  29
    Rae Langton (2003). Review: Van Cleve, James, Problems From Kant. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):211–218.
    According to Van Cleve, Kant distinguishes phenomena from things in themselves, thereby distinguishing the virtual from the real; and Kant makes primary qualities merely spatial. However, phenomena are not the virtual, but the relational; things in themselves are not the real, but the intrinsic. Moreover, to make primary qualities merely spatial is to leave out force, and thereby leave out the feature that makes phenomena relational and real-not just virtual.
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  41.  8
    Rae Langton (2013). Excerpts From Kantian Humility. In Stewart Duncan & Antonia LoLordo (eds.), Debates in Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses. Routledge. pp. 323.
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  42.  7
    Rae Langton (2005). Feminism in Philosophy. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 231.
  43.  1
    Rae Langton (2000). IV-Locke's Relations and God's Good Pleasure. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):75-91.
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  44. Rae Langton (2000). 1 The Musical, the Magical, and the Mathematical Soul1. In Tim Crane & Sarah Patterson (eds.), History of the Mind-Body Problem. New York: Routledge. pp. 13.
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  45.  1
    Rae Langton (2007). Sprechakte Und Unsprechbare Akte. In Hannes Kuch, Sybille Krämer & Steffen K. Herrmann (eds.), Verletzende Worte: Die Grammatik Sprachlicher Missachtung. Transcript Verlag. pp. 107-146.
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  46. Rae Langton (1997). 33. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), Pornography, Speech Acts, and Silence. Blackwell. pp. 337-49.
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  47. Rae Langton & James Van Cleve (2001). Problems From Kant. Philosophical Review 110 (3):451.
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  48. Rae Langton (2015). Seksualny solipsyzm. Analiza I Egzystencja 30:5-60.
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  49. A. W. Moore & Rae Langton (2001). Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves. Philosophical Review 110 (1):117.