The purpose of this study was to build upon previous ethical research; thereby, advancing the hospitality industry's understanding of ethical decision making in lodging operations. In particular, this study reviewed: (a) the primary normative ethical precepts (i.e., egoism, benevolence, and principle) used as a criterion in ethical decision making, and (b) the predominant locus of analysis (e.g., individual, local, or cosmopolitan referent sources) used in applying ethical precepts to ethical decisions.The sample consisted of 500 lodging operations as randomly abstracted from (...) the 1994 Hotel Travel Index produced by Reed Travel. The researcher selected full service, limited service, or as rooms-only lodging operations throughout the United States. A full service property offered guest rooms, meeting rooms, and food and beverage services. A limited service property offered a continental breakfast, small meeting facilities, and guest sleeping rooms. A rooms-only property only offered guest rooms. This purposive sampling process resulted in 198 usable surveys. (shrink)

The focus of this research concentrated on ascertaining the presence of ethical climate types and the level of analysis from which ethical decisions were based as perceived by lodging managers. In agreement with Victor and Cullen (1987, 1988), ethical work climates are multidimensional and multi-determined. The results of this study indicated that: (a) benevolence is the predominate dimension of ethical climate present in the lodging organization as perceived by lodging managers, and (b) the local level of analysis (e.g. immediate workplace (...) norms and values) is the predominate determinant of ethical decisions in the organization.The implication of this study is that the knowledge gained from understanding that ethical decision making in an organization is multidimensional and multi-determined will foster understanding of ethical decision formation in the organizational context. (shrink)

In Sartre’s 1946 article “The Humanism of Existentialism,” Sartre places existentialists into two categories, Christian or atheist, and contends that existentialism works differently for each of them. This paper argues that such a distinction should not have been made because existentialist beliefs, views, and themes do not differ based on one’s religiosity. This paper specifically examines three examples in Sartre’s article which undermine his position, and further argues that Sartre made an equivocation fallacy by conflating two different types of essence, (...) one’s innate essence and one’s character essence. The paper then explores six central existentialist themes to demonstrate that in their existentialist beliefs both the theist and the atheist agree. Those six themes are authenticity, sincerity vs. bad faith, the absurdity of life, the meaning of life, choice, and responsibility. The paper also examines the issue of moral objectivity vs. non-objectivity, and argues that not only is this not an existentialist issue, but even if it were one’s belief on moral objectivity does not cleanly correspond to one’s religious beliefs, so here again there is no basis to distinguish the Christian and the atheist. The paper concludes that any disagreement between existentialists who are Christian and those who are atheist comes down to differences in their religious beliefs, not their existentialist views. (shrink)

This essay argues that William Cavanaugh's ‘Theopolitical Imagination’ uncovers some of the possibilities latent within the Catholic imagination. While his critique of modernity is often persuasive, this essay questions whether Cavanaugh's assessment of modernity can be complemented by a more differentiated approach. What Charles Taylor provides is both a bolstering of Cavanaugh's thesis about the power of the imagination and an alternative: that there is a way of thinking about the relationship between the Church and modernity other than in dialectical (...) terms – namely a ‘Ricci reading’ of modernity. (shrink)

Many researchers in the field of business ethics have attempted to develop methods to determine and evaluate the ethics of a variety of different classes of people, including students, professionals, and mixed samples of students and professionals. Unfortunately, most of these studies were disjunctive, simply adding confusion to an already unfocused area of research. However, Reidenbach and Robin (1988, 1990), have changed this trend by attempting to quantify the various ethical philosophies into a multi-dimensional scale of business ethics. This paper (...) examines the background of the Reidenbach and Robin (1988, 1990) scale — including the authors'' findings, empirically tests the scale, and concludes that the scale needs further refinement. A promising result is a model with four dimensions: a broadbased ethical judgment dimension, a deontological judgment dimension, a teleological judgment dimension, and a social contract dimension. (shrink)

This paper proposes that we rename free will, also called libertarian free will, to the more accurate characterization of “predisposed agency.” This is needed for two reasons: First, classical compatibilists have redefined free will to mean something quite different than and in fact contrary to libertarian free will, and thus have introduced needless confusion into the concept. More importantly, even those who believe in libertarian free will recognize that our will is not so free in that we are predisposed toward (...) the decisions we make and the actions we take due to our genetics and our environment, which include our temperament, our character, our past experiences, our past decisions, our habits, the people we have been with, and the situations we find ourselves in, among other things. But the term “free will” totally ignores the fact that we are predisposed toward certain actions. The danger in this is that if we use the lexicon of free will, and believe in free will, then we are apt to judge others harshly for their actions since if they have free will then it would seem they bear both full responsibility and blame for their actions. But this seems unfair since each of us is predisposed to think, decide, and act as we do. The author proposes a distinction between having responsibility and deserving blame and praise. Specifically, it is argued that if we do have agency (or libertarian free will) then we are fully responsible for what we do, but due to our predispositions, which we necessarily and unavoidably have and are often largely out of our control, we frequently do not deserve full blame or praise. (shrink)

Aristotle's explanation of the “active intellect” inDe AnimaIII, 5 constitutes a problem for us simply because we have to take this philosopher so seriously. If he were a writer given to poetic lapses or mythical adornments to his work we could consider dismissing the whole chapter as unessential. However, we know that Aristotle does not write unessential chapters, and that he is invariably engaged in an attempt to explain his subject fully and systematically, neither adding to it nor leaving anything (...) out.TheDe Anima, for example, is an attempt to describe the characteristics of living things, in an ascending order from the basic functions of vegetables to the most abstract thinking by human beings. The activities of nutrition, sensation, common sense, imagination, and movement are presented in Book II and in the early part of Book III. (shrink)

: Educational historians, philosophers, and sociologists have long warned that the increasing encroachment of business logic in public schools bodes ill for democracy as a way of life. Many have concluded that the business person's interest in affecting public education is to bring about a greater bottom line, which, of course, is profit, albeit secured in the name of democratic freedom and social progress. These scholars have noted that the corporate parasite is eating away the insides of our public schools (...) and is reproducing its hereditary material (consumer materialism) within the bodies and souls of its captive hosts: our children. Through corporate advertisements on school walls, corporate-sponsored curriculum materials and programs, and corporate-sponsored fundraisers and contests (not to mention the enormous political influence corporations have in framing the very aim and purpose of public education), corporations use schools as conduits by which to establish consumption as the ultimate expression of participatory democracy and, thus, as the supreme good and standard of personal growth. Drawing upon the work of John Dewey, this paper articulates a conception of democracy and a democratic theory of education that privileges the social over the private, the public over the corporate, such that the homo-economicus ideal that our public schools train our children to aspire to on a daily basis is checked by a wider commitment to the good life, defined in more socially benevolent ways. (shrink)

The study of dyadic coregulation has emerged as a compelling and innovative approach to understanding the links between close relationships and health and functioning. However, the study of dyadic coregulation has been hampered, in part, by the lack of a precise operational definition of the construct and a lack of a framework for systematically evaluating and statistically modeling coregulatory processes. Butler and Randall (2013) present a cogent framework that clearly defines what coregulation is and what it is not, which (...) is critical for advancing this important area of study. Nevertheless, several important questions still remain unaddressed, including the role of individual differences in coregulatory processes; the feasibility of distinguishing between coregulation and related constructs, such as stress-buffering; and potential clinical implications of coregulation. (shrink)

Interdisciplinarity is a notoriously difficult concept to define, and even harder to achieve in practice. All too often social approaches reduce science to an object of study, or conversely physical science approaches are invoked as a source of 'higher' truth. Drawing upon our experiences as ESRC-NERC PhD students within geography, we outline a paratactical approach that links disciplines by adjacency rather than hierarchy. Toppling the disciplinary hierarchy creates the potential for non-reductionistic dialogue between science and social science, but it also (...) raises a series of practical difficulties. These are considered around the themes of polyvocality, breadth over depth and (im)permanence. We suggest that while this kind of approach is increasingly encouraged by research funding bodies, it is less easily sustained within the everyday mechanics of the academic world. (C) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. (shrink)