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  1.  67
    Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Representation.Raffaella De Rosa - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Raffaella De Rosa discusses the theory of sensory perception, especially color perception, offered by Ren Descartes. She offers a detailed overview of the recent literature on the topic and provides a new reading of Descartes' theory; she also raises questions of great interest in the contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
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  2. (1 other version)A teleological account of cartesian sensations?Raffaella De Rosa - 2007 - Synthese 156 (2):311-336.
    Alison Simmons, in Simmons (1999), argues that Descartes in Meditation Six offered a teleological account of sensory representation. According to Simmons, Descartes’ view is that the biological function of sensations explains both why sensations represent what they do (i.e., their referential content) and why they represent their objects the way they do (i.e., their presentational content). Moreover, Simmons claims that her account has several advantages over other currently available interpretations of Cartesian sensations. In this paper, I argue that Simmons’ teleological (...)
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  3. The myth of cartesian qualia.Raffaella de Rosa - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):181-207.
    The standard view of Cartesian sensations is that they present themselves as purely qualitative features of experience. Accordingly, Descartes view would be that in perceiving the color red, for example, we are merely experiencing the subjective feel of redness rather than seeming to perceive a property of bodies. In this paper, I establish that the argument and textual evidence offered in support of SV fail to prove that Descartes held this view. Indeed, I will argue that there are textual and (...)
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  4. Quine's meaning holisms.Raffaella De Rosa & Ernest Lepore - 2004 - In Roger F. Gibson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Quine. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  5.  89
    Rethinking the Ontology of Cartesian Essences.Raffaella De Rosa - 2011 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (4):605 - 622.
    The old and recent debates on Cartesian essences have focused on the question of whether Descartes is a Platonist or a conceptualist about essences. I argue that this is a false dichotomy. An adequate account of Cartesian essences must accommodate and reconcile two central doctrines and texts in Descartes' philosophy. I will argue that recent conceptualist and Platonist interpretations neither accommodate these doctrines nor reconcile these texts. Such failures are not accidental since Descartes' doctrines of divine creation and simplicity render (...)
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  6.  55
    Descartes' Causal Principle and the Case of Body-to-Mind Causation1.Raffaella De Rosa - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):438-459.
    It is a common view that Descartes' causal principle is to be understood in light of a similarity condition that accounts for how finite causes contribute to an explanation of their effects. This paper challenges this common view and offers a sui generis reading of Descartes' views on causation that has also the advantage of solving the two exegetical issues of whether Descartes thought of the body-to-mind relation in occasionalist or causal terms and of whether Descartes regarded sensory ideas innate (...)
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  7.  40
    (1 other version)Descartes on Mathematical Essences.Raffaella De Rosa & Otávio Bueno - 2008 - ProtoSociology 25:160-177.
    Descartes seems to hold two inconsistent accounts of the ontological status of mathematical essences. Meditation Five apparently develops a platonist view about such essences, while the Principles seems to advocate some form of “conceptualism”. We argue that Descartes was neither a platonist nor a conceptualist. Crucial to our interpretation is Descartes’ dispositional nativism. We contend that his doctrine of innate ideas allows him to endorse a hybrid view which avoids the drawbacks of Gassendi’s conceptualism without facing the difficulties of platonism. (...)
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  8.  57
    Prinz's Problematic Proxytypes.Raffaella de Rosa - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):594 - 606.
    Jesse Prinz has argued that a proxytype theory of concepts provides what he calls the 'intentionality' and 'cognitive content' desiderata better than any current competitor, and that the hybrid nature of proxytypes allows his theory to combine the informational component of informational atomism with the view that concepts are semantically structured entities. In response, I argue that the hybrid character of proxytypes, far from delivering the advantages Prinz claims, generates a threatening dilemma: either his theory is novel but fails to (...)
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  9.  32
    Descartes on Sensory Misrepresentation: The Case of Materially False Ideas.Raffaella De Rosa - 2004 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 21 (3):261-280.
  10.  24
    Locke's Critique of Innatism.Raffaella De Rosa - 2015 - In Matthew Stuart (ed.), A Companion to Locke. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 157–174.
    This chapter clarifies the different varieties of dispositional nativism (DN) that John Locke addresses. In the light of this clarification, the chapter then identifies the basic structure of Locke's arguments and assesses their strengths and weaknesses. It points out that Locke's polemic fails to undermine nativism. The chapter analyzes Locke's reasoning for dismissing nativism in its cognitive form. It explains Locke's arguments against the postulation of innate ideas. The chapter examines three problems with Locke's argumentative strategy. In light of the (...)
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  11. Locke’s Essay, Book I: The Question-Begging Status of the Anti-Nativist Arguments.Raffaella de Rosa - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):37-64.
    In this paper I argue against the received view that the anti-nativist arguments of Book I of Locke’s Essay conclusively challenge nativism. I begin by reconstructing the chief argument of Book I and its corollary arguments. I call attention to their dependence on (what I label) “the Awareness Principle”, viz., the view that there are no ideas in the mind of which the mind either isn’t currently aware or hasn’t been aware in the past. I then argue that the arguments’ (...)
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  12. Cartesian sensations.Raffaella De Rosa - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):780-792.
    Descartes maintained that sensations of color and the like misrepresent the material world in normal circumstances. Some prominent scholars have argued that, to explain this Cartesian view, we must attribute to Descartes a causal account of sensory representation. I contend that neither the arguments motivating this reading nor the textual evidence offered in its support is sufficient to justify such attribution. Both textual and theoretical reasons point in the direction of an (at least partial) internalist account of Descartes' views on (...)
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  13.  55
    Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Representation: Précis.Raffaella De Rosa - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (1):93-96.
    Raffaella De Rosa discusses the theory of sensory perception, especially color perception, offered by René Descartes. She offers a detailed overview of the recent literature on the topic and provides a new reading of Descartes' theory; she also raises questions of great interest in the contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
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  14.  49
    Descartes and the Curious Case of the Origin of Sensory Ideas.Raffaella De Rosa - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):704-723.
    Descartes endorses the two prima facie inconsistent claims that sensory ideas are innate and caused in us by bodies. Most scholars believe that Claims A and B can be reconciled by appealing to the notion of occasional or triggering causation. I claim that this notion does not solve the theoretical problems it is introduced to solve and it generates additional difficulties. I argue that these difficulties result from conflating two questions that need to be kept distinct while inquiring about the (...)
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  15. Innate Ideas and Intentionality Descartes Vs Locke.Raffaella De Rosa - 2002 - Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick
    The topic of this dissertation is a discussion of the seventeenth century debate between Descartes and Locke over innate ideas. I propose a novel approach to the study of this debate. I argue that their disagreement over innate ideas is directly related to their differing views of how the content of ideas is determined and of what counts as having an idea in the mind. Approaching the controversy between Descartes and Locke from this perspective has allowed me to conclude that (...)
     
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  16.  89
    Material Falsity and Error in Descartes’s Meditations.Raffaella De Rosa - 2008 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (4):pp. 641-642.
    This book aims to overturn the common view of materially false ideas , which is that Descartes’s discussion in Meditation Three generates confusion about his views on truth and falsehood and is irrelevant to the rest of the argument in the Meditations.After introducing MFIs and then criticizing previous interpretations, Wee provides her own account in chapter three. Since a proper understanding of why MFIs fail in their representational function allows Wee to revisit their role in the Meditations, this chapter occupies (...)
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  17.  44
    On Fodor’s Claim that Classical Empiricists and Rationalists Agree on the Innateness of Ideas.Raffaella De Rosa - 2000 - ProtoSociology 14:240-269.
    Jerry Fodor has argued that Classical Empiricists are as committed to the innateness of ideas as Classical Rationalists. His argument, however, is proven inconclusive by an ambiguity surrounding “innate ideas”.Textual evidence for this ambiguity is provided and the “Dispositional Nativism” that, prima facie, makes Empiricist and Rationalist views similar dissolves into two distinct views about the nature of both the mind’s and the environment’s contribution in the process of concept acquisition.Once the Empiricist’s Dispositional Nativism is not conflated with the Rationalist’s, (...)
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  18.  42
    Replies to Vinci and Nelson.Raffaella De Rosa - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (1):117-128.
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  19.  54
    What's within. Nativism reconsidered.Raffaella De Rosa - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):119 – 122.
    Book Information What's Within. Nativism Reconsidered. What's Within. Nativism Reconsidered F. Cowie New York/Oxford Oxford University Press 1999 xvii + 334 Hardback US$35.00 By F. Cowie. Oxford University Press. New York/Oxford. Pp. xvii + 334. Hardback:US$35.00.
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  20.  37
    Review of Lex Newman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding"[REVIEW]Raffaella De Rosa - 2007 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (9).
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