Search results for 'Reliabilism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  4
    Causal Tracking Reliabilism (2012). Mark McEVOY Hofstra University. Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 86-2012 86:73 - 92.
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  2.  46
    B. Beddor (2014). Process Reliabilism's Troubles with Defeat. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):145-159.
    One attractive feature of process reliabilism is its reductive potential: it promises to explain justification in entirely non-epistemic terms. In this paper, I argue that the phenomenon of epistemic defeat poses a serious challenge for process reliabilism’s reductive ambitions. The standard process reliabilist analysis of defeat is the ‘Alternative Reliable Process Account’ (ARP). According to ARP, whether S’s belief is defeated depends on whether S has certain reliable processes available to her which, if they had been used, would (...)
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  3. Valeriano Iranzo (2008). Reliabilism and the Abductive Defence of Scientific Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 39 (1):115-120.
    According to the “no-miracles argument” (NMA), truth is the best explanation of the predictive-instrumental success of scientific theories. A standard objection against NMA is that it is viciously circular. In Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth Stathis Psillos has claimed that the circularity objection can be met when NMA is supplemented with a reliabilist approach to justification. I will try to show, however, that scientific realists cannot take much comfort from this policy: if reliabilism makes no qualifications about the (...)
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  4. Chris Tucker (2014). On What Inferentially Justifies What: The Vices of Reliabilism and Proper Functionalism. Synthese 191 (14):3311-3328.
    We commonly say that some evidence supports a hypothesis or that some premise evidentially supports a conclusion. Both internalists and externalists attempt to analyze this notion of evidential support, and the primary purpose of this paper is to argue that reliabilist and proper functionalist accounts of this relation fail. Since evidential support is one component of inferential justification, the upshot of this failure is that their accounts of inferential justification also fail. In Sect. 2, I clarify the evidential support relation. (...)
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  5. Brian Ball & Michael Blome-Tillmann (2013). Indexical Reliabilism and the New Evil Demon. Erkenntnis 78 (6):1317-1336.
    Stewart Cohen’s New Evil Demon argument raises familiar and widely discussed concerns for reliabilist accounts of epistemic justification. A now standard response to this argument, initiated by Alvin Goldman and Ernest Sosa, involves distinguishing different notions of justification. Juan Comesaña has recently and prominently claimed that his Indexical Reliabilism (IR) offers a novel solution in this tradition. We argue, however, that Comesaña’s proposal suffers serious difficulties from the perspective of the philosophy of language. More specifically, we show that the (...)
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  6.  87
    Kelly Becker (2013). Why Reliabilism Does Not Permit Easy Knowledge. Synthese 190 (17):3751-3775.
    Reliabilism furnishes an account of basic knowledge that circumvents the problem of the given. However, reliabilism and other epistemological theories that countenance basic knowledge have been criticized for permitting all-too-easy higher-level knowledge. In this paper, I describe the problem of easy knowledge, look briefly at proposed solutions, and then develop my own. I argue that the easy knowledge problem, as it applies to reliabilism, hinges on a false and too crude understanding of ‘reliable’. With a more plausible (...)
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  7.  26
    Spyridon Palermos (2015). Active Externalism, Virtue Reliabilism and Scientific Knowledge. Synthese 192 (9):2955-2986.
    Combining active externalism in the form of the extended and distributed cognition hypotheses with virtue reliabilism can provide the long sought after link between mainstream epistemology and philosophy of science. Specifically, by reading virtue reliabilism along the lines suggested by the hypothesis of extended cognition, we can account for scientific knowledge produced on the basis of both hardware and software scientific artifacts. Additionally, by bringing the distributed cognition hypothesis within the picture, we can introduce the notion of epistemic (...)
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  8.  84
    Wayne Davis & Christoph Jäger (2012). Reliabilism and the Extra Value of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):93-105.
    Goldman and Olsson ( 2009 ) have responded to the common charge that reliabilist theories of knowledge are incapable of accounting for the value knowledge has beyond mere true belief. We examine their “conditional probability solution” in detail, and show that it does not succeed. The conditional probability relation is too weak to support instrumental value, and the specific relation they describe is inessential to the value of knowledge. At best, they have described conditions in which knowledge indicates that additional (...)
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  9. Jochen Briesen (2013). Reliabilism, Bootstrapping, and Epistemic Circularity. Synthese 190 (18):4361-4372.
    Pretheoretically we hold that we cannot gain justification or knowledge through an epistemically circular reasoning process. Epistemically circular reasoning occurs when a subject forms the belief that p on the basis of an argument A, where at least one of the premises of A already presupposes the truth of p. It has often been argued that process reliabilism does not rule out that this kind of reasoning leads to justification or knowledge. For some philosophers, this is a reason to (...)
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  10.  81
    Erik J. Olsson & Martin L. Jönsson (2011). Kinds of Learning and the Likelihood of Future True Beliefs: Reply to Jäger on Reliabilism and the Value Problem. Theoria 77 (3):214-222.
    We reply to Christoph Jäger's criticism of the conditional probability solution (CPS) to the value problem for reliabilism due to Goldman and Olsson (2009). We argue that while Jäger raises some legitimate concerns about the compatibility of CPS with externalist epistemology, his objections do not in the end reduce the plausibility of that solution.
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  11.  83
    David Henderson, Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2007). Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism. Acta Analytica 22 (4):281-300.
    We propose an approach to epistemic justification that incorporates elements of both reliabilism and evidentialism, while also transforming these elements in significant ways. After briefly describing and motivating the non-standard version of reliabilism that Henderson and Horgan call “transglobal” reliabilism, we harness some of Henderson and Horgan’s conceptual machinery to provide a non-reliabilist account of propositional justification (i.e., evidential support). We then invoke this account, together with the notion of a transglobally reliable belief-forming process, to give an (...)
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  12.  69
    Christoph Jäger (2011). Process Reliabilism and the Value Problem. Theoria 77 (3):201-213.
    Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson have recently proposed a novel solution to the value problem in epistemology, i.e., to the question of how to account for the apparent surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief. Their “conditional probability solution” maintains that even simple process reliabilism can account for the added value of knowledge, since forming true beliefs in a reliable way raises the objective probability that the subject will have more true belief of a similar kind in the (...)
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  13.  44
    Kelly Becker (2006). Reliabilism and Safety. Metaphilosophy 37 (5):691-704.
    : Duncan Pritchard has recently highlighted the problem of veritic epistemic luck and claimed that a safety‐based account of knowledge succeeds in eliminating veritic luck where virtue‐based accounts and process reliabilism fail. He then claims that if one accepts a safety‐based account, there is no longer a motivation for retaining a commitment to reliabilism. In this article, I delineate several distinct safety principles, and I argue that those that eliminate veritic luck do so only if at least implicitly (...)
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  14.  25
    Mark McEvoy (2013). Causal Tracking Reliabilism and the Lottery Problem. Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):73-92.
    The lottery problem is often regarded as a successful counterexample to reliabilism. The process of forming your true belief that your ticket has lost solely on the basis of considering the odds is, from a purely probabilistic viewpoint, much more reliable than the process of forming a true belief that you have lost by reading the results in a normally reliable newspaper. Reliabilism thus seems forced, counterintuitively, to count the former process as knowledge if it so counts the (...)
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  15.  94
    Patrick Bondy (2014). Epistemic Circularity, Reliabilism, and Transmission Failure. Episteme 11 (3):335-348.
    Epistemically circular arguments have been receiving quite a bit of attention in the literature for the past decade or so. Often the goal is to determine whether reliabilists (or other foundationalists) are committed to the legitimacy of epistemically circular arguments. It is often assumed that epistemic circularity is objectionable, though sometimes reliabilists accept that their position entails the legitimacy of some epistemically circular arguments, and then go on to affirm that such arguments really are good ones. My goal in this (...)
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  16.  82
    James R. Beebe (2006). Reliabilism and Deflationism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):495 – 510.
    In this article I examine several issues concerning reliabilism and deflationism. I critique Alvin Goldman's account of the key differences between correspondence and deflationary theories and his claim that reliabilism can be combined only with those truth theories that maintain a commitment to truthmakers. I then consider how reliability could be analysed from a deflationary perspective and show that deflationism is compatible with reliabilism. I close with a discussion of whether a deflationary theory of knowledge is possible.
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  17.  98
    Mark Newman (2010). The No-Miracles Argument, Reliabilism, and a Methodological Version of the Generality Problem. Synthese 177 (1):111 - 138.
    The No-Miracles Argument (NMA) is often used to support scientific realism. We can formulate this argument as an inference to the best explanation this accusation of circularity by appealing to reliabilism, an externalist epistemology. In this paper I argue that this retreat fails. Reliabilism suffers from a potentially devastating difficulty known as the Generality Problem and attempts to solve this problem require adopting both epistemic and metaphysical assumptions regarding local scientific theories. Although the externalist can happily adopt the (...)
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  18.  66
    Kourken Michaelian (2009). Reliabilism and Privileged Access. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:69-109.
    Reliabilism is invoked by a standard causal response to the slow switching argument for incompatibilism about mental content externalism and privileged access. Though the response in question is negative, in that it only establishes that, given such an epistemology, externalism does not rule privileged access out, the appeal to reliabilism involves an assumption about the reliability of introspection, an assumption that in turn grounds a simple argument for the positive conclusion that reliabilism itself implies privileged access. This (...)
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  19.  32
    Mark McEvoy (2014). Causal Tracking Reliabilism and the Gettier Problem. Synthese 191 (17):4115-4130.
    This paper argues that reliabilism can handle Gettier cases once it restricts knowledge producing reliable processes to those that involve a suitable causal link between the subject’s belief and the fact it references. Causal tracking reliabilism (as this version of reliabilism is called) also avoids the problems that refuted the causal theory of knowledge, along with problems besetting more contemporary theories (such as virtue reliabilism and the “safety” account of knowledge). Finally, causal tracking reliabilism allows (...)
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  20.  83
    Jack C. Lyons (2009). Perception and Virtue Reliabilism. Acta Analytica 24 (4):249-261.
    In some recent work, Ernest Sosa rejects the “perceptual model” of rational intuition, according to which intuitive beliefs (e.g., that ) are justified by standing in the appropriate relation to a nondoxastic intellectual experience (a seeming-true, or the like), in much the way that perceptual beliefs are often held to be justified by an appropriate relation to nondoxastic sense experiential states. By extending some of Sosa’s arguments and adding a few of my own, I argue that Sosa is right to (...)
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  21.  23
    Mark Mcevoy (2005). Mathematical Apriorism and Warrant: A Reliabilist-Platonist Account. Philosophical Forum 36 (4):399–417.
    Mathematical apriorism holds that mathematical truths must be established using a priori processes. Against this, it has been argued that apparently a priori mathematical processes can, under certain circumstances, fail to warrant the beliefs they produce; this shows that these warrants depend on contingent features of the contexts in which they are used. They thus cannot be a priori. -/- In this paper I develop a position that combines a reliabilist version of mathematical apriorism with a platonistic view of mathematical (...)
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  22.  93
    J. R. Beebe (2004). Reliabilism, Truetemp and New Perceptual Faculties. Synthese 140 (3):307 - 329.
    According to the thought experiment most commonly used to argue against reliabilism, Mr. Truetemp is given an unusual but reliable cognitive faculty. Since he is unaware of the existence of this faculty, its deliverances strike him as rather odd. Many think that Truetemp would not have justified beliefs. Since he satisfies the reliabilist conditions for justified belief, reliabilism appears to be mistaken. I argue that the Truetemp case is underdescribed and that this leads readers to make erroneous assumptions (...)
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  23.  54
    Thomas Grundmann (2015). How Reliabilism Saves the Apriori/Aposteriori Distinction. Synthese 192 (9):2747-2768.
    Contemporary epistemologists typically define a priori justification as justification that is independent of sense experience. However, sense experience plays at least some role in the production of many paradigm cases of a priori justified belief. This raises the question of when experience is epistemically relevant to the justificatory status of the belief that is based on it. In this paper, I will outline the answers that can be given by the two currently dominant accounts of justification, i.e. evidentialism and (...). While for the evidentialist, experience is epistemically relevant only if it is used as evidence, the reliabilist requires that the reliability of the relevant process depends on the reliability of experiential processes. I will argue that the reliabilist account accommodates our pre-theoretic classifications much better. In the final part of my paper I will use the reliabilist criterion to defend the a priori—a posteriori distinction against recent challenges by Hawthorne and Williamson. (shrink)
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  24.  9
    Larry A. Herzberg (2016). On Knowing How I Feel About That—A Process-Reliabilist Approach. Acta Analytica 31 (4):419-438.
    Human subjects seem to have a type of introspective access to their mental states that allows them to immediately judge the types and intensities of their occurrent emotions, as well as what those emotions are about or “directed at”. Such judgments manifest what I call “emotion-direction beliefs”, which, if reliably produced, may constitute emotion-direction knowledge. Many psychologists have argued that the “directed emotions” such beliefs represent have a componential structure, one that includes feelings of emotional responses and related but independent (...)
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  25.  66
    Ernest Sosa (1992). Generic Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Issues 2:79-92.
    Problems for Generic Reliabilism lead to a more specific account of knowledge as involving the exercise of intellectual virtues or faculties.
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  26.  6
    Jan-Hendrik Heinrichs (2014). The Numbers Don't Fit: A Problem for Reliabilism. Epistemologia 1:96-105.
    Reliabilism suffers from a problem with long sequences of justifications. The theory of justification provided in process reliabilism allows for an implausibly large extension of ‘justified belief’. According to process reliabilist theory, it is possible that a justifying cognitive process has an arbitrarily low probability of being successful and a justified belief an arbitrarily low probability of being true. This result violates reliabilism’s aims as well as our ordinary standards of justification.
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  27.  9
    Mark McEvoy (2005). The Internalist Counterexample to Reliabilism. Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):179-187.
    An unadorned form of process reliabilism (UPR) contends that knowledge is true belief, produced by a reliable process, undefeated by a more reliable process. There is no requirement that one know that one’s belief meets this requirement; that it actually does so is sufficient. An integral aspect of UPR, then, is the rejection of the KK thesis. One popular method of showing the implausibility of UPR is to specify a case where a subject satisfies all of UPR’s conditions on (...)
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  28.  1
    David Christensen (2007). Three Questions About Leplin’s Reliabilism. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):43-50.
    This paper raises three critical questions about Jarrett Leplin's version of reliabilism.
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  29. Stewart Clem (2008). Warrant and Epistemic Virtues: Toward and Agent Reliabilist Account of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge. Dissertation, Oklahoma State University
    Alvin Plantinga’s theory of knowledge, as developed in his Warrant trilogy, has shaped the debates surrounding many areas in epistemology in profound ways. Plantinga has received his share of criticism, however, particularly in his treatment of belief in God as being “properly basic”. There has also been much confusion surrounding his notions of warrant and proper function, to which Plantinga has responded numerous times. Many critics remain unsatisfied, while others have developed alternative understandings of warrant in order to rescue Plantinga’s (...)
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  30. Anne Meylan (2007). The Value Problem of Knowledge. Against a Reliabilist Solution. Proceedings of the Latin Meeting in Analytic Philosophy:85-92.
    A satisfying theory of knowledge has to explain why knowledge seems to be better than mere true belief. In this paper, I try to show that the best reliabilist explanation (ERA+) is still not able to solve this problem. According to an already elaborated answer (ERA), it is better to possess knowledge that p because this makes likely that one’s future belief of a similar kind will also be true. I begin with a metaphysical comment which gives birth to ERA (...)
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  31.  4
    Kawalec Pawel (2003). Structural Reliabilism: Inductive Logic as a Theory of Justification. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    This book revives inductive logic by bringing out the underlying epistemology. The resulting structural reliabilist theory propounds the view that justification supervenes on syntactic and semantic properties of sentences as justification-bearers. It is claimed to set up a genuine alternative to the prevailing theories of justification. Kawalec substantiates this claim by confronting structural reliabilism with a number of epistemological problems. While the book is addressed to both professionals and students of philosophical logic, probability, epistemology, and philosophy of science, it (...)
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  32. Jon Altschul (2011). Reliabilism and Brains in Vats. Acta Analytica 26 (3):257-272.
    According to epistemic internalism, the only facts that determine the justificational status of a belief are facts about the subject’s own mental states, like beliefs and experiences. Externalists instead hold that certain external facts, such as facts about the world or the reliability of a belief-producing mechanism, affect a belief’s justificational status. Some internalists argue that considerations about evil demon victims and brains in vats provide excellent reason to reject externalism: because these subjects are placed in epistemically unfavorable settings, externalism (...)
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  33.  84
    Jesper Kallestrup (2009). Reliabilist Justification: Basic, Easy, and Brute. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 24 (3):155-171.
    Process reliabilists hold that in order for a belief to be justified, it must result from a reliable cognitive process. They also hold that a belief can be basically justified: justified in this manner without having any justification to believe that belief is reliably produced. Fumerton (1995), Vogel (2000), and Cohen (2002) have objected that such basic justification leads to implausible easy justification by means of either epistemic closure principles or so-called track record arguments. I argue that once we carefully (...)
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  34. Sanford C. Goldberg (2009). Reliabilism in Philosophy. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):105 - 117.
    The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predicament.
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  35.  70
    J. Brown (2000). Reliabilism, Knowledge, and Mental Content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2):115-35.
    I consider whether one particular anti-individualist claim, the doctrine of object-dependent thoughts (DODT), is compatible with the Principle of Privileged Access, or PPA, which states that, in general, a subject can have non-empirical knowledge of her thought contents. The standard defence of the compatibility of anti-individualism and PPA emphasises the reliability of the process which produces a subject's second order beliefs about her thought contents. I examine whether this defence can be applied to DODT, given that DODT generates the possibility (...)
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  36.  51
    David Christensen (2007). Three Questions About Leplin's Reliabilism. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):43 - 50.
    Jarrett Leplin’s paper is multifaceted; it’s rich with ideas, and I won’t even try to touch on all of them. Instead, I’d like to raise three questions about the paper: one about its definition of reliable method, one about its solution to the generality problem, and one about its answer to clairvoyance-type objections.
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  37.  64
    Jennifer Wilson Mulnix (2008). Reliabilism, Intuition, and Mathematical Knowledge. Filozofia 62 (8):715-723.
    It is alleged that the causal inertness of abstract objects and the causal conditions of certain naturalized epistemologies precludes the possibility of mathematical know- ledge. This paper rejects this alleged incompatibility, while also maintaining that the objects of mathematical beliefs are abstract objects, by incorporating a naturalistically acceptable account of ‘rational intuition.’ On this view, rational intuition consists in a non-inferential belief-forming process where the entertaining of propositions or certain contemplations results in true beliefs. This view is free of any (...)
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  38.  20
    Peter J. Graham (2014). Against Transglobal Reliabilism. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):525-535.
    David Henderson and Terry Horgan argue that doxastic epistemic justification requires the transglobal reliability of the belief-forming process. Transglobal reliability is reliability across a wide range of experientially possible global environments. Focusing on perception, I argue that justification does not require transglobal reliability, for perception is non-accidentally reliable and confers justification but not always transglobally reliable. Transglobal reliability is an epistemically desirable property of belief-forming processes, but not necessary for justification.
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  39. Juan Comesaña (2010). Evidentialist Reliabilism. Noûs 44 (4):571-600.
    I argue for a theory that combines elements of reliabilism and evidentialism.
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  40. John Greco (1999). Agent Reliabilism. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):273-296.
    This paper reviews two skeptical arguments and argues that a reliabilist framework is necessary to avoid them. The paper also argues that agent reliabilism, which makes the knower the seat of reliability, is the most plausible version of reliabilism.
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  41.  28
    Alvin I. Goldman (2012). Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays. OUP Usa.
    This is the most up-to-date collection of essays by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, refining and clarifying that theory and critiquing its rivals. The volume features important essays on the internalism/externalism debate, epistemic value, the intuitional methodology of philosophy, and social epistemology.
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  42.  62
    Jeffrey Dunn & Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (forthcoming). Is Reliabilism a Form of Consequentialism? American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Reliabilism -- the view that a belief is justified iff it is produced by a reliable process -- is often characterized as a form of consequentialism. Recently, critics of reliabilism have suggested that, since a form of consequentialism, reliabilism condones a variety of problematic trade-offs, involving cases where someone forms an epistemically deficient belief now that will lead her to more epistemic value later. In the present paper, we argue that the relevant argument against reliabilism fails (...)
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  43. Alvin Goldman (2008). Reliabilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Reliabilism is a general approach to epistemology that emphasizes the truth conduciveness of a belief forming process, method, or other epistemologically relevant factor. The reliability theme appears both in theories of knowledge and theories of justification. ‘Reliabilism’ is sometimes used broadly to refer to any theory of knowledge or justification that emphasizes truth getting or truth indicating properties. These include theories originally proposed under different labels, such as ‘tracking’ theories. More commonly, ‘reliabilism’ is used narrowly to refer (...)
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  44. Hilary Kornblith (2009). A Reliabilist Solution to the Problem of Promiscuous Bootstrapping. Analysis 69 (2):263-267.
    Jonathan Vogel has presented a disturbing problem for reliabilism. 1 Reliabilists claim that knowledge is reliably produced true belief. Reliabilism is, of course, a version of externalism, and on such a view, a knower need have no knowledge, no justified belief, indeed, no conception that his or her belief is reliably produced. It is the fact that the knower's true belief is reliably produced which makes it a case of knowledge, not any appreciation of this fact. But Vogel (...)
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  45. Berit Brogaard (2006). Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):335-354.
    Virtue reliabilism appears to have a major advantage over generic reliabilism: only the former has the resources to explain the intuition that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. I argue that this appearance is illusory. It is sustained only by the misguided assumption that a principled distinction can be drawn between those belief-forming methods that are grounded in the agent’s intellectual virtues, and those that are not. A further problem for virtue reliabilism is that of (...)
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  46.  51
    Kelly Becker (2006). Is Counterfactual Reliabilism Compatible with Higher-Level Knowledge? Dialectica 60 (1):79–84.
    Jonathan Vogel has recently argued that counterfactual reliabilism cannot account for higher‐level knowledge that one's belief is true, or not false. His particular argument for this claim is straightforward and valid. Interestingly, there is a parallel argument, based on an alternative but plausible reinterpretation of the main premise in Vogel's argument, which squares CR with higher‐level knowledge both that one's belief is true and that one's belief is not false. I argue that, while Vogel's argument reveals the incompatibility of (...)
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  47.  15
    Martin L. Jönsson (2013). A Reliabilism Built on Cognitive Convergence: An Empirically Grounded Solution to the Generality Problem. Episteme 10 (3):241-268.
    Process-reliabilist analyses of justification and knowledge face the generality problem. Recent discussion of this problem turns on certain untested empirical assumptions that this paper investigates. Three experiments are reported: two are free-naming studies that support the existence of a basic level in the previously unexplored domain of names for belief-forming processes; the third demonstrates that reliability judgments for the basic-level belief-forming process types are very strongly correlated with the corresponding justification and knowledge judgments. I argue that these results lend support (...)
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  48.  73
    Juan Comesaña (2009). What Lottery Problem for Reliabilism? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):1-20.
    It can often be heard in the hallways, and occasionally read in print, that reliabilism runs into special trouble regarding lottery cases. My main aim in this paper is to argue that this is not so. Nevertheless, lottery cases do force us to pay close attention to the relation between justification and probability.
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    Kourken Michaelian (2014). JFGI: From Distributed Cognition to Distributed Reliabilism. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):314-346.
    While, prima facie, virtue/credit approaches in epistemology would appear to be in tension with distributed/extended approaches in cognitive science, Pritchard () has recently argued that the tension here is only apparent, at least given a weak version of distributed cognition, which claims merely that external resources often make critical contributions to the formation of true belief, and a weak virtue theory, which claims merely that, whenever a subject achieves knowledge, his cognitive agency makes a significant contribution to the formation of (...)
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  50. Jeff Kochan (2008). Realism, Reliabilism, and the 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (1):21 – 38.
    In this essay, I respond to Tim Lewens's proposal that realists and Strong Programme theorists can find common ground in reliabilism. I agree with Lewens, but point to difficulties in his argument. Chief among these is his assumption that reliabilism is incompatible with the Strong Programme's principle of symmetry. I argue that the two are, in fact, compatible, and that Lewens misses this fact because he wrongly supposes that reliabilism entails naturalism. The Strong Programme can fully accommodate (...)
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