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Profile: Rebekah L. H. Rice (Seattle Pacific University)
  1.  4
    Rebekah L. H. Rice, Daniel McKaughan & Daniel Howard-Snyder (forthcoming). Special Issue: Approaches to Faith. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-6.
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  2.  37
    Rebekah L. H. Rice (2011). Agent Causation and Acting for Reasons. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):333-346.
    The Agent-Causal Theory of Action claims that an event counts as an action when, and only when, it is caused by an agent. The central difference between the Causal Theory of Action (CTA) and the Agent-Causal view comes down to a disagreement about what sort of item (or items) occupies the left-hand position in the causal relation. For CTA, the left-hand position is occupied by mental items within the agent, typically construed in terms of mental events (e.g., belief/desire pairs or (...)
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  3. Rebekah L. H. Rice (forthcoming). Mental Causation. In Meghan Griffith, Neil Levy & Kevin Timpe (eds.), Routledge Companion to Free Will. Routledge.
  4. Rebekah L. H. Rice (2016). Reasons and Divine Action: A Dilemma. In Kevin Timpe Dan Speak (ed.), Free Will and Theism: Connections, Contingencies, and Concerns. Oxford University Press.
    Many theistic philosophers conceive of God’s activity in agent-causal terms. That is, they view divine action as an instance of (perhaps the paradigm case of) substance causation. At the same time, many theists endorse the claim that God acts for reasons, and not merely wantonly. It is the aim of this paper to show that a commitment to both theses gives rise to a dilemma. I present the dilemma and then spend the bulk of the paper defending its premises. I (...)
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    Rebekah L. H. Rice (2011). What is a Causal Theorist to Do About Omissions? Modern Schoolman 88 (1-2):123-144.
    Most philosophers concede that one can properly be held morally responsible for intentionally omitting to do something. If one maintains that omissions are actions (negative actions, perhaps), then assuming the requisite conditions regarding voluntariness are met, one can tell a familiar story about how/why this is. In particular, causal theorists can explain the etiology of an intentional omission in causal terms. However, if one denies that omissions are actions of any kind, then the familiar story is no longer available. Some (...)
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  6. Rebekah L. H. Rice (2016). Mental Causation. In Kevin Timpe, Meghan Griffith & Neil Levy (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Free Will. Routledge.