Results for 'Randolph K. Clarke'

979 found
Order:
  1.  61
    Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility.Randolph K. Clarke - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    Philosophical theories of agency have focused primarily on actions and activities. But, besides acting, we often omit to do or refrain from doing certain things. How is this aspect of our agency to be conceived? This book offers a comprehensive account of omitting and refraining, addressing issues ranging from the nature of agency and moral responsibility to the metaphysics of absences and causation. Topics addressed include the role of intention in intentional omission, the connection between negligence and omission, the distinction (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   77 citations  
  2.  37
    The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays.Randolph K. Clarke, Michael McKenna & Angela M. Smith - 2015 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    What is it to be morally responsible for something? Recent philosophical work reveals considerable disagreement on the question. Indeed, some theorists claim to distinguish several varieties of moral responsibility, with different conditions that must be satisfied if one is to bear responsibility of one or another of these kinds. -/- Debate on this point turns partly on disagreement about the kinds of responses made appropriate when one is blameworthy or praiseworthy. It is generally agreed that these include "reactive attitudes" such (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  3.  17
    Compound-stimulus hypothesis in serial learning.Robert K. Young & James Clark - 1964 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 67 (3):301.
  4.  10
    Collectanea Hispanica.E. K. Rand & Charles Upson Clark - 1921 - American Journal of Philology 42 (4):354.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  17
    Two Lamaistic Pantheons.J. K. Shryock & Walter Eugene Clark - 1938 - Journal of the American Oriental Society 58 (4):695.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  26
    The Prose-Poetry of Su Tung-p'o.J. K. Shryock, Cyril Drummond LeGros Clark & Su Tung-P'O. - 1936 - Journal of the American Oriental Society 56 (1):95.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  43
    Ethical Quandaries and Facebook Use: How Do Medical Students Think They Should Act?Daniel R. George, Anita M. Navarro, Kelly K. Stazyk, Melissa A. Clark & Michael J. Green - 2014 - AJOB Empirical Bioethics 5 (2):68-79.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Libertarian views: Noncausal and event-causal sccounts of free agency.Randolph Clarke - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 356--385.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  9.  2
    Reasons, Intentions, and Actions.Randolph Clarke - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    Several theorists maintain that a consideration is a reason to ϕ (where ϕ-ing is an act-type) if and only if that consideration is a reason to intend to ϕ, and some hold as well that a consideration is a reason not to ϕ if and only if that consideration is a reason to intend not to ϕ. The claims often stem from views about what it is to be a practical reason. Here it is argued that both equivalence claims are (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  21
    Science and technology consortia in U.S. biomedical research: A paradigm shift in response to unsustainable academic growth.Curt Balch, Hugo Arias-Pulido, Soumya Banerjee, Alex K. Lancaster, Kevin B. Clark, Michael Perilstein, Brian Hawkins, John Rhodes, Piotr Sliz, Jon Wilkins & Thomas W. Chittenden - 2015 - Bioessays 37 (2):119-122.
    Graphical AbstractScience and technology consortia provide a viable solution for the recent unsustainable academic growth in biomedical research.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Randolph Clarke - 2003 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
    This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality and diminished control. He subtly explores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one that (...)
  12.  24
    Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. [REVIEW]Randolph Clarke - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):230-232.
  13. Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will.Randolph Clarke & Justin Capes - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    To have free will is to have what it takes to act freely. When an agent acts freely—when she exercises her free will—what she does is up to her. A plurality of alternatives is open to her, and she determines which she pursues. When she does, she is an ultimate source or origin of her action. So runs a familiar conception of free will.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  14. Toward a credible agent–causal account of free will.Randolph Clarke - 1993 - Noûs 27 (2):191-203.
    Agent-causal accounts of free will face two problems. First, such a view needs an account of rational free action, that is, of acting for reasons when one acts freely. And second, an intelligible explication of causation by an agent is required. This paper addresses both of these problems. Free actions are seen as caused both by prior events and by agents. Reasons (or their mental representations) can then be seen as figuring causally when one freely acts for reasons. It is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   86 citations  
  15. Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism.Randolph Clarke - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):323-351.
    This paper examines recent attempts to revive a classic compatibilist position on free will, according to which having an ability to perform a certain action is having a certain disposition. Since having unmanifested dispositions is compatible with determinism, having unexercised abilities to act, it is held, is likewise compatible. Here it is argued that although there is a kind of capacity to act possession of which is a matter of having a disposition, the new dispositionalism leaves unresolved the main points (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   100 citations  
  16. Ignorance, Revision, and Common Sense.Randolph Clarke - 2017 - In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition. Oxford, UK: pp. 233-51.
    Sometimes someone does something morally wrong in clear-eyed awareness that what she is doing is wrong. More commonly, a wrongdoer fails to see that her conduct is wrong. Call the latter behavior unwitting wrongful conduct. It is generally agreed that an agent can be blameworthy for such conduct, but there is considerable disagreement about how one’s blameworthiness in such cases is to be explained, or what conditions must be satisfied for the agent to be blameworthy for her conduct. Many theorists (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  17. True Blame.Randolph Clarke & Piers Rawling - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):736-749.
    1. We sometimes angrily confront, pointedly ostracize, castigate, or denounce those whom we think have committed moral offences. Conduct of this kind may be called blaming behaviour. When genuine,...
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  18. Some Theses on Desert.Randolph Clarke - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):153-64.
    Consider the idea that suffering of some specific kind is deserved by those who are guilty of moral wrongdoing. Feeling guilty is a prime example. It might be said that it is noninstrumentally good that one who is guilty feel guilty (at the right time and to the right degree), or that feeling guilty (at the right time and to the right degree) is apt or fitting for one who is guilty. Each of these claims constitutes an interesting thesis about (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  19.  6
    Multiculturalism, Difference and Postmodernism.Gordon L. Clark, Dean K. Forbes & Roderick Francis - 1993
    Postmodern view of Australian multiculturalism. Discusses the ways in which identity and imagery merge and interact in a multicultural society, within a postmodern theoretical framework, and examines topics such as liberalism and multiculturalism, and cultural postmodernity. Includes chapter notes, a bibliography and an index. Clark is director of the Institute of Ethics and Public Policy at Monash University, Forbes is professor of geography at Flinders University of South Australia, and Francis is a postgraduate student at Monash University. The contributors include (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Abilities to Act.Randolph Clarke - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):893-904.
    This essay examines recent work on abilities to act. Different kinds of ability are distinguished, and a recently proposed conditional analysis of ability ascriptions is evaluated. It is considered whether abilities are causal powers. Finally, several compatibility questions concerning abilities, as well as the relation between free will and abilities of various kinds, are examined.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  21. Skilled activity and the causal theory of action.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):523-550.
    Skilled activity, such as shaving or dancing, differs in important ways from many of the stock examples that are employed by action theorists. Some critics of the causal theory of action contend that such a view founders on the problem of skilled activity. This paper examines how a causal theory can be extended to the case of skilled activity and defends the account from its critics.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  22. Moral Responsibility, Guilt, and Retributivism.Randolph Clarke - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):121-137.
    This paper defends a minimal desert thesis, according to which someone who is blameworthy for something deserves to feel guilty, to the right extent, at the right time, because of her culpability. The sentiment or emotion of guilt includes a thought that one is blameworthy for something as well as an unpleasant affect. Feeling guilty is not a matter of inflicting suffering on oneself, and it need not involve any thought that one deserves to suffer. The desert of a feeling (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  23.  11
    Logic Programming.William R. Clark & K. Clark (eds.) - 1982 - London and New York: Academic Press.
    The author narrates briefly the friendship that developed from his instruction of James Dean in the art of photography and documents the Dean personality with exclusive portraits.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  24. Still guilty.Randolph Clarke - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2579-2596.
    According to what may be called PERMANENT, blameworthiness is forever: once you are blameworthy for something, you are always blameworthy for it. Here a prima facie case for this view is set out, and the view is defended from two lines of attack. On one, you are no longer blameworthy for a past offense if, despite being the person who committed it, you no longer have any of the pertinent psychological states you had at the time of the misdeed. On (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  25. Agent causation and event causation in the production of free action.Randolph Clarke - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):19-48.
  26. Causation, norms, and omissions: A study of causal judgments.Randolph Clarke, Joshua Shepherd, John Stigall, Robyn Repko Waller & Chris Zarpentine - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):279-293.
    Many philosophical theories of causation are egalitarian, rejecting a distinction between causes and mere causal conditions. We sought to determine the extent to which people's causal judgments discriminate, selecting as causes counternormal events—those that violate norms of some kind—while rejecting non-violators. We found significant selectivity of this sort. Moreover, priming that encouraged more egalitarian judgments had little effect on subjects. We also found that omissions are as likely as actions to be judged as causes, and that counternormative selectivity appears to (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  27. Free Will and Agential Powers.Randolph Clarke & Thomas Reed - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Agency and Moral Responsibility 3:6-33.
    Free will is often said—by compatibilists and incompatibilists alike—to be a power (or complex of powers) of agents. This paper offers proposals for, and examines the prospects of, a powers-conception of free will that takes the powers in question to be causal dispositions. A difficulty for such an account stems from the idea that when one exercises free will, it is up to oneself whether one wills to do this or that. The paper also briefly considers whether a powers-conception that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  28. Blameworthiness and Unwitting Omissions.Randolph Clarke - 2017 - In Dana Kay Nelkin and Samuel C. Rickless (ed.), The Ethics and Law of Omissions. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 63-83.
    This paper argues that agents can be directly blameworthy for unwitting omissions. The view developed focuses on the capacities and abilities of agents.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  29. Reason to Feel Guilty.Randolph Clarke & Piers Rawling - 2022 - In Andreas Carlsson (ed.), Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press. pp. 217-36.
    Let F be a fact in virtue of which an agent, S, is blameworthy for performing an act of A-ing. We advance a slightly qualified version of the following thesis: -/- (Reason) F is (at some time) a reason for S to feel guilty (to some extent) for A-ing. -/- Leaving implicit the qualification concerning extent, we claim as well: -/- (Desert) S's having this reason suffices for S’s deserving to feel guilty for A-ing. -/- We also advance a third (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  30. Negligent Action and Unwitting Omissions.Randolph Clarke - 2015 - In Alfred Mele (ed.), Surrounding Free Will. New York, NY, USA: pp. 298-317.
    Negligence and omission are closely related: commonly, in cases of negligent action, the agent has failed to turn her attention to some pertinent fact. But that omission is itself typically unwitting. A sufficient condition for blameworthiness for an unwitting omission is offered, as is an account of blameworthiness for negligent action. It is argued that one can be blameworthy for wrongdoing done from ignorance even if one is not blameworthy for that ignorance.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  31. Opposing powers.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (2):153 - 160.
    A disposition mask is something that prevents a disposition from manifesting despite the occurrence of that disposition’s characteristic stimulus, and without eliminating that disposition. Several authors have maintained that masks must be things extrinsic to the objects that have the masked dispositions. Here it is argued that this is not so; masks can be intrinsic to the objects whose dispositions they mask. If that is correct, then a recent attempt to distinguish dispositional properties from so-called categorical properties fails.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  32. Intentional omissions.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):158-177.
    It is argued that intentionally omitting requires having an intention with relevant content. And the intention must play a causal role with respect to one’s subsequent thought and conduct. Even if omissions cannot be caused, an account of intentional omission must be causal. There is a causal role for one’s reasons as well when one intentionally omits to do something.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  33. On an argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility.Randolph Clarke - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):13-24.
    Galen Strawson has published several versions of an argument to the effect that moral responsibility is impossible, whether determinism is true or not. Few philosophers have been persuaded by the argument, which Strawson remarks is often dismissed “as wrong, or irrelevant, or fatuous, or too rapid, or an expression of metaphysical megalomania.” I offer here a two-part explanation of why Strawson’s argument has impressed so few. First, as he usually states it, the argument is lacking at least one key premise. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  34. Intrinsic finks.Randolph Clarke - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):512–518.
    Dispositions can be finkish, prone to disappear in circumstances that would commonly trigger their characteristic manifestations. Can a disposition be finkish because of something intrinsic to the object possessing that disposition? Sungho Choi has argued that this is not possible, and many agree. Here it is argued that no good case has been made for ruling out the possibility of intrinsic finks; on the contrary, there is good reason to accept it.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  35. Free Will, Agent Causation, and “Disappearing Agents”.Randolph Clarke - 2017 - Noûs:76-96.
    A growing number of philosophers now hold that agent causation is required for agency, or free will, or moral responsibility. To clarify what is at issue, this paper begins with a distinction between agent causation that is ontologically fundamental and agent causation that is reducible to or realized in causation by events or states. It is widely accepted that agency presents us with the latter; the view in question claims a need for the former. The paper then examines a “disappearing (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  36. Responsibility for Acts and Omissions.Randolph Clarke - 2022 - In Dana Kay Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 91-110.
    Accounts of moral responsibility commonly focus on responsibility for actions and their consequences. But we can be responsible as well for omitting to act or refraining from acting, and for consequences of these. And since omitting and refraining are not in every case performing an action, an account of responsibility for actions will not apply straightforwardly to these cases. This paper advances proposals concerning responsibility for omitting, refraining, and their consequences. Providing such an account is complicated by the fact that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. Alternatives for Libertarians.Randolph Clarke - 2011 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd edition. pp. 329-48.
    This essay examines several varieties of libertarian accounts of free will. Some require free actions to be uncaused, some require agent causation, and some require non-deterministic event causation. Difficulties are raised for all of these varieties.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  38. What is an omission?Randolph Clarke - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):127-143.
    This paper examines three views of what an omission or an instance of refraining is. The view advanced is that in many cases, an omission is simply an absence of an action of some type. However, generally one’s not doing a certain thing counts as an omission only if there is some norm, standard, or ideal that calls for one’s doing that thing.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  39. Agent causation and the problem of luck.Randolph Clarke - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):408-421.
    : On a standard libertarian account of free will, an agent acts freely on some occasion only if there remains, until the action is performed, some chance that the agent will do something else instead right then. These views face the objection that, in such a case, it is a matter of luck whether the agent does one thing or another. This paper considers the problem of luck as it bears on agent‐causal libertarian accounts. A view of this type is (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  40. Desert of blame.Randolph Clarke - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):62-80.
    The blameworthy deserve blame. So runs a platitude of commonsense morality. My aim here is to set out an understanding of this desert claim (as I call it) on which it can be seen to be a familiar and attractive aspect of moral thought. I conclude with a response to a prominent denial of the claim.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41. Absence of action.Randolph Clarke - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):361-376.
    Often when one omits to do a certain thing, there's no action that is one's omission; one's omission, it seems, is an absence of any action of some type. This paper advances the view that an absence of an action--and, in general, any absence--is nothing at all: there is nothing that is an absence. Nevertheless, it can result from prior events that one omits to do a certain thing, and there can be results of the fact that one omits to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  42.  76
    Indeterminism and control.Randolph Clarke - 1995 - American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (2):125-138.
  43. Parlog Parallel Programming in Logic.K. L. Clark & Steve Gregory - 1985 - Department of Computing, Imperial College of Science and Technology.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Modest libertarianism.Randolph Clarke - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):21-46.
    This paper examines libertarian accounts that appeal to event causation but avoid appeal to agent causation. Such views are modest in their metaphysical commitments and may be modest, as well, in what they promise. It is argued that an action-centered version should be preferred; on such a view, indeterminism is required in the direct production of decision or other action. Although a view of this kind does not improve on compatibilist accounts when it comes to moral responsibility, they may be (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  45. Omissions, Responsibility, and Symmetry.Randolph Clarke - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):594-624.
    It is widely held that one can be responsible for doing something that one was unable to avoid doing. This paper focuses primarily on the question of whether one can be responsible for not doing something that one was unable to do. The paper begins with an examination of the account of responsibility for omissions offered by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, arguing that in many cases it yields mistaken verdicts. An alternative account is sketched that jibes with and (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  46.  86
    Ability and responsibility for omissions.Randolph Clarke - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):195 - 208.
    Most philosophers now accept that an agent may be responsible for an action even though she could not have acted otherwise. However, many who accept such a view about responsibility for actions nevertheless maintain that, when it comes to omissions, an agent is responsible only if she could have done what she omitted to do. If this Principle of Possible Action (PPA), as it is sometimes called, is correct, then there is an important asymmetry between what is required for responsibility (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  47.  17
    Doing What One Wants Less: A Reappraisal of the Law of Desire.Randolph Clarke - 1994 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1):1-11.
  48. Are we free to obey the laws?Randolph Clarke - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):389-401.
    It is often said that if free will is incompatible with determinism, then free actions must be anomic, not covered by any law of nature. Here it is argued that there is no need for incompatiblists to hold this view. Even if freedom requires indeterminism, our freedom can be freedom to obey the laws.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  49.  97
    Responsibility, Mechanisms, and Capacities.Randolph Clarke - 2011 - Modern Schoolman 88 (1/2):161-169.
    Frankfurt-style cases are supposed to show that an agent can be responsible for doing something even though the agent wasn’t able to do otherwise. Neil Levy has argued that the cases fail. Agents in such cases, he says, lack a capacity that they’d have to have in order to be responsible for doing what they do. Here it’s argued that Levy is mistaken. Although it may be that agents in Frankfurt-style cases lack some kind of capability, what they lack isn’t (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  50.  67
    Reflections on an Argument from Luck.Randolph Clarke - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):47-64.
    An argument from luck purports to show than an undetermined action cannot be a free action. I examine here an argument of this sort recently set out by Alfred Mele. Mele does not endorse the argument; rather, he claims, it constitutes a serious challenge to standard libertarian accounts of free will, and he has some proposals about how the challenge can be met. I offer an assessment of Mele's proposals and some observations on the strengths and weaknesses of the argument (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
1 — 50 / 979