Results for 'Reasons Internalism'

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  1.  64
    Reasons Internalism and the Function of Normative Reasons.Neil Sinclair - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):209-229.
    What is the connection between reasons and motives? According to Reasons Internalism there is a non-trivial conceptual connection between normative reasons and the possibility of rationally accessing relevant motivation. Reasons Internalism is attractive insofar as it captures the thought that reasons are for reasoning with and repulsive insofar as it fails to generate sufficient critical distance between reasons and motives. Rather than directly adjudicate this dispute, I extract from it two generally accepted (...)
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  2. Evilism, Moral Rationalism, and Reasons Internalism.Christopher Gregory Weaver - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (1):3-24.
    I show that the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and essentially omnimalevolent being is impossible given only two metaethical assumptions (viz., moral rationalism and reasons internalism). I then argue (pace Stephen Law) that such an impossibility undercuts Law’s (Relig Stud 46(3):353–373, 2010) evil god challenge.
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  3. Internalism About Reasons: Sad but True?Kate Manne - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):89-117.
    Internalists about reasons following Bernard Williams claim that an agent’s normative reasons for action are constrained in some interesting way by her desires or motivations. In this paper, I offer a new argument for such a position—although one that resonates, I believe, with certain key elements of Williams’ original view. I initially draw on P.F. Strawson’s famous distinction between the interpersonal and the objective stances that we can take to other people, from the second-person point of view. I (...)
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  4.  14
    Reasons Internalism.Errol Lord & David Plunkett - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 324-339.
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  5. Instrumental Reasons.Instrumental Reasons - unknown
    As Kant claimed in the Groundwork, and as the idea has been developed by Korsgaard 1997, Bratman 1987, and Broome 2002. This formulation is agnostic on whether reasons for ends derive from our desiring those ends, or from the relation of those ends to things of independent value. However, desire-based theorists may deny, against Hubin 1999, that their theory is a combination of a principle of instrumental transmission and the principle that reasons for ends are provided by desires. (...)
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  6.  31
    Internalism and Hyperexternalism About Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (1):15-34.
    Alan Goldman’s Reasons from Within is one of the most thorough recent defenses of what might be called ‘orthodox internalism’ about practical reasons. Goldman’s main target is an opposing view that includes a commitment to the following two theses: (O) that there are such things as objective values, and (E) that these values give rise to external reasons. One version of this view, which we can call ‘orthodox externalism’, also includes a commitment to the thesis (I) (...)
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  7. A New Defence of Williams's Reasons-Internalism.Christopher Cowley - 2005 - Philosophical Investigations 28 (4):346–368.
  8.  39
    Skepticism About Practical Reasons Internalism.Joshua Gert - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):59-77.
  9.  28
    Reasons Internalism, Hegelian Resources.Kate Padgett Walsh - 2010 - Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (2):225-240.
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  10. Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action.David Sobel - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):218.
    These days, just about every philosophical debate seems to generate a position labeled internalism. The debate I will be joining in this essay concerns reasons for action and their connection, or lack of connection, to motivation. The internalist position in this debate posits a certain essential connection between reasons and motivation, while the externalist position denies such a connection. This debate about internalism overlaps an older debate between Humeans and Kantians about the exclusive reason-giving power of (...)
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  11. Reasons, Value, and Particular Agents: Normative Relevance Without Motivational Internalism.William J. FitzPatrick - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):285-318.
    While differing widely in other respects, both neo-Humean and neo-Kantian approaches to normativity embrace an internalist thesis linking reasons for acting to potential motivation. This thesis pushes in different directions depending on the underlying view of the powers of practical reason, but either way it sets the stage for an attack on realist attempts to ground reasons directly in facts about value. How can reasons that are not somehow grounded in motivational features of the agent nonetheless count (...)
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  12. Varieties of Reasons/Motives Internalism.Steven Arkonovich - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (3):210-219.
    Under what conditions do you have a reason to perform some action? Do you only have reason to do what you want to do? Reasons-motives internalism is the appealingly simple view that unless an agent is, or could be, motivated to act in a certain way, he has no normative reason to act in that way. Thus, according to reasons-motives internalism, facts about an individual’s motivational psychology constrain what is rational for that agent to do. This (...)
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  13.  54
    Internalism, (Super)Fragile Reasons, and the Conditional Fallacy.Teresa Robertson - 2003 - Philosophical Papers 32 (2):171-184.
    Abstract David Sobel (2001) objects to Bernard Williams's internalism, the view that an agent has a reason to perform an action only if she has some motive that will be served by performing that action. Sobel is an unusual challenger in that he endorses neo-Humean subjectivism, ?the view that it is the agent's subjective motivational set that makes it the case that an agent does or does not have a reason to φ? (219). Sobel's objection in fact arises from (...)
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  14. Internalist and Externalist Theories: The Diversity of Reasons for Acting.Linda Marie Paul - 1990 - Dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park
    Although common-sense moral theories tend to hold that everyone has reason to act morally, Bernard Williams argues in "Internal and External Reasons" that an agent has no reason to act if the act in question fails to promote any desire or project of hers. Williams considers this a logical property of reasons for acting and refers to this position as "internalism." ;After critically examining Williams' specific arguments, I use a heterogeneous group of arguments to show that (...) oversimplifies the logic of reasons. There are various ways in which reasons can be attributed to an agent without first examining her motives or projects: some ways of undertaking obligations give rise to reasons for acting due to rational requirements on consistency of intention; Thomas Nagel's arguments that prudential reasons are best described in terms of the agent's metaphysical conception of herself allow us to attribute reasons for acting to an agent without checking her desires first; and John McDowell's account of agents "perceiving" reasons explains how an agent's conception of the facts will give rise to a reason and a motive for acting. ;It also appears that internalism's appeal relies in part on our prejudices in favor of self-interest theories of rationality and our tendency to view agents as more separate and independent than they actually are. As a result, internalism suffers from too narrow a value focus. The emphasis on a shared form of life that originates in the Wittgensteinian notion of a practice allows us to attribute reasons for acting to agents without considering their individual projects in each case and better suits the process of judging and understanding reasons for acting than a view which focuses as heavily on the individual as internalism does. ;Finally, because agents are sometimes perverse, reasons themselves do not always motivate and motivation cannot logically be part of having a reason. ;In conclusion, reasons for acting are significantly more diverse than internalism allows and the theory should therefore be rejected. (shrink)
     
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  15. Internalizam razloga: dvije interpretacije: Internalism about Reasons: Two Interpretations.Matej Sušnik - 2009 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 29 (2):349-363.
    Internalisti razloga smatraju da je prisutnost motiva preduvjet za postojanje razloga. Prema humeovskoj interpretaciji ovog stajališta, razlozi za djelovanje uvijek su relativni budući da njihovo postojanje ovisi o arbitrarnim elementima koji čine nečiji subjektivni motivacijski skup. Jedan od najvećih izazova humeovskom internalizmu predstavlja kantovska interpretacija internalističkog stajališta. Glavna intencija kantovskog pristupa jest dokazati mogućnost racionalne motivacije te tako osporiti humeovski relativizam. U članku kritički prikazujem ovu raspravu te nastojim obraniti humeovski internalizam od jednog suvremenog kantovskog prijedloga.Internalists about reasons argue (...)
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  16.  63
    Why Be an Internalist About Reasons?Julia Markovits - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:255.
  17.  72
    Sound Advice and Internal Reasons.Ariela Tubert - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):181-199.
    Reasons internalism holds that reasons for action contain an essential connection with motivation. I defend an account of reasons internalism based on the advisor model. The advisor model provides an account of reasons for action in terms of the advice of a more rational version of the agent. Contrary to Pettit and Smith's proposal and responding to Sobel's and Johnson's objections, I argue that the advisor model can provide an account of internal reasons (...)
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  18. Internalism About Reasons for Action.Rachel Cohon - 1993 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (4):265-288.
  19.  70
    Internalism and Different Kinds of Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2003 - Philosophical Forum 34 (1):53–72.
  20.  58
    Against Internalism About Reasons—Gert’s Rational Options. [REVIEW]David Copp - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):455–461.
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  21. The Real Problem with Internalism About Reasons.Talbot Brewer - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):443 - 473.
  22. Internalism About Moral Reasons.John Robertson - 1986 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67 (2):124.
     
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  23.  23
    Dancy on Desire and Internalism of Reasons.Ingmar Persson - 1999 - Theoria 65 (2-3):156-170.
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  24.  6
    How Problematic for Morality is Internalism About Reasons?Simon Robertson - 2004 - Selected Papers Contributed to 5th International Congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy.
  25.  7
    Internalism About Reasons: Two Interpretations.Matej Sušnik - 2009 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 29 (2):349-363.
  26.  2
    The Real Problem With Internalism About Reasons.Talbot Brewer - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):443-473.
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  27.  66
    Rational Internalism.Samuel Asarnow - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):147-178.
    I describe and motivate Rational Internalism, a principle concerning the relationship between motivating reasons (which explain actions) and normative reasons (which justify actions). I use this principle to construct a novel argument against Objectivist theories of normative reasons, which hold that facts about normative reasons can be analyzed in terms of an independently specified class of normative or evaluative facts. I then argue for an alternative theory of normative reasons, the Reasoning View, which is (...)
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  28.  5
    An Ecumenical Account of Categorical Moral Reasons.Caj Strandberg - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    According to an influential way of understanding the debate between internalism and externalism about normative reasons, these theories confront us with a dilemma. Internalism is taken to involve a view about rationality which is considered less philosophically problematic than its competitors, whereas externalism is taken to suggest a more contentious view concerning this notion. However, the assumption that externalism involves a more demanding notion of rationality implies that it is able to account for categorical moral reasons, (...)
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  29.  24
    Towards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons.Caj Sixten Strandberg - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (1):69-100.
    A theory of normative reasons for action faces the fundamental challenge of accounting for the dual nature of reasons. On the one hand, some reasons appear to depend on, and vary with, desires. On the other hand, some reasons appear categorical in the sense of being desire‐independent. However, it has turned out to be difficult to provide a theory that accommodates both these aspects. Internalism is able to account for the former aspect, but has difficulties (...)
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  30.  8
    Epistemic Internalism and Testimonial Justification.Jonathan Egeland - forthcoming - Episteme:1-17.
    According to epistemic internalists, facts about justification supervene upon one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. Epistemic externalists, on the other hand, deny this. More specifically, externalists think that the supervenience base of justification isn't exhausted by one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. In the last decade, the internalism–externalism debate has made its mark on the epistemology of testimony. The proponent of internalism about the epistemology of testimony claims that a hearer's testimonial justification for believing (...)
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  31. Rationalist Restrictions and External Reasons.Matthew S. Bedke - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (1):39 - 57.
    Historically, the most persuasive argument against external reasons proceeds through a rationalist restriction: For all agents A, and all actions Φ, there is a reason for A to Φ only if Φing is rationally accessible from A's actual motivational states. Here I distinguish conceptions of rationality, show which one the internalist must rely on to argue against external reasons, and argue that a rationalist restriction that features that conception of rationality is extremely implausible. Other conceptions of rationality can (...)
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  32. Internalism, Ideal Advisors and the Conditional Fallacy.Alexander Hyun - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2):1-7.
    In her recent article, ‘Internalism About Reasons: Sad But True?,’ Kate Manne offers a brilliant defense of a novel version of internalism about normative reasons. But I will argue that this defense is not successful. After explaining the nature of Manne’s internalism, I offer two counterexamples to it, thereby showing that her argument in its favor goes wrong somewhere. I then identify the false premise in her argument. In brief, I suggest that Manne’s ‘practice-based approach’ (...)
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  33. What's Wrong with Moral Internalism.Robert Lockie - 1998 - Ratio 11 (1):14–36.
    Moral Internalism is the claim that it is a priori that moral beliefs are reasons for action. At least three conceptions of 'reason' may be disambiguated: psychological, epistemological, and purely ethical. The first two conceptions of Internalism are false on conceptual, and indeed empirical, grounds. On a purely ethical conception of 'reasons', the claim is true but is an Externalist claim. Positive arguments for Internalism — from phenomenology, connection and oddness — are found wanting. Three (...)
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  34. Empathy, Shared Intentionality, and Motivation by Moral Reasons.Marion Hourdequin - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):403 - 419.
    Internalists about reasons generally insist that if a putative reason, R, is to count as a genuine normative reason for a particular agent to do something, then R must make a rational connection to some desire or interest of the agent in question. If internalism is true, but moral reasons purport to apply to agents independently of the particular desires, interests, and commitments they have, then we may be forced to conclude that moral reasons are incoherent. (...)
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  35.  87
    Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):337-355.
    According to epistemic instrumentalism, epistemic normativity arises from and depends on facts about our ends. On that view, a consideration C is an epistemic reason for a subject S to Φ only if Φ-ing would promote an end that S has. However, according to the Too Few Epistemic Reasons objection, this cannot be correct since there are cases in which, intuitively, C is an epistemic reason for S to Φ even though Φ-ing would not promote any of S’s ends. (...)
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  36. Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.
    One of the most important disputes in the foundations of ethics concerns the source of practical reasons. On the desire-based view, only one’s desires provide one with reasons to act. On the value-based view, reasons are instead provided by the objective evaluative facts, and never by our desires. Similarly, there are desire-based and non-desired-based theories about two other phenomena: pleasure and welfare. It has been argued, and is natural to think, that holding a desire-based theory about either (...)
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  37.  48
    A Puzzle About Reasons and Rationality.Caj Strandberg - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):63-88.
    According to a guiding idea in metaethics, there is a necessary link between the concept of normative reasons and the concept of practical rationality. This notion brings up two issues: The exact nature of this link, and the nature of rationality. With regard to the first issue, the debate is dominated by a certain standard claim. With regard to the second issue, the debate is dominated by what I will refer to as ‘subjectivism’ and ‘objectivism’ about rationality, where the (...)
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  38.  20
    Normative Reasons and the Possibility of Motivation.Andrés Carlos Luco - 2014 - South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):47-63.
    This article defends a claim about the conditions under which agents possess normative reasons for action. According to this claim, an agent has a normative reason to φ only if it’s psychologically possible for that reason to motivate the agent to φ. The claim is called‘Williams’s explanatory constraint,’since it’s drawn from Bernard Williams’s work on the topic of practical reason. A two-premise‘master argument’ for Williams’s explanatory constraint is put forward. First, an agent has a normative reason to φ only (...)
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  39. Reasons and Motivation.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):99–130.
    When we have a normative reason, and we act for that reason, it becomes our motivating reason. But we can have either kind of reason without having the other. Thus, if I jump into the canal, my motivating reason was provided by my belief; but I had no normative reason to jump. I merely thought I did. And, if I failed to notice that the canal was frozen, I had a reason not to jump that, because it was unknown to (...)
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  40. Believing for Practical Reasons.Susanna Rinard - 2018 - Noûs.
    Some prominent evidentialists argue that practical considerations cannot be normative reasons for belief because they can’t be motivating reasons for belief. Existing pragmatist responses turn out to depend on the assumption that it’s possible to believe in the absence of evidence. The evidentialist may deny this, at which point the debate ends in an impasse. I propose a new strategy for the pragmatist. This involves conceding that belief in the absence of evidence is impossible. We then argue that (...)
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  41. Reasons and Belief's Justification.Clayton Littlejohn - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
    There has been a considerable amount of debate about the norms of belief, but little discussion to date about what the reasons associated with these norms demand from us. By working out an account of what reasons demand, we can better understand the nature of justification.
     
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  42. Having Reasons and the Factoring Account.Errol Lord - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):283 - 296.
    It’s natural to say that when it’s rational for me to φ, I have reasons to φ. That is, there are reasons for φ-ing, and moreover, I have some of them. Mark Schroeder calls this view The Factoring Account of the having reasons relation. He thinks The Factoring Account is false. In this paper, I defend The Factoring Account. Not only do I provide intuitive support for the view, but I also defend it against Schroeder’s criticisms. Moreover, (...)
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  43.  52
    Internalism and the Origin of Rational Motivation.Houston Smit - 2003 - The Journal of Ethics 7 (2):183-231.
    What makes a subject''s motivationrational is its originating in her practicalreasoning. I explain the appeal of this thesisabout rational motivation, and explore itsrelation to recent discussions of internalismabout reasons for action. I do so in theservice of clarifying an important meta-ethicaldebate between Humean motivational skeptics andtheir Kantian opponents. This debate is oneover whether, as this skeptic contends andKantians deny, considerations about ourmotivational capacities, together withinternalism, restrict genuine reasons foraction to merely instrumental ones. I arguethat properly adjudicating this debate (...)
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  44.  75
    On the Rational Impotence of Urges.Simon Rippon - 2014 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 10 (1):70-75.
    Intuitively, it seems that certain basic desires, or urges, are rationally impotent, i.e., that they provide no reasons for action (a famous example is Warren Quinn's story of a man who has a brute urge to turn on every radio he sees). This intuition seems to conflict with the internalist, or Humean subjectivist, claim that our desires give us reasons. But Harry Frankfurt's well-known subjectivist account, with its distinction between first- order and higher-order desires and its concepts of (...)
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  45.  32
    Practical Reasons and the Redundancy of Motives.Richard Norman - 2001 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (1):3-22.
    Jonathan Dancy, in his 1994 Aristotelian Society Presidential Address, set out to show ''why there is really no such thing as the theory of motivation''. In this paper I want to agree that there is no such thing, and to offer reasons of a different kind for that conclusion. I shall suggest that the so-called theory of motivation misconstrues the question which it purports to answer, and that when we properly analyse the question and distinguish it clearly from other (...)
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  46. The Reasons That Matter.Stephen Finlay - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):1 – 20.
    Bernard Williams's motivational reasons-internalism fails to capture our first-order reasons judgements, while Derek Parfit's nonnaturalistic reasons-externalism cannot explain the nature or normative authority of reasons. This paper offers an intermediary view, reformulating scepticism about external reasons as the claim not that they don't exist but rather that they don't matter. The end-relational theory of normative reasons is proposed, according to which a reason for an action is a fact that explains why the action (...)
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  47.  62
    Can Virtuous Actions Be Both Habitual and Rational?Bill Pollard - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (4):411-425.
    Virtuous actions seem to be both habitual and rational. But if we combine an intuitive understanding of habituality with the currently predominant paradigm of rational action, these two features of virtuous actions are hard to reconcile. Intuitively, acting habitually is acting as one has before in similar contexts, and automatically, that is, without thinking about it. Meanwhile, contemporary philosophers tend to assume the truth of what I call the reasons theory of rational action, which states that all rational actions (...)
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  48. Evidence and Armchair Access.Clayton Mitchell Littlejohn - 2011 - Synthese 179 (3):479-500.
    In this paper, I shall discuss a problem that arises when you try to combine an attractive account of what constitutes evidence with an independently plausible account of the kind of access we have to our evidence. According to E = K, our evidence consists of what we know. According to the principle of armchair access, we can know from the armchair what our evidence is. Combined, these claims entail that we can have armchair knowledge of the external world. Because (...)
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  49.  16
    Accessibilism Defined.Michael Hatcher - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):1-23.
    Accessibilism is a version of epistemic internalism on which justification is determined by what is accessible to the subject. I argue that misunderstandings of accessibilism have hinged on a failure to appreciate an ambiguity in the phrase ‘what is accessible to the subject’. I first show that this phrase may either refer to the very things accessible to the subject, or instead to the facts about which things are accessible to her. I then discuss Ralph Wedgwood’s (2002: 350-352) argument (...)
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  50. The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.
    Epistemic reasons are mental states. They are not propositions or non-mental facts. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 gives two concrete examples of how our topic directly affects the internalism/externalism debate in normative epistemology. Section 3 responds to an argument against the view that reasons are mental states. Section 4 presents two problems for the view that reasons are propositions. Section 5 presents two problems for the view that reasons (...)
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