I discuss why one critical aspect of the process of political reconciliation involves the restoration of mutual respect for the rule of law and suggest that psychological research on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) provides valuable resources for understanding how successfully to restore such mutual respect.

Nir Eisikovits argues in A Theory of Truces that most contemporary conflicts wind down in a much more piecemeal fashion than our theorizing about the morality of ending wars suggests. Pauses in violence are achieved by securing agreement on narrow questions. Moreover, rather than hoping to do away with violence, theorizing would do best, he writes, to take as its starting point the fact of warfare as part of the human condition. Eisikovits aims to articulate the features of truce thinking, (...) a framework that is more descriptively accurate and normatively useful in navigating contemporary conflicts and promoting reconciliation. After summarizing his view, I argue that Eisikovits’ explanation of the contribution of truces to political reconciliation is too narrow; contrary to what he claims, truces can make an important contribution to the rule of law. I also challenge Eisikovits’ characterization of the first feature of truce thinking. I argue that while there is an important present focus on immediate benefits from temporary measures, the future looms much larger than Eisikovits recognizes. Truces matter not only for what they make possible now, but also for their ramifications for prospects for future peace. These ramifications go beyond creating conditions for hope or optimism. (shrink)

Political reconciliation involves the repairing of damaged political relationships. This paper considers the possibility and moral justifiability of pursuing political reconciliation in the aftermath of systematic and egregious wrongdoing, in particular genocide. The first two sections discuss what political reconciliation specifically requires. I argue that it neither entails nor necessitates forgiveness. Rather, I claim, political reconciliation should be conceptualized as the (re-)establishment of Fullerian mutual respect for the rule of law. When a society governs by law, (...) publicly declared legal rules establish clear and practicable standards for behavior which are enforced in practice. Subjects of the law thus can form stable and reasonable predictions of how other citizens and officials will respond to their actions. After explaining why this analysis of political reconciliation is compelling, the third section spells out the implications of my analysis for determining the possibility of achieving and the justifiability of pursuing political reconciliation. (shrink)

The kings of the Achaemenid Empire are known for employing a number of particularly gruesome punishments for those who were deemed guilty of rebellion. While it is certainly true that the Achaemenids punished rebels with utmost severity, it is also true that they were, at times, willing to forgive rebels, and even to rehabilitate them. In this paper, I investigate the mechanisms by which the Achaemenid kings were able to show mercy to rebels. By examining a number of relevant cases (...) from a period of a century and a half, I argue that the decision to be merciful was based on the king’s familial or social relationship with the rebel, the rebel’s relative strength vis-à-vis the king, the geography of the revolt, and the presence of other external factors which might also restrict the king’s powers. By a comparison with royal inscriptions and texts found throughout the empire, I demonstrate the ways in which these reconciliations stood apart from, and even in contradiction to, administrative and ideological norms concerning law and justice within the Achaemenid Empire. Finally, by reviewing the traditions and attitudes towards justice and mercy among the Achaemenids' Near Eastern predecessors, I put this policy in historical context and show that it is a unique response to a problem faced by other ancient empires. (shrink)

This book offers a series of original essays by an international group of scholars whose work looks comparatively at law's attempts to deal with the past.

I argue that international criminal trials can contribute to political reconciliation by fostering the social conditions required for law’s efficacy.

Reconciliation, Transitional and Indigenous Justice presents fifteen reflections upon justice twenty years after the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa introduced a new paradigm for political reconciliation in settler and post-colonial societies. The volume considers processes of political reconciliation, appraising the results of South Africa’s Commission, of the recently concluded Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada and of the on-going process of the Waitangi Tribunal of Aotearoa New Zealand. Contributors discuss the separate politics of (...) Indigenous resurgence, linguistic justice, environmental justice and law. Further contributors present a theoretical symposium focused on The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice, authored by Colleen Murphy, who provides a response to their comments. Indigenous and non-indigenous voices from four regions of the world are represented in this critical assessment of the prospects for political reconciliation, for transitional justice and for alternative, nascent conceptions of just politics. Radically challenging assumptions concerning sovereignty and just process in the current context of settler-colonial states, Reconciliation, Transitional and Indigenous Justice will be of great interest to scholars of Ethics, Indigenous Studies, Transitional Justice and International Relations more broadly. The chapters were originally published as a special issue in the Journal of Global Ethics, with one addition from The Round Table.”. (shrink)

In A Moral Theory of Political Reconilication, Colleen Murphy brings much-needed clarity to debates over political reconciliation by setting out plausible desiderata for a satisfactory theory. She responds to these desiderata by introducing three normative frameworks which, taken together, measure reconciliation: the rule of law, trust and trust responsiveness, and support for political capabilities. In my remarks, I raise two concerns about the relationships among these normative frameworks, and the extent to which they are emblematic of political (...) class='Hi'>reconciliation, specifically, rather than political health more generally. (shrink)

I propose a theory of punishment that is unfamiliar in the West, according to which the state normally ought to have offenders reform their characters and compensate their victims in ways the offenders find burdensome, thereby disavowing the crime and tending to foster improved relationships between offenders, their victims, and the broader society. I begin by indicating how this theory draws on under-appreciated ideas about reconciliation from the Global South, and especially sub-Saharan Africa, and is distinct from the protection (...) and retribution theories that have dominated the Western philosophy of punishment for about 250 years. Then I argue that it neatly avoids objections to them and is prima facie plausible in its own right. I conclude that this reconciliation theory of state punishment should be taken seriously by philosophers of law and policy makers. (shrink)

Reconciliation and the Technics of Healing Content Type Journal Article Pages 235-237 DOI 10.1007/s11673-011-9318-y Authors Paul A. Komesaroff, Monash Centre for Ethics in Medicine and Society, Monash University, Melbourne, Vic., Australia Elizabeth Kath, Global Cities Institute, RMIT University, Melbourne, Vic., Australia Paul James, Global Cities Institute, RMIT University, Melbourne, Vic., Australia Journal Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Online ISSN 1872-4353 Print ISSN 1176-7529 Journal Volume Volume 8 Journal Issue Volume 8, Number 3.

Reconciliation often becomes a superficial term when dealing with cases of violence against women. In several cultures in Indonesia, it is common for reconciliation to be reduced to a retributive process. It has not yet developed according to restorative justice based on women victims. To attain justice, the concept of reconciliation based on the Bible, secular law in Indonesia, and traditional customs need to be reconsidered. This article aims to conduct a critical analysis in cases of violence (...) against women and to offer reconciliation from the perspective of a feminist mission where women victims are the basis. Reconciliation as a mission is based on God’s mission, which invites the participation of the Church through its calling in the world where cases of violence are rampant. The research method used is qualitative research, including interviews as case studies. (shrink)

The conflict in Gaza and Israel that ignited on October 7, 2023 signals a catastrophic breakdown in the possibility of ethical dialogue in the region. The actions on both sides have revealed a dissolution of ethical restraints, with unimaginably cruel attacks on civilians, murder of children, destruction of health facilities, and denial of basic needs such as water, food, and shelter. There is a need both to understand the nature of the ethical singularity represented by this conflict and what, if (...) any, options are available to allow the reconstruction of communication between the warring parties. This article seeks to address these tasks by analysing the conflict as inherently an ethical one, in the sense that it exposes a rupture in the fabric of communicative relationships that has evolved systematically out of the deep cultural structures from which all protagonists have emerged. Drawing on the work of Levinas, Habermas, Arendt, and others, and referring to the specific circumstances in the region, it examines the ethical sources of the crisis and tries to identify conditions for its resolution. The possibility of reconciliation—that is, of refiguring relationships to open up a space for dialogue to create pathways to heal the ruptures—is examined. The dark legacy of the Holocaust is identified as an abiding cultural vulnerability for both societies. It is concluded, however, that the rich history of partnerships and collaborations between Jews and Palestinians provides a robust infrastructure on the basis of which a sustainable peace might be built, providing a much-needed source of hope. (shrink)

Features contributions that respond to deep challenges to social cohesion from racial injustice In the latest installment of the NOMOS series, a distinguished group of interdisciplinary scholars explore the erosion—and potential rebuilding—of civic bonds in response to injustice, wrongdoing, and betrayal. Contributors address the possibility of reconciliation and repair, drawing on cutting-edge insights from the fields of political science, philosophy, and law. Nine timely essays explore our pivotal moment in history, from the question of reparations for slavery to the (...) from the art—and impact—of the public apology. The editors of this volume encourage us to not only examine the roots of mistrust, but also to imagine a collective way forward, particularly as we face the continuing threat of the COVID-19 pandemic. Reconciliation and Repair provides thought-provoking perspectives in an age where they are desperately needed. (shrink)

The two major schools of thought in Indigenous−settler relations on the ground, in the courts, in public policy, and in research are resurgence and reconciliation. Resurgence refers to practices of Indigenous self- determination and cultural renewal. Reconciliation refers to practices of reconciliation between Indigenous and settler nations as well as efforts to strengthen the relationship between Indigenous and settler peoples with the living earth and making that relationship the basis for both resurgence and Indigenous−settler reconciliation. -/- (...) Critically and constructively analyzing these two schools from a variety of perspectives and lived experiences, this volume connects both discourses to the ecosystem dynamics that animate the living earth. Resurgence and Reconciliation is a truly multidisciplinary work, blending law, political science, political economy, women’s studies, history, anthropology, ecology, sustainability, and climate change. Its dialogic approach strives to put these fields in conversation and draw out the connections and tensions between them. -/- By using “earth teachings” to inform social practices, the editors and contributors offer a rich, innovative, and holistic way forward in response to the world’s most profound natural and social challenges. This timely volume shows how the complexities and interconnections of resurgence and reconciliation and the living earth are often overlooked in contemporary discourse and debate. (shrink)

Twenty years ago, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa ushered in a new era, bringing new tools for societies engaged in transition toward more just circumstances. In New paths in reconciliation, transitional and Indigenous justice, sixteen authors take stock of South Africa's Commission and related political processes arising more recently in New Zealand and Canada. The collection includes critical assessment of those processes and radical challenges to their assumptions concerning sovereignty and just process in the current (...) context of settler-colonial states. This introduction reviews the authors' contributions and introduces background for Indigenous approaches to law and justice, including Indigenous reclamation and resurgence. (shrink)

Following extended periods of conflict or repression, political reconciliation is indispensable to the establishment or restoration of democratic relationships and critical to the pursuit of peacemaking globally. In this book, Colleen Murphy offers an innovative analysis of the moral problems plaguing political relationships under the strain of civil conflict and repression. Focusing on the unique moral damage that attends the deterioration of political relationships, Murphy identifies the precise kinds of repair and transformation that processes of political reconciliation ought (...) to promote. Building on this analysis, she proposes a normative model of political relationships. A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation delivers an original account of the failure and restoration of political relationships, which will be of interest to philosophers, social scientists, legal scholars, policy analysts, and all those who are interested in transitional justice, global politics, and democracy. (shrink)

What are the moral obligations of participants and bystanders during—and in the wake of –a conflict? How have theoretical understandings of justice, peace and responsibility changed in the face of contemporary realities of war? Drawing on the work of leading scholars in the fields of philosophy, political theory, international law, religious studies and peace studies, the collection significantly advances current literature on war, justice and post-conflict reconciliation. Contributors address some of the most pressing issues of international and civil conflict, (...) including the tension between attributing individual and collective responsibility for the wrongs of war, the trade-offs made between the search for truth and demands for justice, and the conceptual intricacies of coming to understand just what is meant by ‘peace’ and ‘conflict.’ Individual essays also address concrete topics including the international criminal court, reparations, truces, political apologies, truth commissions and criminal trials, with an eye to contemporary examples from conflicts in the Middle East, Africa and North and South America.​. (shrink)

The disciplines of cybernetics, semiotics and thermodynamics investigate evolutionary processes quite independently from each other. The aim of this paper is to draw the parallels and point out the possibility and necessity of a reconciliation between these disciplines. The concept of metasystem transition has been proposed by Turchin as a quantum of evolution from a cybernetic point of view. Semiotic processes are of prime importance for the realisation of metasystem transitions in the course of evolution. From a thermodynamic point (...) of view, the emergence of more complex, self-producing agents depends on the emergence of more advanced forms of semiosis. As an evolutionary consequence, more symbolic forms of semiosis that allow higher competence for abstraction and anticipation emerge. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis powerful piece by Shain Jackson introduces us to the bringer of natural law and justice to the shishalh people, Ch’as-kin, the Golden Eagle. Sadly, Ch’as-kin does not remain forever to continue guiding the people to maintain the good ways set out for them. The story Shain tells goes on to paint a picture of the pain, loss, death and suffering that follows when we are left without a protective spirit guide. Like all great stories of courage, redemption and (...) class='Hi'>reconciliation, it is up to the people to find their way back to the good life; to a place of justice, healing and a re-newed way of living. It is in this process of resurgence that all of us, not just the shishalh, will become healthy and whole again. (shrink)

Genesis of the early quantum theory represented by Planck’s 1897-1906 papers is considered. It is shown that the first quantum theoretical schemes were constructed as crossbreed ones composed from ideal models and laws of Maxwellian electrodynamics, Newtonian mechanics, statistical mechanics and thermodynamics. Ludwig Boltzmann’s ideas and technique appeared to be crucial. Deriving black-body radiation law Max Planck had to take the experimental evidence into account. It forced him not to deduce from phenomena but to use more theory instead. The experiments (...) forced Planck to apply the statistical technique to radiation in increasing portions. Planck’s theories in no way were generalizations of existing experimental results. They represented the stages of an ambitious programme of Maxwellian electrodynamics and statistical mechanics reconciliation. (shrink)

A meditation on the lessons to be learned from South Africa's transformation in the wake of apartheid. Justice, truth, and identity; race, society, and law--all come into dramatic play as South Africa makes the tumultuous transition to a post-apartheid democracy. Seeking the timeless through the timely and trying to find the deeper meaning in the sweep of events, Daniel Herwitz brings the vast resources of the philosophical essay to bear on the new realities of post-apartheid South Africa--from racial identity to (...) truth commissions, from architecture to film and television. A public intellectual's reflections on public life, Herwitz's essays question how the new South Africa has constructed its concepts of reconciliation and return and how its historical emergence has meant a rethinking, reimagining, reexperiencing, relabeling, and repoliticizing of race. Herwitz's purpose is to give a philosophical reading of society--a society already relying on implicitly philosophical concepts in its social and political agendas. Working through these concepts, testing their relevance for reading society, his book itself becomes a part of the politics of definition and description in the new South Africa. (shrink)

Acts of Christian forgiveness that run counter to natural inclinations and ethical intuitions raise questions about the nature of human identity and the basis of moral theology. An assessment of the biblical and theological warrant for Christian forgiveness challenges the ethical misappropriation of the language of covenant, torah and righteousness to that of contract, law and justice. The argument is made that forgiveness should be seen as normative—indeed, obligatory rather than supererogatory. A theological account is then provided of the conditions (...) under which our natural inclinations are transformed so as to facilitate an orientation of forgiveness. It is argued that the doctrines of the incarnation and human participation in the mind of Christ are axiomatic for interpreting the Christian life and thus moral theology. This leads to the conclusion that a combination of ‘reconciled exemplarism’ and ‘semantic externalism’ is key to the exposition of Christian ethics – the language of which tracks God’s historical engagement with humanity rather than denoting immanent, ethical categories. (shrink)

The book is an accurate and accessible introduction to the complex and dynamic field of transitional and post-conflict justice, providing an overview of its recurring concepts and debated issues. Particular attention is reserved to how these concepts and issues have been addressed, both theoretically and literally, by lawyers, policy-makers, international bodies, and other actors informing the practice. By presenting significant, if undeniably disputable, alternatives to mainstream theories and past methods of addressing past injustice and (re)building a democratic state, the work (...) aims to illustrate some foundational themes of transitional justice that have emerged from a diverse set of discussions. The author's position thus arrives from a careful analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of answers to the question: how, after a traumatic social experience, is justice restored? (shrink)

An ethic for wrongdoers -- Repaying moral debts : self-punishment and restitution -- Changing one's heart, changing the past : repentance and moral transformation -- Reforming relationships : the reconciliation theory of atonement -- Forgiveness, self-forgiveness, and redemption -- Making amends for crime : an evaluation of restorative justice -- Collective atonement : making amends to the Magdalen penitents.

Chez Hegel, la conflictualité humaine, sociale et politique, relève de la liberté de l'esprit, et elle a quelque chose de nécessaire et de fécond, dans la mesure où elle est l'épreuve de cette liberté. En distinguant collision et conflit, cet article étudie trois points : d'abord le problème de la reconnaissance, du droit et de la violence ; ensuite, les conflits socio-économiques, avec les institutions et les lois nécessaires à leur résolution ; et enfin les conflits proprement politiques. Si l'État (...) s'efforce de prévenir ou résoudre les conflits par ses institutions, en chaque sphère persiste une conflictualité invincible, dans une réconciliation qui reste fragile, comme la liberté. According to Hegel, the human propensity for conflicts, both social and political, shows the freedom of spirit and is both necessary and fruitful, serving as proof of this freedom. Making the distinction between collision and conflict, this article studies three points: first, the problem of recognition, of right and of violence; secondly, the socio-economic conflicts, and the institutions and laws necessary to their resolution; and finally, the purely political conflicts. While governments strive to prevent or resolve conflicts by means of their institutions, in every sphere there persists an invincible contradiction, so that reconciliation like liberty remains fragile. (shrink)

In A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation, Colleen Murphy devotes a full chapter to arguing that international criminal trials make significant contributions to political reconciliation within post-conflict and transitional societies. While she is right to claim that these trials serve an important function, I take issue with her with respect to what that important function is. Whereas Murphy focuses on the contributions international criminal prosecutions might make to political reconciliation within the borders of transitional societies, I claim (...) instead that their primary function is to restore order at the international level and to dispense justice. The aims of justice are not always consistent with the aims of reconciliation. Moreover, several features of international criminal trials should give us pause with respect even to how well, in fact, they manage to serve the ends of international justice. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 32.3-4 (2002) 33-59 [Access article in PDF] Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC) Mahmood Mamdani The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa was the fruit of a political compromise whose terms both made possible the Commission and set the limits within which it would work. These limits, in turn, defined the space (...) available to the Commission to interpret its terms of reference and define its agenda. This paper takes the compromise legislation that set up the TRC as a historical given and focuses attention on the TRC's interpretation of its terms of reference.The TRC claimed to be different from its predecessors, whether in Latin America or Eastern Europe. It would practice neither impunity nor vengeance. It was therefore determined to avoid two pitfalls: on the one hand, reconciliation becoming an unprincipled embrace of political evil and, on the other hand, a pursuit of justice so relentless as to turn into revenge. To do so, the Commission was determined to address both "victims" and "perpetrators," not just one or the other.This double determination was first written into the interim constitution that paved the way for the legislation that set up the TRC. First, there would be no blanket amnesty. Amnesty would be conditional. It would not be a group amnesty. Every perpetrator would have to be identified individually, and would have to own up to his or her guilt—the truth—before receiving amnesty from legal prosecution. Second, any victim who is so acknowledged would give up the right to prosecute perpetrators in courts of law. Justice for the victim would thus not be criminal but restorative: acknowledgment would be followed by reparations. In sum, individual amnesty for the perpetrator, truth for the society, and acknowledgement and reparations for the victim—this was the pact built into the legislation that set up the TRC.Since the Act did not clearly define "victim," however, the definition of "perpetrator" was unclear as well. The task of defining "victim" and "perpetrator" was left to the Commission and was the single most important decision that determined the scope and depth of the Commission's work. Without a comprehensive acknowledgment of victims of apartheid, there would be only a limited identification of perpetrators and only a partial understanding of the legal regime that made possible the "crime against humanity." From this perspective, the paper identifies three key limitations in the Commission's Report.First, the TRC individualized the victims of apartheid. Though it acknowledged apartheid as a "crime against humanity" which targeted entire communities for ethnic and racial policing and cleansing, the Commission majority was reluctant to go beyond the formal acknowledgment. The Commission's analysis reduced apartheid from a relationship between the state and entire communities to one between the state and [End Page 33] individuals. Where entire communities were victims of gross violations of rights, the Commission acknowledged only individual victims. If the "crime against humanity" involved a targeting of entire communities for racial and ethnic cleansing and policing, individualizing the victim obliterated this particular—many would argue central—characteristic of apartheid. Limiting the definition of harm and remedy to individuals center-staged political activists as victims of apartheid, as indeed happened with the victim hearings. The consequence was to narrow the TRC perspective to a political reconciliation between state agents and political activists, individual members of a fractured political elite, rather than the "national unity and reconciliation" mandated by the legislation that set it up. To pursue its actual mandate, the TRC needed to broaden its perspective: to work for a social reconciliation between perpetrators and victims required that the relationship between the state and the entire South African people be addressed.Second, by focusing on individuals and obscuring the victimization of communities, the TRC was unable to highlight the bifurcated nature of apartheid as a form of power that governed natives differently from non-natives. If the apartheid state spoke the language of rights to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 32.3-4 (2002) 33-59 [Access article in PDF] Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC) Mahmood Mamdani The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa was the fruit of a political compromise whose terms both made possible the Commission and set the limits within which it would work. These limits, in turn, defined the space (...) available to the Commission to interpret its terms of reference and define its agenda. This paper takes the compromise legislation that set up the TRC as a historical given and focuses attention on the TRC's interpretation of its terms of reference.The TRC claimed to be different from its predecessors, whether in Latin America or Eastern Europe. It would practice neither impunity nor vengeance. It was therefore determined to avoid two pitfalls: on the one hand, reconciliation becoming an unprincipled embrace of political evil and, on the other hand, a pursuit of justice so relentless as to turn into revenge. To do so, the Commission was determined to address both "victims" and "perpetrators," not just one or the other.This double determination was first written into the interim constitution that paved the way for the legislation that set up the TRC. First, there would be no blanket amnesty. Amnesty would be conditional. It would not be a group amnesty. Every perpetrator would have to be identified individually, and would have to own up to his or her guilt—the truth—before receiving amnesty from legal prosecution. Second, any victim who is so acknowledged would give up the right to prosecute perpetrators in courts of law. Justice for the victim would thus not be criminal but restorative: acknowledgment would be followed by reparations. In sum, individual amnesty for the perpetrator, truth for the society, and acknowledgement and reparations for the victim—this was the pact built into the legislation that set up the TRC.Since the Act did not clearly define "victim," however, the definition of "perpetrator" was unclear as well. The task of defining "victim" and "perpetrator" was left to the Commission and was the single most important decision that determined the scope and depth of the Commission's work. Without a comprehensive acknowledgment of victims of apartheid, there would be only a limited identification of perpetrators and only a partial understanding of the legal regime that made possible the "crime against humanity." From this perspective, the paper identifies three key limitations in the Commission's Report.First, the TRC individualized the victims of apartheid. Though it acknowledged apartheid as a "crime against humanity" which targeted entire communities for ethnic and racial policing and cleansing, the Commission majority was reluctant to go beyond the formal acknowledgment. The Commission's analysis reduced apartheid from a relationship between the state and entire communities to one between the state and [End Page 33] individuals. Where entire communities were victims of gross violations of rights, the Commission acknowledged only individual victims. If the "crime against humanity" involved a targeting of entire communities for racial and ethnic cleansing and policing, individualizing the victim obliterated this particular—many would argue central—characteristic of apartheid. Limiting the definition of harm and remedy to individuals center-staged political activists as victims of apartheid, as indeed happened with the victim hearings. The consequence was to narrow the TRC perspective to a political reconciliation between state agents and political activists, individual members of a fractured political elite, rather than the "national unity and reconciliation" mandated by the legislation that set it up. To pursue its actual mandate, the TRC needed to broaden its perspective: to work for a social reconciliation between perpetrators and victims required that the relationship between the state and the entire South African people be addressed.Second, by focusing on individuals and obscuring the victimization of communities, the TRC was unable to highlight the bifurcated nature of apartheid as a form of power that governed natives differently from non-natives. If the apartheid state spoke the language of rights to... (shrink)

It has frequently been argued that the post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was committed to restorative justice (RJ), and that RJ has deep historical roots in African indigenous cultures by virtue of its congruence both with ubuntu and with African indigenous justice systems (AIJS). In this article, I look into the question of what RJ is. I also present the finding that the term ‘restorative justice’ appears only in transcripts of three public TRC hearings, and the hypothesis that (...) the TRC first really began to take notice of the term ‘restorative justice’ after April 1997, when the South African Law Commission published an Issue Paper dealing with RJ. Furthermore, I show that neither the connection between RJ and ubuntu nor the connection between RJ and AIJS is as straightforward and unproblematic as often assumed. (shrink)

In A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation Colleen Murphy develops a rich and potentially transformative account of political reconciliation. The potential of this account is not fully realized because of limitations in how Murphy conceptualizes political relationships. For example, group-differentiated integration into states opens up important questions about partial legality and group-differentiated experiences of repression that Murphy does not address. Murphy’s framework is well-suited to take up these questions, once they are acknowledged. But doing so requires a revised (...) understanding of how states’ relationships with individuals structure individuals’ relationships with one another. (shrink)

The recognition and reconciliation of ‘opposites’ lies at the heart of our most personal and global problems. These problems are ‘wicked’ in the sense that they are difficult or impossible to solve and arise at the interface of interdependent polarities. By exploring the human tendency to divide the world into two parts, _Wicked Problems & the Reconciliation of Opposites_ argues that our relationship with such pairings and polarities is profoundly important to the way we recognise and resolve wicked (...) problems. Using an original theory of bi-relational development, Adam proposes that our everyday ways of knowing and being can be powerfully located and understood in terms of the creation, emergence, opposition, convergence, collapse and trans-positioning of dyadic constituents. Chapters use this concept to frame key debates in and across domains of knowledge, including education, psychology, law and theology, as well as to offer a new perspective on the most profound problems of the twenty-first century: globalisation, sustainability and secularisation. This book is a comprehensive study of dyadic structrures and relationships and provides a multidisciplinary and original approach to human development. It will be of great interest to students and academics of social psychology, psychosocial development, psychoanalysis and transpersonal psychology, but it is also relevant within the fields of education, human development and theology. (shrink)

The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers for Cambodia represent a departure from the model established by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yygoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The SCSL and the ECC have often been referred to as “mixed” or “hybrid” tribunals in which there are significant domestic and international components. The tribunals include a combination of domestic and international judges, utilize domestic and international laws and are administered by a prosecutorial team (...) composed of domestic and international lawyers. Many of these institutional changes have been brought about because of criticisms of the ICTY and the ICTR. The fundamental question of this article is whether these mixed tribunals are a more effective mechanism for providing justice and reconciliation than purely international solutions. This is an important question because both the international community and states are moving in the direction of mixed tribunals. (shrink)

This paper argues that the disagreement between positivists and nonpositivists about law is substantive rather than merely verbal, but that the depth and persistence of the disagreement about law, unlike for the case of morality, threatens skepticism about law. The range of considerations that can be brought to bear to help resolve moral disagreements is broader than is the case for law, thus improving the prospects of reconciliation in morality. But the central argument of the paper is that law, (...) unlike morality, is a concept-dependent social kind, in the sense that law cannot exist in a society without someone in that society having the concept of law. Since the existence of the social kind law is largely dependent on the existence of the corresponding concept, when different actors have different concepts, they can end up creating different kinds. Hence, the difference between positivists and nonpositivists is not just a conceptual one but is capable of giving rise to different legal norms. (shrink)

I thank the members of the Law and Philosophy Discussion Group in Los Angeles and those who attended a talk sponsored by the philosophy department at New York University, where I presented earlier versions of this paper. I would also like to thank G. A. Cohen, Stephen Munzer, Seana Shiffrin, Peter Vallentyne, Andrew Williams, and the editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs, who read and provided written commentary on earlier drafts.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Just and Unjust Peace: An Ethic of Political Reconciliation by Daniel PhilpottGlen StassenJust and Unjust Peace: An Ethic of Political Reconciliation Daniel Philpott New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 365pp. $29.95Just and Unjust Peace deals with an important question: What does a holistic framework of justice consist of in the wake of its massive despoliation? The wounds of political injustice include the following: violation of the (...) victim’s human rights, harms to the victim’s person, the victim’s ignorance of the source and circumstances of political injustices, the lack of acknowledgment of the suffering, the standing victory of the wrongdoer’s political injustice, and harm to the person of the wrongdoer. In such situations, Philpott argues, “what the government and community withhold is... an acknowledgment not only that a victim has rights but also that his rights were violated and that he suffered because of this violation” (37).The definition of justice in this context of wounds is reconciliation. It “encompasses peace settlements, human rights, democracy, and other key goals of negative and positive peace [as well as]... a broad restoration of right relationship involving a multiplicity of practices that each redress wounds of injustice in a particular way” (48–49).Daniel Philpott affirms peace as human rights, equality, and the rule of law, plus actors and institutions like the United Nations that spread this justice. He presents a fair summary of contending positions on human rights and works to develop overlapping agreement. “What is most essential to right relationship in the political order is human rights, their popular legitimacy, and their corresponding virtues” (55). But also, “It is in redressing wrong conduct—the other dimension of justice—that political reconciliation becomes far more distinctive” (55). This requires a deeper understanding of just peacemaking with restorative justice based in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and in insightful assessment of the burgeoning practices of truth commissions and restorative justice in the transitions from dictatorship to democracy.Philpott’s “rooted reason” invites different religions to speak from their depths but also encourages them to speak with reasons that can convince in public discourse (18, 20). Envisioning the incorporation of reconciliation into the modern state “is the life’s work of Rabbi Marc Gopin. In today’s Middle East, [End Page 211] Gopin argues, Jews as well as Christians and Muslims cannot afford to ignore the peacebuilding potential of traditional religious concepts” (132). Philpott also exhibits sensitive understanding of Islam, asking, “Do Islamic texts and traditions contain the materials for the construction of the ethic of political reconciliation that I am proposing? Can Muslims, on the basis of their religious convictions, join in an overlapping consensus on such an ethic?” His answer is a clear yes (153).He identifies and assesses six practices of a politics of reconciliation. The first involves building socially just institutions and relations between states: “Since 1974, some ninety societies... have sought to replace dictatorships with democracies.... A similarly intense global wave of peace operations sponsored by the United Nations... has sought to foster human rights and democratic institutions in states that have seen civil war” (175–76). The second has to do with the practices of political acknowledgment of wrongs: “Human rights are the standard that gives truth commissions and other public forms of acknowledgment form and direction” (188). The third pertains to reparations, with attention to the ongoing effects of historical injustices for descendants (195 and 201). The fourth addresses judicial punishment: “In practicing judicial punishment, a state redresses the violation of the victim’s rights insofar as it expresses, reaffirms, and thereby strengthens human rights as the legally valid values of its realm or of relations between it and another state” (237). The fifth is apology: “Like all of the other practices, apologies performed in political contexts have grown in frequency” (198). Finally, there is forgiveness. “Political injustices harm victims by robbing them of their agency and of their ability to pursue their own and others’ flourishing.... Forgiveness... re-empowers the victim as agent... [and liberates] from anger and resentment” and can also lead to recognition of the victim’s suffering, and to mutual respect for human rights (266–68... (shrink)

In the second Critique, Kant claims that the moral law is given as a fact of reason. In this paper, contra the standard view, I argue that there is a non-dogmatic way of defending this claim. And Kant’s principle of morality is widely taken to be a formal principle. How then can such a formal principle be reconciled with our substantial moral end? In this paper, I also argue that Kant’s principle of morality can be construed as a formal principle (...) in the sense that it provides correctness conditions for moral laws, rather than providing specific moral laws.Dans sa deuxième Critique, Kant affirme que la loi morale se donne comme un fait de raison. Dans cet article, contrairement à la position standard, nous prétendons qu’il existe une autre façon — non dogmatique — de défendre cette affirmation. Par ailleurs, le principe de moralité de Kant est largement considéré comme étant formel. Comment un tel principe formel peut-il être réconcilié avec notre fin morale substantielle? Nous soutenons également que le principe de moralité de Kant peut être interprété comme un principe formel dans le sens où il fournit des conditions d’acceptabilité pour les lois morales, et non des lois morales spécifiques. (shrink)

Societies in transition from repressive rule or civil conflict to a just social order confront distinctive challenges. Many authors claim that the long-term stability of newly established democracies depends crucially upon the ability of former adversaries to reconcile. Interestingly, however, authors typically assume, rather than attempt to prove, the truth of this claim, thereby presupposing the moral value of political reconciliation. Similar assumptions underlie debates about whether truth commissions can be morally justified in granting amnesty to perpetrators of offenses (...) against human rights. A central issue in these debates is whether reconciliation or retribution should have priority. There is thus a general tendency to employ such central concepts as reconciliation without offering an adequate account of their meaning or moral and practical import. Until we adequately understand the concept of reconciliation, the goals of a wide range of policies and the issues at stake in important moral debates will remain unclear. ;In my dissertation, I offer a novel account of political reconciliation. The concept of reconciliation, I argue, implies both a goal and a means of pursuing it. The state of reconciliation is the goal ideally promoted by processes of reconciliation. In the context of transitional justice, this goal is to establish healthy democratic political relationships. I analyze such democratic political relationships in terms of two fundamental ideals of political morality: respect for the rule of law and equality of agency. My strategy is to discuss first the intuitively problematic aspects political relationships typical of societies in conflict or under repressive rule, drawing on empirical data from political science. I then provide a characterization of a philosophical ideal, which I use to offer a new interpretation of the empirical description of problematic political relationships. Finally, based on my account of the state reconciliation, I develop a set of criteria that we can use when judging the effectiveness of various processes in promoting reconciliation. (shrink)

International Criminal Law and Philosophy is the first anthology to bring together legal and philosophical theorists to examine the normative and conceptual foundations of international criminal law. In particular, through these essays the international group of authors addresses questions of state sovereignty; of groups, rather than individuals, as perpetrators and victims of international crimes; of international criminal law and the promotion of human rights and social justice; and of what comes after international criminal prosecutions, namely, punishment and reconciliation. International (...) criminal law is still an emerging field, and as it continues to develop, the elucidation of clear, consistent theoretical groundings for its practices will be crucial. The questions raised and issues addressed by the essays in this volume will aid in this important endeavor. (shrink)

Traditionally, civil law jurisdictions in Scandinavia and the continent of Europe have not been willing to acknowledge the appropriateness of extending bankruptcy relief to consumer debtors and discharging any part of their debts. The opposition was based on the importance of upholding the sanctity of contractual obligations: pacta sunt servanda. This attitude stood in contrast to the fresh start philosophy of US bankruptcy law, which embraced a more forgiving attitude, focusing on the reintegration of the insolvent debtor into society, substantially (...) free of debt, after he has filed for bankruptcy and surrendered his non-exempt property for distribution among his creditors. The relaxation of credit controls and the rapid increase in the number of insolvent debtors in the late 1980s and early 1990s has forced many continental jurisdictions to reconsider their traditional opposition. They have since adopted debt adjustment plans providing various forms of debt relief to overcommitted debtors but only a substantial number of years after the initial proceedings. The American reaction has gone in the opposite direction. With the adoption of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, the United States has reversed its century old liberal fresh start tradition. The 2005 Act imposes a formidable means test as well as other preconditions to determine whether a debtor has sufficient discretionary income to pay off twenty percent of his or her unsecured debts under a Chapter 13 plan. If the answer is yes, the debtor is denied the right to file a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. This paper asks whether these developments on opposite sides of the Atlantic suggest that facts on the ground are more important than dogma and deeply entrenched beliefs. The author’s answer is that while there is certainly a trend towards convergence between continental European and US approaches to consumer insolvency, it is much too soon to speak of a common culture and a common approach. He notes, however, that Commonwealth jurisdictions have long adopted a means test to determine a debtor’s eligibility for discharge from debt and suggests that continental scholars would have done better to study the Commonwealth experience as embodying a suitable compromise than to flirt with the US fresh start philosophy, only to reject it as too alien to the continental moral sense. (shrink)

In the current article and contrary to a widespread assumption, I argue that Humeanism and ontological emergence can peacefully coexist. Such a coexistence can be established by reviving elements of John Stuart Mill’s philosophy of science, in which an idiosyncratic account of diachronic emergence is associated with extensions of the Humean mosaic and the correlative coming into being of new best system laws, which have the peculiarity of being temporally indexed. Incidentally, this reconciliation of Humeanism and emergence allows for (...) conceiving the autonomy of the special sciences in an interesting way, consistently with the reductionist ideal of a unified science. (shrink)