Levinas on the possibility and need for humanist ethics In Humanism of the Other, Emmanuel Levinas argues that it is not only possible but of the highest exigency to understand one's humanity through the humanity of others. In paperback for the first time, Levinas's work here is based in a new appreciation for ethics and takes new distances from phenomenology, idealism, and skepticism to rehabilitate humanism and restore its promises. Painfully aware of the long history of dehumanization that reached its (...) apotheosis in Hitler and Nazism, Levinas does not underestimate the difficulty of reconciling oneself with another. The humanity of the human, Levinas argues, is not discoverable through mathematics, rational metaphysics, or introspection. Rather, it is found in the recognition that the other person comes first, that the suffering and mortality of others are the obligations and morality of the self. (shrink)
This elevating pull of an ethics that can account for the relation of self and other without reducing either term is the central theme of these essays.
The reputation and influence of Emmanuel Levinas has grown powerfully. Well known in France in his lifetime, he has since his death become widely regarded as a major European moral philosopher profoundly shaped by his Jewish background. A pupil of Husserl and Heidegger, Levinas pioneered new forms of exegesis with his post-modern readings of the Talmud, and as an ethicist brought together religious and non-religious, Jewish and non-Jewish traditions of contemporary thought. Richard A. Cohen has written a book which uses (...) Levinas' work as its base but goes on to explore broader questions of interpretation in the context of text-based ethical thinking. Levinas' reorientation of philosophy is considered in critical contrast to alternative contemporary approaches such as those found in modern science, psychology, Nietzsche, Freud, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida and Ricoeur. Cohen explores a manner of philosophizing which he terms 'ethical exegesis'. (shrink)
Detailed exposition of the nine layers of signification of human mortality according to Emmanuel Levinas's phenomenological and ethical account of the meaning and role of death for the embodied human subject and its relations to other persons. Critical contrast to Martin Heidegger's alternative and hitherto more influential phenomenological-ontological conception, elaborated in "Being and Time", of mortality as Dasein's anxious and revelatory being-toward-death.
Is cybernetics good, bad, or indifferent? SherryTurkle enlists deconstructive theory to celebrate thecomputer age as the embodiment of difference. Nolonger just a theory, one can now live a virtual life. Within a differential but ontologically detachedfield of signifiers, one can construct and reconstructegos and environments from the bottom up andendlessly. Lucas Introna, in contrast, enlists theethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas to condemn thesame computer age for increasing the distance betweenflesh and blood people. Mediating the face-to-facerelation between real people, allowing and (...) encouragingcommunication at a distance, information technologywould alienate individuals from the social immediacyproductive of moral obligations and responsibilities. In this paper I argue against both of thesepositions, and for similar reasons. Turkle''scelebration and Introna''s condemnation of informationtechnology both depend, so I will argue, on the samemistaken meta-interpretation of it. Like Introna,however, but to achieve a different end, I will enlistLevinas''s ethical philosophy to make this case. (shrink)
Contemporary philosophers are increasingly turning to the work of Emmanuel Levinas to bring a consideration of ethics into their own thinking. As an exponent of the phenomenological tradition, Levinas ranks with Heidegger and Sartre; as a disciple of Husserl, he was one of the most independent and original interpreters, testifying to the fruitfulness of Husserl's phenomenology. In collecting almost all of Levinas's articles on Husserlian phenomenology, this volume gathers together a wealth of thoughtful exposition and interpretation by one of the (...) most important European philosophers of the twentieth century. Levinas's thought is relevant to a broad variety of disciplines and concerns. This volume serves as a reliable introduction for the beginning student, as well as satisfying the expert's more demanding and critical desire for insight into the complexities of Levinas's thought. (shrink)
This volume brings together a variety of scholars and intellectual disciplines from around the world and across academia. Differences of person, place, culture, history and expertise do not alienate but rather fructify the perspectives of the ongoing conversation of the politics of humanity. The latter is a struggle for justice, for human rights, to be sure, but also for the availability, sustainability and fair distribution of food, clothing, shelter, health care, culture and living environment, and all the concrete conditions necessary (...) to make political rights real and ensure they are flourishing. A politics of humanity therefore demands a humane justice, where everyone universally and each person singularly is accorded respect, where equality, liberty and solidarity intersect supportively. It is not despite differences but because of them that there is discourse, dialogue and conversation, and the aspirations of the present volume. Each author, each chapter raises insights and arguments, solicits a hearing, provokes questions and discussion, while not losing sight of their concrete conditions, the learning, dedication and sensitivity, the cooperation and collegiality that guide research, stimulates truth through constructive criticism, and makes justice possible and worthwhile, despite shortcomings and the great labors—of thought and action—that remain to be done. (shrink)
Contemporary philosophy realizes that time, like language and embodiment, is not an obstacle to truth and reality but one of its primary mediums. Time is dimensionality, past, present, future, and directionality, before and after. Politics has its own temporality. Conservatives aim to restore a selected past; progressives to create a better future; and authoritarians to reinforce the present status quo. In each case, however, the dominant temporal dimension is the future. Time, as Levinas has shown, is also inter-subjective, that is (...) to say, social, and as such also ethical. Hence, in some important sense politics is a struggle over time, a contention between its dimensions, to select a past, to close off a present, or to create a future. This helps us to better understand our contemporary political triangulation of liberalism, socialism and fascism. The peculiarity of fascist politics, and key to its negativity and viciousness, is that it rejects history altogether, past and future, preferring the frenzy of the moment, the violent delirium of immanence, to the short- and long-term responsibilities of justice, liberal or social. (shrink)
The present article argues: that to support the primary aim of Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, which is to establish the primacy of practical reason for religion, Kant elaborates and assigns to it a social ethics. Contrary to the tired adage that without religious foundation ethics must collapse, the reverse is actually the case: without ethical foundation religion must collapse, degenerating into dogmatism, superstition and fanaticism. To ground and concretize the link between ethics and religion Kant elaborates a (...) three layered “anthropology” of human sociality upon which religion builds its communities wherein holiness consists above all in the solidarity of ethical striving to achieve virtue for each and justice for all. Despite his good intentions, however, and independent of the question of the legitimacy of ethical religion, Kant fails in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone owing to the imposition of a debilitating formalism owing to an undiminished allegiance to the epistemological strictures and structures—the Transcendental Idealism—of the Critique of Pure Reason. (shrink)
This book is the collaborative response of engaged scholars from diverse countries and disciplines who are disturbed by the contemporary resurgence of anti-democratic movements and regimes throughout the world. These movements have manifest in vitriolic “nationalist” polemics, state-supported violence, and exclusionary anti-immigrant policies, less than a century after the rise and fall and horrific devastations of fascism in the early 20th century.
Levinas Faces Biblical Figures captures the drama of the encounter between a great philosopher and a text of primary importance. The book considers the ways in which Levinas's thoughts can open up the biblical text to requestioning, and how the biblical text can inform our reading of Levinas.
Alternative oppositions to “infinity” and “totality” are suggested, examined and shown to be inadequate by comparison to the sense of the opposition contained in title Totality and Infinity chosen by Levinas. Special attention is given to this opposition and the priority given to ethics in relation Kant’s distinction between understanding and reason and the priority given by Kant to ethics. The book’s title is further illuminated by means of its first sentence, and the first sentence is illuminated by means of (...) the book’s title. Special attention is given to explicating the nature and significance of the hitherto unnoticed “informal” fallacy contained in the first sentence. (shrink)
I argue against the work of simplifying and applying Levinas’s thought. Simplifying Levinas misses the point of the greatness of his thought, which is addressed to the most sophisticated philosophical thinkers of his day, and calls upon them to re-ground philosophy in the ethical. Applying Levinas misses the point that Levinas’s conception of alterity is perfectly concrete, because it is linked to morality through the mortality of the other.
This chapter aims to awaken awareness of and appreciation for the root of intelligibility in moral responsibility. It understands moral responsibility as beginning in the singularizing response of me, I, myself, to the vulnerability and suffering of you, the other person, the singular other, as a being for-the-other before being for-oneself, as a disinterestedness before self-interest—this “before” serving also as the root significance of all priority, all value, the very importance of importance. It thereby defends a “cosmopolitanism,” the solidarity of (...) all humanity, oriented by such a priority, by moral responsibility, in contrast to the rapacious nihilist greed and self-interest promulgated by globalized capitalism and its governmental allies. To effect such awakening, the chapter illustrates the character and priority of moral responsibility by invoking and commenting upon selected passages from Vasily Grossman, Aristotle, Antonio Gramsci, Heinrich Heine, Herman Melville, Emmanuel Levinas and Socrates. (shrink)
Plato’s two complaints in the Phaedrus about the new technology of writing, namely, that reliance upon it leads to forgetfulness and fosters intellectual misunderstanding, which are here taken equally to be relevant. Possible complaints about contemporary information technology, are examined and assessed, in themselves and in relation to Jewish rabbinic exegetical tradition and in relation to Immanuel Kant’s positive claims for text based religions in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone.
Alternative oppositions to “infinity” and “totality” are suggested, examined and shown to be inadequate by comparison to the sense of the opposition contained in title Totality and Infinity chosen by Levinas. Special attention is given to this opposition and the priority given to ethics in relation Kant’s distinction between understanding and reason and the priority given by Kant to ethics. The book’s title is further illuminated by means of its first sentence, and the first sentence is illuminated by means of (...) the book’s title. Special attention is given to explicating the nature and significance of the hitherto unnoticed “informal” fallacy contained in the first sentence. (shrink)
Chapter 7 of my book, Ethics, Exegesis, and Philosophy: Interpretation after Levinas, entitled “Humanism and the Rights of Exegesis,” was devoted to elaboratingthe notion of “ethical exegesis.” The notion of ethical exegesis is not only inspired by Levinas’s thought, but expresses the essential character of it, its “method,” as it were, the “saying” of its “said.” Accordingly, here I will begin by reviewing some of what I have already said about ethical exegesis, and then I will develop this notion further (...) in relation to Plato and to the question of moralizing. (shrink)
Chapter 7 of my book, Ethics, Exegesis, and Philosophy: Interpretation after Levinas, entitled “Humanism and the Rights of Exegesis,” was devoted to elaboratingthe notion of “ethical exegesis.” The notion of ethical exegesis is not only inspired by Levinas’s thought, but expresses the essential character of it, its “method,” as it were, the “saying” of its “said.” Accordingly, here I will begin by reviewing some of what I have already said about ethical exegesis, and then I will develop this notion further (...) in relation to Plato and to the question of moralizing. (shrink)
In many ways the whole of contemporary thought reduces to the search for new middle terms, such as 'desire', 'will to power', 'language', and "difference', to mediate, displace, or evade the classical philosophical dualisms, such as being and nonbeing, ideality and reality, mind and matter, is and ought. These dualisms--set up by the ancients, pursued by the moderns, and bequeathed to us contemporaries by their failures--are Kearney's target. His aim is to overcome them through the notion of figuration. This term--as (...) well as the book's title--suggests an aesthetic orientation, but it is quite deliberately conceived as no mere substitute for the term 'imagination'. While Kearney does argue that the distinction between the imaginary and the real is a distinction ultimately of greater significance than the distinction between being and nonbeing, he also shows that the imaginary, classically conceived, has always taken second place to the real, and thus has always reproduced rather than overcome the insupportable difficulties of classical metaphysics. Figuration, by contrast, is not to be conceived in opposition to the real, but as a "comprehensive creativity," determining all fields of signification, such as the aesthetic, practical, ontological and ethical. It must be understood functionally, as the activity of an "always new ludic metamorphosis," the reciprocal play of new and old. Thus, like Merleau-Ponty's notion of "the flesh," it has great plasticity and at the same time yields specific insights. (shrink)