Results for 'Reduction in Cognitive Science'

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  1.  22
    Intertheory Relations in Cognitive Science: Privileged Levels and Reductive Strategies.Jesús Ezquerro & Fernando Martinez Manrique - 2004 - Critica 36 (106):55-103.
    Research in cognitive science has often assumed the existence of a privileged level that unifies theoretical explanations arising from different disciplines. Philosophical accounts differ about the locus of those intertheory relations. In this paper, four different views are analyzed: classical, connectionist, pragmatist, and reductionist, as exemplified in the works of von Eckardt, Horgan and Tienson, Hardcastle, and Bickle, respectively. Their divergences are characterized in terms of the possibility of such a privileged level. The classical view favors a privileged (...)
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  2. Intertheory Relations in Cognitive Science: Privileged Levels and Reductive Strategies.Jesús Ezquerro Martínez & Fernando Martínez Manrique - 2004 - Critica 36 (106):55-103.
  3.  63
    Explanations in cognitive science: unification versus pluralism.Marcin Miłkowski & Mateusz Hohol - 2020 - Synthese 199 (Suppl 1):1-17.
    The debate between the defenders of explanatory unification and explanatory pluralism has been ongoing from the beginning of cognitive science and is one of the central themes of its philosophy. Does cognitive science need a grand unifying theory? Should explanatory pluralism be embraced instead? Or maybe local integrative efforts are needed? What are the advantages of explanatory unification as compared to the benefits of explanatory pluralism? These questions, among others, are addressed in this Synthese’s special issue. (...)
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  4. Emergence and Reduction in Dynamical Cognitive Science.Joel Walmsley - 2010 - New Ideas in Psychology 28:274-282.
    This paper examines the widespread intuition that the dynamical approach to cognitive science is importantly related to emergentism about the mind. The explanatory practices adopted by dynamical cognitive science rule out some conceptions of emergence; covering law explanations require a deducibility relationship between explanans and explanandum, whereas canonical theories of emergence require the absence of such deducibility. A response to this problem – one which would save the intuition that dynamics and emergence are related – is (...)
     
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  5. Real reduction in real neuroscience : metascience, not philosophy of science (and certainly not metaphysics!).John Bickle - 2008 - In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter argues that much discussion between philosophers and neuroscientists is infected by philosophical assumptions about the nature of reduction. Instead we should pursue an unbiased examination of the methods used throughout relevant areas of neuroscience. The chapter focuses on reductionist work in the neurobiological discipline of molecular and cellular cognition. It is argued that reduction is a matter of causal intervention into low level mechanisms, and tracking of the effects of these interventions through levels. When interventions provide (...)
     
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  6.  28
    Enactivism Meets Mechanism: Tensions & Congruities in Cognitive Science.Jonny Lee - 2023 - Minds and Machines 33 (1):153-184.
    Enactivism advances an understanding of cognition rooted in the dynamic interaction between an embodied agent and their environment, whilst new mechanism suggests that cognition is explained by uncovering the organised components underlying cognitive capacities. On the face of it, the mechanistic model’s emphasis on localisable and decomposable mechanisms, often neural in nature, runs contrary to the enactivist ethos. Despite appearances, this paper argues that mechanistic explanations of cognition, being neither narrow nor reductive, and compatible with plausible iterations of ideas (...)
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  7. Cognitive science.Paul Thagard - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Cognitive science is the interdisciplinary investigation of mind and intelligence, embracing psychology, neuroscience, anthropology, artificial intelligence, and philosophy. There are many important philosophical questions related to this investigation, but this short chapter will focus on the following three. What is the nature of the explanations and theories developed in cognitive science? What are the relations among the five disciplines that comprise cognitive science? What are the implications of cognitive science research for general (...)
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  8. Comments on Bechtel, levels of description and explanation in cognitive science.Jay F. Rosenberg - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (1):27-37.
    I begin by tracing some of the confusions regarding levels and reduction to a failure to distinguish two different principles according to which theories can be viewed as hierarchically arranged — epistemic authority and ontological constitution. I then argue that the notion of levels relevant to the debate between symbolic and connectionist paradigms of mental activity answers to neither of these models, but is rather correlative to the hierarchy of functional decompositions of cognitive tasks characteristic of homuncular functionalism. (...)
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  9. Pluralistic ontology and theory reduction in the physical sciences.Fritz Rohrlich - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (3):295-312.
    It is demonstrated that the reduction of a physical theory S to another one, T, in the sense that S can be derived from T holds in general only for the mathematical framework. The interpretation of S and the associated central terms cannot all be derived from those of T because of the qualitative differences between the cognitive levels of S and T. Their cognitively autonomous status leads to an epistemic as well as an ontological pluralism. This pluralism (...)
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  10. Neo-mechanistic explanatory integration for cognitive science: the problem of reduction remains.Diego Azevedo Leite - 2019 - Sofia 8 (1):124-145.
    One of the central aims of the neo-mechanistic framework for the neural and cognitive sciences is to construct a pluralistic integration of scientific explanations, allowing for a weak explanatory autonomy of higher-level sciences, such as cognitive science. This integration involves understanding human cognition as information processing occurring in multi-level human neuro-cognitive mechanisms, explained by multi-level neuro-cognitive models. Strong explanatory neuro-cognitive reduction, however, poses a significant challenge to this pluralist ambition and the weak autonomy (...)
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  11.  42
    Representation, reduction, and interdisciplinarity in the sciences of memory.John Sutton - 2004 - In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier. pp. 187--216.
    1. Introduction: memory and interdisciplinarity (footnote 1) Memory is studied at a bewildering number of levels, in a daunting range of disciplines, and with a vast array of methods. Is there any sense at all in which memory theorists - from neurobiologists to narrative theorists, from the developmental to the postcolonial, from the computational to the cross-cultural - are studying the same phenomena? This exploratory review paper sketches the bare outline of a positive framework for understanding current work on memory, (...)
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  12. Representations: philosophical essays on the foundations of cognitive science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    Introduction: Something on the State of the Art 1 I. Functionalism and Realism 1. Operationalism and Ordinary Language 35 2. The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanations 63 3. What Psychological States are Not 79 4. Three Cheers for Propositional Attitudes 100 II. Reduction and Unity of Science 5. Special Sciences 127 6. Computation and Reduction 146 III. Intensionality and Mental Representation 7. Propositional Attitudes 177 8. Tom Swift and His Procedural Grandmother 204 9. Methodological Solipsism (...)
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  13.  45
    ‘I Can’ vs. ‘I Want’: What’s Missing from Gallagher’s Picture of Non-reductive Cognitive Science.Javier Sánchez-Cañizares, Miguel García-Valdecasas & Nathaniel F. Barrett - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):209-213.
    We support the development of non-reductive cognitive science and the naturalization of phenomenology for this purpose, and we agree that the ‘relational turn’ defended by Gallagher is a necessary step in this direction. However, we believe that certain aspects of his relational concept of nature need clarification. In particular, Gallagher does not say whether or how teleology, affect, and other value-related properties of life and mind can be naturalized within this framework. In this paper, we argue that (1) (...)
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  14.  12
    Reduction in Philosophy of Mind: A Pluralistic Account.Markus I. Eronen - 2011 - De Gruyter.
    The notion of reduction continues to play a key role in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science. Supporters of reductionism claim that psychological properties or explanations reduce to neural properties or explanations, while antireductionists claim that such reductions are not possible. In this book, I apply recent developments in philosophy of science, particularly the mechanistic explanation paradigm and the interventionist theory of causation, to reassess the traditional approaches to reduction in philosophy of mind. (...)
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  15. The accuracy-coherence tradeoff in cognition.David Thorstad - forthcoming - British Journal for Philosophy of Science.
    I argue that bounded agents face a systematic accuracy-coherence tradeoff in cognition. Agents must choose whether to structure their cognition in ways likely to promote coherence or accuracy. I illustrate the accuracy-coherence tradeoff by showing how it arises out of at least two component tradeoffs: a coherence-complexity tradeoff between coherence and cognitive complexity, and a coherence-variety tradeoff between coherence and strategic variety. These tradeoffs give rise to an accuracy-coherence tradeoff because privileging coherence over complexity or strategic variety often leads (...)
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  16.  82
    Cognitive science and neuroscience: New wave reductionism.Robert C. Richardson - 1999 - Philosopical Psychology 12 (3):297-307.
    John Bickle's Psychoneural reduction: the new wave (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998) aims to resurrect reductionism within philosophy of mind. He develops a new model of scientific reduction, geared to enhancing our understanding of how theories in neuroscience and cognitive science are interrelated. I put this discussion in context, and assess the prospects for new wave reductionism, both as a general model of scientific reduction and as an attempt to defend reductionism in the philosophy of (...)
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  17. The philosophy of cognitive science.Rick Grush - 2002
    Philosophy interfaces with cognitive science in three distinct but related areas. First, there is the usual set of issues that fall under the heading of philosophy of science (explanation, reduction, etc.), applied to the special case of cognitive science. Second, there is the endeavor of taking results from cognitive science as bearing upon traditional philosophical questions about the mind, such as the nature of mental representation, consciousness, free will, perception, emotions, memory, etc. (...)
     
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  18.  19
    The foundational crisis of cognitive science: challenging the emergentist challenge.Jean-Michel Roy - 2010 - Revista de Filosofia Aurora 22 (30):99.
    The following pages contend that, in spite of its intensive development, contemporary cognitive science has recently entered a phase of fairly acute uncertainty and confusion regarding some of its most essential foundations. They emphasize two aspects of this foundational crisis, specifically vindicating the existence of a crisis of naturalism and of a crisis of representationalism. Like any foundational crisis, this situation constitutes a serious threat to the significance of the empirical achievements of cognitive science. A threat (...)
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  19.  97
    On the Importance of a Rich Embodiment in the Grounding of Concepts: Perspectives From Embodied Cognitive Science and Computational Linguistics.Serge Thill, Sebastian Padó & Tom Ziemke - 2014 - Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (3):545-558.
    The recent trend in cognitive robotics experiments on language learning, symbol grounding, and related issues necessarily entails a reduction of sensorimotor aspects from those provided by a human body to those that can be realized in machines, limiting robotic models of symbol grounding in this respect. Here, we argue that there is a need for modeling work in this domain to explicitly take into account the richer human embodiment even for concrete concepts that prima facie relate merely to (...)
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  20. Representation in Cognitive Science.Nicholas Shea - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    How can we think about things in the outside world? There is still no widely accepted theory of how mental representations get their meaning. In light of pioneering research, Nicholas Shea develops a naturalistic account of the nature of mental representation with a firm focus on the subpersonal representations that pervade the cognitive sciences.
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  21.  58
    The Daulistic, discarnate picture that haunts the cognitive science of reli- gion.David H. Nikkel - 2015 - Zygon 50 (3):621-646.
    A dualistic, discarnate picture haunts contemporary cognitive science of religion. Cognitive scientists of religion generally assert or assume a reductive physicalism, primarily through unconscious mental mechanisms that detect supernatural agency where none exists and a larger purpose to life when none exists. Accompanying this focus is a downplaying of conscious reflection in religious belief and practice. Yet the mind side of dualism enters into CSR in interesting ways. Some cognitive scientists turn practitioners of religion into dualists (...)
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  22. Uncertainty Reduction as a Measure of Cognitive Load in Sentence Comprehension.Stefan L. Frank - 2013 - Topics in Cognitive Science 5 (3):475-494.
    The entropy-reduction hypothesis claims that the cognitive processing difficulty on a word in sentence context is determined by the word's effect on the uncertainty about the sentence. Here, this hypothesis is tested more thoroughly than has been done before, using a recurrent neural network for estimating entropy and self-paced reading for obtaining measures of cognitive processing load. Results show a positive relation between reading time on a word and the reduction in entropy due to processing that (...)
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  23.  32
    Phenomenology and Cognitive Science: Don’t Fear the Reductionist Bogey-man.Jakob Hohwy - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):138-144.
    Shaun Gallagher calls for a radical rethinking of the concept of nature and he resists reduction of phenomenology to computational-neural science. However, classic, reductionist science, at least in contemporary computational guise, has the resources to accommodate insights from transcendental phenomenology. Reductionism should be embraced, not feared.
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  24.  9
    Norms in cognition and cognition of norms.Ilya T. Kasavin - 2017 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 54 (4):8-19.
    The question about epistemic nature of norms is a special case of discussing the non-standard definition of knowledge. Is it possible to expand the understanding of knowledge beyond the proposi­tions expressed by narrative sentence and describing what takes place? Might a moral norm, an aesthetic ideal, a religious symbol be taken as specific types of knowledge? Thesis on the special epistemological status of science, its empirical basis and methods lies in the basis of naturalistic revision of epistemology by Quine. (...)
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  25.  33
    A dilemma for Heideggerian cognitive science.David Suarez - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (5):909-930.
    ‘Naturalizing phenomenology’ by limiting it to the ontology of the sciences is problematic on both metaphysical and phenomenological grounds. While most assessments of the prospects for a ‘naturalized phenomenology’ have focused on approaches based in Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, problems also arise for non-reductive approaches based in Heideggerian existential phenomenology. ‘Heideggerian cognitive science’ faces a dilemma. On the one hand, if it is directly concerned with the nature of subjectivity, and this subjectivity is assumed to be ontologically irreducible to (...)
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  26. Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science.Paul Thagard (ed.) - 2006 - Elsevier.
    Psychology is the study of thinking, and cognitive science is the interdisciplinary investigation of mind and intelligence that also includes philosophy, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, linguistics, and anthropology. In these investigations, many philosophical issues arise concerning methods and central concepts. The Handbook of Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science contains 16 essays by leading philosophers of science that illuminate the nature of the theories and explanations used in the investigation of minds. Topics discussed include representation, mechanisms, (...)
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  27. Models, robustness, and non-causal explanation: a foray into cognitive science and biology.Elizabeth Irvine - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):3943-3959.
    This paper is aimed at identifying how a model’s explanatory power is constructed and identified, particularly in the practice of template-based modeling (Humphreys, Philos Sci 69:1–11, 2002; Extending ourselves: computational science, empiricism, and scientific method, 2004), and what kinds of explanations models constructed in this way can provide. In particular, this paper offers an account of non-causal structural explanation that forms an alternative to causal–mechanical accounts of model explanation that are currently popular in philosophy of biology and cognitive (...)
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  28. Constructing a Philosophy of Science of Cognitive Science.William Bechtel - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (3):548-569.
    Philosophy of science is positioned to make distinctive contributions to cognitive science by providing perspective on its conceptual foundations and by advancing normative recommendations. The philosophy of science I embrace is naturalistic in that it is grounded in the study of actual science. Focusing on explanation, I describe the recent development of a mechanistic philosophy of science from which I draw three normative consequences for cognitive science. First, insofar as cognitive mechanisms (...)
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  29.  28
    Constructing a Philosophy of Science of Cognitive Science.William Bechtel - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (3):548-569.
    Philosophy of science is positioned to make distinctive contributions to cognitive science by providing perspective on its conceptual foundations and by advancing normative recommendations. The philosophy of science I embrace is naturalistic in that it is grounded in the study of actual science. Focusing on explanation, I describe the recent development of a mechanistic philosophy of science from which I draw three normative consequences for cognitive science. First, insofar as cognitive mechanisms (...)
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  30.  9
    Documenting a Reduction in Signing Space in Nicaraguan Sign Language Using Depth and Motion Capture.Molly Flaherty, Asha Sato & Simon Kirby - 2023 - Cognitive Science 47 (4):e13277.
    In this paper, we use motion tracking technology to document the birth of a brand new language: Nicaraguan Sign Language. Languages are dynamic entities that undergo change and growth through use, transmission, and learning, but the earliest stages of this process are generally difficult to observe as most languages have been used and passed down for many generations. Here, we observe a rare case of language emergence: the earliest stages of the new sign language in Nicaragua. By comparing the signing (...)
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  31.  9
    Structures in Science: Heuristic Patterns Based on Cognitive Structures An Advanced Textbook in Neo-Classical Philosophy of Science.Theo A. F. Kuipers - 2001 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    The philosophy of science has lost its self-confidence, witness the lack of advanced textbooks in contrast to the abundance of elementary textbooks. Structures in Science is an advanced textbook that explicates, updates, accommodates, and integrates the best insights of logical-empiricism and its main critics. This `neo-classical approach' aims at providing heuristic patterns for research. The book introduces four ideal types of research programs and reanimates the distinction between observational laws and proper theories. It explicates various patterns of explanation (...)
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  32.  60
    Mechanisms in Cognitive Science.Carlos Zednik - 2017 - In Phyllis McKay Illari & Stuart Glennan (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy. London: Routledge. pp. 389-400.
    This chapter subsumes David Marr’s levels of analysis account of explanation in cognitive science under the framework of mechanistic explanation: Answering the questions that define each one of Marr’s three levels is tantamount to describing the component parts and operations of mechanisms, as well as their organization, behavior, and environmental context. By explicating these questions and showing how they are answered in several different cognitive science research programs, this chapter resolves some of the ambiguities that remain (...)
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  33.  35
    Holism and reduction in sociobiology: Lessons from the ants and human culture. [REVIEW]Edward O. Wilson & Charles J. Lumsden - 1991 - Biology and Philosophy 6 (4):401-412.
    Most research in the natural sciences passes through repeated cycles of a analytic reduction to the next lower level of organization, then resynthesis to the original level, then new analyticareduction, and so on. A residue of unexplained phenomena at the original level appears at first to require a holistic description independent of the lower level, but the residue shrinks as knowledge increases.This principle is well illustrated by recent studies from the social organization of insects, several examples of which are (...)
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  34. Beyond reduction: philosophy of mind and post-reductionist philosophy of science.Steven W. Horst - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to assume that the world of nature can be reduced to basic physics. Yet there are features of the mind consciousness, intentionality, normativity that do not seem to be reducible to physics or neuroscience. This explanatory gap between mind and brain has thus been a major cause of concern in recent philosophy of mind. Reductionists hold that, despite all appearances, the mind can be reduced to the brain. Eliminativists hold that it cannot, and that this (...)
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  35.  25
    Tagging the world : descrying consciousness in cognitive processes.Peter Fazekas - unknown
    Although having conscious experiences is a fundamental feature of our everyday life, our understanding of what consciousness is is very limited. According to one of the main conclusions of contemporary philosophy of mind, the qualitative aspect of consciousness seems to resist functionalisation, i.e. it cannot be adequately defined solely in terms of functional or causal roles, which leads to an epistemic gap between phenomenal and scientific knowledge. Phenomenal qualities, then, seem to be, in principle, unexplainable in scientific terms. As a (...)
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  36. The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science.Anthony F. Beavers - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):533-537.
    The Phenomenological Mind, by Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, is part of a recent initiative to show that phenomenology, classically conceived as the tradition inaugurated by Edmund Husserl and not as mere introspection, contributes something important to cognitive science. (For other examples, see “References” below.) Phenomenology, of course, has been a part of cognitive science for a long time. It implicitly informs the works of Andy Clark (e.g. 1997) and John Haugeland (e.g. 1998), and Hubert Dreyfus (...)
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  37. Structures in scientific cognition: A synopsis of structures in science. Heuristic patterns based on cognitive structures. An advanced textbook in neo-classical philosophy of science.Theo A. F. Kuipers - 2005 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1):23-92.
    The philosophy of science has lost its self-confidence. Structures in Science (2001) is an advanced textbook that explicates, updates and integrates the best insights of logical empiricism and its main critics. This "neo-classical approach" aims at providing heuristic patterns for research.The book introduces four ideal types of research programs (descriptive, explanatory, design and explicative) and reanimates the distinction between observational laws and proper theories without assuming a theory-free language. It explicates various patterns of explanation by subsumption and specification (...)
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  38.  97
    Rethinking Nature: Phenomenology and a Non-reductionist Cognitive Science.Shaun Gallagher - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):125-137.
    Resistance to the idea that phenomenology can be relevant to cognitive scientific explanation has faced two objections advanced, respectively, from both sides of the issue: from the scientific perspective it has been suggested that phenomenology, understood as an account of first-person experience, is ultimately reducible to cognitive neuroscientific explanation; and from a phenomenological perspective it has been argued that phenomenology cannot be naturalized. In this context it makes sense to consider that the notion of scientific reduction is (...)
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  39. Colour Vision: A Study in Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Science.Evan Thompson - 1994 - New York: Routledge.
    Colour fascinates all of us, and scientists and philosophers have sought to understand the true nature of colour vision for many years. In recent times, investigations into colour vision have been one of the main success stories of cognitive science, for each discipline within the field - neuroscience, psychology, linguistics, computer science and artificial intelligence, and philosophy - has contributed significantly to our understanding of colour. Evan Thompson's book is a major contribution to this interdisciplinary project. Colour (...)
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  40.  91
    To Naturalize or Not to Naturalize? An Issue for Cognitive Science as Well as Anthropology.Keith Stenning - 2012 - Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (3):413-419.
    Several of Beller, Bender, and Medin’s (2012) issues are as relevant within cognitive science as between it and anthropology. Knowledge-rich human mental processes impose hermeneutic tasks, both on subjects and researchers. Psychology's current philosophy of science is ill suited to analyzing these: Its demand for ‘‘stimulus control’’ needs to give way to ‘‘negotiation of mutual interpretation.’’ Cognitive science has ways to address these issues, as does anthropology. An example from my own work is about how (...)
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  41. Nativism in cognitive science.Richard Samuels - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (3):233-65.
    Though nativist hypotheses have played a pivotal role in the development of cognitive science, it remains exceedingly obscure how they—and the debates in which they figure—ought to be understood. The central aim of this paper is to provide an account which addresses this concern and in so doing: a) makes sense of the roles that nativist theorizing plays in cognitive science and, moreover, b), explains why it really matters to the contemporary study of cognition. I conclude (...)
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  42.  16
    Interdisciplinarity in Cognitive Science: A Document Similarity Analysis.Oguzhan Alasehir & Cengiz Acarturk - 2022 - Cognitive Science 46 (12):e13222.
    Cognitive science was established as an interdisciplinary domain of research in the 1970s. Since then, the domain has flourished, despite disputes concerning its interdisciplinarity. Multiple methods exist for the assessment of interdisciplinary research. The present study proposes a methodology for quantifying interdisciplinary aspects of research in cognitive science. We propose models for text similarity analysis that provide helpful information about the relationship between publications and their specific research fields, showing potential as a robust measure of interdisciplinarity. (...)
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  43. Linguistics in cognitive science: The state of the art.Ray Jackendoff - manuscript
  44. Computation in cognitive science: it is not all about Turing-equivalent computation.Kenneth Aizawa - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):227-236.
    It is sometimes suggested that the history of computation in cognitive science is one in which the formal apparatus of Turing-equivalent computation, or effective computability, was exported from mathematical logic to ever wider areas of cognitive science and its environs. This paper, however, indicates some respects in which this suggestion is inaccurate. Computability theory has not been focused exclusively on Turing-equivalent computation. Many essential features of Turing-equivalent computation are not captured in definitions of computation as symbol (...)
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  45.  98
    Representation in Cognitive Science: Replies.Nicholas Shea - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (3):402-412.
    In their constructive reviews, Frances Egan, Randy Gallistel and Steven Gross have raised some important problems for the account of content advanced by Nicholas Shea in Representation in Cognitive Science. Here the author addresses their main challenges. Egan argues that the account includes an unrecognised pragmatic element; and that it makes contents explanatorily otiose. Gallistel raises questions about homomorphism and correlational information. Gross puts the account to work to resolve a dispute about probabilistic contents in perception, but argues (...)
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  46. Logic in Cognitive Science: Bridging the Gap between Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms.Alistair Isaac & Jakub Szymanik - 2010 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research (2):279-309.
    This paper surveys applications of logical methods in the cognitive sciences. Special attention is paid to non-monotonic logics and complexity theory. We argue that these particular tools have been useful in clarifying the debate between symbolic and connectionist models of cognition.
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  47.  67
    Transformations in cognitive science: Implications and issues posed.Lisa M. Osbeck - 2009 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):16-33.
    Cognitive science currently offers models of cognition that depart substantively from those of information processing models and classical artificial intelligence, while it embraces methods of inquiry that include case-based, ethnographic, and philosophical methods. To illustrate, five overlapping approaches that constitute departures from classical representational cognitive science are briefly discussed in this paper: dynamical cognition, situated cognition, embodied cognition, extended mind theory, and integrative cognition. Critical responses to these efforts from members of the self-proclaimed cognitive (...) orthodoxy are also summarized. The paper then discusses ethical and epistemological implications arising from the “new” cognitive science and from critical responses to it and considers the broader importance of this literature for theoretical and philosophical psychology. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)
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  48. Mathematics in Cognitive Science.Daniel Andler - unknown
    What role does mathematics play in cognitive science today, what role should mathematics play in cognitive science tomorrow? The cautious short answers are: to the factual question, a rather modest role, except in peripheral areas; to the normative question, a far greater role, as the periphery’s place is reevaluated and as both cognitive science and mathematics grow. This paper aims at providing more detailed, perhaps more contentious answers.
     
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  49. Mutual enlightenment: Recent phenomenology in cognitive science.Shaun Gallagher - 1997 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (3):195-214.
    The term phenomenology can be used in a generic sense to cover a variety of areas related to the problem of consciousness. In this sense it is a title that ranges over issues pertaining to first-person or subjective experience, qualia, and what has become known as "the hard problem" (Chalmers 1995). The term is sometimes used even more generally to signify a variety of approaches to studying such issues, including contemplative, meditative, and mystical studies, and transpersonal psychology.(1) Within the disciplines (...)
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  50.  42
    Representation in Cognitive Science by Nicholas Shea: Reply by the Author.Nicholas Shea - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 92:270-273.
    It is a rare privilege to have such eminent and insightful reviewers. Their kind words about the book are much appreciated – perhaps more than they realise. And I'm grateful to all three for having read the book so constructively. Each has given me several things to think about. In the space available here I will focus on the objections that seem most critical. Robert Rupert argues that I rely on an overly narrow understanding of what the cognitive sciences (...)
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