There is a controversy as to the moral status of an action in the face of uncertainty concerning a non-moral fact that is morally significant (according to an applicable moral standard): According to the objective conception, the right action is determined in light of the truth, namely the actual state of affairs (regarding the pertinent fact), whereas according to the subjective conception, the right action depends on the epistemic state of the agent, namely her (justified) belief (concerning the pertinent fact). (...) A similar debate concerns the law, with respect to uncertainty regarding a legally significant fact. In this paper, I argue that moral and legal normative concepts are ambiguous and include two aspects: The ideal aspect, which is concerned with the constitutive feature of the normative standard, and the pragmatic aspect, which determines the correct action under uncertainty . With regard to each aspect, a different conception is appropriate: The objective conception should govern the ideal aspect and the subjective conception the pragmatic aspect. And the relevant aspect (and therefore the appropriate conception) depends on the question under consideration regarding the pertinent normative standard: what is its constitutive feature or whether an action is right (according to the applicable normative standard) in the face of uncertainty. (shrink)
Discrimination is a central moral and legal concept. However, it is also a contested one. Particularly, accounts of the wrongness of discrimination often rely on controversial and particular assumptions. In this paper, I argue that a theory of discrimination that relies on premises that are very general and widely accepted provides a plausible account of the concept of wrongful discrimination. According to the combined theory, wrongful discrimination consists of allocating a benefit that is not supported by a morally significant fact, (...) or in a way that involves distributive injustice, or both. (shrink)
Does the moral status of an action provide in itself a non-instrumental, pro-tanto reason for a corresponding legal status – a reason that applies regardless of whether the law promotes a value that is independent of the law, such as preventing wrongdoing or promoting distributive or retributive justice? While the relation between morality and law is a familiar topic, this specific question is typically not considered explicitly. Yet it seems to be controversial and each of the contrasting answers to this (...) question has some appeal. The article highlights and considers this question. it concludes that the answer is negative: there is no necessary relation between morality and law in this respect. Rather, there is a reason in favor of incorporating morality into the law only when this incorporation promotes a moral value that is independent of the law. (shrink)
According to a famous maxim, ignorance or mistake of law is no excuse. This maxim is supposed to represent both the standard and the proper rule of law. In fact, this maxim should be qualified in both respects: ignorance and mistake of law sometimes are, and (perhaps even more often) should be, excused. But this dual qualification only reinforces the fundamental and ubiquitous assumption which underlies the discussions of the subject, namely, that the only ground of exculpation relevant to ignorance (...) or mistake of law is excuse due to lack of (sufficient) culpability. The paper challenges this consensus. I argue that, according to the best conception of justification, ignorance and mistake, including ignorance and mistake of law, could be justified. Generally, ignorance and mistake are justified when based on a rational analysis of the information the agent has and should have. The conceptual possibility of justified ignorance or mistake is demonstrated mainly with respect to ignorance or mistake of law due to reliance on the guidance of public officials or private lawyers. (shrink)
Is there a reason to prevent deontological wrongdoing—an action that is wrong due to the violation of a decisive deontological constraint? This question is perplexing. On the one hand, the intuitive response seems to be positive, both when the question is considered in the abstract and when it is considered with regard to paradigmatic cases of deontological wrongdoing such as Bridge and Transplant. On the other hand, common theoretical accounts of deontological wrongdoing do not entail this answer, since not preventing (...) wrongdoing does not necessarily amount to doing harm or intending harm, for example. The puzzle is reinforced due to the fact that the intuitive response to other cases seems to be different, namely that there is no reason in favour of preventing deontological wrongdoing. This question is thus interesting in itself. It might also shed light on additional questions such as the “paradox of deontology” and the appropriate response to wrongful actions more generally. Yet, despite its importance, this question is typically overlooked. The paper explores this question. (shrink)
The article explores the interaction of two, potentially clashing, considerations, each reflecting a different conception of fairness concerning the resolution of interpersonal conflicts. According to the Equal Chance Principle, the harm for each person should be minimized in a significant and (roughly) equal degree; when this is impossible, each person should be accorded the highest possible equal chance to avoid the harm. According to the Importance Principle, the danger to the person who would otherwise suffer the more serious harm should (...) be prevented. (shrink)
Justificatory defenses apply to actions that are generally wrong and illegalâmainly since they harm peopleâwhen they are justifiedâusually since they prevent harm to others. A strict conception of justification limits justificatory defenses to actions that reflect all pertinent principles in the optimal manner. A more relaxed conception of justification applies to actions that do not reflect all pertinent principles optimally due to mistake but are not too far from this optimum. In the paper, I consider whether justificatory defenses should reflect (...) the strict conception of justification or a more relaxed conception of justification. This question is important since often the relevant actions are not strictly justified, while the alternative of an excuse is frequently irrelevant or does not provide an appropriate solution. Reflection on this question raises the following dilemma: On the one hand, the strict interpretation seems too harsh, especially with regard to legal liability. On the other hand, it is difficult to explain the basis for a more relaxed conception of justification. I conclude, first, that justificationâand accordingly wrongfulnessâis a matter of degree and that the strictly justified action is merely the peak of a continuum, and, second, that a practical reaction is in place only with regard to actions whose wrongness is above a minimal threshold. (shrink)
Many think that equality is an intrinsic value. However, this view, especially when based on a consequential foundation, faces familiar objections related to the claim that equality is sometimes good for none and bad for some: most notably the levelling down objection. This article explores a unique (consequential) conception of equality, as part of a more general conception of fairness concerning the resolution of interpersonal conflicts, which is not exposed to these objections.
The paper considers a hierarchical theory that combines concern for two values: individual well-being – as a fundamental, first-order value – and (distributive) fairness – as a high-order value that its exclusive function is to complete the value of individual well-being by resolving internal clashes within it that occur in interpersonal conflicts. The argument for this unique conception of high-order fairness is that fairness is morally significant in itself only regarding what matters – individual well-being – and when it matters (...) – in interpersonal conflicts in which constitutive aspects of individual well-being clash. Consequently, the proposed theory is not exposed to claim that fairness comes at the expense of welfare. This theory is considered within a consequential framework, based on the standard version and, alternatively, on a novel interpretation of consequentialism. Thus, it refutes the claim that consequentialism does not take the distinction between persons seriously. (shrink)
Based on a general thesis regarding the proper resolution of interpersonal conflicts, this paper suggests a normative framework for the distribution of scarce health resources. The proposed thesis includes two basic ideas. First, individual well-being is the fundamental value. Second, interpersonal conflicts affecting well-being should be resolved in light of several conceptions of fairness, reflecting the independent value of persons and the moral significance of responsibility of individuals for the existence of interpersonal conflicts. These ideas are elaborated in several principles (...) that are applied with respect to the distribution of scarce health resources. (shrink)
Criminal prohibitions typically forbid harming people. Justificatory defenses, such as lesser evil, justifying necessity and justifying self-defense, provide exceptions to such prohibitions if certain conditions are met. One common condition is that the agent is not responsible for the conflict. The questions whether justificatory defenses should include such a condition, and if so what should be its content, are controversial. I argue that responsibility for a conflict counts against protecting the responsible person at the expense of a non-responsible or a (...) less-responsible person, but that this consideration is not necessarily decisive but rather might be outweighed by another consideration, for example, in favor of preventing the more serious harm. I conclude that responsibility for the conditions of justificatory defenses raises a unique question whose proper resolution should be based on the interaction of several general considerations. (shrink)
According to an influential and intuitively appealing argument, morality is usually continuous, namely, a gradual change in one morally significant factor triggers a gradual change in another; the law should usually track morality; therefore, the law should often be continuous. This argument is illustrated by cases such as the following example: since the moral difference between a defensive action that is reasonable and one that is just short of being reasonable is small, the law should not impose a severe punishment (...) when the action is almost reasonable and no punishment at all when the action is reasonable. In this Article, I consider two doubts regarding this argument. First, the premise that morality is continuous in such cases is incompatible with the common view that the moral status of actions is not continuous since there is an important difference between actions that are permissible and actions that are wrong— even if this difference is due to a difference that is very small, such as the one between an action whose consequences are the best and an action whose consequences are just slightly less good. This view extends also to the overall moral status of agents given the common assumption that it depends on the moral status of their actions. This is an important challenge that the Continuity Argument should confront. However, I argue that the best account of morality is more scalar than the common view in these respects. Therefore, I conclude that the first premise of the Continuity Argument is correct in this regard, although it is based on a minority view. The second doubt concerns the scope of the second premise: since there are reasons both in favor and against legal continuity, and the applicability and force of these reasons depend not only on various moral propositions but also on contingent non-moral facts, we often lack the evidence to determine the degree to which the law, at a certain place and time, should be continuous, and specifically that it should often be continuous. (shrink)
The article explores the Israeli Supreme Court main judgment regarding the legality of the use of special interrogation methods in order extract information concerning future acts of terror. The Judgment's main conclusion was that while there might be a justification for using exceptional interrogation measures in order to save lives, based on the concept of lesser evil as embedded in the criminal defense of necessity, the government is nevertheless not authorized to use such means in the absence of explicit legislation (...) to that effect. The article presents and evaluates the Judgment, particularly the relation between the substantive moral questions involved and the aspect of authorization. (shrink)
The subject of this study is the justification for limiting negative expression directed at the government: its institutions and public officials, in order to preserve public faith in government. This paper is an abstract of a book that considers this question. The conclusion is that since the value of speech concerned with the performance of government is very high and the interest in protecting the status of government is limited and typically not substantial, there is generally no justification for legal (...) restrictions of this kind. (shrink)
"Freedom of expression" is a complex notion that reflects various considerations and raises many questions related to their content and interaction. This paper is an abstract of a book that considers general aspects regarding the justification and the limits of freedom of expression and analyzes exiting law in light of this normative discussion. Particularly, it considers the way to determine the proper scope of freedom of expression; first-order and second-order considerations in favor and against freedom of expression, both in general (...) and regarding central specific kinds of expressions; and possible ways to normatively regulate the field of expressions - in particular to restrict expressions, primarily by law - and specifically the common view that subsequent punishment for an expression is generally preferable to prior restraint of an expression. (shrink)
One of the central normative questions regards a decision between conflicting moral values. A decision of this nature is often required in disciplines such as philosophy, economics and law. According to common terminology, a decision between conflicting values reflects a balance of values, considerations or interests. Several types of questions arise in this context. One category includes substantive questions: which values exist, which considerations should be derived from these values, what is the degree of importance of these considerations, and which (...) principles should be established for deciding between conflicting considerations? Another category includes institutional questions: which individual or body should decide normative questions, and should the normative nature of the decision be manifest or concealed? This paper is an abstract of a book that considers general aspects concerning these questions. (shrink)
The general assumption that underlines Richard Posner’s argument in his book Not a Suicide Pact is that decisions concerning rights and security in the context of modern terrorism should be made by balancing competing interests. This assumption is obviously correct if one refers to the most rudimentary sense of balancing, namely, the idea that normative decisions should be made in light of the importance of the relevant values and considerations. However, Posner advocates a more specific conception of balancing, both substantively (...) and institutionally. Substantiality, he argues for balancing based on a consequential moral theory that rejects the ideas of deontological rights and particularly absolute or very weighty deontological rights. More specifically, it seems that Posner assumes a utilitarian theory that also rejects intrinsic concern for distributive justice. Institutionally, Posner argues that this method of reasoning should be adopted by judges when interpreting the constitution. These substantive and institutional background assumptions are of course controversial, but I do not dispute them in this Article. My critique concerns Posner’s conclusions based on these assumptions. Posner’s main claim is that given the magnitude of the danger of modern terrorism, even a small probability that an act of terror may occur justifies extreme anti-terror measures. While the general idea that even a slight risk of very serious harm justifies significant cost is plausible, I doubt Posner’s assumptions regarding the cost of various means of preventing these dangers, his claim that judicial review in this context should be very limited, and his suggestion of an absolute formal prohibition that is not strictly enforced in the context of measures such as interrogational torture. (shrink)
What is the appropriate division of power between public officials and private individuals? The straightforward answer to this question, it seems, is that an official should have a power if she employs it (morally) better compared to a private individual. However, Alon Harel argues that this answer is misguided, or at least partially, since there are some decisions—mainly concerning the employment of violence—that should be made and implemented only by public officials regardless of the (relative) moral quality of the decision (...) or action. In this comment I consider and criticize this argument. (shrink)
In this paper, I distinguish between two types of normative accounts of discrimination – general and special – and argue for the former and against the latter. General accounts consider the moral status of discrimination in light of all of the reasons that apply to discrimination, and hold that these reasons are not unique to discrimination (for example, the reasons to bring about the greater benefit or prevent the greater burden, to give priority for people who are worse off, and (...) to give people what they morally deserve). In contrast, special accounts argue that discrimination is objectionable due to factors that are especially salient in the context of discrimination (examples are the "deliberative" freedom of people to decide how to live without considering facts such as their race or sex, the message conveyed by discriminatory actions in terms of the moral status of people, and the mental states that accompany discriminatory actions). I argue that general accounts are more plausible than special ones, as foundational accounts of discrimination that determine its overall moral status (both types of accounts appear to suggest such accounts). One argument is that special accounts that suggest conclusions regarding the overall moral status of discrimination without considering all of the pertinent factors, especially general ones, are implausible. Another argument is that special accounts that claim that the factors that they highlight are basic are misguided since these factors are morally significant only if, and to the degree to which, they are derived from general ones. (shrink)
According to a common view, in a case involving an indivisible good and several potential beneficiaries, who are equal in every relevant respect, there is a non-instrumental reason to allocate the benefit in a way that gives each an equal chance to receive the benefit. In this paper, I argue that this view is incompatible with several plausible and widely held assumptions. I emphasize especially the assumption that the distributive role of chances is secondary to that of benefits in an (...) important sense: the value of allocating chances is related to the ways in which it is possible to allocate the relevant benefits. Specifically, chances should be allocated only when it is impossible or too costly to allocate benefits in accordance with the relative importance of the reasons in favor of allocating the relevant benefit to each potential beneficiary. Given this assumption, I argue that the fact that there is no relation between the distributive concern for chances and other distributive concerns suggests that we should reject the view that chances have a distributive role that is not merely instrumental. (shrink)
The main aim of Jeff McMahan's manuscript on the morality of war is to answer the question: why and accordingly when is it justified or permissible to kill people in war? However, McMahan argues that the same principles apply to individual actions and to war. McMahan rejects all doctrines of collective responsibility and liability. His claim is that every individual is liable for what he has done and not for the actions of others - even if both are part of (...) the same collective. Accordingly, McMahan challenges the common view that it is much easier to justify killing in war compared to killing in other contexts. Therefore, the scope of his project exceeds the context of war and extends to interpersonal conflicts between individuals that do not qualify as war. Many of McMahan's main claims are appealing. Particularly, appealing is his rejection of the collectivist account of war. Indeed, it seems that the simple story according to which people are responsible solely for their actions - rather than (also) to the actions of others - should be held on until a different, more complex, account of collective responsibility is put forward and its plausibility is explained. Therefore, the article focuses on the general principles advocated by McMahan with regard to the resolution of all interpersonal conflicts: Whether these conflicts are small scale or large scale (that is, whether few or a many people are involved in the conflict), and within the latter category of conflicts involving many people, whether these conflicts qualify as war (according to some standard) or not. (shrink)
According to influential view, using the criminal law against innocent actions or agents is wrong. In this paper, I consider four related arguments against this view: a debunking argument that suggests that the intuitive appeal of this view may be due to a conflation of different ideas; a counterexamples argument that points out that there are many cases in which using the criminal law against innocent actions ("non mala" actions that are not even "mala prohibita") or agents is justified; a (...) theoretical argument, according to which the force of the reasons for and against using the criminal law is a matter of degree and it is therefore implausible to hold that the latter always defeat the former; and an analogy argument, which holds that it is implausible to maintain that harming innocents is often justified in other contexts but (almost) never in the context of the criminal law. (shrink)
The question of whether a mistake of law should negate or mitigate criminal liability is commonly considered to be pertinent to the culpability of the agent, often examined in light of the (epistemic) reasonableness of the mistake. I argue that this view disregards an important aspect of this question, namely whether a mistake of law affects the rightness of the action, particularly in light of the moral significance of the mistake. I argue that several plausible premises, regarding moral rightness under (...) uncertainty, the nature of law and the moral significance of law, entail a positive answer to this question. Specifically, I consider this argument: (1) one (subjective) sense of moral rightness depends on the (epistemically justified) belief of the agent concerning a non-moral fact that is morally significant; (2) a law is (partly) a non-moral fact; (3) a legal fact might be morally significant; (4) therefore an action that is compatible with an applicable moral standard, in light of the mistaken (justified) belief of the agent concerning a morally significant law, is (subjectively) right or less wrongful; (5) the (subjective) moral rightness of an action counts against criminal liability for this action; (6) therefore an action that is compatible with the applicable moral standard, in light of the mistaken (epistemically justified) belief of the agent, counts against criminal liability for the action if the law is morally significant. (shrink)
The essence of the moral luck question is whether the responsibility of persons is determined only in light of actions that are within their control or also in light of factors, such as the consequences of their actions, which are beyond their control. Most people seem to have contrasting intuitions regarding this question. On the one hand, there is a common intuition that the responsibility of persons should be judged only in light of what is within their control. On the (...) other hand, there is a strong intuition that the consequences of actions sometimes affect the responsibility of agents even when these consequences depend on factors that are beyond their control. A parallel dilemma is present in the law. Legal rules, particularly criminal law rules and tort rules, often differentiate between agents in light of factors that are beyond their control, and in this sense involve legal luck. Of course, factors beyond the control of persons, including the consequences of their actions, can be significant, with respect to the evaluation of the responsibility of persons for instrumental or epistemic reasons. The question is thus only with respect to the independent significance of factors beyond the control of agents, and particularly the consequences of actions, to the evaluation of the (extent of the) responsibility of agents. Benjamin Zipursky offers an interesting argument in order to support the intuition in favor of moral and legal luck, particularly with regard to consequences, especially the rule according to which the punishment of completed offences is more severe than the punishment of attempts and the rule that tort liability applies only to actions that have caused harm. The aim of this Comment is to evaluate this argument. I will try to consider to what extent Zipursky's explanation merely reiterates the familiar intuition that the normative evaluation of the conduct of persons should be influenced by consequential luck, and to what extent it provides new insights that might appeal also to those who are more forcefully drawn to the contrasting intuition that we should judge people only in light of factors that are within their control. I argue that while Zipursky's suggestions might appeal to those who already share the intuition in favor of (consequential) moral and legal luck, they would not convince those who have doubts regarding moral and legal luck. (shrink)
How should a democratic state fight terrorism? This is the question discussed by Michael Ignatieff in his latest book. Ignatieff explores several possible positions as a response to this question. The review considers the analysis of these positions.
In this comment I consider Jack Balkin’s general argument for his method of constitutional interpretation – the question of why interpret (the United States Constitution) in this way (as presented in his book Living Originalism). I contrast this question with the way in which the conclusion of this argument should be implemented with regard to specific clauses – the question of how to interpret (the United States Constitution). While the former question is concerned with the general form of the argument, (...) the latter is concerned with a substantiation of one premise in the argument. (shrink)
In several papers, I have argued for a theory of distributive justice and considered its implications. This theory includes a principle of responsibility that was endorsed by others within an account of defensive force (self-defense and defense of others). Whitley Kaufman criticizes this account which he refers to as the "distributive justice theory of self-defense" (DJ theory). In this paper, I respond to this criticism. I argue that Kaufman presents the theory inaccurately, that his standard of evaluation of the theory (...) is inadequate and that his claim that the theory should be rejected is unconvincing. (shrink)
The following commentaries are responses to the rough drafts of six lectures — the Hourani Lectures—that I delivered at the University of Buffalo in November of 2006. This draft manuscript is being extensively revised and expanded for publication by Oxford University Press as a book called The Morality and Law of War. Even though in January 2007 the book was still both unpolished and incomplete, David Enoch at that time generously organized a workshop at the Law School of the Hebrew (...) University of Jerusalem to discuss its ideas and arguments. George Fletcher chaired the meeting and Re’em Segev, Yuval Shany, and Noam Zohar all presented superb commentaries. The following papers have all grown out of that memorable occasion. (shrink)
“We know that the children who have been through sustained Philosophy with Children improve in almost every other academic area. Philosophers aretraditionally asked awkward questions and to come up with alternative answers, and it really breeds independent thinking. If we want a generation of people who will begin to tackle and solve the problems we have, we need people who think for themselves and who think differently.”.
Na sua obra, Pedro Abelardo (1079-1142) destaca duas noções metafísicas que fundamentam sua teoria lógica: o status e o dictum propositionis , ao causar, respectivamente, a imposição ( impositio ) dos termos universais e o valor de verdade das proposições. Trata-se de expressões que se referem a naturezas ontológicas peculiares, na medida em que não são consideradas coisas ( res ), mesmo que constituem causas. Todavia, também não são nada. Abelardo as chama de ‘quase coisas’ ( quasi res ). No (...) presente artigo, explicamos, primeiro, essas duas noções essenciais da lógica abelardiana, antes de tentar, em seguida, encontrar a fonte dessa metafísica particular. Em oposição a comentadores importantes da lógica de Abelardo, que estimam que haja uma forte influência platônica sobre essa concepção específica, defendemos antes, com apoio de textos significativos e de acordo com o nominalismo abelardiano, que a maior ascendência sobre a metafísica do nosso autor é a do estoicismo, sobretudo, antigo. (shrink)
O texto apresenta experiências e pedagogias de existências construídas na/com a Rede de Mulheres Negras da Bahia, no âmbito da Pandemia do Sars-Cov2. Trata-se de uma pesquisa em andamento, fundamentada nos estudos do feminismo negro e nas teorias decoloniais. A partir de narrativas inspiradas nas escrevivências de Conceição Evaristo, o estudo aponta o ativismo dos Movimentos de Mulheres Negras da Bahia e a construção de outras epistemologias que rompem com a geopolítica do conhecimento colonizado. O trabalho inscreve as primeiras incursões (...) em uma grafia destas pedagogias de existências produzidas por estas mulheres no contexto de enfrentamento a crise sanitária atual. (shrink)
As mulheres dos quilombos sofrem preconceitos por seu gênero, sua cor e suas origens. Eles lutam todos os dias para quebrar os estereótipos que lhes são impostos desde os tempos da escravidão. A questão de gênero é um fenômeno complexo, e sempre que está ligada à história da escravidão negro-africana, a ideia de submissão e esquecimento emerge. A narrativa das mulheres negras dos quilombos compoem o conjunto de dados para esse artigo. A abordagem interseccional é um recurso teórico relevante para (...) entender as interconexões entre racismo, gênero e classe na estrutura social. Este estudo utilizou a etnografia como estratégia de pesquisa e entrevistas para coletar dados. A metodologia de análise é a teoria interpretativa, em que o sujeito da pesquisa e o contexto em que vivem estão no centro do entendimento acerca da identidade, religiosidade e genero nas comunidades quilombolas. Palavras-chave: mulheres quilombolas, medicina popular, etnia, racismo. (shrink)
Este artigo tem como objetivo principal identificar no pensamento de Habermas elementos que permitam refletir sobre questões referentes às relações entre teoria e prática presentes no discurso educacional, especialmente as relacionadas à formação de professores. Resulta de inquietações provocadas pelo predomínio de um discurso educacional impregnado pela tendência a privilegiar a prática e, de certo modo, negar a teoria, apoiando-se numa ideia de formação restrita a dimensões puramente instrumentais. O lugar da teoria e da prática nos processos de construção do (...) conhecimento na formação de professores não é consensual nem nos discursos a respeito do tema tampouco na produção acadêmica. É possível identificar algumas tendências nos encaminhamentos das discussões sobre as relações entre teoria e prática no contexto educacional. Uma que, ao mesmo tempo em que reconhece a necessidade da teoria para os processos de formação de professores, entende que a teoria nem sempre se aplica à prática ao afirmar, por exemplo, que a teoria é uma coisa e a prática é outra. Outra defende a supremacia da prática para uma formação mais efetiva; agrupa argumentos como “muita teoria e pouca prática”. A partir das contribuições de Habermas, expressas especialmente em Conhecimento e Interesse e Teoria e Prática, analisam-se as formas de inter-relacionamento entre teoria e prática a partir do papel da autorreflexão enquanto atitude capaz de oferecer condições para a compreensão dos mecanismos que contribuem para a dicotomia não só entre teoria e prática, mas também entre conhecimento e interesse. O diálogo com as contribuições de Habermas convida e, ao mesmo tempo, provoca o campo e o discurso educacional a reverem as formas como pensam e formulam seus projetos de formação. Sobretudo, acerca das condições de essa formação permitir que os sujeitos destinatários participem de forma mais autônoma desse processo e tomem o mundo da vida como ponto de articulação entre conhecimento e interesse, e consequentemente, entre teoria e prática. Nessa perspectiva, o exercício da autorreflexão como metodologia é que permite, de fato, uma visão integradora entre teoria e prática. Palavras-chave: Teoria e prática. Conhecimento e interesse. Formação. Autorreflexão. (shrink)
Este artigo tem como objetivo discutir os principais resultados apresentados pelas pesquisas “Relações étnico-raciais e de gênero no contexto das práticas pedagógicas: escrevivências e invenções na educação básica” e a pesquisa “Ensino de História e Cultura Afro-brasileira, Africana e Identidade: desafios e implicações nas Práticas pedagógicas”[1]. Dialogamos com os métodos adotados nas pesquisas, a etnoescrevivência e a pesquisa ação colaborativa, tomando os Ateliês de Pesquisa como dispositivo de construção de dados e intervenção, que possibilitou a construção de um movimento formativo (...) e coautoral, pautado na colaboração e na reflexão sobre a prática. As discussões teóricas dialogam principalmente com hooks ; Lima ; Pimenta ; Silva e Costa e outros/as autores/as. Os resultados apontaram que ao tomar como centralidade as narrativas da experiência docente e suas histórias de vida no entrelace do desenvolvimento profissional, os APs provocaram deslocamentos nos processos formativos com os temas raça e gênero, produzindo reflexão e alteração nas práticas pedagógicas. Demonstraram ainda, que não basta ser colaborador da pesquisa para que a cocriação e coautoria se estabeleçam, é fundamental que o ethos da confiança, a relação ética e horizontal seja construída ao longo do processo, haja vista que o modus operandi dos Ateliês de Pesquisa prima pela horizontalidade, invenção e experiência ancoradas no real do cotidiano escolar como propulsoras da produção do conhecimento pedagógico considerado como conhecimento científico do campo da docência. (shrink)
A proposta do artigo é analisar o fenômeno peculiar da honraria santoral na comunidade messiânico-milenarista de Pau de Colher (Casa Nova, sertão da Bahia, 1934-1938). A partir de um recorte histórico-cultural e teológico, a investigação será encaminhada no sentido de esclarecer a atuação de uma liderança religiosa, popular e carismática atada a modelos de santidade gestados durante o período medieval no ocidente cristão e transmigrados para o Novo Mundo após os descobrimentos. O texto apresenta documentação inédita e estabelece uma discussão (...) - a partir de obras clássicas e outras referências garimpadas ao longo da pesquisa - em torno da manifestação de santos católicos no interior baiano na década de 30 do século XX. O movimento de Pau de Colher, através da pregação de seus líderes, instituiu um diálogo com uma tradição que remonta às origens do cristianismo; fez crer na ressurreição de personagens como São José, o Carpinteiro e Santa Maria, a Imaculada -, figuras privilegiadas em nosso estudo -; e re-atualizou um conjunto de credos e valores transmitidos pelas mãos de missionários itinerantes e de beatos errantes durante a história do Brasil, revelando um intenso hibridismo entre catolicismo popular e eclesiástico. Palavras-chave: Pau de Colher; santos; sertão; catolicismo; religiosidade popular.The aim of this paper is to analyze the peculiar phenomenon of the honor saints in the messianic-millenarian community of Pau de Colher (Casa Nova, interior of Bahia, 1934-1938). From a cultural-historical and theological approach, the research will be directed towards clarifying the role of religious, popular and charismatic leadership tied to models of holiness gestated during the medieval period in the Christian West and transmigrated to the New World after the discoveries. The paper presents unpublished documentation and provides a discussion - from classical works and other references panned throughout the research - around the manifestation of catholic saints in the Bahia´s hinterland in the 30s of the twentieth century. The movement of Pau de Colher, through the preaching of their leaders, established a dialogue with a tradition dating back to the origins of christianity; did believe in the resurrection of characters as St. Joseph the Carpenter and St. Mary, the Immaculate - privileged figures in our study -; and re-updated a set of beliefs and values transmitted by the hands of itinerant missionaries and blessed wandering during Brazil's history, revealing an intense hybridization between popular and ecclesiastical catholicism. Key words: Pau de Colher; saints; hinterland; catholicism; popular religiousness. (shrink)
Vive-se uma demanda por integração, por solidariedade. As religiões e o cristianismo, em especial, podem respondem a esse desafio? A visão de re-ligação de Leonardo Boff, à luz do paradigma ecológico, abre novas perspectivas para as religiões, especialmente para a experiência cristã e seu papel no contexto atual. Objetiva-se aqui refletir sobre o significado do encontro das religiões ante os desafios oferecidos pela realidade ecológica, propiciando uma visão teológica teoantropocósmica. Palavras-chave: Re-ligação; Religião; Cristianismo; Paradigma ecológico; Teologia Teoantropocósmica; Diálogo. ABSTRACT Nowadays (...) there is a demand for integration and solidarity. Can religions and Christianity, in particular, meet this challenge? Leonardo Boff’s vision of re-connection, in the light of the ecological paradigm, opens new perspectives to religions, mainly to the Christian esperience and its role in the present scope. This article iams at reflecting upon the meaning of encounter of religions in face of challenges presented by the ecological reality, offering a theoanthropocosmic theological view. Key words: Re-connection, Religion, Christianity, Ecological paradigm, Theoanthropocosmic Theology and Dialogue. (shrink)
Resumo: Este texto discute a hipótese de que a crise das democracias contemporâneas é indissociável de dois fenômenos políticos distintos, porém correlatos, analisados a partir das teorizações de Michel Foucault sobre a biopolítica e o neoliberalismo: a) a crescente disseminação de atos e discursos de violência, de ódio e de preconceito contra populações vulneráveis, obedecendo à lógica biopolítica da proteção da vida de alguns ao custo da exposição à morte de vastas parcelas da população; b) a disseminação de políticas neoliberais (...) para a gestão da vida de populações vulneráveis. Considera-se que a articulação entre biopolítica e neoliberalismo produz o paradoxo de uma democracia sem demos, no sentido da desvalorização das lutas políticas coletivas por direitos iguais e por melhores condições de vida. Na conclusão, sugere-se que a reinvenção da democracia exige repensar o poder do demos, isto é, repolitizar o poder político de categorias sociais sujeitas a processos históricos de vulneração. Palavras-chave: Crise da democracia. Biopolítica. Neoliberalismo. Foucault. Butler. Democracy in crisis: biopolitics and neoliberal government of populations: This text discusses the hypothesis that the crisis of contemporary democracy relates to two distinct political phenomena, however correlated, analyzed thru Michel Foucault’s concepts about biopolitics and neoliberalism: a) the ascending dissemination of acts and discourses of hate, violence and prejudgment against vulnerable populations, according to the biopolitical logics of protecting the life of some at the expense of exposing the life of others to death; b) the dissemination of neoliberal policies to administrate the life of vulnerable populations. I argue that both phenomena seem to imply the paradox of a democracy without the demos, in the sense of the devaluation of collective political struggles for equal rights and for better life conditions. At the conclusion, it is suggested that the reinvention of democracy requires rethinking the power of the demos in the sense of re-politicizing the political power of social categories subjected to historical process that render them vulnerable. Keywords: Crisis of democracy. Biopolitics. Neoliberalism. Foucault. Butler. Démocratie en crise : biopolitique et gouvernement néolibéral de populations Résumé : On discute l’hypothèse que la crise de la démocratie contemporaine est associée à deux phénomènes politiques distinctes, mais corrélâtes, analysés par les concepts de Foucault sur la biopolitique et le néolibéralisme : a) la vague accrue d’actes et de mots de violence, haine et pré-jugements contre des populations vulnérables, selon la logique biopolitique de la protection de la vie de quelques-uns au prix du rejet à la morte de la vie des autres ; b) la dissémination des politiques néolibéraux vouées à la gestion de la vie des populations vulnérabilisées. L’articulation entre biopolitique et néolibéralisme semble impliquer le paradoxe d’une démocratie sans demos, au sens de la dévaluation des luttes politiques collectives pour des droits égaux et pour des meilleures conditions de vie. Finalement, on considère la réinvention de la démocratie par la ré-politisation du pouvoir du demos en tant que pouvoir des catégories sociales soumises à la vulnération. Mots-clés: Crise de la démocratie. Biopolitique. Néolibéralisme. Foucault. Butler. (shrink)
O objetivo deste trabalho é rever criticamente algumas interpretações contemporâneas da noção kantiana de intuição sensível. Defendo uma interpretação alternativa segundo a qual a intuição sensível em Kant deva ser entendida nos termos do que McDowell denomina sentido de re cuja principal característica é a dependênciado objeto. Nesse sentido, a função da intuição sensível é introduzir entidades no discurso para que essas possam ser conceituadas em juízos. Por essa razão,as intuições sensíveis devem ser vistas como o modo de se dar (...) dos objetos e seus atributos e relações que a eles se refere apenas na medida em que eles nos aparecem de forma dependente e relativa. (shrink)
A pintura da luz de José Claudino da Nóbrega propõe reflexão heurística: luz indivisa e luz da coisa são refletidas analogicamente na história de doutrinas e artes diversas. O Século de Justiniano tem realce: as ecfrases de panegírico, as articulações de metafísica e, principalmente, os mosaicos de ouro que então se produzem distinguem a téssera. Simultaneamente cubo, senha e jogo, a téssera e o análogo principal da pintura da luz indivisa, oposta à luz determinada.
RESUMO O objetivo do presente artigo é mostrar quando e de que forma a abordagem dialógico-discursiva começou a servir de base para se pensar o processo de aquisição da linguagem, no Brasil e fora dele - especialmente na França. Essa linha teórica busca analisar a fala da criança a partir dos movimentos discursivos que compreendem a relação entre a criança e o seu interlocutor, levando em consideração os contextos situacionais, a dialogia, a constituição dos sujeitos no discurso etc. Portanto, a) (...) faremos referência aos autores responsáveis por essa abordagem, em uma es, retrospectiva; b) explicitaremos os aspectos teóricos mobilizados durante as análises dos dados de fala de crianças; e c) abordaremos os aspectos metodológicos implicados nessa perspectiva teórica. Nosso intuito é discutir não apenas esse outro olhar lançado para a linguagem da criança, mas os desafios teórico-metodológicos que essa abordagem traz para o campo de investigação. ABSTRACT The purpose of this article is to show when and how the dialogical-discursive approach began to serve as a basis for thinking about the language acquisition process in Brazil and abroad - especially in France. This theoretical line seeks to analyze - the speech of children starting from the discursive movements found in the relationship between the child and his or her interlocutor, taking into account the situational contexts, the dialogism, the constitution of the subject in the speech, etc. Thus a) we refer to the authors responsible for this approach, in a retrospective; b) we explain the theoretical aspects mobilized during the data analysis of children's speech; and c) we utilize the methodological aspects involved in this theoretical perspective. Our aim, therefore, is to discuss not only this other way of looking at children's language, but also the theoretical and methodological challenges that this approach brings to this specific field of investigation. (shrink)
O artigo propõe uma interlocução entre o filósofo francês Michel Foucault e o filósofo norte-americano Richard Rorty. Apresenta a descrição que Rorty realizou do colega francês. Analisa essa leitura e oferece, a partir do próprio Foucault, uma interpretação alternativa, que aponta para algumas imprecisões cometidas por Rorty, em sua interpretação. Conclui com um comentário sobre a conversação proposta.
