There have been two prominent ways of thinking about the relationship between phenomenology and naturalism: the first and more traditional way, in continuity with Husserl’s critique of psychologism, exhibits the incompatibility of phenomenology with all forms of naturalism and positivism; the second and more recent interpretive strategy attempts to naturalize phenomenology and make it consistent with current scientific accounts of consciousness and intentionality. In this paper I argue that despite the fact that Heidegger followed the first path and remained critical (...) of naturalism and positivism throughout his career, there are important moments in the late twenties where his project of a phenomenological ontology is challenged by problems pertaining to naturalism. I show how the question of determining the essence of life and animality as well as the overturning of ontology into metontology offer significant methodological hurdles for Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. (shrink)

This paper argues against recent post-Kantian readings of Hegel that overstate the role that the distinction between nature and spirit plays within Hegelian Idealism. In order to do so, it first differentiates between a transcendental and an ontological way of understanding such a distinction, arguing that the former is Kantian or neo-Kantian in nature while the latter is properly Hegelian. Then it demonstrates how Hegel attempts to both preserve the difference between the realm of nature and the realm of spirit (...) without turning it into a dichotomy, which he does by admitting a continuity of gradual stages or levels of conceptual development. Finally, the paper concludes that the coherence of Hegel’s attempt to simultaneously preserve and overcome the modern division between the natural and the spiritual rests on a view of reality that is closer to ontological pluralism than it is to either dualism or monism. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there are two distinct senses of contingency operative within Hegel’s philosophy, and that the failure to sufficiently distinguish between them can lead to a misrepresentation of Hegel’s idealism. The first sense of contingency is the categorical one explicated in the Science of Logic, in which contingency carries the meaning of dependence and conditionality, while the second sense of contingency, predominantly found within the Philosophy of Nature, means irrationality and chance. Not only does Hegel acknowledge (...) a systematic place for the necessity of contingency within his ontological logic, but he also admits the existence of real chance and multiplicity in nature. However, I claim that these two acknowledgements should not be collapsed since they involve different senses of contingency. (shrink)

Quentin Meillassoux has recently leveled a controversial attack on critical philosophy and the transcendental turn through his concept of correlationism. This critique is motivated by the attempt to move away from a philosophy of human finitude towards a speculative materialism. In this paper I argue that Meillassoux’s understanding of correlationism does not adequately depict the critical turn, especially in regards to the distinction between the epistemological problem of realism and the problem of materialism. I attempt to show that by reading (...) the critical turn as anti-epistemological one can think of its turn away from things themselves towards relation and mediation in ways that are not necessarily against either science or materialism. (shrink)

This book argues that Hegel and Heidegger offer two divergent paths towards reconciling the dichotomy between nature and world inherited from modern philosophy. Raoni Padui traces the ways in which nature is incorporated into the domain of meaningful human dwelling that Heidegger calls “world” and Hegel calls “Spirit” or Geist.