Results for 'Ralph Wojtowicz'

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  1.  19
    Piagetian Roboethics Via Category Theory Moving Beyond Mere Formal Operations to Engineer Robots Whose Decisions Are Guaranteed to Be Ethically Correct.Selmer Bringsjord, Joshua Taylor, Bram van Heuveln, Konstantine Arkoudas, Micah Clark & Ralph Wojtowicz - 2011 - In M. Anderson S. Anderson (ed.), Machine Ethics. Cambridge Univ. Press.
  2. Bernard Williams on Regarding One's Own Action Purely Externally.Jake Wojtowicz - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (1):49-66.
    I explore what BernardWilliams means by regarding one’s action ‘purely externally, as one might regard anyone else’s action’, and how it links to regret and agent-regret. I suggest some ways that we might understand the external view: as a failure to recognize what one has done, in terms of Williams’s distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic luck, and as akin to Thomas Nagel’s distinction between an internal and external view. I argue that none of these captures what Williams was getting at (...)
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  3. A Model of Hippocampal Neurogenesis in Memory and Mood Disorders.Suzanna Becker & J. Martin Wojtowicz - 2007 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):70-76.
  4. The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    This is a book about normativity -- where the central normative terms are words like 'ought' and 'should' and their equivalents in other languages. It has three parts: The first part is about the semantics of normative discourse: what it means to talk about what ought to be the case. The second part is about the metaphysics of normative properties and relations: what is the nature of those properties and relations whose pattern of instantiation makes propositions about what ought to (...)
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  5.  29
    The Value of Rationality.Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    Ralph Wedgwood gives a general account of what it is for states of mind and processes of thought to count as rational. Whether you are thinking rationally depends purely on what is going on in your mind, but rational thinking is a means to the goal of getting things right in your thinking, by believing the truth or making good choices.
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  6. A Dialog with Ralph Tyler.Ralph W. Tyler, W. Schubert & Ann Lynn Lopez Schubert - 1986 - Journal of Thought 21 (1):91-118.
     
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  7. The Aim of Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.
    It is often said, metaphorically, that belief "aims" at the truth. This paper proposes a normative interpretation of this metaphor. First, the notion of "epistemic norms" is clarified, and reasons are given for the view that epistemic norms articulate essential features of the beliefs that are subject to them. Then it is argued that all epistemic norms--including those that specify when beliefs count as rational, and when they count as knowledge--are explained by a fundamental norm of correct belief, which requires (...)
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  8. Justified Inference.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):273-295.
    What is the connection between justification and the kind of consequence relations that are studied by logic? In this essay, I shall try to provide an answer, by proposing a general conception of the kind of inference that counts as justified or rational.
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  9. Internalism Explained.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):349-369.
    According to epistemological internalism, the rationality of a belief supervenes purely on "internal facts" about the thinker's mind. But what are "internal facts"? Why does the rationality of a belief supervene on them? The standard answers are unacceptable. This paper proposes new answers. "Internal facts" are facts about the thinker's nonfactive mental states. The rationality of a belief supervenes on such internal facts because we need rules of belief revision that we can follow directly, not by means of following any (...)
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  10.  18
    White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice. [REVIEW]Ralph Wedgwood - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):156.
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  11. Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.
    Sometimes, we think of belief as a phenomenon that comes in degrees – that is, in the many different levels of confidence that a thinker might have in various different propositions. Sometimes, we think of belief as a simple two-place relation that holds between a thinker and a proposition – that is, as what I shall here call "outright belief".
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  12. The Metaphysical Expositions of Space and Time.Randy Wojtowicz - 1997 - Synthese 113 (1):71-115.
    The direct proof of transcendental idealism, in the Transcendental Aesthetic of Kant's First Critique, has borne the brunt of enormous criticism. Much of this criticism has arisen from a confusion regarding the epistemological nature of the arguments Kant proposes with the alleged ontological conclusions he draws. In this paper I attempt to deflect this species of criticism. I concentrate my analysis on the Metaphysical Expositions of Space and Time. I argue that the argument form of the Metaphysical Expositions is that (...)
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  13. Independence and Justification in Mathematics.Krzysztof Wójtowicz - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1):349-373.
    In the article the problem of independence in mathematics is discussed. The status of the continuum hypothesis, large cardinal axioms and the axiom of constructablility is presented in some detail. The problem whether incompleteness is really relevant for ordinary mathematics and for empirical science is investigated. Another aim of the article is to give some arguments for the thesis that the problem of reliability and justification of new axioms is well-posed and worthy of attention. In my opinion, investigations concerning the (...)
     
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  14. The Moral Evil Demons.Ralph Wedgwood - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford University Press.
    Moral disagreement has long been thought to create serious problems for certain views in metaethics. More specifically, moral disagreement has been thought to pose problems for any metaethical view that rejects relativism—that is, for any view that implies that whenever two thinkers disagree about a moral question, at least one of those thinkers’ beliefs about the question is not correct. In this essay, I shall outline a solution to one of these problems. As I shall argue, it turns out in (...)
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  15.  16
    God and the Astronomers. By William Ralph Inge, K.C.V.O., D.D., F.B.A.(The Warburton Lectures, 1931–1933. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1933). [REVIEW]Ralph E. Stedman - 1934 - Philosophy 9 (33):96-.
    Dictionary entry discussing the main moral and meta-ethical doctrines found in the works of James Griffin.
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  16.  22
    The Meaning of the Humanities: Five Essays by Ralph Barton Perry and Others. Edited with an Introduction by Theodore Meyer Greene . (Princeton: Princeton University Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1938. Pp. Vii + 178. Price $2.50; 11s.). [REVIEW]Ralph E. Stedman - 1939 - Philosophy 14 (56):503-.
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  17.  18
    Practical Ethics: A Sketch for the Moral Structure of Society. By Ralph R. Rueter.Ralph R. Reuter - 1950 - Ethics 61 (4):326-327.
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  18. The Normative Force of Reasoning.Ralph Wedgwood - 2006 - Noûs 40 (4):660–686.
    What exactly is reasoning? Like many other philosophers, I shall endorse a broadly causal conception of reasoning. Reasoning is a causal process, in which one mental event (say, one’s accepting the conclusion of a certain argument) is caused by an antecedent mental event (say, one’s considering the premises of the argument). Just like causal accounts of action and causal accounts of perception, causal accounts of reasoning have to confront a version of what has come to be known as the problem (...)
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  19.  26
    O tzw. programie Gödla.Krzysztof Wójtowicz - 2001 - Zagadnienia Filozoficzne W Nauce 29.
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  20. Defending Double Effect.Ralph Wedgwood - 2011 - Ratio 24 (4):384-401.
    This essay defends a version of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) – the doctrine that there is normally a stronger reason against an act that has a bad state of affairs as one of its intended effects than against an otherwise similar act that has that bad state of affairs as an unintended effect. First, a precise account of this version of the DDE is given. Secondly, some suggestions are made about why we should believe the DDE, and about (...)
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  21. The Pitfalls of ‘Reasons’.Ralph Wedgwood - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):123-143.
    Many philosophers working on the branches of philosophy that deal with the normative questions have adopted a " Reasons First" program. This paper criticizes the foundational assumptions of this program. In fact, there are many different concepts that can be expressed by the term 'reason' in English, none of which are any more fundamental than any others. Indeed, most of these concepts are not particularly fundamental in any interesting sense.
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  22.  23
    Paradoksy skończoności.Krzysztof Wójtowicz - 1996 - Zagadnienia Filozoficzne W Nauce 18.
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  23. Kant.Ralph Charles Sutherland Walker - 1978 - Routledge.
    This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.
     
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  24.  18
    Induction Justified : Ralph W. Clark.Ralph W. Clark - 1983 - Philosophy 58 (226):481-488.
    Hume's sceptical arguments regarding induction have not yet been successfully answered. However, I shall not in this paper discuss the important attempts to answer Hume since that would be too lengthy a task. On the supposition that Hume's sceptical arguments have not been met, the empirical world is a place where, as the popular metaphor goes, all the glue has been removed. For the Humean sceptic, the only empirical knowledge that we can have is given to us in immediate perception. (...)
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  25. Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms.Ralph Wedgwood - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (1):1-30.
    This paper outlines a new approach to the task of giving an account of the meaning of moral statements: a sort of "conceptual role semantics", according to which the meaning of moral terms is given by their role in practical reasoning. This role is sufficient both to distinguish the meaning of any moral term from that of other terms, and to determine the property or relation (if any) that the term stands for. The paper ends by suggesting reasons for regarding (...)
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  26. The Meaning of 'Ought'.Ralph Wedgwood - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1. Clarendon Press. pp. 127-160.
    In this paper, I apply the "conceptual role semantics" approach that I have proposed elsewhere (according to which the meaning of normative terms is given by their role in practical reasoning or deliberation) to the meaning of the term 'ought'. I argue that this approach can do three things: It can give an adequate explanation of the special connection that normative judgments have to practical reasoning and motivation for action. It can give an adequate account of why the central principles (...)
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  27. Gandalf’s Solution to the Newcomb Problem.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2643–2675.
    This article proposes a new theory of rational decision, distinct from both causal decision theory (CDT) and evidential decision theory (EDT). First, some intuitive counterexamples to CDT and EDT are presented. Then the motivation for the new theory is given: the correct theory of rational decision will resemble CDT in that it will not be sensitive to any comparisons of absolute levels of value across different states of nature, but only to comparisons of the differences in value between the available (...)
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  28. Doxastic Correctness.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):217-234.
    If beliefs are subject to a basic norm of correctness—roughly, to the principle that a belief is correct only if the proposition believed is true—how can this norm guide believers in forming their beliefs? Answer: this norm guides believers indirectly: believers are directly guided by requirements of rationality—which are themselves explained by this norm of correctness. The fundamental connection between rationality and correctness is probabilistic. Incorrectness comes in degrees; for beliefs, these degrees of incorrectness are measured by quadratic scoring rules, (...)
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  29.  7
    The Value of Rationality.Ralph Wedgwood - 2019 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (1):153-157.
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  30. The Right Thing to Believe.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 123-139.
    Many philosophers have claimed that “belief aims at the truth”. But is there any interpretation of this claim on which it counts as true? According to some philosophers, the best interpretation of the claim takes it as the normative thesis that belief is subject to a truth-norm. The goal of this essay is to clarify this normative interpretation of the claim. First, the claim can be developed so that it applies to partial beliefs as well as to flat-out full beliefs. (...)
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  31. Normativism Defended.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 85--102.
    The aim of this chapter is to defend the claim that “the intentional is normative” against a number of objections, including those that Georges Rey has presented in his contribution to this volume. First, I give a quick sketch of the principal argument that I have used to support this claim, and briefly comment on Rey’s criticisms of this argument. Next, I try to answer the main objections that have been raised against this claim. First, it may seem that the (...)
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  32.  46
    Ralph Burhoe: Reconsidering the Man and His Vision of Yoking Religion and Science.Philip Hefner - 2014 - Zygon 49 (3):629-641.
    Ralph Wendell Burhoe was a leading figure in relating religion and science in the second half of the twentieth century. His autodidactic style and character as a public intellectual resulted in a vision that is comprehensive in its concern for the salvation of society. He does not fit easily into academic frameworks, even though he has been influential upon scholars who work in academia. This article discusses some conundrums posed by his work. There are also brief presentations of the (...)
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  33. W sprawie realności zdarzeń. Uwagi do artykułu Jana Czerniawskiego „Teoria względności a upływ czasu”.Anna Lissowska-Wójtowicz - 1994 - Filozofia Nauki 1.
    The authoress shows a simple way to avoid paradoxical consequences of the Czerniawski's argument.
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  34.  51
    Moral Disagreement and Inexcusable Irrationality.Ralph Wedgwood - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):97.
    This essay explores the following position: Ultimate moral principles are a priori truths; hence, it is irrational to assign a non-zero credence to any proposition that is incompatible with these ultimate moral principles ; and this sort of irrationality, if it could have been avoided, is in a sense inexcusable. So—at least if moral relativism is false—in any disagreement about ultimate moral principles, at least one party to the disagreement is inexcusably irrational. This position may seem extreme, but it is (...)
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  35. Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly.Ralph Wedgwood - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford University Press. pp. 201--229.
    Let us take an example that Bernard Williams (1981: 102) made famous. Suppose that you want a gin and tonic, and you believe that the stuff in front of you is gin. In fact, however, the stuff is not gin but petrol. So if you drink the stuff (even mixed with tonic), it will be decidedly unpleasant, to say the least. Should you choose to drink the stuff or not?
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  36.  3
    To Dwell Within: Bridging the Theory–Practice Gap.Mark Zieber & Bernadine Wojtowicz - 2020 - Nursing Philosophy 21 (2).
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  37. Akrasia and Uncertainty.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):483–505.
    According to John Broome, akrasia consists in a failure to intend to do something that one believes one ought to do, and such akrasia is necessarily irrational. In fact, however, failing to intend something that one believes one ought to do is only guaranteed to be irrational if one is certain of a maximally detailed proposition about what one ought to do; if one is uncertain about any part of the full story about what one ought to do, it could (...)
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  38. Rationality as a Virtue.Ralph Wedgwood - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):319-338.
    A concept that can be expressed by the term ‘rationality’ plays a central role in both epistemology and ethics -- and especially in formal epistemology and decision theory. It is argued here that when the term is used in this way, the concept of “rationality” is the concept of a kind of virtue, with all the central features that are ascribed to the virtues by Plato and Aristotle, among others. Interpreting rationality as a kind of virtue helps to solve several (...)
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  39. The Forest of Yggdrasill the Autobiography of Ralph Tyler Flewelling.Ralph Tyler Flewelling - 1962 - University of Southern California Press.
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  40. A Priori Bootstrapping.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - In Albert Casullo & Joshua Thurow (eds.), The A Priori In Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 226-246.
    This paper explores the problems that are raised by a certain traditional sceptical paradox. The conclusion will be that the most challenging problem raised by this paradox does not primarily concern the justification of beliefs; it concerns the justification of belief-forming practices. This conclusion is supported by showing that if we can solve the sceptical problem for belief-forming practices, then it will be a relatively straightforward matter to solve the problem that concerns the justification of beliefs.
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  41. Intrinsic Values and Reasons for Action.Ralph Wedgwood - 2009 - In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals. pp. 342-363.
    What reasons for action do we have? What explains why we have these reasons? This paper articulates some of the basic structural features of a theory that would provide answers to these questions. According to this theory, reasons for action are all grounded in intrinsic values, but in a way that makes room for a thoroughly non-consequentialist view of the way in which intrinsic values generate reasons for aaction.
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  42. Rational 'Ought' Implies 'Can'.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):70-92.
    Every kind of ‘ought’ implies some kind of ‘can’ – but there are many kinds of ‘ought’ and even more kinds of ‘can’. In this essay, I shall focus on a particular kind of ‘ought’ – specifically, on what I shall call the “rational ‘ought’”. On every occasion of use, this kind of ‘ought’ is focused on the situation of a particular agent at a particular time; but this kind of ‘ought’ is concerned, not with how that agent acts at (...)
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  43. The "Good" and the "Right" Revisited.Ralph Wedgwood - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):499-519..
    Moral philosophy has long been preoccupied by a supposed dichotomy between the "good" and the "right". This dichotomy has been taken to define certain allegedly central issues for ethics. How are the good and the right related to each other? For example, is one of the two "prior" to the other? If so, is the good prior to the right, or is the right prior to the good?
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  44.  57
    The Unity of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 23-45.
    What is normativity? It is argued here that normativity is best understood as a property of certain concepts: normative thoughts are those involving these normative concepts; normative statements are statements that express normative thoughts; and normative facts are the facts (if such there be) that make such normative thoughts true. Many philosophers propose that there is a single basic normative concept—perhaps the concept of a reason for an action or attitude—in terms of which all other normative concepts can be defined. (...)
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  45. Must Rational Intentions Maximize Utility?Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):73-92.
    Suppose that it is rational to choose or intend a course of action if and only if the course of action maximizes some sort of expectation of some sort of value. What sort of value should this definition appeal to? According to an influential neo-Humean view, the answer is “Utility”, where utility is defined as a measure of subjective preference. According to a rival neo-Aristotelian view, the answer is “Choiceworthiness”, where choiceworthiness is an irreducibly normative notion of a course of (...)
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  46. A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality.Ralph Cudworth - 1731 - Cambridge University Press.
    Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688) deserves recognition as one of the most important English seventeenth-century philosophers after Hobbes and Locke. In opposition to Hobbes, Cudworth proposes an innatist theory of knowledge which may be contrasted with the empirical position of his younger contemporary Locke, and in moral philosophy he anticipates the ethical rationalists of the eighteenth century. A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality is his most important work, and this volume makes it available, together with his shorter Treatise of Freewill, (...)
     
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  47. Objective and Subjective 'Ought'.Ralph Wedgwood - 2016 - In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality. Oxford University Press. pp. 143-168.
    This essay offers an account of the truth conditions of sentences involving deontic modals like ‘ought’, designed to capture the difference between objective and subjective kinds of ‘ought’ This account resembles the classical semantics for deontic logic: according to this account, these truths conditions involve a function from the world of evaluation to a domain of worlds (equivalent to a so-called “modal base”), and an ordering of the worlds in such domains; this ordering of the worlds itself arises from two (...)
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  48. Plato's Theory of Knowledge.Ralph Wedgwood - 2018 - In David Brink, Susan Sauvé Meyer & Christopher Shields (eds.), Virtue, Happiness, Knowledge: Themes from the Work of Gail Fine and Terence Irwin. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-56.
    An account of Plato’s theory of knowledge is offered. Plato is in a sense a contextualist: at least, he recognizes that his own use of the word for “knowledge” varies – in some contexts, it stands for the fullest possible level of understanding of a truth, while in other contexts, it is broader and includes less complete levels of understanding as well. But for Plato, all knowledge, properly speaking, is a priori knowledge of necessary truths – based on recollection of (...)
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  49. Scanlon on Double Effect. [REVIEW]Ralph Wedgwood - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):464-472.
    In this new book Moral Dimensions, T. M. Scanlon (2008) explores the ethical significance of the intentions and motives with which people act. According to Scanlon, these intentions and motives do not have any direct bearing on the permissibility of the act. Thus, Scanlon claims that the traditional Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) is mistaken. However, the way in which someone is motivated to act has a direct bearing on what Scanlon calls the act's "meaning". One particularly important kind of (...)
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  50. Epistemic Teleology: Synchronic and Diachronic.Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 85-112.
    According to a widely held view of the matter, whenever we assess beliefs as ‘rational’ or ‘justified’, we are making normative judgements about those beliefs. In this discussion, I shall simply assume, for the sake of argument, that this view is correct. My goal here is to explore a particular approach to understanding the basic principles that explain which of these normative judgements are true. Specifically, this approach is based on the assumption that all such normative principles are grounded in (...)
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