In this book, Rebekka Hufendiek explores emotions as embodied, action-oriented representations, providing a non-cognitivist theory of emotions that accounts for their normative dimensions. _Embodied Emotions_ focuses not only on the bodily reactions involved in emotions, but also on the environment within which emotions are embedded and on the social character of this environment, its ontological constitution, and the way it scaffolds both the development of particular emotion types and the unfolding of individual emotional episodes. In addition, it provides a critical (...) review and appraisal of current empirical studies, mainly in psychophysiology and developmental psychology, which are relevant to discussions about whether emotions are embodied as well as socially embedded. The theory that Hufendiek puts forward denies the distinction between basic and higher cognitive emotions: all emotions are embodied, action-oriented representations. This approach can account for the complex normative structure of emotions, and shares the advantages of cognitivist accounts of emotions without sharing their problems. _Embodied Emotions _makes an original contribution to ongoing debates on the normative aspects of emotions and will be of interest to philosophers working on emotions, embodied cognition and situated cognition, as well as neuroscientists or psychologists who study emotions and are interested in placing their own work within a broader theoretical framework. (shrink)
The normativity of emotions is a widely discussed phenomenon. So far embodied accounts have not paid sufficient attention to the various aspects of the normativity of emotions. In this paper it shall be pointed out that embodied accounts are constrained in the way they can account for the normativity of emotions due to their commitments to naturalism, externalism, and anti-vehicle-internalism. One way to account for the normativity of emotions within a naturalist framework is to describe the intentional objects of emotions (...) as affordances that are of value for the organism. These affordances are part of a biological and social environment we are situated in, and they stand in complex relations to each other and to skillful organisms. I suggest that describing these relations can replace vehicle-internalist approaches but still account for the normativity of emotions within a naturalist framework. (shrink)
Embodied accounts have offered a theoretical framework in which emotions are understood to be patterned embodied responses that are about core relational themes. Some authors argue that this intentionality should be understood in terms of some kind of non-conceptual representation format, while others suggest a radical enactivist framework that takes emotions to be intentional but not representational. In this paper I will argue that the abstract nature of the core relational themes emotions are about and the interrelatedness of emotions with (...) each other and with other mental states speak in favor of emotions being representations. (shrink)
Beim Stichwort ”Kognition“ denken die meisten an das Gehirn, Computermodelle oder Informationsverarbeitung. In der realen Welt treffen wir aber immer nur auf Wesen mit Körpern, die in eine Umwelt eingebunden und in ihr aktiv sind. Kognition findet nicht im Kopf statt, sondern in der Welt. So lautet der Grundgedanke der Philosophie der Verkörperung. Die Hinwendung zu Körper und Umwelt stellt eine der vielleicht weitreichendsten Neuorientierungen der modernen Kognitionswissenschaft und Philosophie dar, die auch unser Verständnis von Wissenschaft und Kultur prägen wird. (...) Der Band versammelt die Grundlagentexte zu diesem Thema zum ersten Mal in deutscher Sprache. (shrink)
A recurring claim made by evolutionary psychologists is that their opponents neglect biological explanations as such for ideological reasons. I argue in this paper that this is a self-immunizing strategy that avoids serious engagement with existing critique by exploiting the long history of essentialist fallacies and anti-essentialist debunking arguments. To argue for this claim, I reconstruct the general form of the essentialist fallacy as well as the history of anti-essentialist debunking arguments and suggest that they play a central role in (...) the persistence of the ideological dimension of the nature-nurture debate. Discussing recent work from evolutionary psychology on how hormones influence female behavior, I show how self-immunizing strategies are used to avoid engagement with existing critique, while reproducing sexist stereotypes at the same time. (shrink)
This paper reconstructs Michael Tomasello's account of the evolution of morality and discusses it in the context of the philosophical debates on human nature and the concept of morality. The aim is to show that Tomasello presupposes a particular understanding of what morality is. He takes cooperation and fairness to be constitutive elements of human moral psychology and takes these to be dispositions that enable egalitarian interaction within a group. That these dispositions are what is central to the evolution of (...) human morality is not justified through the causal-historical reconstruction that Tomasello offers. Moreover, his understanding of morality is not without alternatives. (shrink)
Social functions and functional explanations play a prominent role not only in our everyday reasoning but also in classical as well as contemporary social theory and empirical social research. This volume explores metaphysical, normative, and methodological perspectives on social functions and functional explanations in the social sciences. It aims to push the philosophical debate on social functions forward along new investigative lines by including up-to-date discussions of the metaphysics of social functions, questions concerning the nature of functional explanations within the (...) social domain, and various applications of functionalist theorising. As such, this is one of the first collections to exclusively address a variety of philosophical questions concerning the nature and relevance of social functions. (shrink)
There is an eye-catching similarity in structure between Paul Rée’s Origin of Moral Sensations and Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals. Accordingly, the Genealogy has been understood as a riposte to Rée. I will argue in this paper that Nietzsche distances himself from Rée not only by developing alternative genealogies for moral concepts and institutions. Nietzsche’s main aim in criticizing Rée is to develop his own genealogical method that aims for historical adequacy, psychological adequacy, distinction of cause and function, acceptance of partial (...) historical opacity and perspectivism. (shrink)
