محاضرة القيت في المركز العربي للدراسات وابحاث السياسات (الدوحة/قطر) في العام 2018. تعرض المحاضرة لمفاهيم مختلفة حول عبور التخصصات وتحاول ان تبين من منها يمكن ان يؤخذ بجدية ومن منها لا يصمد امام الامتحان النقدي. ينتهي المحاضر الى القول بان هناك عبور للتخصصات بمعني او معاني تتسم بالبراءة ويمكن التعايش معها، كما ان هناك مفاهيم أخرى ليست واضحة المعنى، واخرى معادية لفكرة وجود تخصصات في المقام الأول. يحاجج المحاضر ان ليس هناك مبرر قوي للتنكر للتخصصات ولا لمحو الحدود بينها، وان (...) القول بخلاف ذلك ينم عن رؤية سطحية للنظرية العلمية وشروط امكان التوصل اليها. (shrink)
The object of this paper is to elaborate an understanding of Islamic law and legal theory in terms of the conceptual framework provided by Legal Positivism. The study is not based on denying or contesting the claim of Islamic law to being of divine origin; rather, it is based on the historical reality of Islamic law as part of a (once) living legal tradition, with structure, method, and theory, regardless of claims of origin. It will be suggested that Ash‘arism may (...) be taken as providing an Islamic version of Legal Positivism, and that the objections which Mu‘tazilism raised in the face of Ash‘arism were not different in substance from some of the objections that have been directed at contemporary Legal Positivism. It will also be suggested that the Ash‘arites and the Mu‘tazilites were not opposed to each other in the way they are commonly supposed to have been. Rather, they were preoccupied with different notions of what it is to be obliged (to have an obligation) to do something. (shrink)
This chapter (5) focuses on the concept of the forgiving God in Islamic religion and theology and claims that Islamic thinking about divine forgiveness accommodates two different views that emphasize two different attributes of God: justice and mercy. The first view is associated with a rationalist school of theology known as Mu'tazilism, while the second is associated with a fideistic school known as Ash'arism. The author argues that the first view, which is based on a strict calculus of desert, leaves (...) little or no room for mercy, and that the second view is more true to our ordinary notion of forgiveness. (shrink)
The object of this paper is to present and discuss the way democracy is conceived of by some prominent Islamic thinkers. Their position is that democracy, rightly understood, is simply a method of dispensing, sharing, and managing political authority, and as such does not imply secularism or other values and practices that are associated with liberalism. This paper is conceived of within a broader project to theorize the relations (actual and possible) between Islam, democracy, and modernity.
This paper is a discussion of the ways in which the notion of public reason has come to manifest itself in recent Islamic writings. The discussion is part of an effort to discover a common language in terms of which Islamic and liberal/secular discourses about democracy and public debate can be understood. The difficult question we are left with is whether it is permissible to speak of “public reason” sans phrase, or whether the notion must always be qualified by reference (...) to culture and religion. (shrink)
My aim is to argue that forgiveness may be conceived by analogy to healing. The analogy is not self-evident, but a number of subsidiary analogies will be seen to point in its direction, or so I will argue. In the course of the discussion we shall see how injustice (and wrong-doing) may be compared to physical injury (both change the state of the sufferer to the worse), and how the resentment caused by suffering injustice may be compared to the physical (...) pain caused by injury (both are aversive, action-motivating states). The analogies will be illustrated and supported by concrete examples, ultimately suggesting that, in an important sense, when we forgive, we actually heal. (shrink)
The paper offers a critical examination of Ghazali’s main arguments against the views of the philosophers on causation. The authors argue that Ghazali’s definition of miracles as "departure from the usual course of events" carries at least two meanings, only one of which is in conflict with necessary causal relations. The authors also argue that Ghazali’s desire to uphold the possibility of miracles need not constrain him to repudiate the idea of necessary connection, since he is able to explain miracles (...) in ways that are compatible with belief in causality and necessary connection. The authors conclude by examining some arguments to the effect that Ghazali’s attempt to hold on to both miracles and necessary connection is inherently unstable, and explore directions which Ghazalians may take in order to counter these arguments. (shrink)
There are two ways in which Ghazali contributes to the discussion of whether God exists: by arguing for the existence of God, and by arguing against certain views which, in his opinion, stand in the way of truly believing that God exists. In this paper I examine Ghazali’s argument from creation and his refutation or the philosophers’ second proof for the eternity or the world. My purpose will be to argue that: firstly, Ghazali’s argument and his refutation are based on (...) incompatible views of time, and cannot, therefore, both be maintained. Secondly, Ghazali fails to establish the one interesting premiss which he employs in his argument from creation. (shrink)
This paper aims at clarifying the role which the concept of 'divine sovereignty ' plays in the discussions which are taking place among Islamic thinkers (and others) concerning the possibility of democracy in an Islamic context. It argues that 'sovereignty ' has at least two meanings, one 'f'actual', the other 'normative'. The paper also argues that the second sense of 'sovereignty ' allows us to construe ta!k o{ 'divine sovereignty' as an attempt by Islamic thinkers to go beyond the merely (...) procedural views of democracy which focus on the familiar procedures o( power contestation, election and accountability. (shrink)
In this paper it is argued that The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles can be justified as a concrete application of Ockham’s Razor, the maxim which enjoins us not to multiply entities beyond necessity. First, a statement of the Principle is presented, according to which the Principle, while interesting enough, is not logically necessary. It is then argued that the assumption of the falsity of the Principle prescribes an epistemological situation where it seems to be impossible to find grounds (...) for thinking that the Principle is indeed false. Hence it is to be accepted as an epistemological necessity of sorts, one that recommended by the desire not to multiply entities beyond need. (shrink)
The object of this paper is to explore the possibility defending women's rights (or, more broadly, expressing women's concerns) within a framework of Islamic concepts and ideas. This is to be accomplished by introducing a number of methodological principles that can, and (for feminists) should govern the practice of "religious interpretation" (ijtihad) which Muslims have used throughout the centuries to adapt Qur'anic and Islamic teachings to changing realities and circumstances.
In the 17th Discussion of his Tahafut al-Falasifah, Ghazali presents two theories of causation which, he claims, accommodate belief in the possibility of miracles. The first of these, which is usually taken to represent Ghazali’s own position, is a form of occasionalism. In this paper I argue that Ghazali fails to prove that this theory is compatible with belief in the possibility of miracles.
The main object of this paper is to clarify and evaluate Avicenna’s view of universals, in light of some modern and contemporarydiscussions. According to Avicenna, universality is a contingent attribute of entities that are in themselves neither universal norparticular. An account of universality as a contingent attribute is offered which clarifies and gives additional support to Avicenna’sview. Nevertheless, it will be argued that Avicenna, through his use of such terms as “nature” and “quiddity,” faces the same problemswhich he attributes to (...) his predecessors. (shrink)
The object of this paper is to explore the possibility of defending women's rights within a framework of Islamic concepts and ideas. This is to be accomplished by introducing a number of methodological principles that can, and for feminists should, govern the practice of " religious interpretation" (ijtihad) which Muslims have used throughout the centuries to adapt Qur)anic and Islamic teachings to changing realities and circumstances. The main goal is to explore the meaning and possibility of "Islamic feminism".
Leibniz and Aristotle offer diametrically opposed accounts of what it is for ordinary particulars to be numerically diverse. Leibniz, through his Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII), affirms that numerically diverse particulars must have different qualities, whereas Aristotle insists that such particulars are different on account of their "matter". In this paper I seek to bridge the gap between these two rival accounts by means of a (PII)-like principle which seems to be a consequence of the Aristotelian position.
The main idea of this book (in Arabic) is that the dichotomy of intention/behavior is about as viable as the mind/body dichotomy, which is to say it is not at all viable. An approach to the problem of knowledge of other minds and intersubjectivity via a discussion of the ontology of human action, which must be viewed as an original unity, not a combination of two really distinct things, namely, intention and bodily movement.
In this paper I argue that al Ash'ari was a Theological Determinist whose position on free will and human responsibility was marred by his failure to distinguish between two senses of the word 'can' (yastati'u ). I also compare al Ash'ari's position with that of the Mu'tazilite thinker al Qadi 'Abd al Jabbar. I conclude that their positions may not have been so much opposed to each other as merely different. This, I suggest, should invite us to re evaluate the (...) nature and extent of the disagreement between the Ash'arites and the Mu'tazilites on the free will question. (shrink)
An exploration (in Arabic) of the foundations of humans rights and the associated notion of human dignity. These include religious, rational-secular, as well as naturalistic foundations. Arguments are presented in support of naturalistic foundations, with reference to natural human needs and dispositions and 'moral sentiments'.
The object of this article is to review and evaluate a debate that has been taking place among Muslim and Arab writers for some time now about the concept of ‘dawla madaniyya’ (‘civil state/ government’), and the place of religion in democratic politics. More precisely, it will be suggested that the current popularity of the term ‘dawla madaniyya’ signifies only a partial meeting of minds between Islamists and their liberal and secular opponents. By and large, the concept seems to have (...) an instrumental value as part of an on-going discursive struggle between various political orientations about the place of Islam in the social–political order. On the basis of our discussion of the terms of the debate, a new approach to conceptualizing the disagreement will be suggested. The goal of this is not to resolve the disagreement, but rather to sharpen it in a way that shows what is required to achieve significant progress. The final resolution of the disagreement must await a more radical convergence of ideas than currently exists a convergence that touches not only on standards of reasonableness but also on substantive beliefs and values. (shrink)
The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, commonly attributed to Leibniz, has given rise to much discussion and debate. Thus philosophers have argued over how it should be formulated, whether it is true, and what, if any, metaphysical consequences it has.It is not my intention to add to these discussions here, having done so elsewhere. Rather, I intend to introduce and defend a closely related principle which I shall, for want of a better name, refer to as The Principle of (...) the Identity of Necessary Similarity’.In section II, I briefly recapitulate some of the distinctions and other relevant points which are customarily made in connection with. This is all too familiar material, but it is necessary in order to provide a general framework of concepts in terms of which we can discuss in an intelligible fashion. (shrink)
In this paper it is argued that The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles can be justified as a concrete application of Ockham’s Razor, the maxim which enjoins us not to multiply entities beyond necessity. First, a statement of the Principle is presented, according to which the Principle, while interesting enough, is not logically necessary. It is then argued that the assumption of the falsity of the Principle prescribes an epistemological situation where it seems to be impossible to find grounds (...) for thinking that the Principle is indeed false. Hence it is to be accepted as an epistemological necessity of sorts, one that recommended by the desire not to multiply entities beyond need. (shrink)