Recently predominant forms of anti-realism claim that all truths are knowable. We argue that in a logical explanation of the notion of knowability more attention should be paid to its epistemic part. Especially very useful in such explanation are notions of group knowledge. In this paper we examine mainly the notion of distributed knowability and show its effectiveness in the case of Fitch’s paradox. Proposed approach raised some philosophical questions to which we try to find responses. We also show how (...) we can combine our point of view on Fitch’s paradox with the others. Next we give an answer to the question: is distributed knowability factive? At the end, we present some details concerning a construction of anti-realist modal epistemic logic. (shrink)

Poznawalność jako modalność de re: pewne rozwiązanie paradoksu Fitcha W artykule staramy się znaleźć nowe, intuicyjne rozwiązanie paradoksu Fitcha. Twierdzimy, że tradycyjne wyrażenie zasady poznawalności opiera się na błędnym rozumieniu poznawalności jako modalności de dicto. Zamiast tego proponujemy rozumieć poznawalność jako modalność de re. W artykule przedstawiamy minimalną logikę poznawalności, w której zasada poznawalności jest ważna, ale paradoks Fitcha już nie obowiązuje. Logikę charakteryzujemy semantycznie, a także poprzez podejście aksjomatyczne i tabelaryczne.

This book is dedicated to the life and work of logician Janusz Czelakowski on the topic of logical consequence. It consists of three parts – a biography, a survey and research sections. The volume begins with an autobiographic chapter by Janusz Czelakowski followed by a historical chapter written by Jacek Malinowski. The survey section forms the backbone of the volume with each chapter covering one of Janusz Czelakowski’s results. They focus on his results in the area of logical consequence, demonstrate (...) how his results influenced following research, and presents potential future results, problems and applications. This volume is of interest to logicians and mathematicians. (shrink)

According to a brief and very general definition Cognitive Science is an interdisciplinary scientific study of how information is represented and transformed in a human nervous system. “Information”, “representation” and “transformation” are keywords here. Many disciplines bring considerable contribution to Cognitive Science. Logic is one of them. Logic investigates these rules which allow us to recognize valid reasonings and distinguish them from those that fail to fulfill the condition of valid- ity. Thus logic investigates some representation (or representations) of reasoning. (...) Significant part of information transformed in nervous system is related to reasoning and inference. This fact opens special perspectives on applying Logic in Cognitive Science both in representing as well as in transforming information. Any formal logical system constitutes a kind of representation of a class of propositions considered as sentence content. In this way each logical system provides a representation of a broad class of belief states. At the same time any inference relation, related to a given logical system, represents a transformation of some type of information. As a consequence it would be hard to find logical investigations which could not be applied in Cognitive Science. Such an idea guided us while we were preparing the present volume. (shrink)

In this paper, we indicate how Jan Woleński’s non-linguistic concept of the norm allows us to clarify the deontic relationship between sentences and the given normative system. A relationship of this kind constitutes a component of the metalogic of relating deontic logic, which subjects the logical value of the deontic sentence to the logical value of the constituent sentence and its relationship with a given normative system in the accessible possible worlds.

If knowledge is factive, it is not voluntary. In the paper, I discuss this relation within the framework of the theory of knowledge proposed by Adam Grobler. It directly questions the factivity of knowledge and indirectly assumes voluntariness. So, in fact, this theory shows how the acceptance of voluntariness leads to the rejection of factivity. I argue that the exact opposite is true by defending the factivity of knowledge. I also show that Grobler’s theory of knowledge is the variation of (...) Lewis’s relevant alternative approach to knowledge. (shrink)

According to contrastivism in epistemology - advocated chiefly by Jonathan Schaffer - the knowledge relation is not binary (s knows that p) but ternary (s knows that p rather than q). Thus knowledge ascriptions are contrast-sensitive. The aim of this paper is to portray, investigate and assess the details of this view. In the first three sections I focus mainly on arguments for contrastivism. Section fourth is devoted to the contrastivist solution to the skeptical puzzle. In the last three sections (...) I present several problems for contrastivism as well as three main binary explanations for contrast-sensitivity. (shrink)

Contextualism is an epistemological claim that truth-conditions of knowledge ascribing sentences depend on context in which they are uttered. The discussion concerned with its background and assumptions is predominant in recent epistemology. However, contextualism is known better as the suggested solution for skepticism about the external world. In this paper I present one of the most important contextualist theory which have been proposed in 90's by Keith DeRose. In what follows I outline this proposal's main sources, i.e. i) a relevant (...) alternative theory, ii) Nozick's definition of knowledge and iii) two earlier contextualist ideas made by David Lewis and Gail Stine. Next, I consider some weak aspects of this theory that have been pointed out by critics. (shrink)

Praca jest poświęcona negacji dyskursywnej (metajęzykowej). Omawiane są jej funkcje (np. sprostowanie, uwypuklenie, zaskoczenie), rodzaje (np. implikacyjna, językowa, prozodyczna) i własności (np. pozorna sprzeczność, pragmatyczne odkodowanie, przytoczenie, a nie użycie, brak konstrukcji z prefiksem „nie”, brak konstrukcji z zaimkami negatywnymi). Następnie rozpatrzona została możliwość, że negacja dyskursywna jest jedynie szczególnym przypadkiem innych rodzajów negacji, w szczególności negacji kontrastywnej lub illokucyjnej. Dalej postawiono pytanie, czy w przypadku negacji dyskursywnej mamy do czynienia ze zjawiskiem semantycznym czy pragmatycznym, jak również, czy jest możliwe (...) ujęcie negacji dyskursywnej w ramach mechanizmu konwersacyjnego nazywanego „przywołaniem echem”. (shrink)

tom I. Między pragmatyką a semantyką -- tom 2. Między semantyką a epistemologią.