6 found
Richard A. Moran [6]Richard Atkinson Moran [1]
See also
Profile: Richard Moran (Harvard University)
  1. Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard A. Moran - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
    Since Socrates, and through Descartes to the present day, the problems of self-knowledge have been central to philosophy's understanding of itself. Today the idea of ''first-person authority''--the claim of a distinctive relation each person has toward his or her own mental life--has been challenged from a number of directions, to the point where many doubt the person bears any distinctive relation to his or her own mental life, let alone a privileged one. In Authority and Estrangement, Richard Moran argues for (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   172 citations  
  2. Responses to O'Brien and Shoemaker.Richard A. Moran - 2003 - European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):402-19.
  3. Self-Knowledge: Discovery, Resolution, and Undoing.Richard A. Moran - 1997 - European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):141-61.
    remarks some lessons about self-knowledge (and some other self-relations) as well as use them to throw some light on what might seem to be a fairly distant area of philosophy, namely, Sartre's view of the person as of a divided nature, divided between what he calls the self-as-facticity and the self-as-transcendence. I hope it will become clear that there is not just perversity on my part in bringing together Wittgenstein and the last great Cartesian. One specific connection that will occupy (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  4. Making Up Your Mind: Self-Interpretation and Self-Constitution.Richard A. Moran - 1988 - Ratio 1 (2):135-51.
  5.  78
    Interpretation Theory and the First-Person.Richard A. Moran - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):154-73.
  6.  78
    The Authority of Self-Consciousness.Richard A. Moran - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):174-200.
    central to virtually all contemporary thinking on self-consciousness and first-person authority. And a good measure of its importance has been not only as an evolving philosophical account of these phenomena, but also as a model of an account that places the capacity for specifically first-person awareness of one's mental states at the center of what it is to be a subject of mental states in the first place. For not every philosophical account of introspection will take its specifically first-person features (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   3 citations