The target article addresses important empirical issues, but adopts a nonanalytic stance toward consciousness and presents the mentalistic view as a very radical position that rules out informational description of anything other than conscious mental states. A better mentalistic strategy is to show how the structure of some informational states is both constitutive of consciousness and necessary for psychological functions.
Dienes & Perner's target article constitutes a significant advance in thinking about implicit knowledge. However, it largely neglects processing details and thus the time scale of mental states realizing propositional attitudes. Considering real-time processing raises questions about the possible brevity of implicit representation, the nature of processes that generate explicit knowledge, and the points of view from which knowledge may be represented. Understanding the propositional attitude analysis in terms of momentary mental states points the way toward answering these questions.
The target article offers an intriguing hypothesis relating the content of phenomenal experience to a qualitative characteristic of information processing. This hypothesis, however, offers only an explanation of the of consciousness, not the – the experiencing agent remains mysterious. Their hypothesis about the unity of consciousness can be linked to an informational account of the agency or subjectivity of consciousness.
Glenberg 's rethinking of memory theory seems limited in its ability to handle abstract symbolic thought, the selective character of cognition, and the self. Glenberg 's framework can be elaborated by linking it with theoretical efforts concerned with cognitive development and ecological perception. These elaborations point to the role of memory in specifying the self as an active agent.