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  1.  67
    Natural Doubts: Williams's Diagnosis of Scepticism.Reid Buchanan - 2002 - Synthese 131 (1):57-80.
    Michael Williams believes that scepticism about the externalworld seems compelling only because the considerations that underpin it are thoughtto be ``mere platitudes'''' about e.g., the nature and source of human knowledge, and hence,that if it shown through a ``theoretical diagnosis'''' that it does not rest upon suchplatitudes, but contentious theoretical considerations that we are no means bound toaccept, we can simply dismiss the absurd sceptical conclusion. Williams argues thatscepticism does presuppose two extremely contentious doctrines, however, he admits thatif these doctrines (...)
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    Natural Doubts: Williams's Diagnosis Of Scepticism.Reid Buchanan - 2002 - Synthese 131 (1):57-80.
    Michael Williams believes that scepticism about the external world seems compelling only because the considerations that underpin it are thought to be "mere platitudes" about e.g., the nature and source of human knowledge, and hence, that if it shown through a "theoretical diagnosis" that it does not rest upon such platitudes, but contentious theoretical considerations that we are no means bound to accept, we can simply dismiss the absurd sceptical conclusion. Williams argues that scepticism does presuppose two extremely contentious doctrines, (...)
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  3.  19
    From the Familiar to the Mysterious: Putnam's Natural Realism.Reid Buchanan - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (3-4):555-565.
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    The Tension in Wittgenstein's Diagnosis of Scepticism.Reid Buchanan - 2000 - Dialectica 54 (3):201–225.
    I argue that Wittgenstein's rejection of scepticism in On Certainty rests on the view that epistemic concepts such as‘doubt,‘knowledge’,‘justification’and so on, cannot be intelligibly applied to the common sense propositions that traditional sceptical arguments appear to undermine. I detect two strands in On Certainty in support of this view. I attempt to show that neither of these strands adequately establishes the thesis, and that they point to a tension in Wittgenstein's treatment of scepticism. I argue that the first strand is (...)
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  5. The Tension in Wittgenstein's Diagnosis of Scepticism.Reid Buchanan - 2000 - Dialectica 54 (3):201-225.
    I argue that Wittgenstein's rejection of scepticism in On Certainty rests on the view that epistemic concepts such as‘doubt,‘knowledge’,‘justification’and so on, cannot be intelligibly applied to the common sense propositions that traditional sceptical arguments appear to undermine. I detect two strands in On Certainty in support of this view. I attempt to show that neither of these strands adequately establishes the thesis, and that they point to a tension in Wittgenstein's treatment of scepticism. I argue that the first strand is (...)
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