Results for 'Relevant alternatives'

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  1. Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure.G. C. Stine - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 29 (4):249--261.
  2. Relevant Alternatives, Perceptual Knowledge and Discrimination.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):245-268.
    This paper examines the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discrimination in the light of the so-called ‘relevant alternatives’ intuition. It begins by outlining an intuitive relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge which incorporates the insight that there is a close connection between perceptual knowledge and the possession of relevant discriminatory abilities. It is argued, however, that in order to resolve certain problems that face this view, it is essential to recognise an important distinction between favouring (...)
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  3. Relevant Alternatives, Contextualism Included.Ernest Sosa - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):35-65.
    Since this paper is for a conference on “Contextualism in Epistemology and Beyond,” I have opted to sketch a retrospective of contextualism in epistemology, including highlights of the “relevant alternatives” approach, given how relevantism and contextualism have developed in tandem. We focus on externalist forms of contextualism, bypassing internalist forms such as Cohen 1988 and Lewis 1996, but much of our discussion will be applicable to contextualism generally. Internalist contextualism is helpfully discussed in papers by Stewart Cohen, Richard (...)
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  4. Relevant Alternatives and Closure.Mark Heller - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):196 – 208.
  5. Perceptual Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):969-990.
    A very natural view about perceptual knowledge is articulated, one on which perceptual knowledge is closely related to perceptual discrimination, and which fits well with a relevant alternatives account of knowledge. It is shown that this kind of proposal faces a problem, and various options for resolving this difficulty are explored. In light of this discussion, a two-tiered relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge is offered which avoids the closure problem. It is further shown how this (...)
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  6. Relevant Alternatives and the Content of Knowledge Attributions.Keith Derose - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):193 - 197.
    In “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions,” I argue that advocates of the “Relevant Alternatives” theory of knowledge fall into certain mistakes result if they tie the content of a knowledge attribution, on a given occasion of use, too tightly to what the range of relevant alternatives is on that occasion, and I sketch an alternative approach to the issues involved that avoids such mistakes. In “The Shifting Content of Knowledge Attributions,” Anthony Brueckner charges that my own account (...)
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  7. Knowledge, Relevant Alternatives and Missed Clues.J. Schaffer - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):202-208.
    The classic version of the relevant alternatives theory (RAT) identifies knowledge with the elimination of relevant alternatives (Dretske 1981, Stine 1976, Lewis 1996, inter alia). I argue that the RAT is trapped by the problem of the missed clue, in which the subject sees but does not appreciate decisive information.
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  8.  75
    Relevant Alternatives.Mark Heller - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (1):23 - 40.
  9.  82
    The Relevant Alternatives Theory and Missed Clues.T. Black - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):96 – 106.
    According to the relevant alternatives theory of knowledge (RA), I know that p only if my evidence eliminates all relevant alternatives to p . Jonathan Schaffer has recently argued that David Lewis's version of RA, which is perhaps the most detailed version yet provided, cannot account for our failure to know in cases involving missed clues, that is, cases in which we see but fail to appreciate decisive evidence. I argue, however, that Lewis's version of RA (...)
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  10. Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: An Empirical Study.Joshua May, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jay G. Hull & Aaron Zimmerman - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):265–273.
    In defending his interest-relative account of knowledge in Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005), Jason Stanley relies heavily on intuitions about several bank cases. We experimentally test the empirical claims that Stanley seems to make concerning our common-sense intuitions about these bank cases. Additionally, we test the empirical claims that Jonathan Schaffer seems to make in his critique of Stanley. We argue that our data impugn what both Stanley and Schaffer claim our intuitions about such cases are. To account for these (...)
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  11. Relevance and Risk: How the Relevant Alternatives Framework Models the Epistemology of Risk.Georgi Gardiner - forthcoming - Synthese:1-31.
    The epistemology of risk examines how risks bear on epistemic properties. A common framework for examining the epistemology of risk holds that strength of evidential support is best modelled as numerical probability given the available evidence. In this essay I develop and motivate a rival ‘relevant alternatives’ framework for theorising about the epistemology of risk. I describe three loci for thinking about the epistemology of risk. The first locus concerns consequences of relying on a belief for action, where (...)
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  12. The New Relevant Alternatives Theory.Jonathan Vogel - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:155-180.
  13. Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives.Palle Yourgrau - 1983 - Synthese 55 (2):175 - 190.
    Traditionally, skeptics as well as their opponents have agreed that in order to know that p one must be able, by some preferred means, to rule out all the alternatives to p. Recently, however, some philosophers have attempted to avert skepticism not (merely) by weakening the preferred means but rather by articulating a subset of the alternatives to p — the so-called relevant alternatives — and insisting that knowledge that p requires only that we be able (...)
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  14. Relevant Alternatives Contextualism and Ordinary Contingent Knowledge.Franck Lihoreau - 2008 - Disputatio 2 (24):281-294.
    According to David Lewis’s contextualist analysis of knowledge, there can be contexts in which a subject counts as knowing a proposition just because every possibility that this proposition might be false is irrelevant in those contexts. In this paper I argue that, in some cases at least, Lewis’ analysis results in granting people non-evidentially based knowledge of ordinary contingent truths which, intuitively, cannot be known but on the basis of appropriate evidence.
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  15.  45
    Relevant Alternatives and Demon Skepticism.Bredo C. Johnsen - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (11):643-653.
  16. Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism.Wesley H. Holliday - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (1):1-62.
    Epistemic closure has been a central issue in epistemology over the last forty years. According to versions of the relevant alternatives and subjunctivist theories of knowledge, epistemic closure can fail: an agent who knows some propositions can fail to know a logical consequence of those propositions, even if the agent explicitly believes the consequence (having “competently deduced” it from the known propositions). In this sense, the claim that epistemic closure can fail must be distinguished from the fact that (...)
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  17. Democratically Relevant Alternatives.Robert E. Goodin & Lina Eriksson - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):9-17.
    Many paradoxes have been revealed in the theory of democracy over the years. This article points to yet another paradox at the heart of democracy, whether in its aggregative or deliberative form.The paradox is this: If you are dealing with a large and heterogeneous community, in which people's choices are menu-sensitive in diverse ways, and if people's cognitive capacities preclude them from considering all items on a large menu simultaneouslythen individuals’ choices may be unstable and manipulable depending on how choices (...)
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  18. Epistemic Logic, Relevant Alternatives, and the Dynamics of Context.Wesley H. Holliday - 2012 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science 7415:109-129.
    According to the Relevant Alternatives (RA) Theory of knowledge, knowing that something is the case involves ruling out (only) the relevant alternatives. The conception of knowledge in epistemic logic also involves the elimination of possibilities, but without an explicit distinction, among the possibilities consistent with an agent’s information, between those relevant possibilities that an agent must rule out in order to know and those remote, far-fetched or otherwise irrelevant possibilities. In this article, I propose formalizations (...)
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  19. Contextualism, Contrastivism, Relevant Alternatives, and Closure.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):131-140.
    Contextualists claim two important virtues for their view. First, contextualism is a non-skeptical epistemology, given the plausible idea that not all contexts invoke the high standards for knowledge needed to generate the skeptical conclusion that we know little or nothing. Second, contextualism is able to preserve closure concerning knowledge – the idea that knowledge is extendable on the basis of competent deduction from known premises. As long as one keeps the context fixed, it is plausible to think that some closure (...)
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  20.  18
    The New Relevant Alternatives TheorY.Jonathan Vogel - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):155-180.
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  21.  71
    Whole-Hearted Motivation and Relevant Alternatives: A Problem for the Contrastivist Account of Moral Reasons.Andrew Jordan - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (5):835-845.
    Recently, Walter Sinott-Armstrong and Justin Snedegar have argued for a general contrastivist theory of reasons. According to the contrastivist account of reasons, all reasons claims should be understood as a relation with an additional place for a contrast class. For example, rather than X being a reason for A to P simpliciter, the contrastivist claims that X is a reason for A to P out of {P,Q,R…}. The main goal of this paper is to argue that the contrastivist account of (...)
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  22. Motivating the Relevant Alternatives Approach.Patrick Rysiew - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):259-279.
    But it’s not the mere fact that the RA theorist needs an account of ‘ruling out’ and ‘relevance’ that has tended to lead people to regard the RA approach with suspicion. In itself, this simply means that the RA theorist has some further work to do; and what theorist doesn’t? No; the principal source of scepticism regarding the ability of the RA theorist to come up with a complete and satisfactory account of knowing stems, rather, from an unhappiness with the (...)
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  23.  8
    Motivating the Relevant Alternatives Approach.Patrick Rysiew - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):259-279.
    But it’s not the mere fact that the RA theorist needs an account of ‘ruling out’ and ‘relevance’ that has tended to lead people to regard the RA approach with suspicion. In itself, this simply means that the RA theorist has some further work to do; and what theorist doesn’t? No; the principal source of scepticism regarding the ability of the RA theorist to come up with a complete and satisfactory account of knowing stems, rather, from an unhappiness with the (...)
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  24. Comments on Sosa's “Relevant Alternatives, Contextualism Included”.James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):67-72.
    There is much I agree with in Sosa’s paper. His discussion of Stine and Peirce is quite useful; so too his discussion of Dretske in Appendix II. A further issue he focuses on concerns how Contextualists are to give full endorsement to the knowledge-claims of ordinary subjects. Just saying, metalinguistically, that.
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  25. A Relevant Alternatives Solution to the Bootstrapping and Self-Knowledge Problems.Darren Bradley - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (7):379-393.
    The main argument given for relevant alternatives theories of knowledge has been that they answer scepticism about the external world. I will argue that relevant alternatives also solve two other problems that have been much discussed in recent years, a) the bootstrapping problem and b) the apparent conflict between semantic externalism and armchair self-knowledge. Furthermore, I will argue that scepticism and Mooreanism can be embedded within the relevant alternatives framework.
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  26.  67
    Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives: Comments on Dretske.David H. Sanford - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 40 (3):379 - 388.
    Fred Dretske holds that if one knows something, one need not eliminate every alternative to it but only the relevant alternatives. Besides defending this view in "The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge" ("Phil. Stud.", 40, 363-378, n 81), he makes some tentative suggestions about determining when an alternative is relevant. I discuss these suggestions and conclude that there are problems yet to be solved. I do not conclude that there are insoluble problems or that Dretske's approach is on (...)
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  27.  83
    Relevant Alternatives, Presuppositions, and Skepticism.Jonathan E. Adler - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (11):653-654.
  28. RELEVANT ALTERNATIVES AND THE SHIFTING STANDARDS OF KNOWLEDGE.Tim Black - 2002 - Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (1):23-32.
    So, C. I don’t know that T. Premises 1 and 2 are both plausible. However, C seems false—I do seem to know that there is a tree before me. AI presents a puzzle because its two plausible premises yield a conclusion whose negation is plausible. And no matter whether we accept or reject AI, we find that we must give up something plausible—either premise 1, premise 2, or the negation of C. But which of these should we give up? I (...)
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  29.  6
    Relevant Alternatives and the Shifting Standards of Knowledge.Tim Black - 2002 - Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (1):23-32.
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    Relevant Alternatives, Presuppositions, and Skepticism.Jonathan E. Adler - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (11):653-654.
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  31. Relevant Alternatives, Contextualism Included. E. Sosa - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):35.
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  32. Relevant Alternatives in Epistemology and Logic.Peter Hawke - 2016 - In Ángel Nepomuceno Fernández, Olga Pombo Martins & Juan Redmond (eds.), Epistemology, Knowledge and the Impact of Interaction. Springer Verlag.
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  33. Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure.Gail Stine - 1999 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. Oup Usa.
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  34. Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure.G. C. Sane - 2003 - In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. pp. 263.
  35. Fake News, Relevant Alternatives, and the Degradation of Our Epistemic Environment.Christopher Blake-Turner - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1.
    This paper contributes to the growing literature in social epistemology of diagnosing the epistemically problematic features of fake news. I identify two novel problems: the problem of relevant alternatives; and the problem of the degradation of the epistemic environment. The former arises among individual epistemic transactions. By making salient, and thereby relevant, alternatives to knowledge claims, fake news stories threaten knowledge. The problem of the degradation of the epistemic environment arises at the level of entire epistemic (...)
     
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  36. Causal Models and the Relevant Alternatives Theory of Knowledge.Jonathan Vandenburgh - manuscript
    One approach to knowledge, termed the relevant alternatives theory, stipulates that a belief amounts to knowledge if one can eliminate all relevant alternatives to the belief in the epistemic situation. This paper uses causal graphical models to formalize the relevant alternatives approach to knowledge. On this theory, an epistemic situation is encoded through the causal relationships between propositions, which determine which alternatives are relevant and irrelevant. This formalization entails that statistical evidence is (...)
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  37.  58
    Deductive Closure and Relevant Alternatives.Ted A. Warfield - 1991 - Southwest Philosophical Studies 13.
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  38.  26
    Reliability and Relevant Alternatives.David Shatz - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 39 (4):393 - 408.
  39. Use-Novelty, Severity, and a Systematic Neglect of Relevant Alternatives.Tetsuji Iseda - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):413.
    This paper analyzes Deborah Mayo's recent criticism of use-novelty requirement. She claims that her severity criterion captures actual scientific practice better than use-novelty, and that use-novelty is not a necessary condition for severity. Even though certain cases in which evidence used for the construction of the hypothesis can test the hypothesis severely, I do not think that her severity criterion fits better with our intuition about good tests than use-novelty. I argue for this by showing a parallelism in terms of (...)
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  40.  36
    How Relevant Are?Irrelevant? Alternatives?Jean-Marie Blin - 1976 - Theory and Decision 7 (1-2):95-105.
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  41. The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof.Georgi Gardiner - 2019 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 47 (3):288-318.
    According to a common conception of legal proof, satisfying a legal burden requires establishing a claim to a numerical threshold. Beyond reasonable doubt, for example, is often glossed as 90% or 95% likelihood given the evidence. Preponderance of evidence is interpreted as meaning at least 50% likelihood given the evidence. In light of problems with the common conception, I propose a new ‘relevant alternatives’ framework for legal standards of proof. Relevant alternative accounts of knowledge state that a (...)
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  42. On the Characterization of Alternatives.Danny Fox Roni Katzir - 2011 - Natural Language Semantics 19 (1):87-107.
    The computation of both Scalar Implicatures (SI) and Association with Focus (AF) is characterized with reference to sets of alternatives. However, it has generally been assumed that the relevant alternatives are determined in different ways for the two processes. Specifically, it has been assumed that the alternatives for SI – scalar alternatives – are computed by a special procedure specifically designed for implicatures, whereas the alternatives for AF – focus alternatives – are determined (...)
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  43.  81
    Alternatives and Truthmakers in Conditional Semantics.Paolo Santorio - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (10):513-549.
    Natural language conditionals seem to be subject to three logical requirements: they invalidate Antecedent Strengthening, they validate so-called Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents, and they allow for the replacement of logically equivalent clauses in antecedent position. Unfortunately, these requirements are jointly inconsistent. Conservative solutions to the puzzle drop Simplification, treating it as a pragmatic inference. I show that pragmatic accounts of Simplification fail, and develop a truthmaker semantics for conditionals that captures all the relevant data. Differently from existing truthmaker semantics, (...)
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  44. Structurally-Defined Alternatives.Roni Katzir - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (6):669-690.
    Scalar implicatures depend on alternatives in order to avoid the symmetry problem. I argue for a structure-sensitive characterization of these alternatives: the alternatives for a structure are all those structures that are at most as complex as the original one. There have been claims in the literature that complexity is irrelevant for implicatures and that the relevant condition is the semantic notion of monotonicity. I provide new data that pose a challenge to the use of monotonicity (...)
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  45.  72
    Relevant Possibilities.Joshua Allen Smith - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):55-71.
    There are a number of relevant alternatives accounts of knowledge in the literature, including those by contextualists (like Lewis and Cohen), and invariantists (like Dretske). Despite widespread discussion of such views, an explication of the notion of relevance is conspicuously absent from the literature. Without a careful explication of that notion, relevant alternatives accounts resist evaluation. This paper attempts to aid in the evaluation of those accounts, by providing an account of relevance. The account rejects two (...)
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  46.  40
    Alternatives to Histories? Employing a Local Notion of Modal Consistency in Branching Theories.Thomas Müller - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):1-22.
    Branching theories are popular frameworks for modeling objective indeterminism in the form of a future of open possibilities. In such theories, the notion of a history plays a crucial role: it is both a basic ingredient in the axiomatic definition of the framework, and it is used as a parameter of truth in semantics for languages with a future tense. Furthermore, histories—complete possible courses of events—ground the notion of modal consistency: a set of events is modally consistent iff there is (...)
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  47.  94
    Lotteries, Knowledge, and Irrelevant Alternatives.Rachel Mckinnon - 2013 - Dialogue 52 (3):523-549.
    The lottery paradox plays an important role in arguments for various norms of assertion. Why is it that, prior to information on the results of a draw, assertions such as, “My ticket lost,” seem inappropriate? This paper is composed of two projects. First, I articulate a number of problems arising from Timothy Williamson’s analysis of the lottery paradox. Second, I propose a relevant alternatives theory, which I call the Non-Destabilizing Alternatives Theory , that better explains the pathology (...)
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  48. Some Difficulties for the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives.Samuel Ruhmkorff - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):875-886.
    P. Kyle Stanford defends the problem of unconceived alternatives, which maintains that scientists are unlikely to conceive of all the scientifically plausible alternatives to the theories they accept. Stanford’s argument has been criticized on the grounds that the failure of individual scientists to conceive of relevant alternatives does not entail the failure of science as a corporate body to do so. I consider two replies to this criticism and find both lacking. In the process, I argue (...)
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  49.  30
    Too Many Alternatives: Density, Symmetry and Other Predicaments.Danny Fox - unknown
    In a recent paper, Martin Hackl and I identified a variety of circumstances where scalar implicatures, questions, definite descriptions, and sentences with the focus particle only are absent or unacceptable (Fox and Hackl 2006, henceforth F&H). We argued that the relevant effect is one of maximization failure (MF): an application of a maximization operator to a set that cannot have the required maximal member. We derived MF from our hypothesis that the set of degrees relevant for the semantics (...)
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  50.  66
    Some Alternatives in Interpreting Parmenides.Alexander P. D. Mourelatos - 1979 - The Monist 62 (1):3-14.
    In the work of interpreting Parmenides we have witnessed in the ’sixties and ’seventies, in English language scholarship, that rarest of phenomena in the study of ancient philosophy, the emergence of a consensus. Four interpretive theses now seem quite widely shared: Parmenides deliberately suppresses the subject of esti, “is,” or einai, “to be,” in his statement of the two “routes” in B2, his intention being to allow the subject to become gradually specified as the argument unfolds. The negative route, ouk (...)
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