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  1.  82
    Sinking Cohen's Flagship — or Why People with Expensive Tastes Should not be Compensated.Rasmus Sommer Hansen & Søren Flinch Midtgaard - 2011 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (4):341-354.
    G. A. Cohen argues that egalitarians should compensate for expensive tastes or for the fact that they are expensive. Ronald Dworkin, by contrast, regards most expensive tastes as unworthy of compensation — only if a person disidentifies with his own such tastes (i.e. wishes he did not have them) is compensation appropriate. Dworkinians appeal, inter alia, to the so-called ‘first-person’ or ‘continuity’ test. According to the continuity test, an appropriate standard of interpersonal comparison reflects people's own assessment of their relative (...)
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  2.  91
    Equality of Resources and the Problem of Recognition.Rasmus Sommer Hansen - 2011 - Res Publica 17 (2):157-174.
    Liberal egalitarianism is commonly criticized for being insufficiently sensitive to status inequalities and the effects of misrecognition. I examine this criticism as it applies to Ronald Dworkin’s ‘equality of resources’ and argue that, in fact, liberal egalitarians possess the resources to deal effectively with recognition-type issues. More precisely, while conceding that the distributive principles required to realize equality of resources must apply against a particular institutional background, I point out, following Dworkin, that among the principles guiding this background is a (...)
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  3.  15
    In Defence of Conceptual Integration.Rasmus Sommer Hansen - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (3):349-365.
    According to the ‘integration approach’, interpretations of political concepts should explain that they stand for rights we ought to respect and be both compatible and mutually supporting. I start by clarifying what this means, and proceed to an examination of Ronald Dworkin’s latest argument for value holism. I argue that his argument fails to provide a convincing case for the integration approach. I go on to argue that we nonetheless should accept that interpretations of political concepts should be compatible, because (...)
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