Within Germany, Carl Schmitt's status as a political thinker is on a par with Machiavelli and Hobbes. With the rise in neo-conservatism and authoritarian liberalism in less developed countries such as Chile and Singapore, Renato Christi believes Schmitt's theories will become of considerable importance. Nazi Third Reich. His political theories provide an insight into the nature of Conservatism. well as extrapolate possibilities for the future.

Nedelsky and Kelsen criticize the notion of subjective rights. While Nedelsky does so on the basis of a relational theory of rights founded on the Hegelian intersubjective recognition, Kelsen rejects Hegel’s theory of rights because property, the paradigmatic subjective right, appears to be constituted prior to intersubjectve recognition. This paper probes into Hegel’s conception of property to elucidate the root of the divergence between Nedelsky and Kelsen. Pierson v. Post is examined as an illustration of that divergence.

While Hegel’s political philosophy has been attacked on the left by republican democrats and on the right by feudalist reactionaries, his apologists see him as a liberal reformer, a moderate who theorized about the development of a free-market society within the bounds of a stabilizing constitutional state. This centrist view has gained ascendancy since the end of the Second World War, enshrining Hegel within the liberal tradition. In this book, Renato Cristi argues that, like the Prussian liberal reformers of his (...) time, Hegel was committed to expand the scope of a free economy and concurrently to ensure that the social practice of subjective freedom did not endanger political stability and order. Aware that a system of mutual advantage failed to integrate the members of civil society and that profound social disharmonies were ineradicable, Hegel adopted the views of the French liberal _doctrinaires_, who sought to realize the principles of the French Revolution by supporting Louis XVIII’s sovereign assertion of the monarchical principle. Not surprisingly, Hegel hailed the French _Charte_ of June 1814 as a beacon of freedom. Endorsement of the monarchical principle was meant to prevent the atomized individuals of civil society from gaining control of the state through appeals to popular sovereignty. This challenges most conventional interpretations of Hegel’s theory of the state and draws it closer to the conservative-authoritarian end of the political spectrum than is usual. (shrink)

Este ensayo analiza la conjunción libertad/autoridad defendida por el republicanismo clásico. Como pensador moderno, Maquiavelo recupera esta síntesis clásica y define la autoridad como la condición de posibilidad de la libertad. Pero, como muestra Eric Nelson, el republicanismo de Maquiavelo es más ateniense que romano. El republicanismo de Michael Sandel tiene una orientación similar. Basado en la ontología social desarrollada por Arendt y Taylor, Sandel postula el valor intrínseco de las nociones de participación y soberanía popular. De este modo, él (...) puede refutar la objeción de Rorty y su interpretación idiosincrática de Dewey. Según Sandel, Dewey critica el rechazo liberal de la autoridad y es capaz de articular orgánicamente la autoridad democrática y la libertad. This essay analyzes the conjunction freedom/authority defended by classical republicanism. As a modern thinker, Machiavelli retrieves this classical synthesis and defines the authority of law as the condition of possibility for freedom. But, as Eric Neson shows, Machiavelli's republicanism is more Athenian than Roman. Michael Sandel's democratic republicanism has a similar orientation. Besed on the social ontology developed by Arendt and Taylor, Sandel postulates the intrinsic value of the notions of participation and popular sovereignty. In this way he can refute Rorty's objections and his idiosyncratic interpretation of Dewey. According to Sandel, Dewey criticizes liberalism's rejection of authority and is able organically to articulate democratic authority and freedom. (shrink)

A critical examination of Kymlicka's conception of republicanism as a mediation between liberalism and communitarianism. The difficulties encountered by Kymlicka's view are traced to the holistic ontology republicanism shares with communitarianism. Mediation with liberalism is better attained by expanding the range of participation beyond the political sphere and a recognition of the value of representation.

In his struggle against Weimar, Geneva, and Versailles, Carl Schmitt enlisted a number of political thinkers as confederates—Machiavelli, Hobbes, Joseph de Maistre, Louis de Bonald, Juan Donoso Cortés, Benjamin Constant, and Hegel. The legitimacy of this claim has gone unchallenged except in the case of Hegel. Many have felt that his liberal credentials, most clearly manifested in his conception of civil society and his allegiance to the reformist policies espoused in Prussia by H.F.K. von Stein, K.A. von Hardenberg, and Wilhelm (...) von Humboldt, were compromised by Schmitt, who appears to have opposed liberalism and contributed to the demise of the Weimar republic. Schmitt’s attempt to tie Hegel’s views to the political outlook of Hobbes and de Maistre also discredits his speculative stance. Jean-François Kervégan’s extraordinary book seeks to extricate Hegel from this troubling association and attempts both to defend Hegel’s liberalism and confirm the philosophical nature of his argument. Without diminishing Schmitt’s Hegelian debt, his exhaustive comparative study, supported by impeccable scholarship, attempts to show that Schmitt distorted Hegel’s liberalism by disregarding the dialectical intent of his philosophy. In the process, Kervégan aims to preserve the Hegelian legacy from any contamination that might accrue to it from association with Schmitt. (shrink)

In his struggle against Weimar, Geneva, and Versailles, Carl Schmitt enlisted a number of political thinkers as confederates—Machiavelli, Hobbes, Joseph de Maistre, Louis de Bonald, Juan Donoso Cortés, Benjamin Constant, and Hegel. The legitimacy of this claim has gone unchallenged except in the case of Hegel. Many have felt that his liberal credentials, most clearly manifested in his conception of civil society and his allegiance to the reformist policies espoused in Prussia by H.F.K. von Stein, K.A. von Hardenberg, and Wilhelm (...) von Humboldt, were compromised by Schmitt, who appears to have opposed liberalism and contributed to the demise of the Weimar republic. Schmitt’s attempt to tie Hegel’s views to the political outlook of Hobbes and de Maistre also discredits his speculative stance. Jean-François Kervégan’s extraordinary book seeks to extricate Hegel from this troubling association and attempts both to defend Hegel’s liberalism and confirm the philosophical nature of his argument. Without diminishing Schmitt’s Hegelian debt, his exhaustive comparative study, supported by impeccable scholarship, attempts to show that Schmitt distorted Hegel’s liberalism by disregarding the dialectical intent of his philosophy. In the process, Kervégan aims to preserve the Hegelian legacy from any contamination that might accrue to it from association with Schmitt. (shrink)