In the 20th century, the role of the unconscious in Kant s philosophy has been in great part neglected by Kant scholars. Nevertheless, the unconscious, the other of consciousness, is a key problem of the critical philosophy. The purpose of the volume is to fill a substantial gap in Kant research and to offer a complete survey of the topic in different areas of research, such as history of philosophy, philosophy of mind, aesthetics, moral philosophy, and anthropology. ".

: The object of G. F. Meier's Vernunftlehre and its abridgement for courses, the Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, does not consist exclusively in the elaboration of the formal aspects of logic, but rather in the individuation of the elements of thought and language, which make human understanding possible. Instead of limiting himself to formal truth, Meier investigates the realms of epistemic, aesthetic, and historic truths, of horizons, and prejudices. Kant used both Meier's Vernunftlehre and its Auszug for about forty years (...) in his logic-lectures. Kant's Logik, and also his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, were thus strongly influenced by Meier. (shrink)

This paper considers philosophical approaches that are relevant to the intertwinement of logic, metaphysics, and psychology proposed by the Aquinas commentator Tommaso de Vio Cardinal Cajetan, the humanist Petrus Ramus, the pure Aristotelian Cornelius Martini, the Semi-Ramist Bartholomaeus Keckermann, and the lexicographer Rudolf Goclenius. Mostly, however, it is about Ramus and his followers, the Ramists, because of the role they played in exacerbating a discussion on the constitution of objectivity during the Renaissance that was to have an impact on Cartesian (...) andpost-Cartesian theories of subjectivity. Finally, keeping in mind that Kant was familiar with the secunda Petri, i.e., with the second part of Ramus's logic, namely the theory of judgment, some common ground is recognizable between Ramus and Kant as well. (shrink)

A mistaken interpretation of Kant as an intellectual property advocate.

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 109 Heft: 1 Seiten: 185-188.

This book collects nine papers on Kant’s philosophical theology written between 1975 and 1992 by Aloysius Winter, who teaches fundamental theology and philosophy of religion at Fulda’s Catholic Theological Faculty. Its object is clear and important. It aims at presenting a different reading of several Kantian texts in order to refute the common interpretation of Kant as an agnostic and highlight instead an overall theological orientation of his philosophy. As remarked by Norbert Hinske in his foreword to this volume, Winter (...) has been looking for “another Kant,” which eventually turns out to be the more authentic one. Indeed, Kant had been considered by most Catholic thinkers to be despicable, momentous, and dangerous. A wholesale evaluation took place that began with the two volumes of Benedikt Sattler’s Antikant, which appeared in 1788, and was sealed by the insertion of the Critique of Pure Reason in the Index librorum prohibitorum in 1827. The reason for this rejection, argues Winter, probably lies in certain formulations of the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason that superficial readers may have regarded as offensive. However, this is not enough, says Winter, to dismiss a philosopher at once. In fact, Kant offers a number of positive suggestions and reflections that can, especially today, be of great help also to Catholic theology. The first essay deals with Kant and the confessions. One should not forget the cautious Renaissance of Kant’s transcendental philosophy initiated in the first half of the twentieth century by Joseph Maréchal, Emmerich Coreth, Bernard Lonergan, Johannes B. Lotz, André Marc, and Karl Rahner. It is true that Kant understood himself first and foremost as a scholar of “rational religion,” by this implying the legitimacy of his taking distance from all confessions, and it is also true that Kant’s positions on free will and God’s grace can be considered pelagian. Yet, this is Winter’s point, the fact of the matter is not so simple. We should rather remember that Kant, when dealing with free will, speaks only for the aspect of quoad nos, and that he does not deny that effects of grace could precede our efforts. The second essay proposes a reconstruction of the theological sources Kant was acquainted with from his student years to his mature age. The third essay deals with Kant’s elaborations on prayer and mass. The forth delves into the soul seen as a problem of transcendental philosophy. The fifth investigates the proof of God’s existence from the standpoint of practical reason. The sixth essay reads the Critique of Judgment from the perspective of Kant’s philosophy of religion. The seventh, entitled “Transcendental Theology of Cognition,” is dedicated to theological receptions of Kant’s Critiques, first and foremost to Rahner’s understanding of transcendental theology as a systematic doctrine that makes use of the tools of transcendental philosophy and thematizes the a priori conditions the believer refers to by the cognition of important truth of faith. Finally, the eighth and ninth essays propose a list of the sources of Kant’s philosophy of religion from the history of theology and from religious literature. (shrink)

Bondeli starts his book with the following remark: “Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s philosophical viewpoint, with which he went public in 1800 in Jena, at the beginning of his academic teaching, is everything but presupposition-less. It is the result of a step by step appropriation, critique, and overcoming of Kant’s philosophy dating back ten years”. The goal of Bondeli’s book is to provide a new and comprehensive discussion of Hegel as a critical reader of Kant from 1790 to 1800. As is (...) well known, Hegel scholars are divided on this issue, particularly because we have no definite proof that Hegel ever read Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason before writing extensively about it in Faith and Knowledge, which appeared in 1802. Moreover, Bondeli reminds us that today it is still fairly common to characterize the foundation and methodology of new philosophical standpoints by referring to either Kant or Hegel. Also, many issues concerning the foundation of knowledge or of ethics can be identified as confrontations between Kantian or Hegelian positions. Bondeli shows, however, that there is a considerable deficit in Hegel’s arguments against Kant as we know them from Faith and Reason, the Encyclopedia, and the Lectures on History of Philosophy. In these texts Hegel deals with Kant from the rather hermetic standpoint of the system of absolute identity, while giving no proper charge to Kant but that of having remained within the realm of reflection. Bondeli tries to challenge this argumentative deficit of Hegel’s appropriation and critique of Kant by reconstructing its motives as well as the actual or the possible series of arguments. (shrink)

This book is a collection of essays, some of them unpublished, some of them published between 1986 and 1995. They represent Allison’s efforts to reply to the critiques he received on his books, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Given that the latter deals with Kant’s theoretical philosophy and the former with Kant’s practical philosophy, the book under review presents Allison’s interpretation of both Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophy as it had been clarified, developed, and applied in the (...) wave of dialectical discussions with his critics. Although the book is a collection of essays, its contents possess nonetheless a systematic unity and advance the discussion in a significant way. What gives systematic unity to the volume is Allison’s constant interest toward reconstructing the role played by the concept of spontaneity in Kant’s philosophy. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 110 Heft: 2 Seiten: 321-323.

This book is a revised dissertation defended at Cologne in 1997 under the direction of Klaus Düsing. It concentrates on the problem of idealism, that is on the question whether anything exists besides ourselves. It is a question as old as philosophy itself and for this reason the author takes the approach of the “history of the problems”. It is, however, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason which provides the axis around which this study rotates, because in it Kant succeeded in (...) formulating one of the most original answers to the question raised above, namely that yes, something exists besides ourselves, but this does not mean that we have to commit ourselves to the position of philosophical realism, which considers the existence of the external world beyond any doubt. Kant was clear in distinguishing between a critical investigation into the issue of idealism and a dogmatic acceptance of what he calls “metaphysical idealism,” adding that it is twofold, including Descartes’s skeptical or problematical idealism, that doubts about the existence of the external world, and Berkeley’s dogmatic idealism, that flatly denies it. Kant was not tender with metaphysical idealism. Heidemann quotes a salient passage from Kant’s Metaphysikvorlesung of Winter 1792/93, “[i]dealism is a kind of cancer in metaphysics that to date has been considered incurable”. (shrink)

Inhalt: K.-O. Apel: Vorwort - G. Calabro: Gesprach uber Hobbes mit Karl-Heinz Ilting - I. Grundfragen der praktischen Philosophie: H.-G. Gadamer: Die Gegenwart der sokratischen Frage in Aristoteles - P. Lorenzen: Politische Ethik - J. D'Hondt: Die Ethik und der Weltlauf - K.-O. Apel: Faktische Anerkennung oder einsehbar notwendige Anerkennung? - H. Schnadelbach: Rationalitat und Normativitat - F. W. Veauthier: Vom sozialen Verantwortungsapriori im phanomenologischen Denken - K. Lorenz: Der Antagonismus von Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit - P. Rohs: Moralische Praferenzen - (...) H. Hoppe: Normenbegrundung ohne naturalistischen Fehlschluss? - W. Kuhlmann: Solipsismus in Kants praktischer Philosophie und die Diskursethik - R. Maliandi: Anerkennung oder Argumentation? - L. H. Meyer: Anerkennung, Zumutbarkeit und Diskussion als praktische Prinzipien - A. Cortina: Substantielle Ethik oder wertfreie Verfahrensethik? - R. Zimmer: Der Selbstbezug des asthetischen Zeichens - II. Zur Geschichte der praktischen Philosophie: P. R. Franke: Zu einem Munzbildnis des Stoikers Chrysippos - V. Hosle: Recht und Geschichte bei Giambattista Vico - M. Riedel: Imputation der Handlung und Applikation des Sittengesetzes - A. Buha: Moral und Geschichte - C. Cesa: Zum Begriff des Praktischen bei Fichte - N. Bobbio: Hegel und das Recht - L. W. Beck: Reformation, Revolution und Restauration in Hegels politischer Philosophie - D. Losurdo: Moralisches Motiv und Primat der Politik bei Hegel - P. Becchi: Die Wurzeln der Ethik der Uberzeugung - R. Pozzo: 'Bourgeois' oder 'citoyen'? Zu Hegels Begriff der burgerlichen Gesellschaft - Die Veroffentlichungen K.-H. Iltings von P. Becchi - Personenregister - Sachregister. (shrink)

Die Geisteswissenschaften zu verstehen, was sie sind und was sie erreichen konnen, ist heute, hundert Jahre nach Diltheys Tod, eine genauso wichtige Aufgabe wie zu dessen Lebzeiten. Diltheys Argumente und seine Position einer umfassenden philosophischen Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften sind auch heute noch von Bedeutung. Seine Verteidigung der Autonomie der geistigen Welt angesichts der positivistischen Herrschaftsanspruche liefert wichtige Gesichtspunkte fur die Evaluierung geisteswissenschaftlicher Forschung. Zum 100. Todestag Diltheys zeigen zehn renommierte Forscher anhand zweier Themengebiete - 'Dilthey and Kant' sowie 'Dilthey and (...) Hermeneutics' - auf, wie Dilthey fur heutige Fragestellungen fruchtbar gemacht werden kann. Die deutsch- und englischsprachigen Beitrage sollen insbesondere jenen Wissenschaftlern dienen, die sich der methodischen Erneuerung der intellectual history, der Philosophie- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte sowie der Begriffsgeschichte verpflichtet haben. - Mit Beitragen von Benjamin D. Crowe, Annette Hilt, Theodore Kisiel, Rudolf A. Makkreel, Massimo Mezzanzanica, Jared A. Millson, Eric Sean Nelson, Frithjof Rodi, Maja Soboleva und Denis Thouard. (shrink)

Das Ziel der Begriffsgeschichte ist es, eine kritische und moglichst vollstandige Ubersicht uber den Bedeutungswandel von Begriffen durch die Jahrzehnte zu geben, so Gustav Teichmuller in der Vorrede zu seinen Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe. Ein solches Unterfangen bringt Uberlappungen mit der Terminologiegeschichte, der Wortgeschichte, der Problemgeschichte, der Ideengeschichte und der Sachgeschichte mit sich, denn alle diese Disziplinen untersuchen letztlich den philosophischen Diskurs und seine Wandlungen in der Zeit. Erst die Verdeutlichung ihrer geschichtlichen Wirksamkeit macht Begriffe fur die philosophische Reflexion (...) brauchbar und schafft den ausreichend begrundeten Ruckhalt fur ihre stringente Anwendung. Die Basis dafur bietet der lexikographische Ansatz des Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, das heute das grosste Repositorium von lemmatisierten Texten der Philosophie- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte ist. Der von Riccardo Pozzo und Marco Sgarbi herausgegebene Band gliedert sich in drei Teile, die sich mit den neuen Entwicklungen in der Methodologie der Geschichte der Philosophie im 21. Jahrhundert befassen. Wahrend der erste Teil die methodischen Aspekte von Begriffs-, Problem- und Ideengeschichte thematisiert und der zweite Teil die Anwendung dieser Methoden auf die neuen Informationstechnologien zeigt, enthalt der dritte und letzte Teil einige Beispiele, an denen die Notwendigkeit der Verschrankung zwischen Begriffs-, Problem- und Ideengeschichte deutlich wird. (shrink)

This paper looks into the relation between judgment and authority from the point of view of humanistic logic. It shows that the position of a domain of objects by a thinking subject endowed with authority is the preliminary condition of judgments which are not merely cognitive and include instead historical and cultural aspects. This lesson was disseminated in the work of Rudolph Agricola and Petrus Ramus. Too bad, however, too little attention has been given as yet to the vital role (...) played by the doctrine of the loci until Immanuel Kant. (shrink)

This book is about innovation, reflection and inclusion. Cultural innovation is something real that tops up social and technological innovation by providing the reflective society with spaces of exchange in which citizens engage in the process of sharing their experiences while appropriating common goods content. We are talking of public spaces such as universities, academies, libraries, museums, science-centres, but also of any place in which co-creation activities may occur. The argument starts with the need for new narratives in the history (...) of philosophy, which can be established through co-creation, the motor of cultural innovation. The result is redefining the history of philosophy in terms of a dialogical civilization by ensuring continuous translations, individual processes of reflection and collective processes of inclusion. Readers will grasp the effectiveness of the history of philosophy in societies that are inclusive, innovative and reflective. (shrink)

Philosophy is cosmopolitan and immune to the influence of the idea of nation; it does not depend on some specific linguistic heritage, and, anyway, tends to be in contrast to the various nationalisms. Nevertheless, in front of the crisis of the very idea of national identity, not only the Ueberweg dedicates an entire volume to the Italian philosophy of the Eighteenth century, but also he reconstructs it on a regional level, following the catchment areas of the single universities, academies and (...) scientific societies as a unit of measurement. The volume shows the usefulness of joining the approach of the philosophical history of philosophy, the traditional history of philosophy, together with the historical history of philosophy, according to the interdisciplinary method of survey developed by the history of ideas yesterday and by the intellectual history today. (shrink)