Results for 'Reasons'

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  1.  81
    The reasonableness of christianity and its vindications.Reasonableness Of Christianity - 2010 - In S. J. Savonius-Wroth Paul Schuurman & Jonathen Walmsley (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Locke. Continuum.
  2. Instrumental Reasons.Instrumental Reasons - unknown
    As Kant claimed in the Groundwork, and as the idea has been developed by Korsgaard 1997, Bratman 1987, and Broome 2002. This formulation is agnostic on whether reasons for ends derive from our desiring those ends, or from the relation of those ends to things of independent value. However, desire-based theorists may deny, against Hubin 1999, that their theory is a combination of a principle of instrumental transmission and the principle that reasons for ends are provided by desires. (...)
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  3.  31
    Section I phenomenology of life in the critique of reason.Of Reason - 2011 - Analecta Husserliana: Phenomenology/Ontopoiesis Retrieving Geo-Cosmic Horizons of Antiquity: Logos and Life 110:14.
  4. Actions not as planned: The price of automatization.J. T. Reason - 1979 - In Geoffrey Underwood & Robin Stevens (eds.), Aspects of consciousness. New York: Academic Press. pp. 1--67.
     
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  5. title:• To explain the expressive role that distinguishes specifically normative vocabulary. That is, to say what it is the job of such vocabulary to make explicit. Doing this is saying what'ought'means.• To introduce a non-Humean way of thinking about practical reasoning. [REVIEW]Practical Reasoning - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:127.
     
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  6. Reasons for Reliabilism.Bob Beddor - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 146-176.
    One leading approach to justification comes from the reliabilist tradition, which maintains that a belief is justified provided that it is reliably formed. Another comes from the ‘Reasons First’ tradition, which claims that a belief is justified provided that it is based on reasons that support it. These two approaches are typically developed in isolation from each other; this essay motivates and defends a synthesis. On the view proposed here, justification is understood in terms of an agent’s (...) for belief, which are in turn analyzed along reliabilist lines: an agent's reasons for belief are the states that serve as inputs to their reliable processes. I show that this synthesis allows each tradition to profit from the other's explanatory resources. In particular, it enables reliabilists to explain epistemic defeat without abandoning their naturalistic ambitions. I go on to compare my proposed synthesis with other hybrid versions of reliabilism that have been proposed in the literature. (shrink)
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  7.  92
    Reasons First.Mark Schroeder - 2021 - Oxford University Press.
    Reasons First explores the hypothesis that reasons have a basic explanatory role in ethics and epistemology. While widely accepted concerning moral worth, Schroeder argues that this idea also illuminates some long-standing puzzles to do with knowledge.
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  8.  99
    Giving Reasons Does Not Always Amount to Arguing.Lilian Bermejo-Luque - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):659-668.
    Both because of the vagueness of the word ‘give’ when speaking about giving reasons, and because we lack an adequate definition of ‘reasons’, there is a harmful ambiguity in the expression ‘giving reasons’. Particularly, straightforwardly identifying argumentation with reasons giving would make of virtually any interplay a piece of argumentation. Besides, if we adopt the mainstream definition of reasons as “considerations that count in favour of doing or believing something”, then only good argumentation would count (...)
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  9.  24
    Reasons doctors provide futile treatment at the end of life: a qualitative study.Lindy Willmott, Benjamin White, Cindy Gallois, Malcolm Parker, Nicholas Graves, Sarah Winch, Leonie Kaye Callaway, Nicole Shepherd & Eliana Close - 2016 - Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (8):496-503.
    Objective Futile treatment, which by definition cannot benefit a patient, is undesirable. This research investigated why doctors believe that treatment that they consider to be futile is sometimes provided at the end of a patient9s life. Design Semistructured in-depth interviews. Setting Three large tertiary public hospitals in Brisbane, Australia. Participants 96 doctors from emergency, intensive care, palliative care, oncology, renal medicine, internal medicine, respiratory medicine, surgery, cardiology, geriatric medicine and medical administration departments. Participants were recruited using purposive maximum variation sampling. (...)
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  10.  39
    The 'No-Supervenience' Theorem and its Implications for Theories of Consciousness.Catherine M. Reason - 2024 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 31 (1):138-148.
    The 'no-supervenience' theorem (Reason, 2019; Reason and Shah, 2021) is a proof that no fully self-aware system can entirely supervene on any objectively observable system. I here present a simple, non-technical summary of the proof and demonstrate its implications for four separate theories of consciousness: the 'property dualism' theory of David Chalmers; the 'reflexive monism' of Max Velmans; Galen Strawson's 'realistic monism'; and the 'illusionism' of Keith Frankish. It is shown that all are ruled out in their current form by (...)
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  11. Acting for reasons, apt action, and knowledge.Susanne Mantel - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3865-3888.
    I argue for the view that there are important similarities between knowledge and acting for a normative reason. I interpret acting for a normative reason in terms of Sosa’s notion of an apt performance. Actions that are done for a normative reason are normatively apt actions. They are in accordance with a normative reason because of a competence to act in accordance with normative reasons. I argue that, if Sosa’s account of knowledge as apt belief is correct, this means (...)
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  12. Handbook of Action Research. Participative.P. Reason & H. Bradbury - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
     
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  13.  14
    John Taber.Revelation Reason & Idealism In Sankara'S. - 2000 - In Roy W. Perrett (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: Indian Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 161.
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  14. Knowledge, Reasons, and Errors about Error Theory.Charles Cote-Bouchard & Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
    According to moral error theorists, moral claims necessarily represent categorically or robustly normative facts. But since there are no such facts, moral thought and discourse are systematically mistaken. One widely discussed objection to the moral error theory is that it cannot be true because it leads to an epistemic error theory. We argue that this objection is mistaken. Objectors may be right that the epistemic error theory is untenable. We also agree with epistemic realists that our epistemological claims are not (...)
     
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  15. Romans in Full Circle: A History of Interpretation.Mark Reasoner - 2006
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  16.  77
    Reasons, attenuators, and virtue: A novel account of pragmatic encroachment.Eva Schmidt - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy:1-22.
    In this paper, I explicate pragmatic encroachment by appealing to pragmatic considerations attenuating, or weakening, epistemic reasons to believe. I call this the ‘Attenuators View’. I will show that this proposal is better than spelling out pragmatic encroachment in terms of reasons against believing – what I call the ‘Reasons View’. While both views do equally well when it comes to providing a plausible mechanism of how pragmatic encroachment works, the Attenuators View does a better job distinguishing (...)
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  17. Which Reasons? Which Rationality?Daniel Fogal & Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8.
    The slogan that rationality is about responding to reasons has a turbulent history: once taken for granted; then widely rejected; now enjoying a resurgence. The slogan is made harder to assess by an ever-increasing plethora of distinctions pertaining to reasons and rationality. Here we are occupied with two such distinctions: that between subjective and objective reasons, and that between structural rationality (a.k.a. coherence) and substantive rationality (a.k.a. reasonableness). Our paper has two main aims. The first is to (...)
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  18. Reasons for action, acting for reasons, and rationality.Maria Alvarez - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3293-3310.
    What kind of thing is a reason for action? What is it to act for a reason? And what is the connection between acting for a reason and rationality? There is controversy about the many issues raised by these questions. In this paper I shall answer the first question with a conception of practical reasons that I call ‘Factualism’, which says that all reasons are facts. I defend this conception against its main rival, Psychologism, which says that practical (...)
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  19.  27
    Sharing reasons and emotions in a non-ideal discursive system.Paul Billingham - 2023 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 22 (3):294-314.
    This paper critically evaluates two aspects of Maxime Lepoutre's important book, Democratic Speech in Divided Times. First, I examine Lepoutre's approach to the shared reasons constraint—the requirement to offer shared reasons within public deliberation—and the place of emotions in public discourse. I argue that he, and indeed all who adopt such a highly inclusivist approach, face a dilemma that pushes him either to apply the shared reasons constraint more widely than he desires or to abandon it completely. (...)
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  20.  21
    Reasons to Redefine Moral Distress: A Feminist Empirical Bioethics Analysis.Georgina Morley, Caroline Bradbury-Jones & Jonathan Ives - 2021 - Bioethics 35 (1):61-71.
    There has been increasing debate in recent years about the conceptualization of moral distress. Broadly speaking, two groups of scholars have emerged: those who agree with Jameton’s ‘narrow definition’ that focuses on constraint and those who argue that Jameton’s definition is insufficient and needs to be broadened. Using feminist empirical bioethics, we interviewed critical care nurses in the United Kingdom about their experiences and conceptualizations of moral distress. We provide our broader definition of moral distress and examples of data that (...)
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  21. Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    It is often claimed that irreducibly normative truths would have unacceptable metaphysical implications, and are incompatible with a scientific view of the world. The book argues, on the basis of a general account of the relevance of ontological questions, that this claim is mistaken. It is also a mistake to think that interpreting normative judgments as beliefs would make it impossible to explain their connection with action. An agent’s acceptance of a normative judgment can explain that agent’s subsequent action because (...)
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  22. What apparent reasons appear to be.Kurt Sylvan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):587-606.
    Many meta-ethicists have thought that rationality requires us to heed apparent normative reasons, not objective normative reasons. But what are apparent reasons? There are two kinds of standard answers. On de dicto views, R is an apparent reason for S to \ when it appears to S that R is an objective reason to \ . On de re views, R is an apparent reason for S to \ when R’s truth would constitute an objective reason for (...)
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  23.  66
    Reasons without rationalism * by Kieran Setiya * princeton university press, 2007. IX + 131 pp. 22.50: Summary.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):509-510.
    Reasons without Rationalism has two related parts, devoted to action theory and ethics, respectively. In the second part, I argue for a close connection between reasons for action and virtues of character. This connection is mediated by the idea of good practical thought and the disposition to engage in it. The argument relies on the following principle, which is intended as common ground: " Reasons: The fact that p is a reason for A to ϕ just in (...)
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  24. Normative Reasons as Reasons Why We Ought.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):459-484.
    I defend the view that a reason for someone to do something is just a reason why she ought to do it. This simple view has been thought incompatible with the existence of reasons to do things that we may refrain from doing or even ought not to do. For it is widely assumed that there are reasons why we ought to do something only if we ought to do it. I present several counterexamples to this principle and (...)
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  25.  15
    Sincerity and japanese values.Paul Reasoner - 1990 - Philosophy East and West 40 (4):471-488.
  26.  9
    Lance J. Rips.Reasoning Imperialism - 2002 - In Renée Elio (ed.), Common sense, reasoning, & rationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 215.
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  27.  40
    Relational Reasons and the Criminal Law.R. A. Duff - 2013 - In Leiter B. & Green L. (eds.), Oxford Studies in Legal Philosophy, vol. 2. Oxford UP. pp. 175-208.
    First paragraph: Some reasons for action are relational. I have a relational reason to Φ when I have reason to Φ in virtue of a relationship in which I stand, or a role that I fill; absent that relationship or that role I would not have that reason to Φ ; others who do not stand in that relationship or fill that role do not have that reason to Φ . I have a relational reason to feed this child (...)
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  28.  69
    Explaining Reasons: Where Does the Buck Stop?Ulrike Heuer - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (3):1-25.
    The buck-passing account of values offers an explanation of the close relation of values and reasons for action: of why it is that the question whether something that is of value provides reasons is not ”open.” Being of value simply is, its defenders claim, a property that something has in virtue of its having other reason-providing properties. The generic idea of buck-passing is that the property of being good or being of value does not provide reasons. It (...)
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  29.  62
    Reasons Regresses and Tragedy.Andrew Cling - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):333-346.
    The epistemic regress problem is about the possibility of having beliefs that are based on evidence. The problem of the criterion is about the possibility of having beliefs that are based on general standards for distinguishing what is true from what is false. These problems are similar. Each is constituted by a set of propositions about epistemically valuable relational properties—being supported by evidence and being authorized by a criterion of truth—that are individually plausible but jointly inconsistent, a paradox. The propositions (...)
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  30.  38
    The ranges of reasons and creasons.Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-10.
    In this discussion, we look at three potential problems that arise for Whiting’s account of normative reasons. The first has to do with the idea that objective reasons might have a modal dimension. The second and third concern the idea that there is some sort of direct connection between sets of reasons and the deliberative ought or the ought of rationality. We can see that we might be better served using credences about reasons (i.e., creasons) to (...)
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  31. Conflicting reasons in the small-improvement argument.Johan E. Gustafsson & Nicolas Espinoza - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):754-763.
    The small-improvement argument is usually considered the most powerful argument against comparability, viz the view that for any two alternatives an agent is rationally required either to prefer one of the alternatives to the other or to be indifferent between them. We argue that while there might be reasons to believe each of the premises in the small-improvement argument, there is a conflict between these reasons. As a result, the reasons do not provide support for believing the (...)
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  32.  91
    Weighing Reasons.Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.) - 2016 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA.
    Normative reasons have become a popular theoretical tool in recent decades. One helpful feature of normative reasons is their weight. The fourteen new essays in this book theorize about many different aspects of weight. Topics range from foundational issues to applications of weight in debates across philosophy.
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  33. Exchanging Reasons: responses to critics.Lilian Bermejo Luque - 2011 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 26 (3):329-346.
    Ofrezco respuestas a lo que considero son los aspectos más destacados de las críticas de John Biro, James Freeman, David Hitchcock, Robert Pinto, Harvey Siegel y Luis Vega al modelo normativo para la argumentación que he desarrollado en Giving Reasons. Cada respuesta se articula en torno a una cuestión principal, i.e., la distinción entre normatividad constitutiva y regulativa dentro de los modelos de la Teoría de la Argumentación, la evaluación semántica de la argumentación, el concepto de justificación, las diferencias (...)
     
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  34.  13
    External Reasons.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 2006 - In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Mcdowell and His Critics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 142–179.
    This chapter contains section titled: Williams's Analysis of Internal Reasons Williams's Claim that All Reasons are Internal Reasons McDowell's Analysis of External Reasons.
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  35. The Reasons of Love.Harry G. Frankfurt - 2004 - Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
    A clear, accessible exploration of how and why we love by prominent philosopher and bestselling author Harry Frankfurt In The Reasons of Love, leading moral philosopher and bestselling author Harry Frankfurt argues that the key to a fulfilled life is to pursue wholeheartedly what one cares about, that love is the most authoritative form of caring, and that the purest form of love is, in a complicated way, self-love. Through caring, we infuse the world with meaning. Caring provides us (...)
  36. Particular Reasons.Selim Berker - 2007 - Ethics 118 (1):109-139.
    Moral particularists argue that because reasons for action are irreducibly context-dependent, the traditional quest in ethics for true and exceptionless moral principles is hopelessly misguided. In making this claim, particularists assume a general framework according to which reasons are the ground floor normative units undergirding all other normative properties and relations. They then argue that there is no cashing out in finite terms either (i) when a given non-normative feature gives rise to a reason for or against action, (...)
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  37.  18
    Subject lndex.Ar See Affective Reasoner - 2001 - In Robert Trappl (ed.), Emotions in Humans and Artifacts. Bradford Book/MIT Press. pp. 381.
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  38.  19
    The bible of justice.Justice T. Reason - 1970 - Green Bay, Wis.,: Justice T. Reason Publications.
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  39. Reasons and motivation: John Broome.John Broome - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):131–146.
    Derek Parfit takes an externalist and cognitivist view about normative reasons. I shall explore this view and add some arguments that support it. But I shall also raise a doubt about it at the end.
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  40.  61
    Reasons and practices of reasoning: On the analytic/Continental distinction in political philosophy.David Owen - 2016 - European Journal of Political Theory 15 (2):172-188.
    This essay argues that whereas ‘analytic’ political philosophy is focussed on generating reasons that are oriented to the issue of articulating norms of justice, legitimacy and so on, that guide political judgements about institutions and/or forms of conduct; ‘Continental’ political philosophy is oriented to critically assessing the practices of reasoning that characterise our social and political institutions and forms of conduct as well as our first-order normative reflection on them. It explores the distinction between the two orientations in terms (...)
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  41.  46
    Reasons, Motivations, and Obligations.Jason Wyckoff - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):451-468.
    I argue against Reasons Internalism, the view that possession of a normative reason for the performance of an action entails that one can be motivated to perform that action, and Motivational Existence Internalism, the view that if one is obligated to perform an action, then one can be motivated to perform that action. My thesis is that these positions cannot accommodate the fact that reasonable moral agents are frequently motivated to act only because they believe theircontemplated actions to be (...)
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  42. Bruno de finetti.I. Inductive Reasoning - 1970 - In Paul Weingartner & Gerhard Zecha (eds.), Induction, physics, and ethics. Dordrecht,: Reidel. pp. 3.
  43.  23
    Derek W STRIJBOS Radboud University Nijmegen Leon C. de BRUIN Ruhr—University of Bochum.Reason Attribution - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 86-2012 86:157 - 180.
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  44. Module 1–“early romanticism and the gothic” history.Emotions vs Reason, M. Shelley, W. Blake, W. Wordsworth, S. T. Coleridge, G. G. Byron & P. B. Shelley - forthcoming - Verifiche: Rivista Trimestrale di Scienze Umane.
     
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  45. Reasons, basing, and the normative collapse of logical pluralism.Christopher Blake-Turner - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):4099-4118.
    Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. A key objection to logical pluralism is that it collapses into monism. The core of the Collapse Objection is that only the pluralist’s strongest logic does any genuine normative work; since a logic must do genuine normative work, this means that the pluralist is really a monist, who is committed to her strongest logic being the one true logic. This paper considers a neglected question in the collapse (...)
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  46.  94
    Reasons for and reasons against.Justin Snedegar - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):725-743.
    What an agent ought to do is determined by competition between reasons bearing on the options open to her. The popular metaphor of balancing or weighing reasons on a scale to represent this competition encourages a focus on competition between reasons for competing options. But what an agent ought to do also depends on the reasons against those options. The balancing metaphor does not provide an obvious way to represent reasons against. Partly as a result (...)
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  47. Practical reasons to believe, epistemic reasons to act, and the baffled action theorist.Nomy Arpaly - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):22-32.
    I argue that unless belief is voluntary in a very strict sense – that is, unless credence is simply under our direct control – there can be no practical reasons to believe. I defend this view against recent work by Susanna Rinard. I then argue that for very similar reasons, barring the truth of strict doxastic voluntarism, there cannot be epistemic reasons to act, only purely practical reasons possessed by those whose goal is attaining knowledge or (...)
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  48. weighing reasons.Garrett Cullity - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
    What is involved in weighing normative reasons against each other? One attractive answer offers us the following Simple Picture: a fact is a reason for action when it bears to an action the normative relation of counting in its favour; this relation comes in different strengths or weights; the weights of the reasons for and against an action can be summed; the reasons for performing the action are sufficient when no other action is more strongly supported, overall; (...)
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  49.  7
    Reasons and Causes.Timothy O'Connor - 2010 - In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 129–138.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Reasons as Not (Efficiently) Causal, Underwriting Irreducibly Teleological Explanations Reasons as Efficient Causes Reasons, Causes, and Physicalism Causally Relevant, though Not Causes Structuring Causes Reasons, Causes, and Free Will References Further reading.
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  50. Actions, reasons, and causes.Donald Davidson - 1997 - In Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The philosophy of action. New York: Oxford University Press.
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