Le but de cet article est de montrer comment la lecture de Kant par Bergson, loin de se ramener à un mot d’ordre sommaire, comporte une reprise partielle, une critique précise, un refus ultime enfin, qui conduisent au cœur d’une relation profonde entre deux philosophies irréductibles. La reprise partielle de la distinction entre intelligence et intuition, et même entre matière et forme de l’intuition, doit être comprise autrement que comme un hommage ironique. Elle seule permet de comprendre l’unité que Bergson (...) revendique contre Kant, d’abord entre matière et forme de l’intuition, dans le cas du temps, puis entre intelligence et intuition même, à partir de L’évolution créatrice. À son tour, cette unité permet aussi de comprendre pourquoi l’intelligence reste à l’écart de l’intuition pratique dans le dernier grand livre de Bergson. « Gagnée » par l’intuition, l’intelligence ou l’entendement le sont donc bien en un double sens : non seulement surmontés, mais envahis par elle, jusqu’à une limite qui révèle au cœur d’un problème commun, une singulière différence.The purpose of this paper is to show how Bergson’s reading of Kant, far from any expeditive fightword, implies at the same time some reappropriation, a precise critique, and a final objection that together lead to the heart of a profound relationship between two irreducible doctrines. The partial endorsing of Kant’s distinction between intelligence and intuition, and even between matter and form of intuition itself, must not be understood only as a ironical hommage. On the contrary, it helps understanding the unity Bergson advocates against Kant, first between the matter and form of intuition, in the case of time, then between intuition and intelligence itself, after Creative Evolution. In its own turn, that unity helps understanding why intelligence is put aside of practical intuition in Bergson’s last great book. Intelligence or understanding are thus « won » in a double way : not only as surpassed, but also as penetrated by intuition, up to a last limit, which reveals a peculiar difference, at the heart of a common problem. (shrink)
The course on nature coincides with the re-working of Merleau-Ponty's breakthrough towards an ontology and therefore plays a primordial role. The appearance of an interrogation of nature is inscribed in the movement of thought that comes after the Phenomenology of Perception. What is at issue is to show that the ontological mode of the perceived object - not the unity of a positive sense but the unity of a style that shows through in filigree in the sensible aspects - has (...) a universal meaning, that the description of the perceived world can give way to a philosophy of perception and therefore to a theory of truth. The analysis of linguistic expression to which the philosophy of perception leads opens out onto a definition of meaning as institution, understood as what inaugurates an open series of expressive appropriations. It is this theory of institution that turns the analysis of the perceived in the direction of a reflection on nature: the perceived is no longer the originary in its difference from the derived but the natural in its difference from the instituted. Nature is the "non-constructed, non-instituted," and thereby, the source of expression: "nature is what has a sense without this sense having been posited by thought." The first part of the course, which consists in a historical overview, must not be considered as a mere introduction. In fact, the problem of nature is brought out into the open by means of the history of Western metaphysics, in which Descartes is the emblematic figure. The problem consists in the duality - at once unsatisfactory and unsurpassable - between two approaches to nature: the one which accentuates its determinability and therefore its transparency to the understanding; the other which emphasizes the irreducible facticity of nature and tends therefore to valorize the view-point of the senses. To conceive nature is to constitute a concept of it that allows us to "take possession" of this duality, that is, to found the duality. The second part of the course attempts to develop this concept of nature by drawing upon the results of contemporary science. Thus a philosophy of nature is sketched that can be summarized in four propositions: 1) the totality is no less real than the parts; 2) there is a reality of the negative and therefore no alternative between being and nothingmess; 3) a natural event is not assigned to a unique spatio-temporal localization; and 4) there is generality only as generativity. (shrink)
In French, the verb "to live" designates both being alive and the experience of something. This ambiguity has a philosophical meaning. The task of a phenomenology of life is to describe an originary sense of living from which the very distinction between life in the intransitive sense and life in the transitive, or intentional, sense proceeds. Hans Jonas is one of those rare authors who has tried to give an account of the specificity of life instead of reducing life to (...) categories that are foreign to it. However, the concept of metabolism, by which Jonas characterizes vital activity, attests to a presupposition as to life: life is conceived as self-preservation, that is, as negation of death, in such a way that life is, in the end, not thought on the basis of itself. The aim of this article is to show that life as such must be understood as movement in a radicalized sense, in which the living being is no more the subject than the product. All living beings are in effect characterized by a movement, which nothing can cause to cease, a movement that largely exceeds what is required by the satisfaction of needs and that, because of this, bears witness to an essential incompleteness. This incompleteness reveals that life is originarily bound to a world. Because the world to which the living being relates is essentially non-totalizable and unpresentable, living movement can not essentially complete itself. Thus, in the final analysis, life must be defined as desire, and in virtue of this view, life does not tend toward self-preservation, as we have almost always thought, but toward the manifestation of the world. (shrink)
This paper explores the notion of sensing (Empfinden) as developed by Erwin Straus. It argues that the notion of sensing is at the center of Strauss's thought about animal and human experience. Straus's originality consists in approaching sensory experience from an existential point of view. Sensing is not a mode of knowing. Sensing is distinguished from perceiving but is still a mode of relation to exteriority, and is situated on the side of what is usually called affectivity. At the same (...) time Strauss redefines the field of that which is commonly characterized as affectivity. Sensing designates a stratum that lies deeper than the division between perceiving and feeling (s'éprouver), a self-affection that is not an alternative to the opening upon exteriority. It corresponds to a mode of immediate communication, to a sympathy with the world that does not entail any thematic dimension, but does not fall back into a blind fusion. Rather, sensing is something in the living being's mode of moving that is irreducible, and that includes a tending toward something. (shrink)
Husserl is the first philosopher who has managed to account for the specificity of perception, characterized as givenness by sketches (Abschattungen); but neither Husserl nor Merleau-Ponty have given a satisfying definition of the subject of perception. This article tries to show that the subject of perception must be conceived as living being and that, therefore, the phenomenology of perception must lead to a phenomenology of life. Here, life is approached from an existential point of view, that is to say, as (...) a specific relationship to the world. However, life cannot be characterized from human existence in a privative way, as in Heidegger's philosophy: on the contrary, human existence, and particularly perception itself, must be understood from vital existence, and accordingly, an "additive" anthropology must replace the privative zoology. The hypothesis of this article is that it is by characterizing life as desire, we are able to account for perception as givenness by sketches. (shrink)
In this article, I seek to make sense of the oft-invoked idea of 'public emergency' and of some of its (supposedly) radical moral implications. I challenge controversial claims by Tom Sorell, Michael Walzer, and Giorgio Agamben, and argue for a more discriminating understanding of the category and its moral force.
Although it was influential for several hundred years after it first appeared, doubts about the authenticity of the Platonic Alcibiades I have unnecessarily impeded its interpretation ever since. It positions itself firmly within the Platonic and Socratic traditions, and should therefore be approached in the same way as most other Platonic dialogues. It paints a vivid portrait of a Socrates in his late thirties tackling the unrealistic ambitions of the youthful Alcibiades, urging him to come to know himself and to (...) care for himself. François Renaud and Harold Tarrant re-examine the drama and philosophy of Alcibiades I with an eye on those interpreters who cherished it most. Modern scholars regularly play down one or more of the religious, erotic, philosophic or dramatic aspects of the dialogue, so ancient Platonist interpreters are given special consideration. This rich study will interest a wide range of readers in ancient philosophy. (shrink)
ObjectiveTo identify the ethical challenges associated with the development and implementation of new tuberculosis drugs and diagnostics.MethodsTwenty-three semi-structured qualitative interviews conducted between December 2015 and September 2016 with programme administrators, healthcare workers, advocates, policymakers, and funders based in the Americas, Europe, and Africa. Interviews were analysed using thematic analysis.ResultsDivergent interests and responsibilities, coupled with power imbalances, are a primary source of ethical challenges; the uncertain risk profiles of new drugs present an additional one. Although this challenge can be partially mitigated (...) through stringent pharmacovigilance, respondents highlighted that high-burden countries tend to lack the resources to facilitate safe implementation. Increased advocacy and community engagement are considered an ethical imperative for future TB development and implementation.ConclusionsThis project helps identify some of the ethical challenges of new TB technologies. It demonstrates that investigating ethical challenges through qualitative research is one way to apprehend the difficulty of implementing new TB technologies. Addressing this difficulty will require that those in positions of power reconsider their interests in relation to disempowered communities.Policy implicationsEfforts to build consensus regarding what values should underpin the global governance of TB research, prevention, and care are essential to facilitate the ethical implementation of new TB technologies. (shrink)
Connections among Varela's theory of enactive cognition , his evolutionary theory of natural drift, and his concept of autopoiesis are made clear. Two questions are posed in relation to Varela's conception of perception, and the tension that exists in his thought between the formal level of organization and the Jonasian notion of the organism.
This paper investigates how and when pairs of terms such as “local–global” and “im Kleinen–im Grossen” began to be used by mathematicians as explicit reflexive categories. A first phase of automatic search led to the delineation of the relevant corpus, and to the identification of the period from 1898 to 1918 as that of emergence. The emergence appears to have been, from the very start, both transdisciplinary and international, although the AMS-Göttingen connection played a specific part. First used as an (...) expository and didactic tool, it soon played a crucial part in the creation of new mathematical concepts, in the shaping of research agendas, and in Weyl’s axiomatic foundation of the manifold concept. We finally turn to France, where in the 1910s, in the wake of Poincaré’s work, Hadamard began to promote a research agenda in terms of “passage du local au general.”. (shrink)
The universal a priori of the correlation between transcendental being and its subjective modes of givenness constitutes the minimal framework for any phenomenological approach. The proper object of phenomenology is then to characterize both the exact nature of the correlation and the sense of being of the terms in relation, that is to say, of subject and world. It involves demonstrating that a rigorous analysis of the correlation unfolds necessarily on three levels and that phenomenology is thus destined to move (...) beyond itself towards a cosmology and metaphysics. The phenomenological correlation that we will establish is essentially a relation between a subject that is desire and a world that is pure transcendence and assumes their common belonging to a φύσίς whose description stems from a cosmology. But the difference of the subject, without which there is no correlation, refers itself to a more originary split that affects the very process of the manifestation and opens the space of metaphysics. (shrink)
In this article, I seek to make sense of the oft-invoked idea of ‘public emergency’ and of some of its radical moral implications. I challenge controversial claims by Tom Sorell, Michael Walzer, and Giorgio Agamben, and argue for a more discriminating understanding of the category and its moral force.
Although complex hallucinations are extremely vivid, painful symptoms in schizophrenia, little is known about the underlying mechanisms of multisensory integration in such a phenomenon. We investigated the neural basis of these altered states of consciousness in a patient with schizophrenia, by combining state of the art neuroscientific exploratory methods like functional MRI, diffusion tensor imaging, cortical thickness analysis, electrical source reconstruction and trans-cranial magnetic stimulation. The results shed light on the functional architecture of the hallucinatory processes, in which unimodal information (...) from different modalities is strongly functionally connected to higher-order integrative areas. (shrink)
In this article, I ask whether the state, as opposed to its individual members, can intelligibly and legitimately be criminalized, with a focus on the possibility of its domestic criminalization. I proceed by identifying what I take to be the core objections to such criminalization, and then investigate ways in which they can be challenged. First, I address the claim that the state is not a kind of entity that can intelligibly perpetrate domestic criminal wrongs. I argue against it by (...) building upon an account of the modern state as a moral agent proper, capable of both culpable moral and legal wrongdoing. I then consider objections to the intelligibility and legitimacy of subjecting states to domestic criminal processes, which primarily find their source in the assumption that such subjection would necessarily involve the state prosecuting, judging, and punishing itself. I argue that whether this (questionable) assumption is sound or not, it does not create the kinds of unsolvable quandaries its exponents think it does. I then move on to reject the distinct, yet related, objection that, at least in aspiring liberal jurisdictions, treating the state as a criminal objectionably involves extending to it various substantive and procedural guarantees that, given its nature and raison d’être, it should not have. Finally, I discuss three central objections to punishing the state. First, that organizations like states do not have the phenomenal consciousness required to suffer punishment. Second, that the constant possibility of dispersion of state punishment amongst individual members stands in the way of its justification. Lastly, that whatever justification there may be for making things harder for the state in response to its culpable wrongdoing, such treatment need not be understood as punishment. While partially conceding the strength of these objections, I strive to loosen their grip in ways that show that justified punishment of the state, meaningfully understood as such, remains a distinct possibility. I conclude by contrasting supposed alternatives to the criminalization of states, and by contending that my analysis leaves us with enough to keep the possibility of state criminalization on the table as a justifiable response to state wrongdoing. (shrink)
Desire and Distance constitutes an important new departure in contemporary phenomenological thought, a rethinking and critique of basic philosophical positions concerning the concept of perception presented by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, though it departs in significant and original ways from their work. Barbaras’s overall goal is to develop a philosophy of what “life” is—one that would do justice to the question of embodiment and its role in perception and the formation of the human subject. Barbaras posits that desire and distance inform (...) the concept of “life.” Levinas identified a similar structure in Descartes’s notion of the infinite. For Barbaras, desire and distance are anchored not in meaning, but in a rethinking of the philosophy of biology and, in consequence, cosmology. Barbaras elaborates and extends the formal structure of desire and distance by drawing on motifs as yet unexplored in the French phenomenological tradition, especially the notions of “life” and the “life-world,” which are prominent in the later Husserl but also appear in non-phenomenological thinkers such as Bergson. Barbaras then filters these notions (especially “life”) through Merleau-Ponty. (shrink)
Les choix normatifs actuels du Web esquissent-ils une mutation des contours de la personne et, dans l'affirmative, quelle mutation? Quelles régulations les normes actuelles autorisent-elles au regard de l'objectif permanent de sauvegarde d'une identité personnelle et d'une vie privée, et quels obstacles se dressent-ils dans ce sens? En soutenant que des réponses évolutives sont en cours de construction, cet article suggère des buts et voies d'investigation, et conclut en proposant une typologie d'objectifs de régulation communs aux choix normatifs de production (...) et d'échange de données personnelles.Are current standardization options for the Web pointing to a redefinition of the boundaries of what is personal? If so, how are they being redefined? What forms of regulation do current standards allow as regards the ever-relevant objective of safeguarding personal identity and privacy, and what obstacles are emerging to counter this aim? This paper argues that responses are developing to address the changing situation, and suggests aims and avenues for investigation. It concludes with a proposal for a typology of regulatory objectives that are common to standardization options as well as exchanges of personal data. (shrink)
In this essay, I address one methodological aspect of Victor Tadros's The Ends of Harm--namely, the moral character of the theory of criminal punishment it defends. First, I offer a brief reconstruction of this dimension of the argument, highlighting some of its distinctive strengths while drawing attention to particular inconsistencies. I then argue that Tadros ought to refrain from developing this approach in terms of an overly narrow understanding of the morality of harming as fully unified and reconciled under the (...) lone heading of justice. In a final and most critical section, I offer arguments for why this reconciliatory commitment, further constrained by a misplaced emphasis on corrective justice, generates major problems for his general deterrence account of the core justification of criminal punishment. (shrink)
L’originalité de la métaphysique de Ruyer tient à ceci que le problème de l’incarnation de la conscience, décrite par la phénoménologie comme condition de possibilité de la perception, est résolu par le biais d’une identification de la conscience et du corps. Cette identification repose sur la découverte du concept fondamental de « surface absolue » ou « domaine de survol » : présence à soi sans distance d’une réalité étendue. Ce mode d’être convient également à la vie et à la (...) conscience vécue et il fonde par conséquent leur unité originaire. La conscience sensible, ou secondaire, doit alors être décrite comme l’autosurvol des aires cérébrales. Cependant, cette identification de la vie et de la conscience a pour contrepartie la perte de la dimension intentionnelle de la conscience et, par conséquent, l’impossibilité de rendre compte de la perception. La philosophie de Ruyer pose donc le problème suivant : cette conséquence est-elle nécessaire ou bien peut-on envisager au contraire une philosophie de la vie qui ne compromette pas mais fonde la conscience intentionnelle ?— The originality of Ruyer’s metaphysics is due to the fact that the problem of the incarnation of consciousness, described by phenomenology as a condition of possibility of perception, is solved by means of an identification between consciousness and body. This identification rests on the discovery of the basic concept of « absolute surface » or « flying-over domain » : self-presence without distance of a spatial reality. This mode of being is appropriate both to life and lived consciousness and, accordingly, grounds their originary unity. Then, sensible, or secondary consciousness is to be described as self flying-over of the cerebral areas. However, this identification between life and consciousness has as counterpart the lost of the intentional feature of consciousness and, consequently, the impossibility to account for perception. Thus, Ruyer’s philosophy poses the following problem : is that conclusion necessary or is it possible, on the contrary, to plan a philosophy of life that does not compromise but grounds intentional consciousness ? (shrink)
Can the state, as opposed to its individual human members in their personal capacity, intelligibly seek to avoid blame for unjustified wrongdoing by invoking excuses (as opposed to justifications)? Insofar as it can, should such claims ever be given moral and legal recognition? While a number of theorists have denied it in passing, the question remains radically underexplored. -/- In this article (in its penultimate draft version), I seek to identify the main metaphysical and moral objections to state excuses, and (...) begin to investigate their strength. I work from the ecumenical assumption that general understandings of modern states as group moral agents proper or as mere fictional points of imputation for individual behaviour are both plausible, and that the question of state excuses should be asked in terms of both paradigms. Issues addressed include: the lack of state consciousness/affect, the nature and relevance of developmental and executive defects in group agents, the value of state interests and how interests relate to plausible claims of excuses, the shortfall of responsibility argument for group responsibility and its interface with state excuses, the symbolic and consequential (dis)value that state excuses may have, as well as concerns that states are entities that should live up to outstandingly high virtuous standards of impartiality and equanimity. -/- I conclude that even if the range of excuses available to states does not overlap neatly with excuses available to ordinary individuals, some excuses may still be morally available to states. More generally, I emphasize the need for a systematic discussion of group excuses writ large, and of their relationship with the wider question of when group entities may legitimately be singled out to bear adverse normative consequences for wrongdoing. (shrink)
This paper argues that international development research should be submitted to the oversight of research ethics committees from the countries where data will be collected. This includes research conducted by individuals who may fall outside the jurisdictions of most ethics guidelines or policies, such as individuals contracted by non-governmental organizations. The argument is grounded in an understanding of social justice that recognizes that not seeking local ethics approval can be an affront to the decolonization movement, and may lead to significant (...) direct harms to participants. Local ethics oversight can help ensure projects appropriately take into consideration local laws, regulations, priorities and context. For example, a local research ethics committee may be in a better position than a foreign one to assess whether any given proposed project carries context-specific risks. In addition, submitting to a local research ethics committee is to acknowledge the legitimacy of local authorities, thereby taking a stance against the history of colonizing disempowerment. Local oversight is a mechanism to increase the accountability of researchers working abroad: if respect for local authority and tailoring to local context are to be upheld, there must be mechanisms to ensure that research that does not meet these requirements does not proceed. Objections based on the limited oversight capacity in some countries and on concerns related to the politicization of the review process are discussed. Finally, the roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholders in the implementation of greater local ethics oversight are laid out. (shrink)
Although the laws of thermodynamics are well established for black hole horizons, much less has been said in the literature to support the extension of these laws to more general settings such as an asymptotic de Sitter horizon or a Rindler horizon (the event horizon of an asymptotic uniformly accelerated observer). In the present paper we review the results that have been previously established and argue that the laws of black hole thermodynamics, as well as their underlying statistical mechanical content, (...) extend quite generally to what we call here “causal horizons.” The root of this generalization is the local notion of horizon entropy density. (shrink)
Some legal theorists deny that states can conceivably act extra-legally, in the sense of acting contrary to domestic law. This position finds its most robust articulation in the writings of Hans Kelsen, and has more recently been taken up by David Dyzenhaus in the context of his work on emergencies and legality. This paper seeks to demystify their arguments and, ultimately, contend that we can intelligibly speak of the state as a legal wrongdoer or a legally unauthorized actor.
This research aims to understand how two basic schemas—vigilante and reparation—influence online public complaining. Drawing on two experiments, a longitudinal field study and content analysis of online complaints, the current research makes three core contributions. First, we show that for similar service failures, each schema is associated with different justice motivations, which have different moral implications for consumers. Second, vigilante and reparation complainers write complaints in a different manner and are drawn to different online platforms; this information is helpful to (...) identify complainers using each schema. Third, the schemas moderate the process leading to different post-complaint benefits. Specifically, perseverance has a greater effect on obtaining a resolution for reparation complainers compared to vigilantes. Additionally, whereas a recovery leads to an increase in positive affect for reparation complainers, vigilantes experience a high level of positive affect simply by posting their complaint. The theoretical, ethical, and managerial implications of these findings are discussed. (shrink)
Some legal theorists deny that states can conceivably act extralegally in the sense of acting contrary to domestic law. This position finds its most robust articulation in the writings of Hans Kelsen and has more recently been taken up by David Dyzenhaus in the context of his work on emergencies and legality. This paper seeks to demystify their arguments and ultimately contend that we can intelligibly speak of the state as a legal wrongdoer or a legally unauthorized actor.
L’authenticité de l’Alcibiade majeur est depuis le xixe siècle souvent remise en cause; on y voit notamment un mélange incongru de socratisme et de platonisme. Inséparable du débat sur l’authenticité du dialogue, l’étude du passage clé sur la connaissance de soi est confrontée à deux interprétations opposées, habituellement estimées irréconciliables, soit les lectures théocentrique et anthropocentrique. Le commentaire d’Olympiodore a le mérite d’unir habilement, à la lumière du contexte dramatique, les dimensions «érotique» et «démonique» des activités pédagogiques de Socrate et (...) par là de concilier ces deux lectures. (shrink)
This paper investigates Western professional bankers’ perceptions of Islamic finance. Exploiting data from an original survey, we carry out a principal component analysis to characterize the main dimensions on which financial agents diverge. The PCA extracts five dimensions—accounting for 61 % of the variance in the agents’ answers—that we interpret with the help of a pilot field survey. In addition to confirm the increased association of Islamic financial values with ethical practices in the West, our results allow us to understand (...) how the observed growth of the industry has been conceptualized by conventional agents. The five dimensions identified shed light on the multitude of constructs that have informed the diffusion of Islamic financial ideas to international markets. This supports the fact that Islamic finance cannot be seen as a single movement but is characterized by opposing and concurrent logics in global markets. (shrink)
Le premier site naturel de compensation français a été inauguré le 11 mai 2009 sur le site d’un verger abandonné dans la plaine de Crau. Cette opération avait notamment pour objectif d’expérimenter le premier mécanisme d’offre de compensation français via la réhabilitation d’une végétation herbacée permettant le retour des oiseaux steppiques emblématiques de cet espace. Impliqués dans le comité local de pilotage, des écologues ont conseillé les techniques de réhabilitation et expertisé leurs effets sur la biodiversité tout en réalisant des (...) recherches expérimentales pour étendre la restauration à la végétation et à certains groupes d’insectes. Après 7 années de suivis, les résultats montrent que la réhabilitation a bien permis la création d’une végétation favorable au retour de l’avifaune steppique mais le succès des expérimentations de restauration ne peut pas encore être définitivement prédit sur le long terme. Ces résultats soulignent les difficultés scientifiques et techniques de la restauration et limitent donc le mécanisme de compensation à la réhabilitation de certaines composantes ou fonctions. The first French ecological offset area was inaugurated on May 11th 2009 at the site of an abandoned orchard in the Crau plain. One of the objectives of this intervention was to test the first French mitigation bank rehabilitating the herbaceous vegetation in order to encourage the return of steppe birds emblematic of this area. The ecologists involved in the local steering committee proposed rehabilitation techniques and assessed their impact on biodiversity while at the same time carrying out experimental research designed to extend the restoration process to plant communities and some groups of insects. The results of various studies showed that the rehabilitation scheme led to the development of a plant community favorable to the return of steppe birds. However, the long-term results of the restoration experiments cannot be definitively predicted. Thus, these results highlight the scientific and technical difficulties facing the restoration process and hence restrict the compensation mechanism to the rehabilitation of some of their components or functions. (shrink)