This study evaluated the potential contribution of extrageniculate visual pathways to oculomotor orienting reflexes in hemianopic patients. It tested whether extrageniculate pathways mediate inhibition of return —a phenomenon characterized by slowed target detections at recently stimulated locations . Because hemianopic subjects cannot overtly respond to stimuli presented within their hemianopic field, we utilized a spatial cueing paradigm that capitalized on the fact that IOR operates in spatiotopic coordinates. Subjects moved their eyes so that a cue and a target presented at (...) the same spatial location were imaged successively onto blind and seeing portions of their retinas. One hemianopic patient showed a similar IOR effect from cues presented within both the seeing and the hemianopic fields. With a second hemianopic patient, only presentations of the cue to the subject's seeing field produced IOR. The explanation for this discrepancy is not evident. These observations highlight both the potential value and the pitfalls inherent in using “blindsight” as a window into human consciousness. (shrink)
We compared the processing of natural language quantifiers in a group of patients with schizophrenia and a healthy control group. In both groups, the difficulty of the quantifiers was consistent with computational predictions, and patients with schizophrenia took more time to solve the problems. However, they were significantly less accurate only with proportional quantifiers, like more than half. This can be explained by noting that, according to the complexity perspective, only proportional quantifiers require working memory engagement.
Author: Michalski Rafał Title: ANCIENT SOURCES OF MEANING OF THE TERM “MIMESIS” (Antyczne źródła pojęcia mimezis) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2005, vol:.5, number: 2005/1, pages: 45-64 Keywords: ‘MIMESIS’, PLATO, PYTHAGORAS Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:In this article I show the evolution of meaning of the term ‘mimesis’ in ancient Greece. I distinguish its two basic meanings: copying (imitation) and expression. The older meaning (mimesis as expression) comes from the Pythagorean (...) tradition, whereas the newer one (mimesis as copying) can be traced back to the philosophy of Plato. Analysis of Plato’s dialogues step by step reveals ambivalence of the notion, and, what is most important, points out how useful it can be in epistemology, philosophy of language, psychology and aesthetics. (shrink)
Author: Michalski Rafał Title: IN SEARCH OF PARADISIAC NAMES – PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE (W poszukiwaniu „rajskich imion” – antropologia filozoficzna wobec problemu genezy języka) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2006, vol:.6, number: 2006/1, pages: 101-117 Keywords: WALTER BENJAMIN, HERDER, GEHLEN, ORIGINS LANGUAGE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The article deals with the problem of origin of an individual, particular speech and its relation to the language (...) of intersubjective communication. Paradisiac names – the term used by Walter Benjamin – are words which release suppresed semantic potentiality originated in the early phase of childhood. The author of the article shows the way J.G. Herder and A. Gehlen make clear this phaenomen in their conceptions of anthropology. (shrink)
As it is indicated in the title, this paper is devoted to the problem of defining mereological (collective) sets. Starting from basic properties of sets in mathematics and differences between them and so called conglomerates in Section 1, we go on to explicate informally in Section 2 what it means to join many objects into a single entity from point of view of mereology, the theory of part of (parthood) relation. In Section 3 we present and motivate basic axioms for (...) part of relation and we point to their most fundamental consequences. Next three sections are devoted to formal explication of the notion of mereological set (collective set) in terms of sums, fusions and aggregates. We do not give proofs of all theorems. Some of them are complicated and their presentation would divert the reader’s attention from the main topic of the paper. In such cases we indicate where the proofs can be found and analyzed by those who are interested. (shrink)
The goal is to sketch a nominalist approach to mathematics which just like neologicism employs abstraction principles, but unlike neologicism is not committed to the idea that mathematical objects exist and does not insist that abstraction principles establish the reference of abstract terms. It is well-known that neologicism runs into certain philosophical problems and faces the technical difficulty of finding appropriate acceptability criteria for abstraction principles. I will argue that a modal and iterative nominalist approach to abstraction principles circumvents those (...) difficulties while still being able to put abstraction principles to a foundational use. (shrink)
We investigate what happens when ‘truth’ is replaced with ‘provability’ in Yablo’s paradox. By diagonalization, appropriate sequences of sentences can be constructed. Such sequences contain no sentence decided by the background consistent and sufficiently strong arithmetical theory. If the provability predicate satisfies the derivability conditions, each such sentence is provably equivalent to the consistency statement and to the Gödel sentence. Thus each two such sentences are provably equivalent to each other. The same holds for the arithmetization of the existential Yablo (...) paradox. We also look at a formulation which employs Rosser’s provability predicate. (shrink)
In our paper we investigate a difficulty arising when one tries to reconsiliateessentialis t’s thinking with classification practice in the biological sciences. The article outlinessome varieties of essentialism with particular attention to the version defended by Brian Ellis. Weunderline the basic difference: Ellis thinks that essentialism is not a viable position in biology dueto its incompatibility with biological typology and other essentialists think that these two elementscan be reconciled. However, both parties have in common metaphysical starting point and theylack explicit (...) track of methodological procedures. Methodological inquiry involves less demandingassumptions than metaphysical, and therefore it is justified to analyse abovementioned discrepancy between Ellis and other essentialist in this context. We do it by bottom-up investigation whichfocuses on the practice of taxonomists in the particular field of biology. A case study helps us todiscover four characteristics of biological typology practice: impossibility of algorithmization,relativity, subjectivity and conventionality. These features prove non-realistic and therefore anti-essentialistic character of biological classification. We conclude by saying that any essentialismrelated to the notion of biological kind cannot be regarded as justified by scientific enterprise of creating typologies. (shrink)
This article is devoted to the problem of ontological foundations of three-dimensional Euclidean geometry. Starting from Bertrand Russell’s intuitions concerning the sensual world we try to show that it is possible to build a foundation for pure geometry by means of the so called regions of space. It is not our intention to present mathematically developed theory, but rather demonstrate basic assumptions, tools and techniques that are used in construction of systems of point-free geometry and topology by means of mereology (...) and Whitehead-like connection structures. We list and briefly analyze axioms for mereological structures, as well as those for connection structures. We argue that mereology is a good tool to model so called spatial relations. We also try to justify our choice of axioms for connection relation. Finally, we briefly discuss two theories: Grzegorczyk’s point-free topology and Tarski’s geometry of solids. (shrink)
. Uwagi na temat teorii rewolucji Hanny Arendt Niniejszy artykuł zawiera krytyczny komentarz do teorii rewolucji Hannah Arendt. W pierwszej części artykułu zostaną omówione główne kategorie, za pomocą których filozofka definiuje istotę każdej rewolucji: polityka, wolność publiczna, demokracja bezpośrednia, działanie jako praxis, system rad, nowość, pluralizm. W drugiej części wskazane zostaną deficyty argumentacyjne, które można sprowadzić do dwóch punktów: ukrytej irracjonalności pojęcia tego, co polityczne oraz zbyt ostrego przeciwstawienia demokracji bezpośredniej i parlamentarnej.
One of the standard views on plural quantification is that its use commits one to the existence of abstract objects–sets. On this view claims like ‘some logicians admire only each other’ involve ineliminable quantification over subsets of a salient domain. The main motivation for this view is that plural quantification has to be given some sort of semantics, and among the two main candidates—substitutional and set-theoretic—only the latter can provide the language of plurals with the desired expressive power (given that (...) the nominalist seems committed to the assumption that there can be at most countably many names). To counter this approach I develop a modal-substitutional semantics of plural quantification (on which plural variables, roughly speaking, range over ways names could be) and argue for its nominalistic acceptability. (shrink)
With material on his early philosophical views, his contributions to set theory and his work on nominalism and higher-order quantification, this book offers a uniquely expansive critical commentary on one of analytical philosophy’s great ...
The main focus of this paper is to develop an adaptive formal apparatus capable of capturing (certain types of) reasoning conducted within the framework of the so-called dynamic conceptual frames. I first explain one of the most recent theories of concepts developed by cognitivists, in which a crucial part is played by the notion of a dynamic frame. Next, I describe how a dynamic frame may be captured by a finite set of first-order formulas and how a formalized adaptive framework (...) for reasoning within a dynamic frame can be developed. (shrink)
David Lewis has formulated a well-known challenge to his Best System account of lawhood: the content of any system whatever can be formulated very simply if one allows for perverse choices of primitive vocabulary. We show that the challenge is not that dangerous, and that to account for it one need not invoke natural properties or relativized versions of the Best System account. This way, we help to move towards an even better Best System account. We discuss extensions of our (...) strategy to the discussions about the indexicality of the notion of laws of nature, and to another trivialization argument. (shrink)
Salmon and Soames argue against nominalism about numbers and sentence types. They employ (respectively) higher-order and first-order logic to model certain natural language inferences and claim that the natural language conclusions carry commitment to abstract objects, partially because their renderings in those formal systems seem to do that. I argue that this strategy fails because the nominalist can accept those natural language consequences, provide them with plausible and non-committing truth conditions and account for the inferences made without committing themselves to (...) abstract objects. I sketch a modal account of higher-order quantification, on which instead of ranging over sets, higher order quantifiers are used to make (logical) possibility claims about which predicate tokens can be introduced. This approach provides an alternative account of truth conditions for natural language sentences which seem to employ higher-order quantification, thus allowing the nominalist to evade Salmon’s argument. I also show how the nominalist can account for the occurrence of apparently singular abstract terms in certain true statements. I argue that the nominalist can achieve this by, first, dividing singular terms into real singular terms (referring to concrete objects) and only apparent singular terms (called onomatoids), introduced for the sake of brevity and simplicity, and then providing an account of nominalistically acceptable truth conditions of sentences containing onomatoids. I develop such an account in terms of modally interpreted abstraction principles and argue that applying this strategy to Soames’s argument allows the nominalists to defend themselves. (shrink)
The essay reviews references to Immanuel Kant’s transcendental philosophy in the work of Helmuth Plessner. First discussed is the Krisis der transzendentalen Wahrheit im Anfang, in which Plessner effects a critique of the transcendental method and shows that overcoming its crisis requires philosophy to rigorously restrict the applicability of theory to the experimental sphere and put it up for judgment by the tribunal of practical reason. Next under scrutiny is Plessner’s programmatic text in philosophical anthropology, in which he strives to (...) employ Kant’s deductive method for the construction of his own system of organic forms. (shrink)
A theory of definitions which places the eliminability and conservativeness requirements on definitions is usually called the standard theory. We examine a persistent myth which credits this theory to Le?niewski, a Polish logician. After a brief survey of its origins, we show that the myth is highly dubious. First, no place in Le?niewski's published or unpublished work is known where the standard conditions are discussed. Second, Le?niewski's own logical theories allow for creative definitions. Third, Le?niewski's celebrated ?rules of definition? lay (...) merely syntactical restrictions on the form of definitions: they do not provide definitions with such meta-theoretical requirements as eliminability or conservativeness. On the positive side, we point out that among the Polish logicians, in the 1920s and 1930s, a study of these meta-theoretical conditions is more readily found in the works of ?ukasiewicz and Ajdukiewicz. (shrink)
The purpose of this article is a critical reconstruction of the Platonic conception of laughter, which is presented primarily in Republic and Philebus. A comic quality calls, in his opinion, to lower emotions, it throws human mind out of balance and undermines the prevailing order of values. The philosopher associates a laughter with the feeling of envy, which comes down to the joy of humiliating of someone weaker. The comic envy - as opposed to passive jealousy - almost automatically leads (...) to the activity, to the enhancement of humiliation. Laughter is caused according to Plato by a defect resulting from the ignorance about himself. The key feature of the comic situation is the asymmetry between the victim's weakness and the strength of a laughing person. Plato's concept of laughter turns out to be one-sided, when we compare it with "laughter of Democritus" which serves as a therapeutic and catharctic means. Laughter is here a clear signal that initiates the critical reflection on himself and gives impetus to a change of attitude towards the world. In his writings Plato did not include such educational and cognitive aspects of laughter because in his philosophy it becomes a specific antagonist of true knowledge. The negative attitude towards laughter does not go hand in hand with Plato’s recognition of Socrates, who used irony as a key element in his method of inquiry leading to truth. (shrink)
Sobocinski in his paper on Leśniewski's solution to Russell's paradox (1949b) argued that Leśniewski has succeeded in explaining it away. The general strategy of this alleged explanation is presented. The key element of this attempt is the distinction between the collective (mereological) and the distributive (set-theoretic) understanding of the set. The mereological part of the solution, although correct, is likely to fall short of providing foundations of mathematics. I argue that the remaining part of the solution which suggests a specific (...) reading of the distributive interpretation is unacceptable. It follows from it that every individual is an element of every individual. Finally, another Leśniewskian-style approach which uses so-called higher-order epsilon connectives is used and its weakness is indicated. (shrink)
Recently predominant forms of anti-realism claim that all truths are knowable. We argue that in a logical explanation of the notion of knowability more attention should be paid to its epistemic part. Especially very useful in such explanation are notions of group knowledge. In this paper we examine mainly the notion of distributed knowability and show its effectiveness in the case of Fitch’s paradox. Proposed approach raised some philosophical questions to which we try to find responses. We also show how (...) we can combine our point of view on Fitch’s paradox with the others. Next we give an answer to the question: is distributed knowability factive? At the end, we present some details concerning a construction of anti-realist modal epistemic logic. (shrink)
The systems of patent rights in force in Europe today, both at the level of national law and on the regional level, contain general clauses prohibiting the patenting of inventions whose publication and exploitation would be contrary to “ordre public” or morality. Recent years have brought frequent discussion about limiting the possibility of patent protection for biotechnological inventions for ethical reasons. This is undoubtedly a result of the dynamic development in this field in the last several years. Human genome sequencing, (...) the first successful cloning of mammals, and the progress in human stem cell research present humanity with many new questions of an ethical nature. Directive 98/44 of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 6, 1998, on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions created a new basis for patent protection in this field of technology. Based on the European experience to now, however, it must be said that patent law is not the right place to legislate the consequences of the morality of an invention. (shrink)
The aim of this paper is to articulate dispositonal essentialism (DE) as a viable position in the discussions considering properties and laws of nature. In the first part of the article there are given several „must have” trades of properties in DE. They are followed by the conceptions themselves. The last part of the article brings a little insight about ceteris paribus laws in DE.
Brown (The laboratory of the mind. Thought experiments in the natural science, 1991a , 1991b ; Contemporary debates in philosophy of science, 2004 ; Thought experiments, 2008 ) argues that thought experiments (TE) in science cannot be arguments and cannot even be represented by arguments. He rest his case on examples of TEs which proceed through a contradiction to reach a positive resolution (Brown calls such TEs “platonic”). This, supposedly, makes it impossible to represent them as arguments for logical reasons: (...) there is no logic that can adequately model such phenomena. (Brown further argues that this being the case, “platonic” TEs provide us with irreducible insight into the abstract realm of laws of nature). I argue against this approach by describing how “platonic” TEs can be modeled within the logical framework of adaptive proofs for prioritized consequence operations. To show how this mundane apparatus works, I use it to reconstruct one of the key examples used by Brown, Galileo’s TE involving falling bodies. (shrink)
In this paper we give probably an exhaustive analysis of the geometry of solids which was sketched by Tarski in his short paper [20, 21]. We show that in order to prove theorems stated in [20, 21] one must enrich Tarski's theory with a new postulate asserting that the universe of discourse of the geometry of solids coincides with arbitrary mereological sums of balls, i.e., with solids. We show that once having adopted such a solution Tarski's Postulate 4 can be (...) omitted, together with its versions 4' and 4". We also prove that the equivalence of postulates 4, 4' and 4" is not provable in any theory whose domain contains objects other than solids. Moreover, we show that the concentricity relation as defined by Tarski must be transitive in the largest class of structures satisfying Tarski's axioms. We build a model (in three-dimensional Euclidean space) of the theory of so called T*-structures and present the proof of the fact that this is the only (up to isomorphism) model of this theory. Moreover, we propose different categorical axiomatizations of the geometry of solids. In the final part of the paper we answer the question concerning the logical status (within the theory of T*-structures) of the definition of the concentricity relation given by Tarski. (shrink)
The question whether I am the same person at different moments has brought many difficulties for a long time. The problem with identity of things through time was already known in the ancient times especially when Plutarch asked whether a ship of Theseus with exchanged elements is still the same ship as before renovation. Today, we continue these considerations asking, for instance, if things, apart from their physical parts, also have temporal parts. The number of the proposed solutions to the (...) problem of identity and identity of persons at different times resembles wandering in a dark room with a scarf on your eyes. As a result, rather than coming closer to the light switch, we find concepts which suggest that personal identity is not important, or what is important is psychological continuity or identity which is only a matter of degree. So I can be the same person as I was in some part, in some degree. It sounds like a constitution person who likes darkness and does not need light anymore. Unfortunately, first of all, we still use successfully the concept of identity in an ordinary language, and what is more, the abandonment of the notion of personal identity results in a greater number of absurdities, so in consequence, we still do not have an idea how to treat personal identity. (shrink)