Results for 'Relevant alternatives'

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  1. Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism.Wesley H. Holliday - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (1):1-62.
    Epistemic closure has been a central issue in epistemology over the last forty years. According to versions of the relevant alternatives and subjunctivist theories of knowledge, epistemic closure can fail: an agent who knows some propositions can fail to know a logical consequence of those propositions, even if the agent explicitly believes the consequence (having “competently deduced” it from the known propositions). In this sense, the claim that epistemic closure can fail must be distinguished from the fact that (...)
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  2.  83
    Perceptual Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):969-990.
    A very natural view about perceptual knowledge is articulated, one on which perceptual knowledge is closely related to perceptual discrimination, and which fits well with a relevant alternatives account of knowledge. It is shown that this kind of proposal faces a problem, and various options for resolving this difficulty are explored. In light of this discussion, a two-tiered relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge is offered which avoids the closure problem. It is further shown how this (...)
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  3. Epistemic Logic, Relevant Alternatives, and the Dynamics of Context.Wesley H. Holliday - 2012 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science 7415:109-129.
    According to the Relevant Alternatives (RA) Theory of knowledge, knowing that something is the case involves ruling out (only) the relevant alternatives. The conception of knowledge in epistemic logic also involves the elimination of possibilities, but without an explicit distinction, among the possibilities consistent with an agent’s information, between those relevant possibilities that an agent must rule out in order to know and those remote, far-fetched or otherwise irrelevant possibilities. In this article, I propose formalizations (...)
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  4. Knowledge, Relevant Alternatives and Missed Clues.J. Schaffer - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):202-208.
    The classic version of the relevant alternatives theory (RAT) identifies knowledge with the elimination of relevant alternatives (Dretske 1981, Stine 1976, Lewis 1996, inter alia). I argue that the RAT is trapped by the problem of the missed clue, in which the subject sees but does not appreciate decisive information.
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  5. Relevant Alternatives, Perceptual Knowledge and Discrimination.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):245-268.
    This paper examines the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discrimination in the light of the so-called ‘relevant alternatives’ intuition. It begins by outlining an intuitive relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge which incorporates the insight that there is a close connection between perceptual knowledge and the possession of relevant discriminatory abilities. It is argued, however, that in order to resolve certain problems that face this view, it is essential to recognise an important distinction between favouring (...)
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  6. Relevant Alternatives, Contextualism Included.Ernest Sosa - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):35-65.
    Since this paper is for a conference on “Contextualism in Epistemology and Beyond,” I have opted to sketch a retrospective of contextualism in epistemology, including highlights of the “relevant alternatives” approach, given how relevantism and contextualism have developed in tandem. We focus on externalist forms of contextualism, bypassing internalist forms such as Cohen 1988 and Lewis 1996, but much of our discussion will be applicable to contextualism generally. Internalist contextualism is helpfully discussed in papers by Stewart Cohen, Richard (...)
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  7. A Relevant Alternatives Solution to the Bootstrapping and Self-Knowledge Problems.Darren Bradley - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (7):379-393.
    The main argument given for relevant alternatives theories of knowledge has been that they answer scepticism about the external world. I will argue that relevant alternatives also solve two other problems that have been much discussed in recent years, a) the bootstrapping problem and b) the apparent conflict between semantic externalism and armchair self-knowledge. Furthermore, I will argue that scepticism and Mooreanism can be embedded within the relevant alternatives framework.
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  8.  98
    Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives.Palle Yourgrau - 1983 - Synthese 55 (2):175 - 190.
    Traditionally, skeptics as well as their opponents have agreed that in order to know that p one must be able, by some preferred means, to rule out all the alternatives to p. Recently, however, some philosophers have attempted to avert skepticism not (merely) by weakening the preferred means but rather by articulating a subset of the alternatives to p — the so-called relevant alternatives — and insisting that knowledge that p requires only that we be able (...)
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  9. Use-Novelty, Severity, and a Systematic Neglect of Relevant Alternatives.Tetsuji Iseda - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):413.
    This paper analyzes Deborah Mayo's recent criticism of use-novelty requirement. She claims that her severity criterion captures actual scientific practice better than use-novelty, and that use-novelty is not a necessary condition for severity. Even though certain cases in which evidence used for the construction of the hypothesis can test the hypothesis severely, I do not think that her severity criterion fits better with our intuition about good tests than use-novelty. I argue for this by showing a parallelism in terms of (...)
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  10.  16
    Perceptual Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives.Carter J. Adam & Pritchard Duncan - unknown
    A very natural view about perceptual knowledge is articulated, one on which perceptual knowledge is closely related to perceptual discrimination, and which fits well with a relevant alternatives account of knowledge. It is shown that this kind of proposal faces a problem, and various options for resolving this difficulty are explored. In light of this discussion, a two-tiered relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge is offered which avoids the closure problem. It is further shown how this (...)
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  11.  4
    Perceptual Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - unknown
    A very natural view about perceptual knowledge is articulated, one on which perceptual knowledge is closely related to perceptual discrimination, and which fits well with a relevant alternatives account of knowledge. It is shown that this kind of proposal faces a problem, and various options for resolving this difficulty are explored. In light of this discussion, a two-tiered relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge is offered which avoids the closure problem. It is further shown how this (...)
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  12.  55
    The Relevant Alternatives Theory and Missed Clues.T. Black - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):96 – 106.
    According to the relevant alternatives theory of knowledge (RA), I know that p only if my evidence eliminates all relevant alternatives to p . Jonathan Schaffer has recently argued that David Lewis's version of RA, which is perhaps the most detailed version yet provided, cannot account for our failure to know in cases involving missed clues, that is, cases in which we see but fail to appreciate decisive evidence. I argue, however, that Lewis's version of RA (...)
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  13.  53
    Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives: Comments on Dretske.David H. Sanford - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 40 (3):379 - 388.
    Fred Dretske holds that if one knows something, one need not eliminate every alternative to it but only the relevant alternatives. Besides defending this view in "The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge" ("Phil. Stud.", 40, 363-378, n 81), he makes some tentative suggestions about determining when an alternative is relevant. I discuss these suggestions and conclude that there are problems yet to be solved. I do not conclude that there are insoluble problems or that Dretske's approach is on (...)
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  14. Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: An Empirical Study.Joshua May, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jay G. Hull & Aaron Zimmerman - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):265–273.
    In defending his interest-relative account of knowledge in Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005), Jason Stanley relies heavily on intuitions about several bank cases. We experimentally test the empirical claims that Stanley seems to make concerning our common-sense intuitions about these bank cases. Additionally, we test the empirical claims that Jonathan Schaffer seems to make in his critique of Stanley. We argue that our data impugn what both Stanley and Schaffer claim our intuitions about such cases are. To account for these (...)
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  15. The New Relevant Alternatives Theory.Jonathan Vogel - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):155-180.
  16.  40
    Whole-Hearted Motivation and Relevant Alternatives: A Problem for the Contrastivist Account of Moral Reasons.Andrew Jordan - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (5):835-845.
    Recently, Walter Sinott-Armstrong and Justin Snedegar have argued for a general contrastivist theory of reasons. According to the contrastivist account of reasons, all reasons claims should be understood as a relation with an additional place for a contrast class. For example, rather than X being a reason for A to P simpliciter, the contrastivist claims that X is a reason for A to P out of {P,Q,R…}. The main goal of this paper is to argue that the contrastivist account of (...)
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  17.  90
    Democratically Relevant Alternatives.Robert E. Goodin & Lina Eriksson - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):9-17.
    Many paradoxes have been revealed in the theory of democracy over the years. This article points to yet another paradox at the heart of democracy, whether in its aggregative or deliberative form.The paradox is this: If you are dealing with a large and heterogeneous community, in which people's choices are menu-sensitive in diverse ways, and if people's cognitive capacities preclude them from considering all items on a large menu simultaneouslythen individuals’ choices may be unstable and manipulable depending on how choices (...)
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  18. Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure.G. C. Stine - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 29 (4):249--261.
  19. Relevant Alternatives and Closure.Mark Heller - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):196 – 208.
  20. Contextualism, Contrastivism, Relevant Alternatives, and Closure.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):131-140.
    Contextualists claim two important virtues for their view. First, contextualism is a non-skeptical epistemology, given the plausible idea that not all contexts invoke the high standards for knowledge needed to generate the skeptical conclusion that we know little or nothing. Second, contextualism is able to preserve closure concerning knowledge – the idea that knowledge is extendable on the basis of competent deduction from known premises. As long as one keeps the context fixed, it is plausible to think that some closure (...)
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  21.  68
    Relevant Alternatives, Presuppositions, and Skepticism.Jonathan E. Adler - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (11):653-654.
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    Relevant Alternatives and the Content of Knowledge Attributions.Keith Derose - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):193 - 197.
  23.  51
    Motivating the Relevant Alternatives Approach.Patrick Rysiew - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):259-279.
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  24. Relevant Alternatives Contextualism and Ordinary Contingent Knowledge.Franck Lihoreau - 2008 - Disputatio 2 (24):281-294.
    According to David Lewis’s contextualist analysis of knowledge, there can be contexts in which a subject counts as knowing a proposition just because every possibility that this proposition might be false is irrelevant in those contexts. In this paper I argue that, in some cases at least, Lewis’ analysis results in granting people non-evidentially based knowledge of ordinary contingent truths which, intuitively, cannot be known but on the basis of appropriate evidence.
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  25.  35
    Relevant Alternatives and Demon Skepticism.Bredo C. Johnsen - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (11):643-653.
  26.  52
    Relevant Alternatives.Mark Heller - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (1):23 - 40.
  27.  49
    Comments on Sosa's “Relevant Alternatives, Contextualism Included”.James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):67-72.
    There is much I agree with in Sosa’s paper. His discussion of Stine and Peirce is quite useful; so too his discussion of Dretske in Appendix II. A further issue he focuses on concerns how Contextualists are to give full endorsement to the knowledge-claims of ordinary subjects. Just saying, metalinguistically, that.
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  28.  49
    Deductive Closure and Relevant Alternatives.Ted A. Warfield - 1991 - Southwest Philosophical Studies 13.
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  29.  69
    RELEVANT ALTERNATIVES AND THE SHIFTING STANDARDS OF KNOWLEDGE.Tim Black - 2002 - Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (1):23-32.
    So, C. I don’t know that T. Premises 1 and 2 are both plausible. However, C seems false—I do seem to know that there is a tree before me. AI presents a puzzle because its two plausible premises yield a conclusion whose negation is plausible. And no matter whether we accept or reject AI, we find that we must give up something plausible—either premise 1, premise 2, or the negation of C. But which of these should we give up? I (...)
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    The New Relevant Alternatives TheorY.Jonathan Vogel - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):155-180.
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  31.  2
    Relevant Alternatives and the Shifting Standards of Knowledge.Tim Black - 2002 - Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (1):23-32.
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  32.  11
    Reliability and Relevant Alternatives.David Shatz - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 39 (4):393 - 408.
  33.  1
    The New Relevant Alternatives TheorY.Jonathan Vogel - 1999 - Noanducirc;S 33 (s13):155-180.
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  34. Relevant Alternatives, Presuppositions, and Skepticism.Jonathan E. Adler - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (11):653-654.
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  35. Relevant Alternatives, Contextualism Included. E. Sosa - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):35.
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  36. Motivating the Relevant Alternatives Approach.Patrick Rysiew - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):259-279.
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  37. Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure.G. C. Sane - 2003 - In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. pp. 263.
     
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  38.  26
    How Relevant Are?Irrelevant? Alternatives?Jean-Marie Blin - 1976 - Theory and Decision 7 (1-2):95-105.
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  39.  44
    Relevant Possibilities.Joshua Allen Smith - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):55-71.
    There are a number of relevant alternatives accounts of knowledge in the literature, including those by contextualists (like Lewis and Cohen), and invariantists (like Dretske). Despite widespread discussion of such views, an explication of the notion of relevance is conspicuously absent from the literature. Without a careful explication of that notion, relevant alternatives accounts resist evaluation. This paper attempts to aid in the evaluation of those accounts, by providing an account of relevance. The account rejects two (...)
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  40.  70
    The Logic of Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Simon D'Alfonso - 2014 - Minds and Machines 24 (3):307-325.
    In this paper I look at Fred Dretske’s account of information and knowledge as developed in Knowledge and The Flow of Information. In particular, I translate Dretske’s probabilistic definition of information to a modal logical framework and subsequently use this to explicate the conception of information and its flow which is central to his account, including the notions of channel conditions and relevant alternatives. Some key products of this task are an analysis of the issue of information closure (...)
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  41.  41
    Response to Egré and Xu.Wesley H. Holliday - 2013 - In Johan van Benthem Fenrong Liu (ed.), Logic Across the University: Foundations and Applications. College Publications. pp. 39-46.
    In this note, I respond to comments by Paul Egré and Xu Zhaoqing on my “Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism” (Journal of Philosophical Logic).
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  42.  94
    Contrastivism and Lucky Questions.Kelly Becker - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (2):245-260.
    There’s something deeply right in the idea that knowledge requires an ability to discriminate truth from falsity. Failing to incorporate some version of the discrimination requirement into one’s epistemology generates cases of putative knowledge that are at best problematic. On the other hand, many theories that include a discrimination requirement thereby appear to entail violations of closure. This prima facie tension is resolved nicely in Jonathan Schaffer’s contrastivism, which I describe herein. The contrastivist take on relevant alternatives is (...)
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    Justification in Context.Matjaž Potrč & Vojko Strahovnik - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (2):91-104.
    Contextualism has been a prominent epistemological theory for more than twenty years. Its central claim is that standards for justification and of knowledge ascriptions can vary from one context to another context. However this in not the end of the story, for one must subsequently explain these variations of standards in order to avoid arbitrariness. Two strategies offer themselves at this point: generalism and particularism. We argue that the latter could provide a viable support for an overall contextualist approach. David (...)
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    Some Difficulties for the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives.Samuel Ruhmkorff - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):875-886.
    P. Kyle Stanford defends the problem of unconceived alternatives, which maintains that scientists are unlikely to conceive of all the scientifically plausible alternatives to the theories they accept. Stanford’s argument has been criticized on the grounds that the failure of individual scientists to conceive of relevant alternatives does not entail the failure of science as a corporate body to do so. I consider two replies to this criticism and find both lacking. In the process, I argue (...)
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    Structurally-Defined Alternatives.Roni Katzir - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (6):669-690.
    Scalar implicatures depend on alternatives in order to avoid the symmetry problem. I argue for a structure-sensitive characterization of these alternatives: the alternatives for a structure are all those structures that are at most as complex as the original one. There have been claims in the literature that complexity is irrelevant for implicatures and that the relevant condition is the semantic notion of monotonicity. I provide new data that pose a challenge to the use of monotonicity (...)
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  46. Solving the Moorean Puzzle.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):493-514.
    This article addresses and resolves an epistemological puzzle that has attracted much attention in the recent literature—namely, the puzzle arising from Moorean anti-sceptical reasoning and the phenomenon of transmission failure. The paper argues that an appealing account of Moorean reasoning can be given by distinguishing carefully between two subtly different ways of thinking about justification and evidence. Once the respective distinctions are in place we have a simple and straightforward way to model both the Wrightean position of transmission failure and (...)
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  47. Fallibilism and Multiple Paths to Knowledge.Wesley H. Holliday - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:97-144.
    This chapter argues that epistemologists should replace a “standard alternatives” picture of knowledge, assumed by many fallibilist theories of knowledge, with a new “multipath” picture of knowledge. The chapter first identifies a problem for the standard picture: fallibilists working with this picture cannot maintain even the most uncontroversial epistemic closure principles without making extreme assumptions about the ability of humans to know empirical truths without empirical investigation. The chapter then shows how the multipath picture, motivated by independent arguments, saves (...)
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  48. On Intellectual Skepticism: A Selection of Skeptical Arguments and Tusi's Criticisms, with Some Comparative Notes.Pirooz Fatoorchi - 2013 - Philosophy East and West 63 (2):213-250.
    This essay deals with a selected part of an epistemological controversy provided by Tūsī in response to the skeptical arguments reported by Rāzī that is related to what might be called "intellectual skepticism," or skepticism regarding the judgments of the intellect, particularly in connection with self-evident principles. It will be shown that Rāzī has cited and exposed a position that seems to be no less than a medieval version of empiricism. Tūsī, in contrast, has presented us with a position that (...)
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  49.  25
    Choosing and Describing: Sen and the Irrelevance of Independence Alternatives[REVIEW]Michael Neumann - 2007 - Theory and Decision 63 (1):79-94.
    Amartya Sen argues that it is not, after all, irrational to reverse preferences when your choices are amplified by an ‘irrelevant’ alternative. He offers examples such as the agent who always picks the next-to-largest piece of cake. Given a choice between a larger and smaller piece, I will prefer the smaller one. But when a third and largest piece in added to my alternatives, I will now prefer the formerly largest piece over the smallest piece. This violates ‘contraction consistency’: (...)
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    Questions, Topics and Restricted Closure.Peter Hawke - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2759-2784.
    Single-premise epistemic closure is the principle that: if one is in an evidential position to know that P where P entails Q, then one is in an evidential position to know that Q. In this paper, I defend the viability of opposition to closure. A key task for such an opponent is to precisely formulate a restricted closure principle that remains true to the motivations for abandoning unrestricted closure but does not endorse particularly egregious instances of closure violation. I focus (...)
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