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Rebecca Stangl [6]Rebecca Lynn Stangl [1]
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Profile: Rebecca Stangl (University of Virginia)
  1.  69
    Rebecca Lynn Stangl (2006). Particularism and the Point of Moral Principles. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):201-229.
    According to radical moral particularists such as Jonathan Dancy, there are no substantive moral principles. And yet, few particularists wish to deny that something very like moral principles do indeed play a significant role in our everyday moral practice. Loathe at dismissing this as mere error on the part of everyday moral agents, particularists have proposed a number of alternative accounts of the practice. The aim of all of these accounts is to make sense of our appeal to general moral (...)
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  2. Rebecca Stangl (2008). A Dilemma for Particularist Virtue Ethics. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):665-678.
    There is an obvious affinity between virtue ethics and particularism. Both stress the complexify of the moral life, the inadequacy of rule-following as a guide to moral deliberation, and the importance of judgement in discerning the morally relevant features of particular situations. Yet it remains an open question how deep the affinity goes. I argue that the radical form of particularism defended by Jonathan Dancy has surprisingly strong implications for virtue ethics. Adopting such a view would require the virtue theorist (...)
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  3.  20
    Rebecca Stangl (2015). Neo-Aristotelian Supererogation. Ethics 126 (2):339-365.
    I develop and defend the following neo-Aristotelian account of supererogation: an action is supererogatory if and only if it is overall virtuous and either the omission of an overall virtuous action in that situation would not be overall vicious or there is some overall virtuous action that is less virtuous than it and whose performance in its place would not be overall vicious. I develop this account from within the virtue-ethical tradition. And I argue that it is intuitively defensible and (...)
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  4.  41
    Rebecca Stangl (2009). Plan B and the Doctrine of Double Effect. Hastings Center Report 39 (4):21-25.
  5.  78
    Rebecca Stangl (2010). Asymmetrical Virtue Particularism. Ethics 121 (1):37-57.
    In this essay, I defend an account of right action that I shall call “asymmetrical virtue particularism.” An action, on this account, is right just insofar as it is overall virtuous. But the virtuousness of an action in any particular respect, X, is deontically variant; it can fail to be right-making, either because it is deontically irrelevant or because it is wrong-making. Finally, the account is asymmetrical insofar as the viciousness of actions is not deontically variant; if any action is (...)
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  6.  2
    Rebecca Stangl (2014). Russell, Daniel C., Ed.The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. 380. $95.00 ; $32.99. [REVIEW] Ethics 124 (4):922-926.
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  7.  7
    Rebecca Stangl (2006). Review of Andrew Fiala, Tolerance and the Ethical Life. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (3).