Results for 'Review by: Richard Pettigrew'

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  1.  13
    Reviewed Work(S): An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics by Mark Colyvan.Review by: Richard Pettigrew - 2013 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 19 (3):396-397,.
  2. Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):241-275.
    In ‘A Non-Pragmatic Vindication of Probabilism’, Jim Joyce attempts to ‘depragmatize’ de Finetti’s prevision argument for the claim that our partial beliefs ought to satisfy the axioms of probability calculus. In this paper, I adapt Joyce’s argument to give a non-pragmatic vindication of various versions of David Lewis’ Principal Principle, such as the version based on Isaac Levi's account of admissibility, Michael Thau and Ned Hall's New Principle, and Jenann Ismael's Generalized Principal Principle. Joyce enumerates properties that must be had (...)
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  3.  20
    Reviewed Work(S): An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics by Mark Colyvan.Richard Pettigrew - 2013 - Association for Symbolic Logic: The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 19 (3):396-397.
    Review by: Richard Pettigrew The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Volume 19, Issue 3, Page 396-397, September 2013.
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  4. Indispensability Arguments and Instrumental Nominalism.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):687-709.
    In the philosophy of mathematics, indispensability arguments aim to show that we are justified in believing that abstract mathematical objects exist. I wish to defend a particular objection to such arguments that has become increasingly popular recently. It is called instrumental nominalism. I consider the recent versions of this view and conclude that it has yet to be given an adequate formulation. I provide such a formulation and show that it can be used to answer the indispensability arguments. -/- There (...)
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  5.  9
    Review of Richard Pettigrew's Accuracy and the Laws of Credence. [REVIEW]Chad Marxen & Gerard Rothfus - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
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  6.  17
    Choosing for Changing Selves, by Richard Pettigrew.Krister Bykvist - forthcoming - Mind.
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  7.  63
    Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences. The main principles that he justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are discussed along the way. Pettigrew looks to decision theory in order to ground his argument. He treats an agent's credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed (...)
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  8. A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle.Richard G. Pettigrew - 2013 - Episteme 10 (1):19-35.
    Jim Joyce has presented an argument for Probabilism based on considerations of epistemic utility [Joyce, 1998]. In a recent paper, I adapted this argument to give an argument for Probablism and the Principal Principle based on similar considerations [Pettigrew, 2012]. Joyce’s argument assumes that a credence in a true proposition is better the closer it is to maximal credence, whilst a credence in a false proposition is better the closer it is to minimal credence. By contrast, my argument in (...)
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  9.  48
    Epistemology, Pettigrew Style: A Critical Notice of Accuracy and the Laws of Credence, by Richard Pettigrew1.Scott Sturgeon - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1319-1336.
    The sharpest corner of the cutting edge of recent epistemology is to be found in Richard Pettigrew’s Accuracy and the Laws of Credence. In this fine book Pettigrew argues that a certain kind of accuracy-based value monism entails that rational credence manifests a host of features emphasized by anti-externalists in epistemology. Specifically, he demonstrates how a particular version of accuracy-based value monism—to be discussed at length below—when placed with some not implausible views about how epistemic value and (...)
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  10. Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):897-908.
    Beliefs come in different strengths. An agent's credence in a proposition is a measure of the strength of her belief in that proposition. Various norms for credences have been proposed. Traditionally, philosophers have tried to argue for these norms by showing that any agent who violates them will be lead by her credences to make bad decisions. In this article, we survey a new strategy for justifying these norms. The strategy begins by identifying an epistemic utility function and a decision-theoretic (...)
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  11. On the Accuracy of Group Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
    to appear in Szabó Gendler, T. & J. Hawthorne (eds.) Oxford Studies in Epistemology volume 6 We often ask for the opinion of a group of individuals. How strongly does the scientific community believe that the rate at which sea levels are rising increased over the last 200 years? How likely does the UK Treasury think it is that there will be a recession if the country leaves the European Union? What are these group credences that such questions request? And (...)
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  12. Jamesian Epistemology Formalised: An Explication of ‘the Will to Believe’.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):253-268.
    Famously, William James held that there are two commandments that govern our epistemic life: Believe truth! Shun error! In this paper, I give a formal account of James' claim using the tools of epistemic utility theory. I begin by giving the account for categorical doxastic states – that is, full belief, full disbelief, and suspension of judgment. Then I will show how the account plays out for graded doxastic states – that is, credences. The latter part of the paper thus (...)
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  13. What is conditionalization, and why should we do it?Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3427-3463.
    Conditionalization is one of the central norms of Bayesian epistemology. But there are a number of competing formulations, and a number of arguments that purport to establish it. In this paper, I explore which formulations of the norm are supported by which arguments. In their standard formulations, each of the arguments I consider here depends on the same assumption, which I call Deterministic Updating. I will investigate whether it is possible to amend these arguments so that they no longer depend (...)
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  14.  88
    The Dutch Book Arguments.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    (This is for the series Elements of Decision Theory published by Cambridge University Press and edited by Martin Peterson) -/- Our beliefs come in degrees. I believe some things more strongly than I believe others. I believe very strongly that global temperatures will continue to rise during the coming century; I believe slightly less strongly that the European Union will still exist in 2029; and I believe much less strongly that Cardiff is east of Edinburgh. My credence in something is (...)
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  15. Risk, Rationality and Expected Utility Theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):798-826.
    There are decision problems where the preferences that seem rational to many people cannot be accommodated within orthodox decision theory in the natural way. In response, a number of alternatives to the orthodoxy have been proposed. In this paper, I offer an argument against those alternatives and in favour of the orthodoxy. I focus on preferences that seem to encode sensitivity to risk. And I focus on the alternative to the orthodoxy proposed by Lara Buchak’s risk-weighted expected utility theory. I (...)
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  16.  63
    Accuracy and Evidence.Richard Pettigrew - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):579-596.
    In “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism”, Jim Joyce argues that our credences should obey the axioms of the probability calculus by showing that, if they don't, there will be alternative credences that are guaranteed to be more accurate than ours. But it seems that accuracy is not the only goal of credences: there is also the goal of matching one's credences to one's evidence. I will consider four ways in which we might make this latter goal precise: on the first, (...)
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  17.  60
    Transformative Experience, by L. A. Paul.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):927-935.
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  18. The Population Ethics of Belief: In Search of an Epistemic Theory X.Richard Pettigrew - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):336-372.
    Consider Phoebe and Daphne. Phoebe has credences in 1 million propositions. Daphne, on the other hand, has credences in all of these propositions, but she's also got credences in 999 million other propositions. Phoebe's credences are all very accurate. Each of Daphne's credences, in contrast, are not very accurate at all; each is a little more accurate than it is inaccurate, but not by much. Whose doxastic state is better, Phoebe's or Daphne's? It is clear that this question is analogous (...)
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  19. Logical Ignorance and Logical Learning.Richard G. Pettigrew - forthcoming - Synthese:1-30.
    According to certain normative theories in epistemology, rationality requires us to be logically omniscient. Yet this prescription clashes with our ordinary judgments of rationality. How should we resolve this tension? In this paper, I focus particularly on the logical omniscience requirement in Bayesian epistemology. Building on a key insight by Ian Hacking (1967), I develop a version of Bayesianism that permits logical ignorance. This includes an account of the synchronic norms that govern a logically ignorant individual at any given time, (...)
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  20.  90
    II—Pluralism About Belief States.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):187-204.
    With his Humean thesis on belief, Leitgeb seeks to say how beliefs and credences ought to interact with one another. To argue for this thesis, he enumerates the roles beliefs must play and the properties they must have if they are to play them, together with norms that beliefs and credences intuitively must satisfy. He then argues that beliefs can play these roles and satisfy these norms if, and only if, they are related to credences in the way set out (...)
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  21.  16
    On the Accuracy of Group Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
    We often ask for the opinion of a group of individuals. How strongly does the scientific community believe that the rate at which sea levels are rising has increased over the last 200 years? How likely does the UK Treasury think it is that there will be a recession if the country leaves the European Union? What are these group credences that such questions request? And how do they relate to the individual credences assigned by the members of the particular (...)
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  22.  19
    The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):605-619.
    In a recent paper in this journal, James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann, and Jon Williamson argue that the principal principle entails the principle of indifference. In this article, I argue that it does not. Lewis’s version of the principal principle notoriously depends on a notion of admissibility, which Lewis uses to restrict its application. HLWW base their argument on certain intuitions concerning when one proposition is admissible for another: Conditions 1 and 2. There are two ways of reading their (...)
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  23. On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Noûs (1):23-38.
    The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism assumes Ramsey's Thesis (RT), which purports to determine the prices an agent is rationally required to pay for a bet. Recently, a new objection to Ramsey's Thesis has emerged (Hedden 2013, Wronski & Godziszewski 2017, Wronski 2018)--I call this the Expected Utility Objection. According to this objection, it is Maximise Subjective Expected Utility (MSEU) that determines the prices an agent is required to pay for a bet, and this often disagrees with Ramsey's Thesis. I (...)
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  24. What is Justified Credence?Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):16-30.
    In this paper, we seek a reliabilist account of justified credence. Reliabilism about justified beliefs comes in two varieties: process reliabilism (Goldman, 1979, 2008) and indicator reliabilism (Alston, 1988, 2005). Existing accounts of reliabilism about justified credence comes in the same two varieties: Jeff Dunn (2015) proposes a version of process reliabilism, while Weng Hong Tang (2016) offers a version of indicator reliabilism. As we will see, both face the same objection. If they are right about what justification is, it (...)
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  25.  85
    The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axx060.
    In a recent paper in this journal, James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann, and Jon Williamson argue that the principal principle entails the principle of indifference. In this paper, I argue that it does not. Lewis’s version of the principal principle notoriously depends on a notion of admissibility, which Lewis uses to restrict its application. HLWW base their argument on certain intuitions concerning when one proposition is admissible for another: Conditions 1 and 2. There are two ways of reading their (...)
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  26. Deference Done Right.Richard Pettigrew & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-19.
    There are many kinds of epistemic experts to which we might wish to defer in setting our credences. These include: highly rational agents, objective chances, our own future credences, our own current credences, and evidential probabilities. But exactly what constraint does a deference requirement place on an agent's credences? In this paper we consider three answers, inspired by three principles that have been proposed for deference to objective chances. We consider how these options fare when applied to the other kinds (...)
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  27. An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):236-272.
    One of the fundamental problems of epistemology is to say when the evidence in an agent’s possession justifies the beliefs she holds. In this paper and its prequel, we defend the Bayesian solution to this problem by appealing to the following fundamental norm: Accuracy An epistemic agent ought to minimize the inaccuracy of her partial beliefs. In the prequel, we made this norm mathematically precise; in this paper, we derive its consequences. We show that the two core tenets of Bayesianism (...)
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  28. The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology.Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.) - 2019 - PhilPapers Foundation.
    In formal epistemology, we use mathematical methods to explore the questions of epistemology and rational choice. What can we know? What should we believe and how strongly? How should we act based on our beliefs and values? We begin by modelling phenomena like knowledge, belief, and desire using mathematical machinery, just as a biologist might model the fluctuations of a pair of competing populations, or a physicist might model the turbulence of a fluid passing through a small aperture. Then, we (...)
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  29. An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):201-235.
    One of the fundamental problems of epistemology is to say when the evidence in an agent’s possession justifies the beliefs she holds. In this paper and its sequel, we defend the Bayesian solution to this problem by appealing to the following fundamental norm: Accuracy An epistemic agent ought to minimize the inaccuracy of her partial beliefs. In this paper, we make this norm mathematically precise in various ways. We describe three epistemic dilemmas that an agent might face if she attempts (...)
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  30. Book Review: Criticizing the Media: An Essay Review by Richard P. Cunningham. [REVIEW]Richard P. Cunningham - 1990 - Journal of Mass Media Ethics 5 (1):59 – 63.
     
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  31. Book Review: New Books Provide a Sharper Focus on Public Journalism: An Essay Review by Richard Cunningham. [REVIEW]Richard Cunningham - 1996 - Journal of Mass Media Ethics 11 (3):184 – 191.
     
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  32.  40
    What We Talk About When We Talk About Numbers.Richard Pettigrew - 2018 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 169 (12):1437-1456.
    In this paper, I describe and motivate a new species of mathematical structuralism, which I call Instrumental Nominalism about Set-Theoretic Structuralism. As the name suggests, this approach takes standard Set-Theoretic Structuralism of the sort championed by Bourbaki and removes its ontological commitments by taking an instrumental nominalist approach to that ontology of the sort described by Joseph Melia and Gideon Rosen. I argue that this avoids all of the problems that plague other versions of structuralism.
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  33. An Improper Introduction to Epistemic Utility Theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2011 - In Henk de Regt, Samir Okasha & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Proceedings of EPSA: Amsterdam '09. Springer. pp. 287--301.
    Beliefs come in different strengths. What are the norms that govern these strengths of belief? Let an agent's belief function at a particular time be the function that assigns, to each of the propositions about which she has an opinion, the strength of her belief in that proposition at that time. Traditionally, philosophers have claimed that an agent's belief function at any time ought to be a probability function (Probabilism), and that she ought to update her belief function upon obtaining (...)
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  34. Aristotle on the Subject Matter of Geometry.Richard Pettigrew - 2009 - Phronesis 54 (3):239-260.
    I offer a new interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy of geometry, which he presents in greatest detail in Metaphysics M 3. On my interpretation, Aristotle holds that the points, lines, planes, and solids of geometry belong to the sensible realm, but not in a straightforward way. Rather, by considering Aristotle's second attempt to solve Zeno's Runner Paradox in Book VIII of the Physics , I explain how such objects exist in the sensibles in a special way. I conclude by considering the (...)
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  35. Two Types of Abstraction for Structuralism.Øystein Linnebo & Richard Pettigrew - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (255):267-283.
    If numbers were identified with any of their standard set-theoretic realizations, then they would have various non-arithmetical properties that mathematicians are reluctant to ascribe to them. Dedekind and later structuralists conclude that we should refrain from ascribing to numbers such ‘foreign’ properties. We first rehearse why it is hard to provide an acceptable formulation of this conclusion. Then we investigate some forms of abstraction meant to purge mathematical objects of all ‘foreign’ properties. One form is inspired by Frege; the other (...)
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  36. Identity and Discernibility in Philosophy and Logic.James Ladyman, Øystein Linnebo & Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (1):162-186.
    Questions about the relation between identity and discernibility are important both in philosophy and in model theory. We show how a philosophical question about identity and dis- cernibility can be ‘factorized’ into a philosophical question about the adequacy of a formal language to the description of the world, and a mathematical question about discernibility in this language. We provide formal definitions of various notions of discernibility and offer a complete classification of their logical relations. Some new and surprising facts are (...)
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  37. Illness as Transformative Experience.Havi Carel, Richard Pettigrew & Ian James Kidd - 2017 - The Lancet 388:1152-1153..
    We propose that certain forms of chronic illness can be transformative experiences, in the sense described by L.A. Paul.
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  38.  29
    Review Of: Painting as an Art by Richard Wollheim. [REVIEW]Joseph Margolis - 1989 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 47 (3):281-284.
  39. Review of Richard Kraut’s What is Good And Why: The Ethics of Well-Being. [REVIEW]Guy Fletcher - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):576-8.
    Anyone familiar with Richard Kraut's work in ancient philosophy will be excited to see him putting aside the dusty tomes of the ancients and delving into ethics first-hand. He does not disappoint. His book is a lucid and wide-ranging discussion that provides at least the core of an ethical theory and an appealing set of answers to a range of ethical questions.Kraut aims to provide an alternative to utilitarianism that preserves the good-centred nature of that theory. He claims that (...)
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  40. Plato’s Earlier Dialectic. By Richard Robinson. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. Second Edition. 1953. Pp. Vii + 286. Price 25s). [REVIEW]D. J. Allan - 1954 - Philosophical Quarterly 4 (17):373-374.
    Following strict rules of interpretation, this book focuses on the ideas in Plato's early and middle dialogues that lie within the fields now called logic and methodology, specifically elenchus and dialectic and the method of hypothesis.
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  41. Review Essay : Richard Kearney's Hermeneutic Imagination: Richard Kearney, Poetics of Modernity: Toward a Hermeneu Tic Imagination (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1995) Also Under Consideration by Richard Kearney: Poetics o F Imagining: From Husserl to Lyotard (London: Rout Ledge, 1994); Modern Movements in European Philosophy (2nd Edn, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994); States of Mind.Tracey Stark - 1997 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 23 (2):115-130.
  42.  34
    Comment by Richard McPherson.Richard McPherson - 1997 - The Chesterton Review 23 (4):538-540.
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  43.  1
    Book Review by Jane Dorner of Richard Lanham's The Electronic Word. [REVIEW]Jane Dorner - 1994 - Logos 5 (4):177.
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  44.  22
    Books in Review : The Practice of Rights by Richard E. Flathman. New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1976. Pp. VI, 250. $15.95. [REVIEW]Richard Wasserstrom - 1977 - Political Theory 5 (4):545-550.
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  45. Book Review: David: Biblical Portraits of Power by Marti J. Steussy University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 1999. 251 Pp. $34.95 (Cloth). ISBN 1-57003-250-5.; The Heart of an Executive by Richard D. Phillips Doubleday, New York, 1999. 271 Pp. $21.00. ISBN 0-385-49232-4. [REVIEW]Richard G. Bowman - 2000 - Interpretation: A Journal of Bible and Theology 54 (1):86-86.
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  46. Bayesian Updating When What You Learn Might Be False.Richard Pettigrew - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-16.
    Michael Rescorla (2020) has recently pointed out that the standard arguments for Bayesian Conditionalization assume that whenever you take yourself to learn something with certainty, it's true. Most people would reject this assumption. In response, Rescorla offers an improved Dutch Book argument for Bayesian Conditionalization that does not make this assumption. My purpose in this paper is two-fold. First, I want to illuminate Rescorla's new argument by giving a very general Dutch Book argument that applies to many cases of updating (...)
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  47.  60
    Epistemic Utility Theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2010
    Beliefs come in different strengths. What are the norms that govern these strengths of belief? Let an agent's belief function at a particular time be the function that assigns, to each of the propositions about which she has an opinion, the strength of her belief in that proposition at that time. Traditionally, philosophers have claimed that an agent's belief function at any time ought to be a probability function, and that she ought to update her belief function upon obtaining new (...)
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  48.  19
    The Thread of Life by Richard Wollheim. [REVIEW]Norton Batkin - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (6):336-344.
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  49.  37
    Review Article: Somaesthetics and the Critique of Cartesian Dualism: Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics by Richard Shusterman Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, Pp. 256, ISBN 978—0—521—67587—1 Paperback, $24.99 Reviewed by Bryan S. Turner, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore. [REVIEW]Bryan S. Turner - 2008 - Body and Society 14 (3):129-133.
  50. Modelling Uncertainty.Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):308-316.
    Review essay on Huber, F. and C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.) Degrees of Belief (Springer).
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