Liberal political philosophy emphasizes the benefits of membership in a cultural group and, in the opinion of this challenging book, neglects its harmful, oppressive aspects. Andrew Kernohan argues that an oppressive culture perpetuates inegalitarian social meanings and false assumptions about who is entitled to what. Cultural pollution harms fundamental interests in self-respect and knowledge of the good and is diffuse, insidious, and unnoticed. This cultural pollution is analogous to environmental pollution, and though difficult to detect, is nonetheless just as real. (...) The book's conclusion is that a liberal state committed to the moral equality of persons must accept a strong role in reforming our cultural environment. (shrink)
The topic of recognition has come to occupy a central place in debates in social and political theory. Developed by George Herbert Mead and Charles Taylor, it has been given expression in the program for Critical Theory developed by Axel Honneth in his book The Struggle for Recognition. Honneth's research program offers an empirically insightful way of reflecting on emancipatory struggles for greater justice and a powerful theoretical tool for generating a conception of justice and the good that enables the (...) normative evaluation of such struggles. This 2007 volume offers a critical clarification and evaluation of this research program, particularly its relationship to the other major development in critical social and political theory; namely, the focus on power as formative of practical identities proposed by Michel Foucault and developed by theorists such as Judith Butler, James Tully, and Iris Marion Young. (shrink)
We revisit the characterization of the Shapley value by van den Brink (Int J Game Theory, 2001, 30:309–319) via efficiency, the Null player axiom, and some fairness axiom. In particular, we show that this characterization also works within certain classes of TU games, including the classes of superadditive and of convex games. Further, we advocate some differential version of the marginality axiom (Young, Int J Game Theory, 1985, 14: 65–72), which turns out to be equivalent to the van den (...)Brink fairness axiom on large classes of games. (shrink)
A solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or simply TU-games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss two classes of equal surplus sharing solutions. The first class consists of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the center-of-gravity of the imputation-set value. The second class is the dual class consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the egalitarian non-separable contribution value. We provide characterizations of the two classes of (...) solutions using either population solidarity or a reduced game consistency in addition to other standard properties. (shrink)
A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable and fixed (...) player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class. (shrink)
Digraph games are cooperative TU-games associated to domination structures which can be modeled by directed graphs. Examples come from sports competitions or from simple majority win digraphs corresponding to preference profiles in social choice theory. The Shapley value, core, marginal vectors and selectope vectors of digraph games are characterized in terms of so-called simple score vectors. A general characterization of the class of (almost positive) TU-games where each selectope vector is a marginal vector is provided in terms of game semi-circuits. (...) Finally, applications to the ranking of teams in sports competitions and of alternatives in social choice theory are discussed. (shrink)
A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. For every symmetric network we define a cooperative transferable utility game that measures the “power” of each coalition of positions in the network. Applying the Shapley value to this game yields a network power measure, the β-measure, which reflects the power of the individual positions in the network. Applying this power distribution method iteratively yields a limit distribution, which turns out to be (...) proportional to the well-known degree measure. We compare the β-measure and degree measure by providing characterizations, which differ only in the normalization that is used. (shrink)
The paper discusses whether deliberative democracy should make us see democracy as deliberation only insofar as we need to see it as such, or whether it should make us see democracy as deliberation essentially. Critics have argued that deliberative democracy does the latter rather than the former. But they have not sufficiently shown how this works, why exactly it is problematic, and how the associated problems may be overcome. Drawing on recent literature on Ludwig Wittgenstein's idea of being held captive (...) by a picture, I develop a conceptual framework for understanding these questions. Drawing on recent empirical work on the realities of deliberative democracy, I show why empirical accounts of democracy demand that we learn to see democracy under many different aspects - of which deliberation is an important, but not necessarily the essential one. (shrink)
This book presents a range of investigative essays on the concept of reasons of one's own by leading authors from all relevant philosophical areas of expertise.
It has recently been argued by both lay people, church leaders and academic philosophers that evolutionary theory – and especially the theory of common ancestry – rules out any adequate notion of human dignity (I). In this paper, this claim is examined and refuted. First of all, when spelled out in a conceptually unambiguous way, it turns out that the evolutionary argument against human dignity hinges on the belief that human uniqueness , as this was traditionally encapsulated in the doctrine (...) of the imago Dei , has been falsified (II). Secondly, therefore, a recent proposal to reinterpret this doctrine in a way which allows us to drop the notion of human uniqueness but to still uphold a robust notion of human dignity is discussed (III). It is concluded, however, that this proposal is problematic for several reasons. Thirdly, therefore, a more fruitful avenue is explored, namely the attempt to reinterpret the notions of human uniqueness and human dignity along theological rather than biological lines (IV). It will turn out that this attempt, which is inspired by both contemporary biblical scholarship and systematic theology, in fact enables us to adhere to notions of human uniqueness and human dignity (and to connect this to the doctrine of the imago Dei ) which are not at odds with evolutionary theory. Finally, some conclusions are drawn (V). (shrink)
This paper explores the relation between evolutionary explanations of religious belief and a core idea in both classical Christian theology and Reformed Epistemology, namely that humans have fallen into sin. In particular, it challenges the claim made by De Cruz and De Smedt that ‘ in the light of current evolutionary and cognitive theories, the Reformed epistemological view of NES [the noetic effects of sin] is in need of revision.’ Three possible solutions to this conundrum are examined, two of which (...) are shown to be plausible. (shrink)
Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) are online tools designed to help citizens decide how to vote. They typically offer their users a representation of what is at stake in an election by matching user preferences on issues with those of parties or candidates. While the use of VAAs has boomed in recent years in both established and new democracies, this new phenomenon in the electoral landscape has received little attention from political theorists. The current academic debate is focused on epistemic aspects (...) of the question how a VAA can adequately represent electoral politics. We argue that conceptual and normative presuppositions at play in the background of the tool are at least as important. Even a well-developed VAA does not simply reflect what is at stake in the election by neutrally passing along information. Rather, it structures political information in a way that is informed by the developers’ presuppositions. Yet, these presuppositions remain hidden if we interpret the tool as a mirror that offers the user a reflection of him/herself situated within the political landscape. VAAs should therefore be understood as electoral dioramas, staged according to a contestable picture of politics. (shrink)
The Shapley value is the unique value defined on the class of cooperative games in characteristic function form which satisfies certain intuitively reasonable axioms. Alternatively, the Banzhaf value is the unique value satisfying a different set of axioms. The main drawback of the latter value is that it does not satisfy the efficiency axiom, so that the sum of the values assigned to the players does not need to be equal to the worth of the grand coalition. By definition, the (...) normalized Banzhaf value satisfies the efficiency axiom, but not the usual axiom of additivity. (shrink)
We deal with the ranking problem of the nodes in a directed graph. The bilateral relationships specified by a directed graph may reflect the outcomes of a sport competition, the mutual reference structure between websites, or a group preference structure over alternatives. We introduce a class of scoring methods for directed graphs, indexed by a single nonnegative parameter α. This parameter reflects the internal slackening of a node within an underlying iterative process. The class of so-called internal slackening scoring methods, (...) denoted by λ α , consists of the limits of these processes. It is seen that λ0 extends the invariant scoring method, while λ ∞ extends the fair bets scoring method. Method λ1 corresponds with the existing λ-scoring method of Borm et al. (Ann Oper Res 109(1):61–75, 2002) and can be seen as a compromise between λ0 and λ ∞ . In particular, an explicit proportionality relation between λ α and λ1 is derived. Moreover, the internal slackening scoring methods are applied to the setting of social choice situations where they give rise to a class of social choice correspondences that refine both the Top cycle correspondence and the Uncovered set correspondence. (shrink)
