This monography provides an overview of the conceptual developments that leads from the traditional views of infinite (and their paradoxes) to the contemporary view in which those old paradoxes are solved but new problems arise. Also a particular insight in the problem of continuity is given, followed by applications in theory of computability.

This work-in-progress aims to explain as accurately as possible the philosophical meaning given by Wittgenstein to the silence in both of his major books, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and the Philosophical Investigations. REMARKS ARE WELL RECEIVED.

El Libro de Arena, de J. L. Borges imagina un libro poblado de infinitas páginas. Esta infinidad se manifiesta de varias formas, cada una de las cuales puede ser asimilada con alguna propiedad de los conjuntos numéricos. Exploraremos dicha similitud y veremos emerger el Libro de Arena como un símbolo complejo, pero no autónomo. En efecto, no sólo el libro y sus páginas, sino asimismo los personajes y cada elemento puesto en escena se articulan en el desarrollo del relato y (...) allí pierden su apariencia de objetos para revelarse como funciones en la producción del sentido final. (shrink)

Las «metáforas», «analogías» o «alegorías» tienen un lugar bien ganado en la tradición filosófica. Han sido atacadas por dar lugar a una interpretación poco rigurosa de las nociones que describen, pues permite asociarles propiedades que originalmente no se había pensado (ni resulta deseable) que formen parte de su concepto. Sin embargo, a pesar del reclamo en favor de procedimientos estrictos de definición, el uso de una imagen apropiada suele ser el mejor modo de explicar esas cuestiones que cada siglo escapan (...) a la disección que el filo de las mejores definiciones pretendía darle. Tal es el caso de las ilustraciones usadas por Charles S. Peirce en sus artículos "Algunas consecuencias de cuatro incapacidades" y "Cómo esclarecer nuestras ideas" para dar cuenta del pensamiento. Primero veremos el papel que juegan estas imágenes en la argumentación conque Peirce establece dos principios importantes de su filosofía: el de que toda cognición se encuentra determinada por otras cogniciones previas, y el de que no tenemos ningún poder de introspección. Luego hallaremos que dos de las imágenes presentan cierta incompatibilidad en un aspecto especialmente relevante desde el punto de vista de lo que tratan de ilustrar. Para finalizar, consideraremos una explicación que sea consistente con los textos y que permita resolver la discrepancia, brindando una mejor comprensión conjunta de ambas ilustraciones . (shrink)

Este trabajo pretende articular la construcción del personaje de Regina Lamo, hasta ahora presentado como sub­alterno a otras vidas que han alcanzado más relevancia históri­ca que ella. Entre otros activismos, Lamo se convirtió en líder de opinión y en creadora de escuela en el terreno del coopera­tivismo como forma más eficaz de lucha contra la explotación del movimiento obrero en las primeras décadas del siglo XX en España. La grave situación de conflicto social vivido en esas primeras décadas del (...) siglo en el contexto de la modernización de España, y en particular en Cataluña, junto con el auge del movimiento obrero, provocó una fuerte represión de la princi­pal fuerza, el anarcosindicalismo. Se abrió así un espacio para los mutualistas que buscaban un desgaste gradual y pacífico del capitalismo y que estaban a favor de la economía social, frente a los bakuninistas, proclives a la lucha militante, la huelga ge­neral y la insurrección. En este marco, Regina Lamo perfila su compromiso con una original propuesta de creación de Bancos Populares de Crédito que singularizó su figura y la convirtió en un personaje relevante, transgresora de los límites de género, que hoy tratamos de reivindicar. (shrink)

En su ópera prima, antes de concebir la filosofía crítica, Kant manifestó su entusiasmo por una geometría de todos los tipos posibles de espacio, y no sólo del espacio conocido. Como el filósofo atribuye cada espacio a un mundo posible distinto, la "geometría suprema", como la denominó, en realidad sería el nombre genérico para un conjunto de geometrías diversas que describen espacios igualmente diversos. En ese conjunto genérico se encuentra la geometría de Euclides, y cabe preguntarse si acaso entre las (...) otras especies no podrían hallarse las geometrías que hoy conocemos como no-euclídeas. Creemos que no es así, y es lo que nos proponemos mostrar en este trabajo. Sostendremos, por lo tanto, la distinción entre las denominaciones "otras geometrías" y "geometrías no-euclídeas" y desarrollaremos la incompatibilidad entre ambas tal como ésta se sigue de los textos de Kant. Intentaremos asimismo caracterizar las "otras geometrías" según la noción de "espacio habitado", por nosotros o por los eventuales habitantes de otros universos posibles. Así, las "otras geometrías" quizá podrían ser comprendidas mejor como geometrías de los otros (de la alteridad), que como anticipación de las geometrías no-euclídeas. (shrink)

O governo das diferenças e a potência da vida surda na escola Resumo: É urgente afirmar a surdez como acontecimento ontológico, produtor de diferenças, as quais se materializam no corpo dos sujeitos surdos. O artigo objetiva produzir uma análise filosófica da surdez-acontecimento, fazendo um paralelo entre a ação das políticas educacionais e a micro relação do cotidiano escolar, pelo movimento de resistência das pessoas surdas às políticas igualitárias. O conceito de governamentalidade, desenvolvido por Michel Foucault, é fundamental para essa reflexão, (...) apontando dois movimentos nas práticas inclusivas: o primeiro, agenciado na pauta da diversidade, com foco em práticas igualitárias e o segundo movimento, produzido na lógica da diferença. Propõe-se anunciar a surdez não apenas pela diferença, linguístico-cultural, mas como efeito de uma diferença ontológica espalhada no corpo social por fluxos ramificados, em movimentos intensivos, minando internamente os sujeitos e por eles, as variadas instituições. É a prática rasteira da contra-ação desse “ser” surdo às ações normalizadoras que interessa aqui ressaltar. Palavras-chave: Educação de surdos. Políticas inclusivas. Diferenças. Apoio e financimento da pesquisa: FAPESP e à CAPES Government of differences and the power of deaf life in school: It is urgent to affirm deafness as an ontological event, producer of differences, which materialize in the body of deaf subjects. The article aims to produce a philosophical analysis of deafness-event, making a parallel between the action of educational policies and the micro relationship of school daily, by the movement of resistance of deaf people to egalitarian policies. The concept of governmentality, developed by Michel Foucault, is fundamental to this reflection, pointing out two movements in inclusive practices: the first, guided by the diversity agenda, focusing on egalitarian practices and the second movement, produced in the logic of difference. It is proposed to announce deafness not only by linguistic-cultural difference, but as the effect of an ontological difference spread in the social body by branched flows, intensive movements, internally undermining the subjects and by them the various institutions. It is the low practice of counteracting this deaf “being” to normalizing actions that is of interest here. Keywords: Deaf education. Inclusive policies. Differences. Gobierno de diferencias y el poder de la vida de los sordos en la escuela Resumen: Es urgente afirmar la sordera como un evento ontológico, productor de diferencias, que se materializa en el cuerpo de los sordos. El artículo tiene como objetivo producir un análisis filosófico del evento de sordera, haciendo un paralelo entre la acción de las políticas educativas y la micro relación de la escuela diaria, por el movimiento de resistencia de las personas sordas a las políticas igualitarias. El concepto de gubernamentalidad, desarrollado por Michel Foucault, es fundamental para esta reflexión, señalando dos movimientos en prácticas inclusivas: el primero, guiado por la agenda de la diversidad, centrado en prácticas igualitarias y el segundo movimiento, producido en la lógica de la diferencia. Se propone anunciar la sordera no solo por la diferencia lingüístico-cultural, sino como el efecto de una diferencia ontológica propagada en el cuerpo social por flujos ramificados, movimientos intensivos, que debilitan internamente a los sujetos y por ellos a las diversas instituciones. Lo que interesa aquí es la baja práctica de contrarrestar este "ser" sordo para normalizar las acciones. Palabras clave: Educación para sordos. Políticas inclusivas. Diferencias. Data de registro: 11/12/2019 Data de aceite: 21/10/2020. (shrink)

This paper brings studies around the poetic dimension of language to approach the relationship between teaching in preschool education and the experience of being open and listening as an aesthesic way of coexisting in the world. The approximation of philosophy, arts and preschool education from the reunion between music and education highlights that listening refers to the sound of meaning, and not to the meaning of the sound to be interpreted. The dialog with the thinking of Jean-Luc Nancy, stating that (...) the sensible sense/meaning arouses the intelligible sense/meaning and in a constant movement that is not completed or finalized, producing signification or information, appears as a philosophical resistance to the privilege of the theoretical record founded upon the western prevalence of the optical model. To be open and listening implies the resonance as the sound of sense, as the body's first or last depth. The music as a play between sound and noise, as a poetic production of ordering sound senses provoked by resonance – as a gesture of listening to the listening, contributes to question the education of babies and small children based on a body that can play with the worlds' sounds to experience the poetics of making noise as the musical power of playing with sounds and noises. Children's sonic appetite calls them to make noise for the esthesia of listening to the world in the plurality of coexistence. The gesture of being open and listening in the teaching of babies and small children points out to educative actions that consider the experience constituted by resonances and reverberations of meanings implied in the sound, a feeling of feeling, as share and sharing of voices, signs, gestures, shapes, of the felt meaning and the sensible meaning that gather ones-with-others in human coexistence.key words: music; listenin; early childhood education; jean-luc nancy.estar à escuta: música e docência na educação infantilresumoO ensaio aproxima estudos em torno da dimensão poética da linguagem para abordar a relação entre docência na educação infantil e experiência de estar à escuta como modo estésico de coexistir no mundo. A aproximação entre filosofia, artes e educação infantil, desde o encontro entre e música e educação, sublinha que a escuta é o som do sentido e não o sentido do som a ser interpretado. A interlocução com o pensamento de Jean-Luc Nancy, ao permitir afirmar que o sentido sensível suscita o sentido sensato ou inteligível e o faz num movimento constante que não se completa ou finaliza produzindo uma significação ou uma informação, emerge como resistência filosófica ao privilégio do registro teórico fundado na primazia ocidental do modelo óptico. Estar à escuta implica a ressonância como o som do sentido, como profundidade primeira ou última do corpo. A música como jogo entre som e ruído, como produção poética de ordenação de sentidos sonoros provocados pela ressonância – como gesto de escutar a escuta, contribui para interrogar a educação de bebês e crianças pequenas a partir de um corpo que pode brincar com a sonoridade do mundo para viver a poética do barulhar como potência musical de jogar com sons e ruídos. O apetite sonoro das crianças as convocam a barulhar pela estesia de escutar o mundo na pluralidade da coexistência. O gesto de estar à escuta na docência com bebês e crianças pequenas aponta para ações educativas que consideram a experiência constituinte de ressonâncias e reverberações de sentidos imbricamos no som, um sentir se sentir, como partição e partilha das vozes, dos signos, dos gestos, das formas, do sentido sentido e do sentido sensato que nos situam sendo-uns-com-os-outros na coexistência mundana.palavras chave: música; escuta; educação infantil; jean-luc nancy.estar a la escucha: música y docencia en la educación infantilresumenEl ensayo aproxima estudios acerca de la dimensión poética del lenguaje para abordar la relación entre docencia en la educación infantil y experiencia de estar a la escucha como modo sensible de coexistir en el mundo. La aproximación entre filosofía, artes y educación infantil, desde el encuentro entre música y educación, destaca que la escucha es el sonido del sentido y no el sentido del sonido a ser interpretado. La interlocución con el pensamiento de Jean-Luc Nancy, al permitir afirmar que el sentido sensible suscita el sentido sensato o inteligible y lo hace en un movimiento constante que no se completa o finaliza produciendo una significación o una información, emerge como resistencia filosófica al privilegio del registro teórico fundado en la primacía occidental del modelo óptico. Estar a la escucha implica la resonancia como el sonido del sentido, como profundidad primera o última del cuerpo. La música como juego entre sonido y ruido, como producción poética de ordenación de los sentidos sonoros provocados por la resonancia -como gesto de escuchar la escucha, contribuye para interrogar la educación de bebés, niños y niñas pequeñas a partir de un cuerpo que puede jugar con la sonoridad del mundo para vivir la poética del hacer ruido como potencia musical del jugar con sonidos y ruidos. El apetito sonoro de los niños y niñas las llama hacer ruidos por la sensibilidad de escuchar el mundo en la pluralidad de la coexistencia. El gesto de estar a la escucha en la docencia con bebés, niños y niñas pequeñas apunta para acciones educativas que consideran la experiencia constituyente de resonancias y reverberaciones de sentidos solapados en el sonido, un sentir sentirse, como participación y intercambio de voces, de signos, de gestos de las formas, del sonido sentido y del sentido sensato que nos sitúan siendo-unos-con-los-otros en la coexistencia mundana.palabras clave: música; escucha; educación infantil; jean-luc nancy. (shrink)

Did you know that Hillary Clinton sold weapons to ISIS? Or that Mike Pence called Michelle Obama “the most vulgar First Lady we’ve ever had”? No, you didn’t know these things. You couldn’t know them, because these claims are false.1 But many American voters believed them.One of the most distinctive features of the 2016 campaign was the rise of “fake news,” factually false claims circulated on social media, usually via channels of partisan camaraderie. Media analysts and social scientists are still (...) debating what role fake news played in Trump’s victory.2 But whether or not it drove the outcome, fake news certainly affected the choices of some individual voters.Why were people willing to believe easily... (shrink)

Deepfake technology uses machine learning to fabricate video and audio recordings that represent people doing and saying things they've never done. In coming years, malicious actors will likely use this technology in attempts to manipulate public discourse. This paper prepares for that danger by explicating the unappreciated way in which recordings have so far provided an epistemic backstop to our testimonial practices. Our reasonable trust in the testimony of others depends, to a surprising extent, on the regulative effects of the (...) ever-present possibility of recordings of the events they testify about. As deepfakes erode the epistemic value of recordings, we may then face an even more consequential challenge to the reliability of our testimonial practices themselves. (shrink)

Recent empirical work appears to suggest that the moral intuitions of professional philosophers are just as vulnerable to distorting psychological factors as are those of ordinary people. This paper assesses these recent tests of the ‘expertise defense’ of philosophical intuition. I argue that the use of familiar cases and principles constitutes a methodological problem. Since these items are familiar to philosophers, but not ordinary people, the two subject groups do not confront identical cognitive tasks. Reflection on this point shows that (...) these findings do not threaten philosophical expertise—though we can draw lessons for more effective empirical tests. (shrink)

How can we tell whether an incident counts as a microaggression? How do we draw the boundary between microaggressions and weightier forms of oppression, such as hate crimes? I address these questions by exploring the ontology and epistemology of microaggression, in particular the constitutive relationship between microaggression and systemic social oppression. I argue that we ought to define microaggression in terms of the ambiguous experience that its victims undergo, focusing attention on their perspectives while providing criteria for distinguishing microaggression.

The evidential value of moral intuitions has been challenged by psychological work showing that the intuitions of ordinary people are affected by distorting factors. One reply to this challenge, the expertise defence, claims that training in philosophical thinking confers enhanced reliability on the intuitions of professional philosophers. This defence is often expressed through analogy: since we do not allow doubts about folk judgments in domains like mathematics or physics to undermine the plausibility of judgments by experts in these domains, we (...) also should not do so in philosophy. In this paper I clarify the logic of the analogy strategy, and defend it against recent challenges by Jesper Ryberg. The discussion exposes an interesting divide: while Ryberg’s challenges may weaken analogies between morality and domains like mathematics, they do not affect analogies to other domains, such as physics. I conclude that the expertise defence can be supported by analogical means, though care is required in selecting an appropriate analog. I discuss implications of this conclusion for the expertise defence debate and for study of the moral domain itself. (shrink)

Many of our cognitive capacities are the result of enculturation. Enculturation is the temporally extended transformative acquisition of cognitive practices in the cognitive niche. Cognitive practices are embodied and normatively constrained ways to interact with epistemic resources in the cognitive niche in order to complete a cognitive task. The emerging predictive processing perspective offers new functional principles and conceptual tools to account for the cerebral and extra-cerebral bodily components that give rise to cognitive practices. According to this emerging perspective, many (...) cases of perception, action, and cognition are realized by the on-going minimization of prediction error. Predictive processing provides us with a mechanistic perspective that helps investigate the functional details of the acquisition of cognitive practices. The argument of this paper is that research on enculturation and recent work on predictive processing are complementary. The main reason is that predictive processing operates at a sub-personal level and on a physiological time scale of explanation only. A complete account of enculturated cognition needs to take additional levels and temporal scales of explanation into account. This complementarity assumption leads to a new framework—enculturated predictive processing—that operates on multiple levels and temporal scales for the explanation of the enculturated predictive acquisition of cognitive practices. Enculturated predictive processing is committed to explanatory pluralism. That is, it subscribes to the idea that we need multiple perspectives and explanatory strategies to account for the complexity of enculturation. The upshot is that predictive processing needs to be complemented by additional considerations and conceptual tools to realize its full explanatory potential. (shrink)

This paper presents a regress challenge to the selective psychological debunking of moral judgments. A selective psychological debunking argument conjoins an empirical claim about the psychological origins of certain moral judgments to a theoretical claim that these psychological origins cannot track moral truth, leading to the conclusion that the moral judgments are unreliable. I argue that psychological debunking arguments are vulnerable to a regress challenge, because the theoretical claim that ‘such-and-such psychological process is not moral-truth-tracking’ relies upon moral judgments. We (...) must then ask about the psychological origins of these judgments, and then make a further evaluative judgment about these psychological origins… and so on. This chain of empirical and evaluative claims may continue indefinitely and, I will argue, proponents of the debunking argument are in a dialectical position where they may not simply call a halt to the process. Hence, their argument cannot terminate, and its debunking conclusion cannot be upheld. (shrink)

A microaggression is a small insulting act made disproportionately harmful by its part in an oppressive pattern of similar insults. How should you respond when made the victim of a microaggression? In this paper I survey several morally salient factors, including effects upon victims, perpetrators, and third parties. I argue, contrary to popular views, that ‘growing a thicker skin’ is not good advice nor is expressing reasonable anger always the best way to contribute to confronting oppression. Instead, appropriately responding to (...) microaggression involves difficult application of practical wisdom that does not easily fall under a simple prescription. (shrink)

The debate between proponents and opponents of a role for empirical psychology in ethical theory seems to be deadlocked. This paper aims to clarify the terms of that debate, and to defend a principled middle position. I argue against extreme views, which see empirical psychology either as irrelevant to, or as wholly displacing, reflective moral inquiry. Instead, I argue that moral theorists of all stripes are committed to a certain conception of moral thought—as aimed at abstracting away from individual inclinations (...) and toward interpersonal norms—and that this conception tells against both extremes. Since we cannot always know introspectively whether our particular moral judgments achieve this interpersonal standard, we must seek the sort of self-knowledge offered by empirical psychology. Yet reflective assessment of this new information remains a matter of substantive normative theorizing, rather than an immediate consequence of empirical findings themselves. (shrink)

It is a philosophical truism that we must think of others as moral agents, not merely as causal or statistical objects. But why? I argue that this follows from the best resolution of an antinomy between our experience of morality as necessarily binding on the will and our knowledge that all moral beliefs originate in contingent histories. We can address this antinomy only by understanding moral deliberation via interpersonal relationships, which simultaneously vindicate and constrains morality’s bind on the will. This (...) means that moral agency is fundamentally social. I model an attitude toward our causal nature on sociologist Erving Goffman’s concept of ‘civil inattention’; our social practice of agency requires that we give minimal attention to the contingent origins of moral judgments in ourselves and others. Understood this way, seeing ourselves as moral agents requires avoiding appeal to causal aetiology to settle substantive moral disagreement. (shrink)

Learning the psychological origins of our moral judgments can lead us to lose confidence in them. In this paper I explain why. I consider two explanations drawn from existing literature—regarding epistemic unreliability and automaticity—and argue that neither is fully adequate. I then propose a new explanation, according to which psychological research reveals the extent to which we are disturbingly disunified as moral agents.

Major depression is a prevalent mental disorder that leads to persistent negative mood and tremendous suffering in affected individuals. However, the biological realization of this disorder and associated symptom clusters remain poorly understood. Recently, phenomenological accounts of major depressive disorder and contributions to the emerging predictive processing account have provided valuable insights into the phenomenological and neuro-functional components that lead to manifestations of major depressive episodes. The purpose of this paper is to weave together these different strands of research to (...) develop a predictive processing account of major depressive disorder. In doing so, I will relate personal-level descriptions of associated phenomenal experiences to a sub-personal-level predictive processing account of the functional realization of major depression. I will argue that pervasive symptoms of the disorder, which include a diminished sense of agency, fatigue, social withdrawal, and rumination, are integrated by existential feelings of loss and impossibility. These phenomenal experiences, I will argue, are associated with dysfunctional processes of prediction error minimization, which are characterized by an overall decrease of the causal contributions of active inference and by distorted precision estimates. The emerging account promises to contribute to a better understanding of the complex processes that give rise to depressive experiences. (shrink)

The essay reviews the digital emergency measures many governments have adopted in an attempt to curb Covid-19. It argues that those ‘virologically legitimized’ measures may infringe the human right to privacy and mark the transition into a world of global surveillance. At this possible turning point in human history, panic and latent fear seem to fog much needed farsightedness. Leaving the current state of emotional paralysis and restarting to critically assess the digital pandemic management can serve as an emergency break (...) against drifting into a new era of digital monitoring. (shrink)

We ought to treat others’ moral views with respect, even when we disagree. But what does that mean? This paper articulates a moral obligation to make ourselves open to sincere moral persuasion by others. Doing so allows us to participate in valuable relationships of reciprocal respect for agency. Yet this proposal can sound tritely agreeable. To explore its full implications, the paper applies the general obligation to one of the most challenging topics of moral disagreement: the morality of abortion. I (...) consider and reject arguments that abortion decisions have special features exempting them from the obligation to be open to moral persuasion. Further, I argue that viewing fetal ultrasound images can accomplish morally persuasion. Accordingly, in at least some cases a woman seeking abortion has an obligation to view fetal ultrasound images as a means of being open to moral persuasion. However, this conclusion does not support recent laws compelling women seeking abortion to view ultrasound images; such laws are in fact incompatible with the respect for agency that underwrites the obligation to be open to persuasion. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Giubilini and Minerva argue for the moral permissibility of what they call ‘after-birth abortion’, or infanticide. Here I suggest that they actually employ a confusion of two distinct arguments: one relying on the purportedly identical moral status of a fetus and a newborn, and the second giving an independent argument for the denial of moral personhood to infants (independent of whatever one might say about fetuses). After distinguishing these arguments, I suggest that neither one is capable (...) of supporting Giubilini and Minerva's conclusion. The first argument is at best neutral between permitting infanticide and prohibiting abortion, and may in fact more strongly support the latter. The second argument, I suggest, contains an ambiguity in its key premise, and can be shown to fail on either resolution of that ambiguity. Hence, I conclude that Giubilini and Minerva have not demonstrated the permissibility of infanticide, or even great moral similarity between abortion and infanticide. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Jakob Hohwy argues that the emerging predictive processing perspective on cognition requires us to explain cognitive functioning in purely internalistic and neurocentric terms. The purpose of the present paper is to challenge the view that PP entails a wholesale rejection of positions that are interested in the embodied, embedded, extended, or enactive dimensions of cognitive processes. I will argue that Hohwy’s argument from analogy, which forces an evidentiary boundary into the picture, lacks the argumentative resources to (...) make a convincing case for the conceptual necessity to interpret PP in solely internalistic terms. For this reason, I will reconsider the postulation and explanatory role of the evidentiary boundary. I will arrive at an account of prediction error minimization and its foundation on the free energy principle that is fully consistent with approaches to cognition that emphasize the embodied and interactive properties of cognitive processes. This gives rise to the suggestion that explanatory pluralism about the application of PP is to be preferred over Hohwy’s explanatory monism that follows from his internalistic and neurocentric view of predictive cognitive systems. (shrink)

Theory suggests that stimulus evaluations automatically evoke approach–avoidance behavior. However, the extent to which approach–avoidance behavior is triggered automatically is not yet clear. Furthermore, the nature of automatically triggered approach–avoidance behavior is controversial. We review research on two views on the type of approach–avoidance behavior that is triggered automatically (arm flexion/extension, distance change). Present evidence supports the distance-change view and corroborates the notion of an automatic pathway from evaluation to distance-change behavior. We discuss underlying mechanisms (direct stimulus–response links, outcome anticipations, (...) goals) as well as implications regarding the flexibility of the evaluation–behavior link. (shrink)

Cognitive innovation has shaped and transformed our cognitive capacities throughout history. Until recently, cognitive innovation has not received much attention by empirical and conceptual research in the cognitive sciences. This paper is a first attempt to help close this gap. It will be argued that cognitive innovation is best understood in connection with cumulative cultural evolution and enculturation. Cumulative cultural evolution plays a vital role for the inter-generational transmission of the products of cognitive innovation. Furthermore, there are at least two (...) important functions of enculturation for cognitive innovation. First, enculturation is responsible for the ontogenetic acquisition of cognitive practices governing the interaction with innovative products. Second, successful processes of enculturation provide opportunities for subsequent innovative processes. The trans-generational trajectory of calculation from mathematical symbol systems to the first digital computers will serve as a paradigm example of the delicate interplay of cognitive innovation, cumulative cultural evolution, and enculturation. (shrink)

The gap between economic rationality, as embedded in utility maximization, and ethical rationality, identified with a set of rules that prescribe the right course of action, has been a challenging issue for economists, philosophers, and business ethicists. Despite the difference and the noncompetition between a scientific economic approach of economics and business ethics, and a behavioral and philosophical one, we highlight the importance of the Aristotelian concept of prudence or phronesis applied to business activity. Phronesis allows for a conceptualization of (...) rationality that can be simultaneously applied to economics and ethics. It also allows conceiving the intrinsically ethical nature of economic rationality. This relationship requires an appropriate education and the intervention of the state. (shrink)

Recent work on enculturation suggests that our cognitive capacities are significantly transformed in the course of the scaffolded acquisition of cognitive practices such as reading and writing. Phylogenetically, enculturation is the result of the co-evolution of human organisms and their socio-culturally structured cognitive niche. It is rendered possible by evolved cerebral and extra-cerebral bodily learning mechanisms that make human organisms apt to acquire culturally inherited cognitive practices. In addition, cultural learning allows for the intergenerational transmission of relevant knowledge and skills. (...) Ontogenetically, enculturation is associated with neural plasticity and the development of new motor routines and action schemas. It relies on scaffolded learning that structures novice-teacher interactions. The acquisition of reading and writing are paradigm examples of enculturation. Based on an empirically informed analysis of the components of enculturation, I will apply the emerging account of enculturated cognition to narrative practices. To date, research on the impact of narratives on the constitution of the self and our understanding of folk psychology has not paid much attention to the question how narratives are influenced by cumulative cultural evolution and our capacity to acquire reading and writing during ontogeny. I will argue that textual narratives, above and beyond oral narratives, provide genuinely new ways of narration. Therefore, the enculturated interaction with textual narratives has the potential to contribute to a better understanding of ourselves and other cognitive agents. (shrink)

It is generally agreed that Edmund Husserl’s theory of depiction describes a three-fold experience of seeing something in pictures, whereas Richard Wollheim’s theory is a two-fold experience of seeingin. The aim of this article is to show that Wollheim’s theory can be interpreted as a three-fold experience of seeing-in. I will first give an overview of Wollheim and Husserl’s theories of seeing-in, and will then show how the concept of figuration in Wollheim’s theory is analogous to the concept of the (...) image subject as the depicted object in Husserl’s theory. I will claim that our experience of non-figurative pictures is a two-fold seeing-in, while that of figurative pictures is a three-fold seeing-in. (shrink)

This paper examines the proposal that the indigenous cosmovision of buen vivir (good living)—the “organizing principle” of Ecuador's 2008 and Bolivia's 2009 constitutional reforms—constitutes an appropriate basis for responding to climate change. Advocates of this approach blame climate change on a “civilizational crisis” that is fundamentally a crisis of modern Enlightenment reason. Certain Latin American feminists and indigenous women, however, question the implications, for women, of any proposed “civilizational shift” seeking to reverse the human separation from nonhuman nature wrought via (...) Enlightenment's “disenchantment of nature.” The paper argues that, in order to adequately address both the climate crisis and feminist concerns about buen vivir, a different critique of Enlightenment modernity is necessary—one drawing on Adorno's philosophy of negative dialectics and on Adorno and Horkheimer's nonidentitarian dialectical understanding of Enlightenment. Conceiving Enlightenment as composed of nonsublatable moments of domination and liberation, Adorno and Horkheimer call for a rational critique of reason and for affinity rather than identity with nonhuman nature. The paper ends with a brief discussion of how feminist critiques of buen vivir and approaches to climate justice can be furthered via an engagement with an environmental feminist philosophy informed by a negative dialectical approach to Enlightenment. (shrink)

A popular argument form uses general theories of cognitive architecture to motivate conclusions about the nature of moral cognition. This paper highlights the possibility for modus tollens reversal of this argument form. If theories of cognitive architecture generate predictions for moral cognition, then tests of moral thinking provide feedback to cognitive science. In certain circumstances, philosophers' introspective attention to their own moral deliberations can provide unique data for these tests. Recognizing the possibility for this sort of feedback helps to illuminate (...) a deep continuity between the disciplines. (shrink)

In this article I maintain the importance of the Aristotelian concept of prudence or phronesis applied to business ethics, distinguishing its meaning from Solomon and Hartman’s approaches to Aristotelian business ethics. Whereas Solomon stresses the value of perception of particulars and Hartman criticizes the incapacity of Aristotelian phronesis to dwell with the interests of others, I advocate that Aristotelian virtue ethics is important because the concept of phronesisdoes three things: (a) stresses the rational calculation and general principles or rules in (...) virtue ethics, in general, and business ethics, in particular; (b) provides a communal-based ethics principle; and c) offers us a clear comprehension about what calculation or reasoning is in ethics. (shrink)

Scientists, philosophers, and policymakers disagree about how to define microaggression. Here, we offer a taxonomy of existing definitions, clustering around (a) the psychological motives of perpetrators, (b) the experience of victims, and (c) the functional role of microaggression in oppressive social structures. We consider conceptual and epistemic challenges to each and suggest that progress may come from developing novel hybrid accounts of microaggression, combining empirically tractable features with sensitivity to the testimony of victims.

By the beginning of the 19th century Hegel's dialectic turn contradiction (conceived as unity of a concept with its determined negation) into distinguished inference. In the course of 20th century a family of systems known as "paraconsistent" formalized dialectical logic according to the contemporary paradigm of inference, oriented to truth-preserving, and not powered anymore solely by contradiction. In this way, nevertheless, Hegel's idea of logic as unfolding of concepts ordered by degree of "determination" reached at every step of the process, (...) was put aside. We attempt to recover the importance of that idea for the hegelian concept of "logical necessity", pointing out in addition that it may well play the role of an order relation for dialectical inference. (shrink)

Many of our cognitive capacities are the result of enculturation. Enculturation is the temporally extended transformative acquisition of cognitive practices in the cognitive niche. Cognitive practices are embodied and normatively constrained ways to interact with epistemic resources in the cognitive niche in order to complete a cognitive task. The emerging predictive processing perspective offers new functional principles and conceptual tools to account for the cerebral and extra-cerebral bodily components that give rise to cognitive practices. According to this emerging perspective, many (...) cases of perception, action, and cognition are realized by the on-going minimization of prediction error. Predictive processing provides us with a mechanistic perspective that helps investigate the functional details of the acquisition of cognitive practices. The argument of this paper is that research on enculturation and recent work on predictive processing are complementary. The main reason is that predictive processing operates at a sub-personal level and on a physiological time scale of explanation only. A complete account of enculturated cognition needs to take additional levels and temporal scales of explanation into account. This complementarity assumption leads to a new framework—enculturated predictive processing—that operates on multiple levels and temporal scales for the explanation of the enculturated predictive acquisition of cognitive practices. Enculturated predictive processing is committed to explanatory pluralism. That is, it subscribes to the idea that we need multiple perspectives and explanatory strategies to account for the complexity of enculturation. The upshot is that predictive processing needs to be complemented by additional considerations and conceptual tools to realize its full explanatory potential. (shrink)