8 found
  1. Approaches to Faith, Guest Editorial Preface.Daniel Howard Snyder, Rebekah L. H. Rice & Daniel J. McKaughan - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81 (Special Double Issue):1-7.
    Springer. We find in contemporary culture starkly contrasting estimates of the value of faith. On the one hand, for many people, faith is a virtue or positive human value, something associated with understanding, hope, and love, something to be inculcated, maintained, and cherished. On the other hand, for many people, faith is a vice, something associated with dogmatism, arrogance, and close-mindedness, something to be avoided at all costs. The papers included in this special (double) issue on approaches to faith explore (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  2. Reasons and Divine Action: A Dilemma.Rebekah L. H. Rice - 2016 - In Kevin Timpe Dan Speak (ed.), Free Will and Theism: Connections, Contingencies, and Concerns. Oxford University Press.
    Many theistic philosophers conceive of God’s activity in agent-causal terms. That is, they view divine action as an instance of (perhaps the paradigm case of) substance causation. At the same time, many theists endorse the claim that God acts for reasons, and not merely wantonly. It is the aim of this paper to show that a commitment to both theses gives rise to a dilemma. I present the dilemma and then spend the bulk of the paper defending its premises. I (...)
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  3.  41
    Special issue: approaches to faith: Guest editorial preface.Rebekah L. H. Rice, Daniel McKaughan & Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81 (1-2):1-6.
    According to many accounts of faith—where faith is thought of as something psychological, e.g., an attitude, state, or trait—one cannot have faith without belief of the relevant propositions. According to other accounts of faith, one can have faith without belief of the relevant propositions. Call the first sort of account doxasticism since it insists that faith requires belief; call the second nondoxasticism since it allows faith without belief. The New Testament may seem to favor doxasticism over nondoxasticism. For it may (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4. Mental Causation.Rebekah L. H. Rice - 2017 - In Kevin Timpe, Meghan Griffith & Neil Levy (eds.), Routledge Companion to Free Will. New York: Routledge.
  5. Agent Causation and Acting for Reasons.Rebekah L. H. Rice - 2011 - American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):333-346.
    The Agent-Causal Theory of Action claims that an event counts as an action when, and only when, it is caused by an agent. The central difference between the Causal Theory of Action (CTA) and the Agent-Causal view comes down to a disagreement about what sort of item (or items) occupies the left-hand position in the causal relation. For CTA, the left-hand position is occupied by mental items within the agent, typically construed in terms of mental events (e.g., belief/desire pairs or (...)
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6.  43
    Death and Persistence.Rebekah L. H. Rice - 2022 - Cambridge:: Cambridge University Press.
    The idea that physical death may not mark the end of an individual's existence has long been a source of fascination. It is perhaps unsurprising that we are apt to wonder what it is that happens to us when we die. Is death the end of me and all the experiences that count as mine? Or might I exist, and indeed have experiences, beyond the time of my death? And yet, deep metaphysical puzzles arise at the very suggestion that persons (...)
    Direct download  
    Export citation  
  7. Divine simplicity.Rebekah L. H. Rice - 2022 - In Mark A. Lamport (ed.), The Rowman & Littlefield Handbook of Philosophy and Religion. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
  8.  42
    What is a Causal Theorist to Do about Omissions?Rebekah L. H. Rice - 2011 - Modern Schoolman 88 (1-2):123-144.
    Most philosophers concede that one can properly be held morally responsible for intentionally omitting to do something. If one maintains that omissions are actions (negative actions, perhaps), then assuming the requisite conditions regarding voluntariness are met, one can tell a familiar story about how/why this is. In particular, causal theorists can explain the etiology of an intentional omission in causal terms. However, if one denies that omissions are actions of any kind, then the familiar story is no longer available. Some (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   1 citation